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This study seeks to capture the identity of a hitherto unknown genre,
to chart its development and to assess its significance. It has been
called querelle to indicate that arms and letters are "quarrelling":
over privileges and titles of greater nobility and utility. Arms and
letters can signify the military and literary professions, the men who
practise them, the tools and methods peculiar to either, the virtues
necessary for or inherent in them, their aims, and the type of life
they secure. The genre was particularly popular in the second half of
the l6th cent., but first manifested itself at the end of the 15th.
Its origins however can be traced back to the 12th cent., amongst Ro¬
man lawyers, in the querelle of Knights and Doctors, which sought to
establish, from the Corpus juris, the rights of precedence of knights
(milites) and doctors of law. The genre developed as follows. 1_. 12th
and 13th cent. First stirrings of the querelle of Knights and Doctors
in legal glosses. 2_ The querelle takes shape at the hands-of the Com¬
mentators. During this and the preceding stage no independent works
are produced on the subject, except for a lecture given at Vercelli
in 13^0. 3_ Early 15th cent. The querelle of Knights and Doctors has
become so well known, that it inspires the works of non-lawyers, which
however remain isolated phenomena at the margins of the genre. Pu¬
blication of Ilicino's commentary to Petrarch's Trionfi (1^75)» which
contains the first version of the querelle of Arms and Letters. Ilici-
no borrowed the idea of the querelle from the Roman lawyers, but
brought to the debate terms and notions from his own Aristotelian-
Scholastic background, which left an indelible mark on the genre. The
popularity of Ilicino's commentary made his querelle known all over
Italy. 5. The popularity of Ilicino's querelle prompted Roman lawyers
to "counterattack" and publish "authorized" versions of the genre-: the
only independent works ever contributed to the querelle of Knights and
Doctors. As a literary phenomenon however it proved no match for the
querelle of Arms and Letters, and it was confined once again to legal
commentaries. But it did continue to be debated by lawyers until the
17th cent., and also to provide inspiration for the querelle of Arms
and Letters. _6. End 15th-early l6th cent. Initial phase of the querel¬
le of Arms and Letters: in southern Italy, and at the hands of philo¬
sopher-physicians like Ilicino. This was the liveliest phase of the
querelle. 7. With the publication of a dialogue by Brucioli (1529)5
which is a plagiarism of an earlier work, the genre enters its most
productive, but least innovative phase. It becomes a literary enter¬
tainment in the vernacular, and mostly in dialogue form. In the se¬
cond half of the l6th cent, a dozen works are written on the subject,
but they only differ from one another in their mode of presentation.
To what extent the querelle reflects a social reality is still un¬
clear. Disputes about precedence were taking place throughout these
centuries, but it is hard to gauge their seriousness and the identity
of those involved. The knights may have been no more than dubbed mer¬
chants, and the conflict therefore more a clash of professional inte¬
rests than of actual classes. Behind the querelle of Arms and Letters
in southern Italy, one can sense a real antagonism between a military
aristocracy contemptuous of letters and men who strongly believe in
the value of learning. With the passing of time (and the return of
the genre to northern Italy), a reconciliation seems to take place
between the contending parties, but the relations may not always
have been as friendly as they were made out to be.
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INTRODUCTION
The research for this thesis was sparked off
by Castiglione's Cortegiano. Arms and letters are the
chief requirements of an ideal courtier, the two discipli¬
nes he must master "piu che mediocremente", but the spea¬
kers are in some doubt as to which of the two should be
his main profession. Is his first duty to serve his prince
with the sword on the battlefield or with the pen in the
council-chamber? Should he put more effort into impressing
ladies with his valour in jousts and tournaments, or into
charming them with his learned conversation in the parlour?
In short, what is to be his primary raison d'etre, war or
peace? This is one of the very first problems with which
the speakers concern themselves, and they continue to de¬
bate it, in one way or another, until the very last.
Given the importance of this problem in the
fabric of the work, it is somewhat surprising that, in
chapters 45 and 46 of book I, where the speakers are ar¬
guing about the relative superiority of arms and letters
and their relationship to one another (are letters to be
held an "ornamento dell'arme", or arms an "ornamento del-
le lettere"?), they should seem so keen to change the
subject as quickly as possible. No sooner have they begun
to discuss it than Ludovico da Canossa says: "omai si e
parlato a bastanza", to which Ludovico Pio replies: "anzi
troppo", and everyone agrees. But although the question
will not again be broached from that angle, the problem
of arms and letters and of the courtier's two professions
will continue to receive much of the speakers' attention
throughout the rest of the work.
One is bound to deduce from this that Casti-
glione considered these two chapters as slightly irrele¬
vant to the major theme of his work, that in his mind the
"disputazione lungamente agitata da omini sapientissimi",
which set arms and letters against one another, was a
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different matter from discussions about reconciling them,
about combining military and literary values, which is
what the Cortegiano is primarily about. This is an assump¬
tion which was first made many years ago by Yittorio Cian.
In his edition of the Cortegiano, he detached these two
chapters, as it were, from the body of the text by iden¬
tifying their contents as a contribution to a specific
and age-old literary topos, and by therefore implicitxly
regarding them as distinct from other discussions about
arms and letters in the work. "Questa della preferenza da
darsi alle armi o alle lettere - Cian wrote - e una delle
tante questioni oziose (come quella sulla nobilta, sulla
preminenza dell'uomo sopra la donna ecc.) che, a partire
dall'antichita, e durante il Rinascimento, furono tratta-
te e agitate con un interesse e un ardore polemico, che
noi oggi difficilmente riusciamo a spiegarci." Cian's con¬
tention has met with both approval and disapproval amongst
scholars, but to this very day it has gone unverified, and
chapters 45 and b6 of the first book of the Cortegiano
have remained somewhat of a mystery. As recently as 1978,
J.R. Woodhouse commented that "the arguments for and
against qualities of military, as opposed to literary,
excellence, were hotly debated during the Renaissance.
Cian has a list of minor treatises where the debate flou¬
rished, as well as quotations from the Classics and from
Castiglione's contemporaries, to show the importance of
the topic. It is perhaps, then, extraordinary that Casti-
glione devotes only two brief chapters to the subject."
To me, it seemed even more extraordinary that Castiglione
should devote only two brief chapters to the subject, when
arms and letters are so crucial to the dialectic of the
Cortegiano (there is no reason, really, why he should have
dwelt on it at greater length, simply because it was "ho¬
tly debated" at the time). Clearly this was a point which
demanded further investigation. Did the topos Cian claimed
to recognize in these two chapters really exist, I asked
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myself, and did its roots really stretch back as far as
antiquity? And was it really as otiose as Cian would have
us believe?
As Woodhouse points out, Cian listed a series
of other works of the period confronting arms and letters.
This was an obvious lead to follow, and I decided to read
these texts (which few other people seemed to have done),
in order to find out what they had in common and whether
they did constitute a distinctive and identifiable genre.
I discovered that they did: that many of the arguments re¬
appeared in work after work, and that many of the works
were written in response to other works. This prompted me
to search for more evidence. Some was readily at hand
(listed for instance in Ruth Kelso's Doctrine of the En¬
glish Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century, or contained in
Eugenio C-arin's La disputa dell e arti nel Quattrocento) ,
but some it took much time and effort to discover (in par¬
ticular Lapo da Castiglionchio's Comparatio inter rem mi-
litarem et studia literarum, Tommaso Beccadelli's Disputa-
tione de precedentia, the anonymous "Florentine" commenta¬
ry to Petrarch's Trionfi, and Luca Prassicio's Impugnatio
contra Augustinum Niphum). This extra evidence confirmed
the existence of a definite genre with a recognizable i-
dentity, and since it existed, I decided that it had to
be given a name. I chose to call it the "querelle" of Arms
and Letters. "Querelle", I felt, would best single it out
for what it was. To call it "debate" for instance, would
not have been precise enough and would not have distin¬
guished it from other pronouncements made on the subject
of arms and letters during the Renaissance (like the type
of discussion we find in the Cortegiano, precisely, on the
educational desirability of combining military and litera¬
ry qualifications). "Querelle", on the other hand, suggests
that arms and letters are pitted against one another, that
they are "quarrelling". And that is what the genre is about.
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It pictures a clash of interests, not a reconciliation,
and although the clash may sometimes be resolved in an
act of reconciliation, on the whole arms are vying with
letters, men-of-arms competing with men-of-letters for
greater privileges and to be recognized as more noble. By
describing the genre as a "querelle", my intention was
also to evoke reminiscences of other genres of a similar
nature and equally popular at the time, which usually
go by the name of "querelle" as well: the querelle des
femes and the querelle des anciens et des modernes . Just
as these sought to establish whether women were inferior,
equal or superior to men, and whether the moderns were in¬
ferior, equal or superior to the ancients, so our querelle
aims to find out the same thing about arms in relation to
letters and letters in relation to arms.
The task I set myself was to read and inter¬
pret the texts, to discover as much as possible about them
and their authors, to establish links between them, and
thus to define and chart the development of the genre. I
would venture, with all due respect, to compare my work
to that of an archaeologist. I continued "excavations"
begun, but left unfinished, by others. I tried to bring
new evidence to light, so as to compare it with material
unearthed many years ago, and I then attempted to explain
the significance of the discoveries. But I am only too
aware that my thesis is no more than a preliminary report
and that much work remains to be done. From now on however
the progress is likely to be much slower. The available e-
vidence suggests that the genre was extremely popular, far
more popular in fact than we are able at this stage to as¬
certain, but it provides few clues for further research.
It is like an incomplete jig-saw puzzle: the gaps are a
good sign in that they certify the existence of more evi¬
dence. But they are also a frustrating reminder of how
that evidence is still missing. This does not prevent us
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however from gathering a clear enough impression of how
the genre developed and what it was.
Amongst the works listed by Cian and Kelso,
most are about arms and letters, but a few are about
knights and doctors (of law). At first the two groups
seemed rather strange bedfellows, until it emerged that
it was from the querelle of Knights and Doctors (as I de¬
cided to call it) that the querelle of Arms and Letters
originally sprang. Roman lawyers at Bologna, from at least
the early thirteenth century, had been discussing the res¬
pective rights of precedence of knights and doctors, and
gathering evidence from Justinian's Corpus juris to prove
their points. The issue remained a favourite topic for de¬
bate with their successors until well into the seventeenth
century, but having been set at the very beginning its
terms were never really altered. It was a debate carried
on by experts at universities, and each generation handed
down to the next what it had inherited from its predece¬
ssors. But the very popularity of the querelle of Knights
and Doctors in schools of law, together perhaps with the
frequent disputes about precedence arising beyond the walls
of academe, made it well known even to the non-initiate.
Authors who were not lawyers or academics referred to it or
quoted from it in their works, and a couple of them, in the
early fifteenth century, composed entire works inspired by
it: Lapo da Castiglionchio his Comparatio inter rem milita-
rem et studia literarum and Flavio Biondo the Borsus. These
two works were an original departure from what by then had
become a rather stifled tradition, but they remained isola¬
ted phenomena at the margins of the genre. They did not
set any new trend. A few years later however someone did
set a new trend. It was the physician-philosopher Bernardo
Ilicino, in the monumental commentary to Petrarch's Trion-
fi , which he wrote in the li+60s and was first published in
lU75. Borrowing the idea of the querelle from the Roman
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lawyers "but using terms and methods of his own trade,
and taking as a pretext Petrarch's presentation of fa¬
mous warriors and philosophers of antiquity (warriors on
the right-hand side of Lady Fame, philosophers on her
left), Ilicino produced the first version of what was to
become a new genre: the querelle of Arms and Letters. I-
licino's commentary was enormously popular: for the next
half century it was re-printed on average once every two
years. As a result his querelle "became known all over I-
taly, and its influence was such, that it not only esta¬
blished a new genre. It also prompted the publication of
independent works on the querelle of Knights and Doctors,
which until then had always remained confined to glosses
and commentaries of the Corpus juris. But as a literary
phenomenon knights and doctors proved no match for arms
and letters, and before long the legal querelle was re¬
turned to its original abode, whilst its offspring pros¬
pered and multiplied. In its initial stage, the querelle
of Arms and Letters was a learned affair. Like the que¬
relle of Knights and Doctors, though unlike Ilicino's,
it was written in Latin. It was however debated witn much
passion, against a vivid social background, which emerges
clearly from between the lines of the texts. The back¬
ground was that of the Kingdom of Naples at the turn of
the fifteenth century. By the early decades of the six¬
teenth century however, as the genre gained in popularity,
it lost the liveliness of its early phase; and by the se¬
cond half of the century, when it was at its most popular,
it had become set in its ways: usually in dialogue form,
always in the vernacular, and mostly as a literary enter¬
tainment which was more a reflection of itself than it
was of any particular social environment. Variations upon
the theme were still being composed at the beginning of
the seventeenth century, although by then the genre seems
on the whole to have run its course.
In my first chapter, I look at the querelle
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of Knights and Doctors, and in order to impress it upon
the reader's mind, I begin with its most original con¬
tribution: T omnia so Beccadelli's Disputatione de prece¬
dent ia of 1489 which, because of its encomiastic nature
(it was written for and in praise of the Bentivoglio of
Bologna), is the only work in this tradition with some
literary polish to it and the only work enlivened by a
kind of narrative, as well as being the only work written
on the subject in Italian and in verse. I then perform a
"flash-back" to trace the origins of the genre amongst
the Glossators of Bologna in the twelfth century, where¬
upon I follow its development through the centuries,
back to Tommaso Beccadelli and beyond. In chapter two I
investigate what happened at the margins of the querelle
of Knights and Doctors during the early decades of the
fifteenth century, showing how the querelle was known be¬
yond strictly legal circles and how it also inspired "out¬
siders" to write on the subject, but how at the same time
it tended almost inevitably to undergo a metamorphosis
once it had been released of its bonds with the corpus of
Roman law. Chapter three tells of the birth of the querel¬
le of Arms and Letters in Ilicino's commentary to Petrarch's
Trionfi, and of the following Ilicino had amongst fellow
physicians of his in the south of Italy. Chapter four is a
survey of the genre during its vernacular and most popular,
but least innovative phase. Here again I juggle with chro¬
nology. I begin with Antonio Brucioli's Dialogo della pre-
minentla dell'armi et delle lettere, written in the 1520s,
and then I jump forward one hundred years, to present Isa¬
bella Andreini's Amoroso contrasto sopra le armi e le let¬
tere. This is to show how very little things had changed
in the course of a century, how repetitive the tradition
had become. In the closing section of the chapter I then
fill in the gap between Brucioli and Andreini. In my final
chapter I attempt to gauge the significance of the querel¬
le, in social and cultural terms, and I make various sugges¬
tions for further research.
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My subject is neither entirely literary, nor
really historical. It can best be classified perhaps as a
history of ideas. The notion may be somewhat out of fashion,
but I believe that the present thesis will show how certain
ideas, once brought into being (under the stimulus of parti¬
cular social, political and cultural events), do take on a
life of their own, as it were, and can continue to exist
for decades and even centuries on end, regardless almost of
changing historical circumstances. It would however be pre¬
posterous to claim that ideas can be totally independent of
men. Like the notes of a symphony without musicians, they
would be naught but for the individuals who express them.
That is why T have tried to provide what information I
could on the authors who wrote the texts and the circum¬
stances under which they were written. On some authors
(like Lapo da Castiglionchio and Galateo) much more infor¬
mation was available than on others (like, say, Beccadelli);
some (like Flavio Biondo) I felt were sufficiently well
known already not to require any biographical presentation.
And in chapter four, which is a survey rather than a de¬
tailed analysis like the other chapters, and because of
the very repetitive nature of the querelle at this stage,
where it seems to have been born more of literary prece¬
dent than of personal circumstances, I did not believe it
was necessary to give that much emphasis to the identity
of the authors. For these reasons there may appear to be
an imbalance between some parts of my text and others.
This is also due to the impossibility of covering in equal
and consistent detail a span of three centuries and more
(my earliest text is Homodeis's Quaestio of 13^0, although
I attempt to go even further back in time, to the early
days of the Bologna school of Roman law, and my last text
is Isabella Andreini's Amoroso contrasto of 1625). It
could be argued, I suppose, that I need not have encom¬
passed such a vast period and that I could have focused
more fruitfully on a smaller number of texts, but, as was
pointed out to me, I suffer from that incurable disease
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which is not uncommon amongst scholars, la maladie des ori-
gines. The first texts upon which my gaze fell were all of
the sixteenth century, and they inevitably compelled me to
enquire where it all came from and how it had all begun.
But I am firmly of the opinion that these are important
questions. One would be ill-advised to pass judgement on a
particular literary phenomenon in any given period, without
having first ascertained whether and how it was peculiar to
that period, and this naturally means to investigate its
prehistory. The querelle of Arms and Letters during the
latter part of the sixteenth century could seem like the
expression of a heated social conflict, but it lo/ses much
of its bite when many of its arguments are seen to be sim¬
ple replays of arguments first expressed decades if not
centuries earlier.
This study, then, covers the fourteenth, fif¬
teenth and sixteenth centuries. I refer to these centuries
as the Renaissance, but I use the expression as a value-
free notion, implying neither condemnation nor approval,
and not intended to distinguish one period from another in
other than chronological terms. I use it simply as practi¬
cal shorthand to describe roughly those centuries which in
any case, and for better or for worse, have come to be
known as the Renaissance. The querelle could, if one so
wished, help in a redefinition of the concept of the Re¬
naissance, but that is not the purpose of my thesis. It
is the querelle itself, with its inner logic and develop¬
ment, which matters and is under investigation, not, or
only incidentally, an historical concept.
Most of the texts which are the subject of
this thesis survive today in more forms.than one: either in
various manuscripts, or in several printed editions, or in
a combination of manuscripts and printed editions. I have
attempted to collate as much of the evidence as possible,
in order to gather as accurate a picture as possible and
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to provide quotations, which are as reliable as possible.
But my aim was not to edit texts, since I was not philo-
logically equipped to do so.. The readings I offer there¬
fore are "more the result of empirical induction than of
strict scientific deduction. However, in order to avoid
the charge of arbitrariness, I have always listed variants
and provided any other data which would allow the reader
to reach his own informed opinion. I have left the spelling
of the originals untouched, but so as to avoid cumbersome
and unsightly quotations, I have not included a sic between
square brackets every time the old spelling differs from
today's (e.g. commune instead of comune). I only use a sic
in cases where the original is blatantly incorrect (e.g.
sine for sive). Punctuation on the other hand I have mo¬
dernized, as well as the use of accents, always seeking to
provide quotations which are as readable yet as accurate
as could be. These remarks apply in particular to Appendix
I (ilicino's version of the querelle), which should not be
judged as an edition, but simply as an aid to a better un¬
derstanding of my argument. My reasons for including it,
are its importance in the history of the querelle, its con¬
ciseness, which makes it a handy introduction to the gen¬
re, and the fact that the edition through which it has been
made available to the modern reading public (Garin's edi¬
tion in La disputa delle arti) is quite misleading, having
been drastically abridged. It would be quite impossible
for anyone to make sense of what I say on the basis of the
text provided by Garin.
The appendix, together with the notes and the
bibliography, as will have been noticed, are in a separate
volume. It was felt that this would be the most practical
solution, since many of the notes are too long to fit at
the bottom of the page and too unwieldy to be included at
the end of each chapter. I have tried to make the notes as
simple as possible. I have reduced the number of abbrevia¬
tions such as op.cit. and ibid, to the bare minimum, en-
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suring that when they are used, there could be no diffi¬
culty in identifying what they are meant to refer to; and
what they refer to is never more than one note away, unless
otherwise indicated. On the whole however I have preferred
to spell out the name of the author and of the work to which
reference is being made, even if it meant repeating the same
thing at short intervals. Complete bibliographical informa¬
tion for secondary material (full title, publisher, date and
place of publication) has been restricted to the actual bi¬
bliography; in the notes only as much information has been
provided (usually author and beginning of title) as is ne¬
cessary to locate any particular work in the bibliography
without difficulty. All cross-references in the notes, un¬
less otherwise indicated, are always to other notes within
the same chapter. As regards the bibliography, I should
like to explain my departure from the normal typographical
practice of italicizing not the title of an article but of
the journal in which it is published. A bibliography should
be a handy reference tool supplying details in the first
place and at first sight of what a particular work is about;
where it is published is ancillary information which only
becomes relevant once one has decided that one is actually
interested in reading that work. One can then pause to
find out more about it, but there is nothing more distrac¬
ting, to my mind, than flicking through a bibliography and
constantly having one's attention drawn (for italicized
words inevitably attract one's attention) to the names of
journals of whose existence one knows already. The prac¬
tice can be still more confusing, when articles and books
have not been kept apart and one is driven cross-eyed from
trying to figure out what is what. To avoid this happening,
I have both separated articles from books in my bibliogra¬
phy and italicized the titles of articles. The titles of
journals are given between double quotation marks. I have
also included amongst the articles those articles which
are not published in actual journals but in Fe st s chriften
or similar works, as well as individual chapters or sec-
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tions of particular works, when it was those chapters or
sections I wished to bring to the reader's notice. But so
that there could be no problem in locating an article, I
adopted the following procedure:- if it is published in a
journal, its italicized title is followed immediately by
the name of the journal between double quotation marks.
If it is published in a book, its italicized title is
followed by the title of the book between double quota¬
tion marks preceded by an 'in'. In my bibliography of o-
riginal works, I have adopted the same procedure, in ca¬
ses where I have concerned myself not with whole works
but with chapters or sections of works, of italicizing
such chapters and sections, and giving the title of the
complete work between double quotation marks preceded by
an 'in'. Most of the original works I studied have a com¬
plicated history of manuscripts and editions, too compli¬
cated to be included in the bibliography. I have there¬
fore listed only one edition for each work in the biblio¬
graphy (usually the first edition, or else the edition I
was able to get hold of), but in every instance I refer
back to the pages and notes where the complete and detai¬
led history of the work is explained. My aim was always
to make my thesis as simple and manageable to read as
po s sible.
Finally, I should like to express my gratitude
to all who gave me their assistance and valuable advice
while I was working on this thesis, in particular to my
supervisor, Professor C.P. Brand, to Professors Dupront
and Wilson of the European University Institute in Floren¬
ce, and Professor David Nolan of University College Dublin.
I am also grateful to Patricia Grogan for the typing she
did; and to my wife, without whose help I would never have
managed to bring the work to a satisfactory conclusion, I
am endebted beyond measure. The thesis is dedicated to her,
and to Alexia who, aged barely a year and a half, had to
learn to say "pee-aish-dee" and not to touch it.
15
Chapter I
THE QUERELLE OF KNIGHTS AND DOCTORS
A. Tommaso Beccadelli: Breve e bella disputatione de
precedentia intra el cavaliero, doctore et eonte.
"Volendo Giovanni Bentivogli che Annibale il
figliuolo riuscisse nel governo della repubblica huomo
pratico, egli lo fa creare confalloniere di giustitia; fu
il primo d£ di novembre, la domenica. II quale hebbe per
compagni gli infrascritti signori antiani, cioe: Bernardino
Gozzadini cavalliere, Petronio Zagni dottore , Alessandro
Buttrigari procuratore, il conte Galeazzo Pepoli, Domenico
da Viggiano notaro, Giovanni Polo da Castello, Agostino
Marsili et Ottaviano Fantucci. Fu in questo magistrato
accompagnato Annibale dal signor Giovanni il padre, dal
senato et da tutto il popolo con tanto fasto et honore quanto
altri fossero stati avanti a lui."^ The year was 1U89 and
Annibale only just 20, too young according to the city
statutes to become Gonfaloniere di Giustizia (the minimun
age was 21), but in the wake of the Malvezzi Conspiracy of
the preceding year the hold of the Bentivoglio over
Bologna was loosening and Giovanni II was anxious to
consolidate his family's power: therefore "fa creare"
Annibale, his eldest son, Standardbearer of Justice, i.e.
president of the Council of Elders (Anziani), which was
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the executive organ of government. As was the custom,
Annibale held office for two months, until the last day of
the year. On the eve of his "retirement" a book recounting
an episode which had occurred under his gonfalonierato and
in which he and his fellow Anziani had been involved, was
published in Bologna by Platone de Benedictis with a
dedication to Annibale: "ad Illustrem et Excellentem Dominum,
Dominum Hannibalem Bentivolum, Vicecomitem de Aragonia,
Dignissimum Bononiensis Iustitiae praesidem". The book was
entitled Breve e bella disputatione de precedentia intra el
cavaliero, doctore et conte and was the work of one little-
known Tommaso Beccadelli, a poet and notary who, it has
been claimed,was also Chancellor of the comune of Bologna,
but on whose life the only indication we seem to have is
that in 1^+75 he acted as a kind of master of ceremonies
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during two after-dinner performances given in Bologna
on the occasion of the wedding of Count Guido Pepoli
3
to a young countess from Modena. He was no doubt of the
same family as the famous Antonio Beccadelli Panormita,
but this does not tell us much about him.
The Pisputatione is a short ("breve") poem
of 529 verses written in t er z a rima. It is not of the
greatest literary value, and Beccadelli himself apologises
for not having succeeded in making it as bella as he
would have liked: "da la mia exigua rhyma/ - he says -
non aspectar facundia Mantuana:/ li nostri versi son de
pocha estima" (vv.91-3). But what Beccadelli was
writing in any case was not so much a work of art as a work
of propaganda. More than a quarter of the poem (l3*+ of
the 529 lines) is given over to superlative praises
of the Bentivoglio and venomous attacks on their enemies,
in the following vein:
0 ben consulto! 0 grandissimo scorno
de synagoghe e rabiose mente,
che glie facean cotal desegni intorno.
0 ben consulto a chi ha lo cor fervente
al stato Bentivoglio, a chi se trova
de la felice Sega bon servente
Questa fia degna e memorabil nova.
El se puo dir, ch'al tempo de Hannibale
el seclo de Saturno se rinova.
El se puo dir, che de profunda valle
ogn'homo sia venuto a chiara luce, ^
e drito a un bono e virtuoso calle (vv.73-8U).
The poem being so blatantly encomiastic and partisan, it
is perhaps not surprising that it should only have had,
as far as we can tell, a limited edition and scant
circulation. Only two copies of it are now extant, one
in Bologna and one in Modena, in the library of Annibale's
family-in-law, the Biblioteca Estense.^ But although
its publication may have passed largely unnoticed, it was
by no means a freak phenomenon. The subject it recounted
belonged to a well and long-established tradition: the
querelle of Knights and Doctors.
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The story of the Pisputatione is briefly
as follows. Annibale and his eight fellow Anziani are
sitting down to a meal together. Of the Anziani we must
remember the names of three in particular: Count Galeazzo
Pepoli , "ferma colona del gran Pepol seme, /de litterati
refugio e solazo,/.../ coniuncto del Falcone excelso e
magno" (vv. 116-19);^ Petronio Zagni, "doctor famoso e
maximo legista" (v. 122), and Bernardino Gozzadini,
"cavalier acorto" (v. 125). Pepoli and Gozzadini are
sitting on either side of the Gonfaloniere and Petronio
Zagni, feeling wronged, gets up to complain that the place
which by right should have gone to him is being usurped
by Gozzadini. Incensed, Gozzadini jumps to his feet and
accuses Zagni, who should know better, of having taken
leave of his senses; and, authorities in hand, he argues
that the knight must have precedence over the doctor.
Zagni is unimpressed and, taking up the challenge, he
retorts with more authorities still that it is the doctor
who must have precedence over the knight. But, he
concludes, "precedete, poi che non vel veda / la prava
abusion de questa Terra" (vv. 382-3). This only serves
to outrage Gozzadini even more, who refuses to accept
the lawyer's conclusions and threatens to appeal to the
Pope in Rome (the Pope, it must be remembered, was
the nominal overlord of Bologna, which was part of the
States of the Church). For the time being however they
patch up their differences and the episode ends happily.
The meal is over and "cum la Corona Bentivoglia, /
Hannibale, i Signuri se n'andorno / in camera de bona
e lieta voglia" (vv. U00-2). The poem itself though
does not end there, for the story is set within a kind
of cornice. At the beginning two fellow-citizens from
Bologna, Volsco and Demetrio, meet in Rome. Volsco asks
Demetrio whether he has any interesting news from home,
and Demetrio answers that he has just heard of an appeal
which is being made by certain bolognesi to the Papal
Court:
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Volsc< Che c'& di novo?
Demetrio: El c'evuna appellasone
che fano certi Bolognesi in Corte, g
a cui de Pietro tene el Confalone (vv. 7-9).*
Volsco wants to know more, so Demetrio tells him the details
of the story (as we have just seen it), which he interweaves
with those exuberant praises of the Bentivoglio. Having
explained the case, Demetrio then asks Yolsco for his
opinion on the matter. Volsco at first disclaims any
qualification to speak about it, but in the end.he gives
his support to the knight, especially - he adds - as
the knight in question is Bernardino Gozzadini:
el Gozadin e molto piu perfecto
che l'altri cavalier e de piu orgulio.
Intendo che, fra mille, el fu gia electo
in Milite dal Duca de Ferrara
pel piu prestante, generoso e accepto.
Questa fu cosa pretiosa e rara
e facta a la presentia de baruni
de li piu degni, ch'abia Italia chiara.
Questo fu al tempo de l'excesi duni ,
de le felice noze del Falcone, gfacti da tuti e principi ciascuni (vv.U28-38).
If a count however should also happen to be present, Volsco
says, he must have precedence not only over the doctor
but also over the knight, and all the more so if he happens
to be called Galeazzo Pepoli:
el Conte Galeazo, nobilissimo
de sangue e de fameglia. Che glie sia?
Che dice' tu de lui? no e'l dignissimo
sopra el doctor e l'equite predicto?
No e'l de piu excellentia e pit. amplissimo?
(vv. UU6-50).
He proves the superiority of the count with legal
references once again, before returning to the knight and
doctor and concluding the poem with a compromise solution
which gives precedence to doctors "in doctoreis" (v. 5'2l),
that is in circumstances and situations connected more
specifically with their own profession, and to knights
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"in gli loro" (v.522), i.e. in circumstances and situations
connected with their profession.
Petronio Zagni too had hinted at this
solution towards the end of his harangue (vv. 325-7), "but
the solution which he finally proposed was a compromise
of a different sort, which is weighted in favour of
doctors. According to Zagni, the first place is to go
to the doctor who is a member of the prince's entourage -
"qui a latere principis no e disciolto" (v. 3^+2) -, the
second to the knight who is in the same position -
"el milite che media / el principe col so sinistro
lato" (vv.3^3-^0 - , the third to the famous doctor who
does not belong to the prince's entourage - "el doctor
celebrato / qui non sit ad latus nec in corona / del
principe descripto e nominate "(vv.3^6-8) -, the fourth
to the simple knight - "el simplex miles" (v.3^9) -»
and the last to the doctorelli (v.350), with the
proviso that any of the latter, any iusconsulto (v.353)
who also happens to be knighted - "ornato de quel auro"
(v.353), a reference to the golden spurs which were part
of the insignia of a duly dubbed knight - must precede
the simple knights - militelli (v.352). Gozzadini for
his part had made no such distinctions. To him all
knights, whatever their description, are superior to any
doctor, whatever his position. Their superiority is
unquestionable: they have earned it through long and
devoted service to mankind. It is thanks to them that
the fatherland and its citizens are protected from
external and internal enemies, thanks to them that
morality is preserved. They, in short, are the purveyors
and guardians of civilization. Long live therefore the
golden spurs .'
Excelso Confalone e vui Signuri,
io credo che potiate haver inteso,
che la militia e prova in casi duri.
La dignita equestre e un grave peso,
de summa auctoritade e d'exercitio,
a le fatiche grande sempre acceso.
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Per quel s'acquista gloria e beneficio
d'imperio e de potente signoria,
de populi e de terre el gran servitio.
Per quel se guarda da la gente ria
la nostra Patria; i nostri citadini
godeno in pace cum la mente pia.
Per quel son descaciati l'assassini;
per quel, col nostro valoroso capo,
semo secur da soi pensier ferini.
Per quel fia expulso Saturnin e Gracho;
per quel destructi li seditiosi
fautur de giochi de Lenoni e Bacho.
Per quel vivemo netti da leprosi,
per quel usciti e mundi da letame,
per quel exempti da contagiosi.
Per quel portiamo le Palladie rame
in luocho de "baliste e de ronchoni ;
per quel frenate le sceleste braie.
Vivano adoncha l'aurati speroni (vv. 190-21U).
As evidence of the knights eminence Gozzadini adduces their
immunity from laws and statutes, in particular laws
regarding inheritance (knights may bequeath their
belongings as they please, without regard for normal
testamentary procedure), and the fact that all great lords,
all princes and emperors are wont to create themselves
knights. To this Zagni retorts that it is their ignorance
and lack of understanding of the law which entitle knights
to such exemptions. Yet he does not altogether dismiss
Gozzadini's arguments. He would agree that certain knights
do have rightful claimd to precedence, but in order to have
them recognized, these knights must satisfy one important
condition, and few contemporary knights any longer do so:
they must bear arms and they must have fought to defend
their fatherland and fellow-citizens. It is not sufficient
simply to have been girt with a sword and to be wearing a
torque (the other insignia, together with the golden spurs,
of ceremonial knighthood). Torquatus, says Zagni, may well
have adorned his neck with a torque. But he deserved it,
for it was a spoil of war, taken from a Gaul he himself had
defeated in battle."'""'" Today however any old Dick, Tom or
Harry demands precedence because he happens to be wearing
a worthless necklace:
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ma l'hodierna usanza e un grande fallo:
el se prepone per un vil cerchiello
(io dico el vero) Piero e Polo in ballo (vv.30^-6).
A necklace no more makes a .knight than a hood makes a
doctor:
un milite non fia per sol colana,
si como pel capuzo un doctorello (vv.308-9)•
So it is only the real knight in the lawyer's opinion,
who may have any justifiable claim to precedence. To
this real knight however the real doctor is not only equal
but superior; and the real doctor is he who "professa in
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scrana"(v.310) , the judge or teacher of law. In some
cases therefore some knights may be superior to some
doctors, but on the whole imost comtemporary {doctors are
superior to contempory knights, and in all events the
best of doctors is preferable to the best of knights.
To bolster their arguments both Gozzadini and
Petronio Zagni quote many legal authorities, but whereas
Zagni (he is of course the expert) gives references
to specific glosses or commentaries, Gozzadini limits
himself to dropping illustrious names: Julian, Ulpian,
13
Paul, Pampinian; Justinian, the "founding father" of
ll;
Roman law; and a host of Glossators and Commentators.
The only exception which Gozzadini makes is a very
specific but mysterious reference to Gratian."^ Zagni
on the other hand gives his sources in great detail. He
says that there are not as many sheep in the Marches as
there are authors, texts, commentaries and glosses which
give precedence to doctors; but he only names six of them,
and what is more he does a bit of cheating, for he mentions
the same person twice, once by his surname and once by
his Christian name,as though he were two different people.
He quotes the commentary of Baldus to the proem of the
Digest (vv.31^-20) , Angelo Aretino's commentary to the
first law "De testamento milit i s'r ( vv . 322-U ) , Alessandro
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Tartagni in his commentary to the law "De vulgari e
pupillar" (vv.325-7); and his pecking order he claims to
derive from Giovanni da Imola's commentary to the "Lex
centurio" (vv.338-5*0. The person he names twice is of
particular interest to us, for he is the author of a text
to which we shall shortly be directing our attention,
(see below chap. 1, section C). He is the fourteenth
century Milanese lawyer Signorelo de Homodeis: "Signorello"
(v.329) and "1'Hamodeo" (v.359). Alessandro Tartagni -
"el gran Tartagna" (v.520) - was a famous fifteenth
century jurist from Imola (1*123-4? - 1**77 ) , who taught
law at various universities in northern Italy and in
particular at Bologna from l46l to 1467, where he may well
have been Beccadelli's teacher, if indeed Becadelli did
study Law (which is a probability given his apparent
familiarity with legal texts) and if he studied it at
Bologna. Angelo Aretino, another famous fifteenth century
jurist who taught in many northern Italian universities
and occupied important positions in the administration
of several northern and central Italian cities, had been
Tartagni's teacher. Giovanni da Imola (d.l436) taught
Angelo Aretino and was the pupil of the famous Baldus
(1327 ?-l*+00 ) , who in turn was the colleague and former
pupil of the no less famous Bartolus (131*+ ?-13 5 7 ) ,
17Roman lawyers both of international fame.
Beccadelli thus takes us back to the very
hey-day of the Bologna Commentators , and through them to
the period of the Glossators (i.e. to the time when Roman
law was re-born in the West), and beyond that, via the
corpus of Roman law, to the late Roman Empire, when
Pampinian, Julian, Ulpian and Paul lived and were active.
He even goes as far back as the late Rebublic, with a
quotation from Cicero. But Cicero, who will have an
important part to play in the context of the Arms and
Letters querelle, in the Disputatione has but a minimal,
not to say negative function. His opinion is adduced by
Volsco to prove the superiority of knights, but because
Volsco in fact misquotes him (unless the error is a
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typographical one), what he ends up "by scoring is not a
point against the adversary hut an own-goal. The quotation
in from Pro Milone (10) and should correctly read:
"silent leges inter arma." But in the mouth of Volsco it
becomes:
ch'el doctor preceda, quell
Arma inter leges silent,
Questa e la propria e ve
a e una zanzaf
disse Tullio. ^g
ra hassadanza (vv.i+2U-6).
With his legal authorities Becadelli is luckily more at
ease. It is on them (going hack in time a few centuries)
that we must now focus our attention, for it is they, the
Glossators and Commentators of Justinian's Corpus iuris,
. • 19
who are the true originators of the querelle.
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B. The Glossators and Commentators.
Although feudalism during the Middle Ages
did not develop into as fully-fledged a system in Italy -
in northern Italy at least - as it did in other parts of
Europe, knighthood was nevertheless a social reality there
of some importance and knights a social group enjoying
considerable privileges, such for instance as immunity
20
from forced labour or exemption from certain taxes.
This was no secret to the early Roman lawyers of Bologna,
in the twelfth century, who were also aware of the fact
that, according to Roman law, the milites were a class with
just as many privileges, if not more. It was not long
therefore before they took to identifying the knights
their contempories with the mi1ites of Roman times.This
identification is still noticeable in Beccadelli's
Pisputatione, where cavalier and milite are
synonymous (see above p .20 ). The early Roman lawyers came
to realize furthermore that those whom the Corpus juris
recognised as milites were not simply those who served
the state in war but those too who served it in peace,
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and in particular lawyers (causidici or advocati) ;
and in the course of time they evolved the notion and
terminology of a twofold militia, the armata militia
and the inermis militia. Azone for instance, one of the
later Glossators, makes the following remarks in his
Summa institutionum:
imperator assignat duo tempora, unum bellorum et alterum
pacis. In tempore bellorum necessaria sunt ad summam
reipublicae tuitionem ista quatuor: arma, usus armorum,
victoria, triumphus. In tempore vero pacis necessaria
sunt quatuor similia: leges scilicet, usus legum,
calumniae pulsio, iuris religio. Ista ergo duo, arma et
leges, pariter debent esse in principe, et alterum semper
eguit alterius auxilio, et tarn militaris res legibus est
in tuto collocata, quam ipsae leges armorum praesidio
servatae sunt. ... et tanta gaudent similitudine pariter
et splendent utilitate, ut nomen armorum et nomina eorum,
qui ex:ercentur in armis, accommodentur legibus et legistis.
Leges ergo dicuntur arma, et Imperator legibus dicitur
armari,... et milites dicuntur advocati,..Est ergo militia
alia armata, alia inermis vel literata. 22
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Arms and laws are the two weapons of the emperor, the
two pillars of the state, each needing the support
of the other. Already in the Corpus iuris.do we find
the expression of such ideas, and in particular
through the very words of Justinian at the beginning
of the Institutes and the Code , where he justifies his
codification of the law and explains the importance
of laws to the emperor and the (Roman) state. These
passages are constantly referred to, not only in the
Knight and Doctor querelle,but also in the querelle of
Arms and Letters, and therefore they deserve to be
quoted in full. The proem to the Institutes reads as
follows:
imperatoriam maiestatem non solum armis decoratam,
sed etiam legibus oportet esse armatam, ut utrumque
tempus et bellorum et pacis recte possit gubernari et
princeps Romanus victor existat non solum in hostilibus
proeliis, sed etiam per legitimos tramites calumniantium
iniquitates expellens, et fiat tarn iuris religiosissimus
quam victis hostibus triumphator. Quorum utramque viam
cum summis vigiliis et summa providentia adnuente deo
perfecimus. et bellicos quidem sudores nostros barbaricae
gentes sub iuga nostra deductae cognoscunt et tarn Africa
quam aliae innumerosae provinciae post tanta temporum
spatia nostris victoriis a caelesti numine praestitis
iterum dicioni Romanae nostroque additae imperio
protestantur. omnes vero populi legibus iam a nobis
vel promulgatis vel compositis reguntur. Et cum
sacratissimas constitutiones antea confusas in luculentam
ereximus consonantiam, tunc nostram extendimus curam et ad
immensa prudentiae veteris volumina, et opus desperatum
quasi per medium profundum euntes caelesti favore iam
adimplevimus ... Summa itaque ope et alacri studio has
leges nostras accipite et vosmet ipsos sic eruditos
ostendite, ut spes vos pulcherrima foveat toto legitimo
opere perfecto posse etiam nostram rem publicam in
partibus eius vobis credendis gubernare. 23
And the introduction to the code begins as follows:
summa rei publicae tuitio de stirpe duarum rerum, armorum
atque legum veniens vimque suam exinde muniens felix
Romanorum genus omnibus anteponi nationibus omnibusque
dominari tarn praeteritis effecit temporibus quam deo
propitio in aeternum efficiet. istorum etenim alterum
alterius auxilio semper viguit, et tarn .militaris res
legibus in tuto collocata est, quam ipsae leges armorum
praesidio servatae sunt. merito igitur ad prima communium
rerum sustentationis semina nostram mentem nostrosque
labores referentes militaria quidem agmina multiplicibus
et omnem providentiam continentibus modis correximus, tarn
veteribus ad meliorem statum brevi' tempore reductis, quam
novis non solum exquisitis, sed etiam recta dispositione
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nostri numinis sine novis expensis publicis constitutis,
legum vero praesidia primo servando positas, deinde novas
ponendo firmissima subiectis effecimus. 2b
If, as these two passages suggest, arms and laws are of
equal importance to the state; if therefore the armata militia
and the inermis militia are of equal standing - so the
Bologna lawyers argued -, it must follow that all milites,
whether armati or inermes, enjoy the same privileges.
Already the Glossators were debating this question and
finding mostly in favour of inermes milites. The Post-
glossators were even more insistent that the armat a and the
inermis militia be considered equal in terms of priviliges
(moving ever further, according to Fitting, from the spirit
and the letter of the corpus of Roman law), and by the
middle of the fifteenth century it was accepted beyond
doubt that all privileges granted to the armata militia
must also be granted to the inermis militia, with the
exception of those privileges however which derived from a
knight's ignorance of the law. The advocatus and the
mile s were therefore equal, and just as the Roman miles
was identified with the contemporary knight, so the Roman
advoc atus was equated with the contemporary lawyer. But
not all lawyers, so the Commentators held, were equal.
Some, as George Orwell was to say, were more equal than
others, and these were the doctors, the doctores legum.
Originally the title "Doctor" would appear to have been
used simply to describe a teacher of law, but in due course
it ceased to be a mere job-description and became instead
2 5
an honorific distinction acquired by special conferment.
This is where the querelle begins: if the advoc atus and the
miles are equal, but the doctor is superior to the simple
advoc atus, it follows that the doctor must also be
superior to the miles. The superiority of the doctor was
then further enhanced by the recognition (deduced from
arguments which we shall shortly be examining) that mere
knighthood was not a dignity (dignitas) whereas doctorhood
was, and that a doctor was therefore noble where a mere
knight was not. Thus the balance between arms and laws
established by Justinian in the two passages quoted
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above could now be broken in favour of laws (it was
lawyers after all who were conducting the debate). Laws
though came to be regarded as superior to arms not so much
because they were deemed to be more useful to the state
(this is not the lawyers' main concern in the querelle
although it is an argument one often comes across), but
because, being a branch of learning, they ennoble man.
Already Cino da Pistoia (1270-1336), the famous lawyer, poet
and friend of Dante's, while discussing the point, had
remarked:
nota, quod meritum scientiae nobilitat hominem.1 Ad hoc facit,
quod Ulpianus iurisconsultus vocatur nobilis non propter
genus, sed propter abundantiam meriti scientiae ... Unde
qui meruit sua virtute nobilitatem habere, magis dicitur
nobilis, quam ille, qui descendit ex nobili genere, quia
ex genere non est aliquis nobilis, nisi praesumptive,
et plus commendari potest quis in eo, quod a se quaerit ,
quam in eo, quod ex parentibus habuit. Et Cato dixit:
scientia nobilitat animum. 26
It was Bartolus more than anyone else who, with the weight
of his authority, gave lasting credibility to the belief that
the doctor was noble whereas the knight was not and that as
a result the doctor deserved precedence over the knight.
The terms of the querelle were thus set. Subsequent
generations of lawyers simply produced variations on the
theme or adduced more examples to prove the point. Any
qualms they may have had about denying rights of precedence
to the knights their contemporaries they allayed with the
argument (which we find also in Beccadelli) that these
knights were not real knights. Accursius (1182?-1260) ,
the compiler of the glossa ordinaria (the gloss to end
all glosses) and the jurist recognized to be the last of
the Glossators, had set out six requisites for a knight
legally to be recognised as such. These conditions were
then accepted as law by his successors:
et nota quod sex sunt necessaria, ut quis sit miles:
1. Primo ut miles non sit negotiator ...
2. Item quod examinetur ...
3. Item quod praestat sacramentum per genium principis
et deum omnipotentem, quod mortem reipubiicae causa
non evitabit ...
1+. Item quod ei ensis cingatur . . .
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5. Item stigma, id est nota publica, debet ei^s brachiis
inscribi vel imponi ...
6. Item in numero aliorum debet poni et scribi ...
Et isti tales habent privilegia, quae dicunt leges concedi
militibus. 27
Apart from the ritual character of knighthood, the
important condition here (and which will be more fully
developed later on) is that the knight must be precisely
that and nothing else. He must bear arms and be ready to
use them in the service of the commonweal, and bearing
arms must be his sole vocation. The mere insignia and
title of knighthood bestowed upon an individual are not
sufficient in themselves to make of that individual a
real knight. To reiterate the words of Beccadelli:
"un milite non fia per sol colana."
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C. _Si.g.norelns de Homodeisr Quae St io utrum doctor in signum
honoris et praecellentiae debeat praecedere militem
vel econverso.
The arguments worked out by Roman lawyers in
favour of doctors and against knights, from at least the
twelfth century onwards, were usually confined to glosses
or commentaries of particular laws or points of law in
the Corpus iuris. It was not, as far as we can tell at
this stage, before the end of the fifteenth century
(with one important exception) that any lawyer thought of
actually gathering these arguments into a single and
independent work on the subject. The exception is that of
Signorelus de Homodeis, the person whom Beccadelli. mentions
twice in his Pisputat ione (see above p. 24), and whom he
mentions too with great respect, calling him first "quel
monarcha / e de le lege pretioso vaso" (vv.329-30), and then
referring to his work on the subject as "li preclari deti /
...ne l'alta soa disputa" (vv.358-9).
This work is in actual fact a lecture which
Homodeis, a famous fourteenth century Milanese jurist who
taught civil law in many cities of northern Italy
(including Bologna, Padua, Parma and Turin) and who was
later knighted and created Count Palatine, a "iusconsuito"
therefore "ornato de quel auro" in Beccadelli's words
2 8(see above p.21), delivered in Vercelli in 13^0. The
lecture was then committed to paper, though whether by
Homodeis himself or a student of his or somebody else it
is impossible to tell. We have very little information
about it and there is only one extant manuscript of it,
which is probably contemporary with the date of the lecture,
but is certainly not an autograph and has clearly been
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copied from another manuscript. For a century and a half
the lecture lay mostly forgotten (hardly anyone ever
quotes from it), until it was brought to light again and
edited by the eminent jurist Ludovico Bolognini (l^U6-
1508), who had it published at the beginning of the very
year in which Beccadelli published his Pisputatione (1U89),
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and in the very same city (Bologna), where Bolognini was
at the time professor of law. The title of Homodeis's
lecture is, Quaestio disputata per me Signorelum de
Homodeis legum doctorem de Mediolano, MCCCXL de mense
Maij, tunc temporis Vercellis in lectura ordinaria
eminentis, 'quae' talis est: utrum doctor in signum
honoris et 'praecellentiae1 debeat praecedere militem, vel
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econverso. A suaestio was a particular genre which came
to be used by lawyers "for purposes of instruction". It
was not bound to the legal text as glosses or commentaries
had been,and it was therefore "a favoured mode of enquiry
because the topic could be dealt with in some considerable
31depth.' in this move away from the actual text we can
detect the culmination of the trend already initiated by
the earliest Glossators of commenting on the Roman law not
so much in order to elucidate it, ,but. so as t(b make, use
of it and to apply it to contemporary problems. In so doing
they often perverted its meaning or found meanings in it
which were totally alien to the original letter and spirit
of the text. This tendency is very noticeable in Homodeis.
For each point he makes, he adduces many titles or laws
from the Corpus iuris, but frequently the link between
his argument and the passage he happens to be quoting is
very tenuous indeed, not to say non-existent. For instance
his first argument in favour of the miles is "quod altero
est antiquius debet alteri praeferri" and that at the time
of the Roman kings, when milite s already existed, no laws
had yet been promulgated and there were no legum doctores.
Milites are therefore of older stock than doctores , which
entitles them to precedence (p.l67r°).^^ This entitlement
of the oldest to precedence is proven with reference to
three laws. The first is the law "De rerum divisione"
(institutes II,i):
Singulorum autem hominum multis modis res fiunt: quarundam
enim rerum dominium nanciscimur iure naturali, quod, sicut
diximus, appellatur ius gentium, quarundam iure civili.
commodius est itaque a vetustiore iure incipere. palam
est autem vetustius esse naturale ius, quod cum ipso genere
humano rerum natura prodidit: civilia enim iura tunc
coeperunt esse, cum et civitates condi et magistratus creari
et leges scribi coeperunt; 33
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the second lav is "De iure immunitatis" (Digest L, 6):
CALLISTRATUS libro primo de cognitionibus. Semper in
civitate nostra senectus venerabilis fuit: namque maiores
nostri paene eundem honorem senibus, quem magistratibus
tribuebant, circa munera quoque municipalia subeunda idem
honor senectuti tributus est; 3U
and the third law is "De fide imstrumehtorum et amissione
eorum" (Digest XXII,k):
ULPIAHUS libro quinquagesimo ad edictum. Si de tabulis
testamenti deponendis agatur et dubitetur, cui eas deponi
oportet, semper seniorem iuniori et amplioris honoris
inferiori et marei feminae et ingenuum libertino
praeferemus. 35
Whereas by a stretch of the imagination the first example
can be construed to have some kind of connection with the
subject of Homodeis's lecture, it becomes more difficult
to do so with the second example,and no stretch of the
imagination would be able to perform the same trick upon
the third example, in which the real purport of the text
matters little so long as its wording can usefully be
adapted to the argument of the lecture.
There are many such instances in Homodeis's
Quaestio; and this is an indication of how the Knight and
Doctor querelle had by then reached a certain state of
autonomy and no longer just existed in the shadow so to
speak of the Corpus iuris. It did not of course cease to
do so altogether (see for instance Angelo Aretino or
Alessandro Tartagni), and Homodeis's lecture is still
admittedly an isolated phenomenon at this early stage (and
with regard to the present state of our knowledge).
Commentaries about the precedence of knights and doctors
continue to be written until well into the sixteenth
century, long after arms and letters have all but out¬
stripped knights and doctors in the context of the genre.
They never totally give way therefore to quaestiones or
similar works. However there can be no doubt that
Homodeis's lecture does mark a definite step forward in
the crystallization of the querelle as an autonomous genre.
The lecture is a straightforward compilation,
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in two parts, of twenty-three arguments in favour of the
doctor's precedence in the first part, and nineteen
arguments in the second part in favour of the knight's
precedence. The style is tediously repetitive. The mode
of argument is the syllogism: first a general axiom,
followed by the major premise, the minor premise and then
the conclusion. This for example is how the first
argument in favour of doctors is constructed:
(i) axiom: "et primo probatur sic: versatus circa
meliora est praeponendus ante omnia. Ex quo
arguitur sic"
(ii) maj or premise: "unusquisque dicitur melior et
nobilior, qui praeest melioribus et nobilioribus ..
(iii) minor premise: "sed ita est, quod doctor versatur
circa nobiliora et meliora, videlicet circa legem;
et omnis lex est inventio et omnium rerum
princeps" ■
(iv) conclusion: "ergo versatus circa leges debet esse
omnium princeps per argumenta supra facta." (p.l65r
Every subsequent argument is introduced by the words:
"praeterea hoc probatur sic", and constructed in exactly
the same way. All arguments are bolstered with exclusive
reference to the Corpus juris or the glossa ordinaria
(the gloss of Accursius); no authorities are named by
name (as they are in Beccadelli for instance) and there is
not a single non-legal quotation. After the last argument
in favour of the doctor, the first part simply ends as
follows: "ex quib.us omnibus pro hac parte videtur
concludendum quod doctor debet precedere militem. Et haec
suffitiant quo ad hanc partem" (p.l67r°). The section
on the knight begins and ends just as casually. It begins
"in oppositum videtur quod miles debet precedere doctorem
et hoc sic probant infrascripte parte rationes" (p.l67r°),
and it ends: "et hec suffitiant quo ad hanc partem"
(p.l68r°). There are five arguments less for the knight
than there are for the doctor, but unless one wishes to
pass what can only be a subjective judgement on the
convincingness of each argument or of the sum of all the
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arguments on each side, one cannot legitimately say that
Homodeis obviously favours one part rather than another,
that because he gives more proofs of the doctor's
superiority, he did indeed believe the doctor to be
superior. As we shall in fact be seeing, Homodeis's
fifteenth century editor, Bolognini, draws quite the
opposite conclusion as to Homodeis's preference, simply
because the lecture ends with the demonstration of the
superiority of the knight.
There is a certain amount of parallelism
between the arguments used on either side and many a
pro-doctor argument turns out to have its counter¬
argument in the pro-knight section; "turns out", because
the lecture is not organized systematically and the
reader has to fit the pieces together as in a jig-saw
puzzle. Some arguments, the most exalted, are about
the respective benefit (to mankind) and scope of the
legal and military professions. "Lex disponit omnes res
divinas et humanas" it is claimed (p.l65r°) with reference
to the following passage of the Code: "nihil tarn
studiosum in omnibus rebus invenitur quam legum auctoritas,
quae et divinas et humanas res bene .disponit et omnem
3 ^
iniquitatem expellit;" and milites are therefore
inferior, for they can only implement the decisions of the
lawyers. The counter-argument to this is that it is
thanks to arms that laws are effective, and moreover, he
who gives effect to what has been prescribed (i.e. who
achieves the desired end) being superior to the person
who merely prescribes, the miles is more noble than the
doctor, for it is he who sees to it that laws are
implemented. From which it can be further argued that the
miles thus deals in two perfections ("bona") , arms and laws,
and has therefore even more claims to superiority over the
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doctor, who only deals in one perfection, namely laws.
But it had also been argued that the doctor benefits
("bonum operatur") both himself and others, whereas the
o Q
miles only benefits himself. In a similar vein we have
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the argument concerning the end, the raison d'etre , of
doctors and milites. Doctors exist to preserve states
("finis doctorum est quod provinciae conserventur"),
milites only to defend states ("finis militiae est quod
3 Q
provinciae vindicentur"); y and the former is the more
noble pursuit. On the other hand it is claimed that he who
has a profession which is more common and more universal
is superior to him who has not. The miles can practise his
profession all over the world, whereas the doctor can only
practise his in royal cities. The miles therefore is of
. . bo
more universal public utility. Then we have what is
certainly the oddest, not to say most perverse argument of
the whole Quaestio. It sounds like a defence of doctors
but is meant to favour the milites. Doctors illuminate
the world ("propter doctorem mundus illuminatur"), but
illumination is not necessary ("sed vivere possumus
aedibus obscuratis et sic mundo obscurato"), therefore
we can do without doctors, whereas we cannot do without
. . Hi
milites. In defence of doctors it is also argued that
professors of law are exposed to greater dangers than
are milites and that it is harder ("laboriosius") to deal
b 2
in laws than it is to deal m arms. This is proven
with reference to the last paragraph of the proem to the
Institutes quoted above (see p.27 ) and the passage from
the Code (inc. "nihil tarn studiosum") quoted at the
beginning of this paragraph. A very similar argument is
to be found in the section on the knight: milites deserve
greater rewards, it is said, for they have to endure greater
labours, as indeed their very appellation bears witness. In the
law "De testamento militis" of the Digest it says:
miles autem appellatur vel a militia, id est duritia,
quam pro nobis sustinent, aut a multitudine, aut a malo,
quod arcere milites solent, aut a numero mille hominum,
ductum a Graeco verbo , tractum a tagmate: nam Graeci mille
hominum multitudinem appellant, quasi millensimum
quemque dictum: unde ipsum ducem appellant,
exercitus autem nomen ab e xer c i t at i one traxit. 1+3
This is an argument we had already encountered in Beccadelli.
Another argument we have already encountered and which we
also find in Homodeis is that knowledge ("scientia") makes
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man noble ("facit hominem nobi1issimum") - a point
tenuously deduced from an irrelevant law of the Code
(which says: "providendum est, ne hi, quos in foro aut
meritum nobilissimos fecerit aut vetustas, in una parte
consistant, aliam a rudibus atque tironibus necesse sit
sustineri") ^ - therefore doctors are noble, and all the
more so for being philosophers too ("doctor est
philosophus cum scientia nostra appelletur philosophia"),^
and better still for being priests, as the Digest says:
ULPIANUS libro primo institutlonum. Iuri operam daturum
prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat. est autem
a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit ,
ius est ars boni et aequi. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes
appellet: iustitia namque colimus et boni et aequi notitiam
profitemur, aequum ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab
illicito discernentes, bonos non solum metu poenarum,
verum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere
cupientes, veram nisi fallor philosophiam, non simulatam
affectantes. ^7
To this the knight may retort that doctors are nothing of
the sort but mere scribes ("scriptores"), and that such an
undignified description can only apply to an undignified
hQ
profession. Milites on the other hand are paragons of
(moral) virtues - fortitude, justice and fidelity. They
are commended in the Code for their fortitude (and
fidelity) and there can be no fortitude without justice.
All this derives from a mere three words in the Code:
1J9"fortissimi ac devotissimi milites". Of course
Homodeis's lecture also contains the argument'that the
miles and the advocatus being peers and the doctor superior
to the advocatus, the doctor must also be superior to the
miles. To counter-balance this Homodeis says that doctors
who belong to the prince's council are entitled to more
immunities than simple doctors, that anyone who is absent
from home for the sake of the commonweal is considered to
be equal to those doctors who belong to the prince's
council, that milite s are in all circumstances deemed to
be absent for the sake of the commonweal and that therefore
all milites are superior to most doctors.^ That the title
of doctor is an honour, that it signifies dignity, whereas
the mere title of miles does not, Homodeis proves on the
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basis of a law which is frequently quoted in the querelle
and which decrees that any professors who have taught in
Constantinople for twenty years are by that mere fact
entitled to ennoblement:
grammaticos tarn Graecos quam Latinos, sophistas et iuris
peritos in hac regia urbe professionem suam exercentes et
inter statutos connumeratos, si laudabilem in se probis
moribus vitam esse monstraverint, si docendi peritiam
facundiamque dicendi interpretandique subtilitatem copiam
disserendi se habere patefecerint, et coetu amplissimo
iudicante digni fuerint aestimati, cum ad viginti annos
observatione iugi ac sedulo docendi labore pervenerint,
placuit honorari et his qui sunt ex vicaria dignitate
connumerari. 51
In the glossa ordinaria, to the words "ex vicaria", it is
explained that the vicarius is the equivalent in modern
terms of "comes et dux" and therefore the doctor is both
count and duke. As to the specification that the law
only applies to Constantinople ("in hac regia urbe"),
Fitting explains that the Glossators and Commentators
usually got around this by discovering royal origins for
the cities to which they wanted the law to apply, Bologna
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m particular. The counter-argument here is that a
miles is automatically entitled to be called dux, whereas
doctors have to wait twenty years before claiming their
5 3
entitlement. Respective rights of precedence are also
deduced from the type of person which either profession
will not admit into its ranks. An adolescent ("impubes")
can become a miles but he cannot become a doctor,
therefore doctorhood is of greater standing than knighthood.
And men of menial origins ("viliores homines"), such as
"villains" ("coloni"), may not join the militia armata
but they may join the militia inermis et legalis, therefore
5b
knighthood is superior to doctorhood. Finally, and to
show how inconclusive the Quaestio is and how bemusing its
casuistry to the layman (the twentieth century layman at
least), the respective rights of precedence of the knight
and doctor are deduced with reference to the same passage
of the Corpus iuris but from diametrically opposed
philosophical premises. The passage from the Corpus is
the introduction to the Code quoted above (see p.?./ ); it
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implies that the Emperor (Justinian) in his self-
appointed task of restoring the Empire, needed arms first
and laws only later. The last place being of greater
dignity than the first, says the doctor, the doctor is more
noble than the miles and therefore deserves precedence.
The first place being of greater dignity than the last,
says the knight, the miles is more noble than the doctor,
and it is he therefore who deserves precedence.^
This point appropriately brings us down to
earth again, down to the real level of the Quaestio. It is
a reminder that, despite all the lofty ideas, not to say
ideals which are put forward on either side, Homodeis's
lecture is basically about precedence, about who is
entitled to walk before whom: "quaestio est utrum doctor
in signum honoris et praecellentiae debeat praecedere
militem vel econverso", as the title says. Naturally the
resolution of this problem does depend on having
established the legitimate nobility of either the doctor
or the knight, but this is a dimension of the debate, the
social and cultural implications of which at this stage in
time remain mostly unexplored. Homodeis's lecture is no
more, it would seem, than an objective presentation to his
students (or at least a presentation which intends to be
objective) of the legal arguments for and against a certain
case of litigation which is still sub iudice. It is also
similar to what nowadays we might call a consultant's
report - and indeed consultant's reports were not a
foreign notion to medieval jurists.^ In that respect it
is not unlike what Agostino Nifo will be writing a couple
of centuries later, though from the different perspective
of arms and letters (see below chap.3). But whereas Nifo
is at pains to conceal his prejudices, Homodeis is
undoubtedly much more impartial. Apart from the convinc¬
ingness or lack thereof of his arguments, which as we have
said remains a matter of opinion, the only time he takes
sides (almost imperceptibly) is when he talks of "scientia
nostra CquaeO appelletur philosophia" (see above p.3/
my italics ) .
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It is interesting that Homodeis should have
chosen to take sides at this particular point. His calling
jurisprudence a philosophy would indicate that he did not
view his profession in narrowly technical and specialist
terms; that instead he considered its scope to be far-
ranging and its significance all-embracing; that he saw it
as a science which reached out into other areas of learning
and knowledge. His very lecture is a witness to this.
Although its overall character and its explicit
phras^eology are of a legal nature, its implicit premises,
its hidden pre-suppositions, even at times its terminology
are philosophical (in the sense that they derive from a
particular philosophical system). There can be little
doubt that notions such as perfections ("bona"), such as the
end ("finis") for which something exists and that of which it
is made (whether adolescents or villains) - in other words
its final and material causes (two of the four causes) -,
such as moral virtues (fortitude, justice), such as
something being superior for being more universal, such as
its name being indicative of its essence ("nomina sunt
consequentia rerum"), not to mention of course the syllogism
which Homodeis uses as his didactic instrument, belong to
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an Aristotelian and Scholastic field of reference. It
is hardly surprising of course to find Homodeis conversant
with such notions, since they were an integral part of the
enviroment in which he was educated and to which he belonged
throughout his life: the University. There the teaching
of Aristotle and of the Schoolmen must have provided in those
years the single most potent ideological force, second only
perhaps, in the case of some universities, to the ideologi¬
cal influence of the corpus of Roman law. And Homodeis makes
use of this philosophical jargon quite without hesitation:
it is second nature to him.
Later, when knights and doctors give way to arms
and letters, the philosophical aspect of the querelle will
receive emphasis at the expense of its legalistic aspect,
for those who take up the defence of learning begun
(unwittingly perhaps) with the tools of their own trade by
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doctors of law, will be doctors of a different sort and
with a different training - doctors of philosophy and
medicine - who are, as we shall see, avowed Aristotelians.
But just as knights and doctors will always leave traces
of themselves, even after arms and letters have been in
the ascendant for many a decade,so too at this early stage
do we get a premonition of what will be characteristic of
the querelle in its later phase. Already now we can
understand how the two phases have more in common than
might at first sight seem probable, and how come doctors
of medicine will be able to follow quite naturally in the
path opened up by doctors of law.
Who these doctors of law were and the nature
of doctorhood are the subject of a final argument in
Homodeis's lecture, which is interesting not so much as an
argument in itself as for the information it gives us
about the doctorate of law and the insight it provides
into the doctors' high esteem of their profession and own
worth. It shows us too that the title of doctor was
indeed no mere job-description, as we have already noted
(see above p.28), but a distinction especially conferred,
with a special aura of mystery about it. The argument
is that the actual procedure of conferment, and one might
even say the rites of conferment, given their significance,
carry with them an automatic entitlement to precedence
("in doctorali consecratione signa adhibita 'sunt'
praelationem significantia, per quae apparet, quod doctor
debet praecedere"). The first stage of the ceremony is
the "handing over" of the "Book of Law" - perhaps a copy
of the Corpus juris - by which the doctor is shown to
become the law's guardian ("ita est, quod doctor ex libri
iustitie traditione est illius effectus proprietarius et
possessor"). The second step is the passing of a ring on
to the doctor's finger ("anuli impositio"), a ring which
signifies pre-eminence ("qui anulus praelationem denotat");
and the third step is the laying of a crown on the doctor's
head, which signifies victory and is a hieratic symbol
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("doctoris capiti imponitur diadema, quod est signum
gratiae et victoriae ... et est signum sacerdotale cuius
5 8
proprium est praeesse"). Such lofty words however end
yet again with the mundane conclusion that doctors may
therefore have precedence over knights. Grandiose
though its expression may sound, the querelle seems
originally to have been intended for very practical, not
to say utilitarian purposes: to decide who was to walk in
front of whom!
42
D. Ludovico Bolo^nini's edition of and additions to the
"Quaestio" of Homodeis.
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which
Homodeis1s lecture survived for other jurists to consult
in the years and decades after it had been delivered, but
it was not forgotten altogether, for there are references
to it in the works of at least two lawyers of the early
fifteenth century, Martinus Laudensis and Petrus Lenauderius.^
It was not therefore completely unknown when it was
published by Ugone de Rugeris in Bologna in February l489>
Its editor was Ludovico Bolognini, a famous lawyer and a
leading citizen of Bologna. Born in lkh6, he studied law
at the university there, under Alessandro Tartagni amongst
others, graduated in civil law in September 1469, in canon
law in August 1U7O (having become a Doctor in October 1469)
and in 1^72 embarked on an academic career at his own
university. He moved to the University of Ferrara in 1^74,
but was back teaching in Bologna in 1^79, and he remained
there until 1501, being on several occasions elected a
member of the Anziani and holding other offices in the
city's executive and judiciary. In 1501 he went to Florence
and occupied various minor positions in the city
administration until he was elected Podesta in 1503, but
in 1505 he returned to his native city and his alma mater
to become once again a member of the Anziani and later of
the new government (the Quaranta Consiglieri e Riformatori)
set up by Julius 11 after his "conquest" of Bologna in
1506. In 1507 Bolognini was Gonfaloniere di Giustizia and
later that year he was .sent by the Pope as ambassador to
the King of France, to try and persuade the King to withdraw
his support from the Bentivoglio party. He returned via
Rome, where he was to report to the Pope on the outcome
of his mission before travelling back to Bologna. On his
way home he fell seriously ill and was not able to get
beyond Florence, where he died in the monastery of San Miniato
6 0
on July 27th 1508. Throughout his career Bolognini had
been an indefatigable editor of numerous legal texts, both
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major and minor. In 1489 his reputation was already such
that he had "been knighted: in the introduction to the
edition of Homodeis's lecture he calls himself "utriusque
iuris doctor equesque auratus".
Bolognini edited Homodeis's lecture with many
other legal texts, which were published all together in an
enormous folio volume and dedicated to Alvise Capra,
lieutenant of the Pope's legate in Bologna, Cardinal
Ascanio Sforza.^1 The dedication is signed "Bologna
University, November 15th 1488" ("datum in felicissimo
Bononie studio, anno Domini Mcccclxxxviii die xv novembris"),
and the date 1488 also appears in the title to Homodeis's
Quaestio, which may suggest that it was the subject of a
lecture before being sent to press, although this is no
more than a guess as the title simply reads: "incipit
solemnis disputatio preclarissimi monarce domini Signoreli
de Homodeis de Mediolano de precedentia doctoris vel
militis cum additionibus domini Ludovici de Bologninis de
Bononia utriusque iuris doctoris prestantissimi equitisque
aurati dignissimi, in vetustissimo Bononie Studio, anno
Domini Mcccclxxxviii." The nature of the publication in
which the Quaestio appears gives us an idea of Bolognini's
intentions in editing these various texts; he is not
providing a work of literature, an easy-to-read and easy-
to-handle "pocket book" (like Beccadelli's Disputatione),
but a legal text-book and work of reference. The nature
of the actual edition of Homodeis's lecture however does
denote certain literary aspirations on Bolognini's behalf,
or at least a desire to relieve the tedium of Homodeis's
compilation of arguments and to enliven the whole debate.
Bolognini does not provide a simple edition of the Quaestio,
but an edition with additions. These additions are twice
the length of Homodeis's lecture and it is they which are
of particular interest to our study. They constitute the
next step in the development of the querelle.
The additions are not only interesting, but
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intriguing. They purport to he reporting a public
disputation on the subject of precedence which is taking
place in the presence of a large and boisterous crowd of
knights and doctors, each supporting their own side like
fans their favourite football team. The contenders for the
milites are Homodeis and Federigo di Montefeltro (lb22-82),
and for the doctores the jurist Francesco Accolti (l4l6/7-
1488), with Bolognini and his teacher Alessandro Tartagni
6 2(lk23/b - 1^77) acting as arbiters. All the participants,
except of course for Homodeis, were contemporaries of one
another, and their being and debating together is therefore
plausibly more than mere poetic licence, but because
Bolognini does not explain the circumstances in which this
public debate might have taken place and introduces us to
it in media re, we are left to wonder whether it is entirely
his invention or whether there is some element of reality
in it. There is unfortunately no known manuscript of this
particular work of Bolognini's to give us more background
information on the matter (both the debate itself and the
composition of the additiones)' and we can therefore only
5
go by what the printed text tells us. Sadly it tells us
less than it leaves untold.
It is the presence of Federigo di Montefeltro
which is most intriguing. He is the only contender who is
not a lawyer and the only one moreover to play a silent part.
In the introduction to the Quaestio (following the passage
quoted in the previous paragraph), Federigo's intervention
is announced in words which say quite clearly that he too
will speak his mind on the subject:
in quibus additionibus £Bolognini3 miro ordine introducit
novum duellum inter illustrem ac excellentissimum in toto
terrarum orbe iurisconsuiturn dominum Franciscum de Acoltis
de Aretio pro parte doctorum tuenda loquentem et invictissimum
ac iustissimum principem armorumque ducem et totius Italiae
capitaneum benemeritum, dominum Federicum, Urbini dominum
etc., pro parte militum defensanda loquentem, et ultimo
loco per omnium concordiam introducit dominum Alexandrum
Tartagnum Imolensem praeceptorem eius unicum, cuius sententie
omnes acquievisse attestatur (p.48r°).
We never get to learn however what Federigo actually said,
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if indeed he ever did say anything. Bolognini's
introduction is followed immediately "by Homodeis's lecture
("by and large as it appears in the Florence manuscript,
though with so many variants - all be they minor that
one cannot exclude the possibility of a derivation from
another manuscript). After the lecture it is Bolognini
who takes over again, and this is where something would
appear to be missing. Indeed Bolognini implies that at
this stage Federigo has also contributed his opinion to
the debate, but we have not heard him utter a sound.
Bolognini's additiones simply begin:
illustrissimus ac excellentissimus princeps et dominus,dominus
Federicus Urbini etc., nec non dominus auctor Signorelus
de Mediolano iuris eminentissimus (ut vides) hucusque
argumentati sunt hinc inde ad partes militum solemniter
et copiose in hac formosa et notabili et, ut ita aixerim,
Caesarea decisione merito digna quaestione, quae habet
utrum doctor insignis honoris et praecellentiae debeat
praeferre £sic)} militi, vel econtra, et tandem post multa
concluserunt militem indistincte praecedere doctorem
(p.25r° col.2). 6k
This is the last we hear of Federigo.
Mysterious though Federigo's opinion may
remain to us, it met at the time (so we are told) with the
enthusiastic approval of the large crowd of attending
knights ("maxima militum turba ibi astante"). All of them
("duces et milites omnes") expressed their support for
Federigo and Homodeis by hurling misquotations from Cicero
6 S
at the doctors: "cedant armis togae!" they shouted. Amid
the ensuing uproar Bolognini is wondering whether Homodeis'
misinformed opinion ought not really to be refuted, when
suddenly "ecce surrexit in magna doctorum et militum corona
illustris ille dominus Franciscus de Acoltis de Aretio"
(p.25r° col.2) who, having managed to restore silence and
bring about an uneasy truce, takes up the defence of the
doctor, first with the help of twelve new arguments and
then with a point by point refutation of Homodeis's pro-
milites arguments. But Accolti's intervention makes things
worse rather than better. The crowd gets even more
excited and quotations and misquotations from Cicero are
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now hurled from all quarters: "et tunc maxima hincinde
caterva et doctorum et militum alta voce clamabat 'cedant
arma togae1 et econtra 'cedant armis togae1, adeo ut omnia
clamoribus plena sonarent et visum est mihi nos fore inter
Syllam et Caribdim deductos"(p•27r° col.l). Fortunately
the participants are saved from such an awful peril and led
into calmer waters by the messianic intervention of
Bolognini's teacher, and obviously much-admired teacher,
Alessandro Tartagni, whose words are greeted with almost
biblical fervour: "et ecce tunc surrexit divus Alexander
Tartagnus Imolensis, dominus meus unicus, in quern omnium
statim ora conversa sunt et oculi omnium in eum sperabant,
et omnes quiescentes cum maxima humanitate gratiaque verba
proferentem audiebant" (ibid.). By putting forward a
compromise solution (the same we have come across in
Beccadelli - see above pp. 20-1 - and which would in fact
appear to be of Tartagni's own making)and by then asking
Bolognini to confirm and clarify this solution, Tartagni
manages to bring a lasting peace to the warring factions:
et statim doctrinam domini mei supra relatam cum hac brevi
additione mea omnes hincinde astantes, tarn doctores quam
milites, in maxima corona una nimiter pari voto et consensu
et nemine discrepante comprobarunt, laudantes eius ingenij
subtilitatem et facundiam et brevis sermonis tantam vim et
substantiam, omnesque alta voce dixerunt, hie est ille pater
toto memorandus in orbe , cui cedunt leges militiaeque
duces (p.27v° col.l).
As in Beccadelli, the parties are thus reconciled and all
is well that ends well. Only the reader is dissatisfied,
for he is still left wondering whether he has been
witnessing a real or an imaginary debate.
There is some evidence that, under the signoria
of Taddeo de Pepoli, i.e. some time between 1327 and 13^7*
or in other words at about the same time as Homodeis deliv¬
ered his lecture at Vercelli, a public debate was held in
Bologna on the subject precisely of the contested precedence
r r?
of knights and doctors. It may well be that such debates
were more frequent than the present state of our knowledge
will allow us to surmize, and that if indeed one was held,
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at Urbino or somewhere else in Italy, under the patronage
and with the participation of Federigo di Montefeltro, it
was part of a well established tradition, as well establi¬
shed perhaps as the literary querelle was amongest lawyers;
but it will only be possible obviously to confirm or
invalidate such a conjecture after much more and pains¬
takingly archival research.
Bolognini's edition of Homodeis's lecture
represents a new development in the querelle in that it
brings it out into the open, as it were, and transmits it
abroad through the medium of the printing press. It does
so too in a memorable way by clothing it in a kind of
narrative. For many jurists it will now represent the
authoritative version of the debate, all the more so for
being re-printed (together with all the other legal texts
of the 1^89 edition) in Turin in May of the following year
and then again in Lyons in 15^95 in the twelfth volume
of a seventeen volume compilation of legal texts, and in
Venice in 1584, in volume eighteen of a multi-volume
Treatise of Universal Lav.^ Many lawyers will read it and
quote from it in their commentaries, mentioning the opinion
now of Homodeis now of Tartagni or Bolognini, or even of
Federigo di Montefeltro. As late as 1689, one Domenico
Maria Brancaccini, a Servite who describes himself as
theologian to Cosimo III, Grand Duke of Tuscany, in chapter
II, Book III of his work De jure doctoratus (published in
Rome), asks the question "num Doctor, vel Miles sit
praeferendus?" and answers with Tartagni's compromise
solution which, he says, even received the sanction of
Federigo di Montefeltro:
cuius decisioni, Ducem ilium invictissimum, etsi in sexies
signa contulisset, octies hostem profligasset, ac totius
Italiae confaederationis imperator factus, quasi alter suae
tempestatis Caesar, omnium proeliorum victor extitisset,
acquievisse, quippe qui scientiarum quoque vires optime
noverat. 69
It is more than likely that Beccadelli too had
read Bolognini's edition of Homodeis's lecture and been
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influenced by "l'alta soa disputa". Is his calling
Homodeis "quel monarcha" (see above p.31 ) not reminiscent
of the opening words of Bolognini's edition: "incipit
solemnis disputatio preclarissimi monarce domini Signoreli
de Homodeis"? In fact there is nothing to speak of in the
Disputatione which is not also to be found in Homodeis's
Quaestio and Bolognini's additiones. Even the "drama" of
the Disputatione is reminiscent of Bolognini's drama¬
tisation of the querelle, with the two sides becoming
in turn very elated about their respective privileges and
indignant at their attempted usurpation until a -third
party settles the dispute with a compromise solution which
is acceptable to both sides, the solution of Alessandro
Tartagni. But if we can thus venture an explanation as to
why Beccadelli wrote his Disputatione at the end of lU895
or at least with the sanction and inspiration of which
model, we still do not know why it was precisely in
1U88-89 that Homodeis was brought to light again. For
the same reasons that we cannot go behind the printed
versions we have, there are no hard facts to hand which at
this stage can provide a satisfactory answer to this
question, but in a later chapter, when the reader will have
been introduced to the Arms and Letters querelle a suggestion
will be put forward which will try and answer the question
in terms of a cross-fertilization of the two querelles.
If Bolognini's edition and publication of
Homodeis's lecture represents a new stage in the development
of the querelle in formal terms, by transmitting it abroad,
as we said, through the medium of the printing press, and
if Bolognini showed some originality in his endeavour to
enliven the debate by creating dramatic effects, in terms
of contents there is nothing original to his additiones.
The quotation and misquotation from Cicero may be misleading
in this respect. They are by no means indicative of a new
dimension in the nature and origins of the arguments. They
are simply introduced to heighten the drama (such as it is) ,
but otherwise Bolognini quotes exclusively from the corpus
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of Roman law and its Glossators and Commentators. Where
Bolognini does innovate however is "by bringing together for
the first time all the separate elements of the querelle,
and in particular by adding Tartagni's compromise and the
six knightly conditions of'Accursius (see above p.29) to
Homodeis's compilation of arguments. It is these conditions
and this compromise which give sense to the debate, in that
they allow for a synthesis and a solution to be reached.
By providing an instrument of objective discrimination,
they turn an otherwise formless list of often contradictory
arguments (which is what Homodeis's lecture is on its own)
into a meaningful discussion. It is in Bolognini's hands
therefore that the querelle really takes shape. This
explains why of course his work was so popular as to be
reprinted on several occasions and quoted on many.
It is Tartagni himself who, in the additiones ,
presents his own compromise solution. He presents it more
concisely and more clearly than Beccadelli will later manage
to do in verse (see above p. 21 )• This is how he does it:
videtur dici posse, quod in actibus doctoralibus sine dubio
doctor praeferatur militi, et econtra in actibus militaribus
miles praeferatur doctor! ... Sed in actibus promiscuis
seu neutralibus, primo praeferantur doctores existentes ad
latus principis, et hi habent primum locum; secundum vero
locum tenent milites, qui militant ad latus principis vel
qui sunt equites Romani; tertium vero locum habent doctores
excellentes, qui non sunt ad latus principis; quartum
vero locum habent simplices milites; quintum vero et
ultimum locum tenent doctorelli (p.27r° col.2). 70
Asked by Tartagni for his opinion on this point, Bolognini
(the dramatis persona) replies with a pun - which is
possibly the only truly original element in the whole text.
Those doctorellos , he tells Tartagni, whom you put in
fifth position, I would call dolore s rather than
doctores . Having thus struck at fake doctors (we are
reminded of the Messer Nicias of this world), he next goes
for fake knights, the "milites nostri temporis ... qui
vadunt quotidie per plateas ... et vacant negociationibus
et mercantijs." A true knight, Bolognini adds, may not
be a merchant, and he has to satisfy five further conditions
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as well (those of Accursius): "miles in assumptione
militiae debet cingi ense, et stigma eius brachiis imponi,
et scribi in numero aliorum militum, et examinari, et
iurare non aufugere mortem propter rempublicam"
(p.27r° col.2). As the knights his contemporaries
clearly do not satisfy these conditions, they are not, says
Bolognini, to be considered true mi1it e s and not therefore
to enjoy the priviliges of milites.
This is Bolognini's last word on the matter
and it is this solution (together with Tartagni's) which
meets with the unanimous approval of the audience,
including all the knights. One wonders what kind of
knights they were (or Bolognini imagined them to be) and
whether they assented from a position of strength, fake
knights having been unmasked, or from a position of
weakness, feeling unmasked themselves? One wonders too
what kind of a knight Bolognini felt himself to be and
how much he basked in the title of eques auratus. No
doubt he set greater store by the dignity of his doctorate,
for "quod doctor dicitur illuminare totum mundum ad
obediendum Deo, casus est perpetuo menti tenendus"
(p.25v° col. 2 ) .
E. Cristoforo Lanfranchino; Tractatulus seu questio
utrum preferendus sit doctor an miles.
We have now seen the querelle of Knights and
Doctors developing from modest "beginnings in glosses to
Justinian's Corpus juris, growing through successive
generations of commentaries and reaching full-hodied
maturity in Bolognini's edition of Homodeis's Quaestio
in 1 It89 • One could say that at this point the genre is
still only semi-independent, since Bolognini and Homodeis
were not published on their own but as one of many treatises
on a variety of subjects in a voluminous book, and that
full independence would only have been achieved once a
contribution to the querelle had been given a binding of
its own. This stage will in fact be reached a few months
later with the publication of Beccadelli's Pisputatione,
which is followed some eight years later by the publication
of another autonomous work on the subject of knights and
doctors (which could well however have been written earlier),
Cristoforo Lanfranchino's Tractatulus seu questio utrum
preferendus sit doctor an miles.
Whereas the Pis put atione might be considered
a slight deviation from the norm for being written in
Italian and in verse, the Tractatulus is prosed in the
traditional Latin jargon of the lawyers. It is a small
quarto book, published in Brescia by Angelus Britanicus
on July 8th 1^97, and which survives today in only five
libraries of northern Italy, at Brescia, Cremona, Milan,
Turin and Venice. As far as we know there are no extant
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manuscripts of the work. Lanfranchino's basic arguments
are those with which the reader is all too familiar, yet
his book is interesting and original in more ways than one.
He adds his own touch to even the most common of arguments,
his discussion ultimately goes beyond the traditional
confines of the querelle and turns into a general discussion
on nobility, and he quotes from a greater variety of sources,
including the Bible and classical authors, than any of his
predecessors. What is more, through the Tract atulus the
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querelle is set in a particular social environment:
Verona at the turn of the fifteenth century. This social
context is at once more real and less real than the context
of Beccadelli's Pisputat ion e. It is more real in that
Lanfranchino's contest for precedence is no mere post¬
prandial entertainment as is Beccadelli's, hut a contest
■which both parties take very seriously, indeed almost
passionately, as we shall shortly be seeing. On the other
hand it is less real, because Lanfranchino is very vague
in his allusions. He names no names and gives no dates,
and yet he seems to be talking about specific incidents of
disputed precedence between knights and doctors. Attempts
to find out more about these incidents have however proved
fruitless, as there have been few leads to follow.
We have for a start insufficient knowledge
of Lanfranchino's biography. The title-page of the
Tractatulus informs us that he was a lawyer from Verona:
"clarissimi utriusque iuris interpretis domini Christophori
Lanfranchini Veronensis Tractatulus". Before that he had
been a student of rhetoric and a poet, and by the time he
was writing the Tractatulus he had been knighted. This
much we can gather from a letter to Lanfranchino written
by one Paulo Andrea del Bene and published at the end of
the work: "tu - says del Bene, addressing himself to
Lanfranchino - qui utraque gaudes dignitate £i.e. doctorhood
and knighthood^ ... qui post eloquentiae studia et poeticam
exercitationem etiam in hac scientia iuriscivilis
elaboraris." Del Bene's letter also tells us that
Lanfranchino held important offices ("magi stratus insignes")
both in Verona and other cities, and that he was sent on
frequent missions to Verona's overlords, the Venetians
("frequentissimas legationes apud serenissimos Venetorum
dominos"). Some of this information can be corroborated
from other sources. There are several extant manuscripts
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which contain poems by Lanfranchino, and in the Sanuto
Diaries there is a mention of Lanfranchino being sent on an
embassy to Venice on January 20th 1501 from Verona, to
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protest his city's inability to raise the money demanded
7 3
by Venice. If this date is correct (and there is no
reason to suppose that it is not), then an early
nineteenth century biographer of Lanfranchino, Scipione
Maffei, was probably mistaken when he said that Lanfranchino
began lecturing at Ferrara University in 11+1+8, unless
Lanfranchino was very young when he embarked upon an
7l+academic career and old and venerable in 1501. But he
certainly does seem to have lectured at Ferrara, for the
Vatican Library has a manuscript of an oration which he
75delivered there. This is the extent of our knowledge
about Lanfranchino. Of the Tractatulus itself all we
know is that it was published in ll+97. There is no reason
to suppose that it was not also written that same year,
but we have no evidence to prove that it was. It is
preceded by a letter to Lanfranchino from one Bartolomeo
Dolci, in which Lanfranchino is asked for his learned
opinion on the contentious issue of precedence between
knights and doctors. The Tractatulus is Lanfranchino' s
reply, and it is followed by the letter from Paulo Andrea
del Bene, who congratulates Lanfranchino on what he has
written. Neither of the letters is dated and the identity
r-7
of their authors is obscure. As to the actual contents
of the letters and the Tractatulus , they shed little
light on the circumstances which lay behind their
c omposition.
In his letter Dolci says that "this year", as
Lanfranchino is well aware, there has been a great increase
in Verona in the number of "Golden Knights" and that these
knights not only contend amongst themselves for precedence
but even, to Dolci's great disgust, claim precedence over
all doctors:
hoc anno, ut scis vir celeberrime, auctus est apud nos
aureatorum militum numerus, qui inter se de praelatura
contendunt, ut alter alteri nullo modo concedat. Sed, quod
mea quidem serrtentia absurdius est ne dixerim temerarius,
volunt doctoribus, quisquis ille sit, anteire et praeferri.
Que res tantam mihi interdum indignationem generat et
fastidium, ut vix aliquando prae nimia admiratione apud me
sim. Et per deum, quis non stomachabitur, ubi viderit viros
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doctissimos, qui aetatem suam consumpserint j ut sic dixerim,
pro nanciscenda doctrina, qui totiens pro sua re publica
elaboraverint et indefessi continue elaborant, at istiusmodi
militibus aureatis postponi et contemni (no pag.).
Lanfranchino begins the Tractatulus by voicing his own
contempt for the ambition vanity and madness of those who
fight for such a trifle as the right of precedence: "tutte
sono bagatelle", he quotes a teacher (?) of his and Dolci's
("bonus ille pater") as having said. He again voices his
contempt in a later passage of the Tractatulus, in terms
which are slightly more specific and which, although they
could have been more informative, do suggest at least
that contests for precedence were all but daily occurrences:
"video ego quotidie, non sine animi molestia, hos milites
primum sibi capere locum supra vicarium et alios magistratos
praetorios, quales sunt reliqui iudices et iudices consules
o 77curiae" (p.22r col.l). An equally strong, and equally
hazy disgust is proffered by Paulo Andrea del Bene in his
letter: "stomacarique non desino plerumque, quod presumptuose
plurimi maiorum sibi usurpent loca, non quidem quia mihi
negetur locus, quern omnibus caedo, sed quia videam
plerosque ordinis nostri seniores patricios viros , virtute
prestantissimos, modestia insignes, auctoritate illustres,
consilio vigiliis indefessis laboribus pro nostra republica
benemeritos, indigne postergari" (no pag.). These outbursts
of indignation may provide us with no factual information,
but their very vehemence is proof enough of how real, in
this case at least, the competition between knights and
doctors was. Lanfranchino and his lawyer friends - that
much at least we may surmize about Dolci and del Bene, that
they were lawyers - are not engaging in a literary debate
for its own sake. They are banding together to defend the
privileges of their caste, "ordinis nostri". And as one
might have expected, Lanfranchino's Tractatulus tends
entirely in that direction.
It begins with a review of the privileges of
the milites, since the milites are of the opinion that they
should come first. These privileges mainly concern matters
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of inheritance, and Lanfranchino expresses his indebte-
1-7 O
dness for this section to Bartolus, Baldus and Salicetus.
Then come the privileges of the doctors, twice as many as
the knights', and mostly regarding immunities (from
torture, taxation etc.) and deference (how doctors are to
be greeted, addressed, called etc.). Here again
Lanfranchino quotes mainly from Bartolus and Baldus, with
many references of course to the Corpus iuris itself.
The impression one derives from this section is a clear
pride of rank, with doctors honoured by everyone from the
emperor downwards, and revered, as we have already seen,
as priests: "tanta est reverentia, quae debetur doctoribus,
ut merito apud leges sacerdotes appellantur" (p.22r° col.l-
see above p.37). Having surveyed the respective privileges
of knights and doctors, Lanfranchino next says that, for
the question to be resolved, four points need to be taken
into consideration, namely: whether the contemporary
milites aureati are entitled to the privileges of milites
as they appear in the Corpus iuris, whence the name miles
derives, what the legal basis and definition of the
res militaris is ("quid sit ius in quo consistat res
militaris") and whether the militia is a dignity (i.e. a
proof of nobility). In isolating these four issues
Lanfranchino, like his predecessors but in more pointed a
manner, reveals a definite parti pris: it is not doctor-
hood but only knighthood which is considered problematic.
To the first question Lanfranchino gives a negative answer,
based on the six knightly conditions of Accursius (see above
p.29 ) and with particular emphasis on the necessity for a
knight to abstain from agriculture and commercial activity
for the exclusive sake of arms: "debent enim milites, qui
gaudere volunt beneficio militari, dare operam armis,
abstinere a cura agrorum et a negotijs privatorum"
(p.22r° col.2). Given that the milites of the time
"quotidie in plateis versantur et non in castris", they
cannot claim entitlement to privileges, even though
they may be registered knights ("licet hi nostri milites
essent descripti in matricula militum"). The only privilege
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which they may enjoy Ls that of wearing golden spurs. As
regards the derivation of the name miles, Lanfranchino
explains it in the very terms of the law "De testamento
militis" (see above p.36 ), which again stress the military
nature of knighthood. And-so too do the legal basis and
definition of res militaris: "ius militare est belli
inferendi solemnitas, foederisque faciendi nexus, signo
dato eggressio in hostem, vel pugnae commissio. Item signo
dato receptio. Item flagitij militaris disciplina si locus
deseratur, Item stipendiorum modus, dignitatum gradus,
praemiorum honor, veluti cum corona vel torques donantur.
Item praedae decisio et pro personarum qualitatibus et
laboribus iusta divisio ac principis ratio" (pp.22r° col.2 -
22v° col.1). Finally and not surprisingly Lanfranchino
repudiates the notion that knighthood is a dignity, whilst
stressing of course that doctorhood is. At most knighthood
can be considered a kind of honour (i.e. a kind of outward
sign) granted in recognition of good conduct under arms:
"potest dici quod, licet militia de se non sit dignitas,
tamen est honor quidem, qui residet in bene militante"
(p.22v° col.1). The only circumstances in which knight¬
hood may be considered to be a dignity, or rather to have
some dignity, is when it is conferred upon a man who already
has a dignity, like for instance ... a doctor! "Ubi militia
adderetur viro habenti dignitatem, et sic adderetur
dignitati, utputa est quidam doctor qui postea efficitur
miles, volunt doctores quod militia in eo homine sit
dignitas. Won enim simplex militia est dignitas"
(p.22v° col . 1) . With the words "voliunt doctores"
Lanfranchino takes his distance from this argument, as
though not entirely convinced of its validity, and it is
true that it contradicts what he had said earlier on.
Granted that of the six conditions of knighthood in the
glossa ordinaria, none says that a knight may not also be
a doctor or a doctor become a knight (only a merchant is
debarred from doing so), the other conditions all stress
what Lanfranchino had also insisted upon, namely that
knighthood is about arms and warfare. And as far as we know
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those who, like Bolognini and Lanfranchino himself, styled
themselves "utriusque iuris doctor equesque auratus", had
never been trained for the military profession, let alone
seen a battlefield. This however was a debate conducted
by and for doctors, and legal weapons at least they knew
how to wield to their own best advantage.
It is at this stage that the tone of
Lanfranchino's Tractatulus becomes more impassioned. The
emphasis subtly shifts from laws and arms to knowledge and
riches, and the querelle all of a sudden acquires a new
significance and dimension, with Lanfranchino striking
out on his own and leaving aside the traditional and
therefore more neutral jargon he had used so far. In so
doing he shows quite obviously that he is writing not, like
Beccadelli, to entertain and eulogize, not for more didactic
purposes like Homodeis and Bolognini, and not for the mere
sake of literary emulation, but out of a sense of personal
frustration and moral indignation. Having proved that
knights are not knights and knighthood not a dignity,
whereas doctors are doctors and doctorhood is a dignity,
he concludes that it is doctors who must therefore have
precedence over knights. But this is not what is
happening.:
et per Deum immortalem quis non admirabitur, quis non
damnabit horum militum insolentiam, qui nulla habita
consideratione, nulla facta distinctione in doctoribus et
virtutis et doctrinae ac aetatis, omnes contendant
precedere. ... et profecto absurdum satis videtur, qui modo,
ut sic dixerim, ex ludo literario processerit, et multo
magis, qui literarum ignarus sit, velit ex hoc solo, quia
sibi dictum sit "miles esto", nullis alijs praecedentibus
meritis et qui nullos unquam pro sua republica labores
passus sit, praecedere doctorem veteranum literatum et
eruditum, qui multa agerit et plurima indefessis laboribus
passus fuerit pro adiuvanda tuenda et augenda sua republica.
Non sic, non sic repente currendum fuit. Discere oportuit
eos prius bene militare et laboribus se prius assuefacere,
ut postea sibi attentis laboribus et suis virtutibus debiti
honores impenderentur ... Non est ergo aequum, non
commendabile, ut deposito (sic dixerim) cremiale, quo in
lanifitium utebantur - de his loquor, qui istiusmodi faciunt
exercitia - et quorum parentes viliores etiam artes
exercuere, quia gladio accinctus sit, ita'in altum primo
volunt salire, quod omnes Doctores velint anteire et iudices.
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Discant, amor Dei, et se cognoscere et modestius agere.
Nec tumeat aut superbiat quis, qui dicat se admodum divitem
et propterea se nobilitatum et militiam se observare,
tenendo equos famulos plures aves et canes pascere, quia
responderi posset, hoc non esse bene militare, sed iactare
suum. ... Nec unquam mihi persuaderi poterit, quod in
divitijs consistat nobilitas, cum ille de se sint
vilissimae (pp.22v col.2 - 23r col.l).
Nobility - true and false - is now the theme of the
Tractatulus. It had always been, as we have seen, an
underlying motif of the querelle, but never before had it
assumed such importance. With Lanfranchino it is as
though precedence is discussed as an excuse to introduce
the subject of nobility, whereas before nobility had
merely been discussed for the sake of establishing
priorities. In this passage make-believe knights are
revealed for what they are: vulgar and ignorant nouveaux
riches, who see knighthood as a justification of their
newly acquired wealth, a confirmation of the new social
status to which they aspire, and a conferment of nobility
upon themselves. Using knighthood as a pretext it is
against these nouveaux riches, who themselves use knight¬
hood as an alibi, that Lanfranchino, contemptuous of their
wealth and of wealth in general, aims his invective. To
them and their meretricious nobility, derived from extrinsic
goods,he opposes the intrinsic and unforfeitable nobility
of doctors. And doctors are no longer mere jurists. They
have become the embodiment of all virtue and knowledge:
no mere technical knowledge but knowledge in its broadest
sense and knowledge furthermore whose function is to serve
the commonweal and not to be simply an end unto itself.
One might almost feel tempted to speak of "civic humanism",
if one were not weary of the expression. But there is no
doubt that, unlike Bolognini or Beccadelli, Lanfranchino
has updated the querelle in line with new intellectual
trends, that he is no longer content simply to rehearse the
lawyers' hackneyed arguments, and that to him the querelle
is more than a mere law-suit about ceremonial precedence.
Against the backdrop of Veronese society it becomes, though
admittedly in circumscribed terms, an essay on man and
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society, on the function, aims and values of the
rightful leaders of society, the true nobility. This
nobility is not a nobility of wealth, or even a nobility
of blood, but a nobility of personal merit and service:
"auamvis sit quis ex humili genere natus, nec amplum a suis
maioribus relictum sit sibi patrimonium, si tamen is
liberalibus artibus diu exercitatus et in sacratissimis
literarum studijs educatus fuerit , si modeste et iuste
vixerit , si pro sua republica indefesse elaboraverit, si de
religione bene senserit, si pius in parentes, si in amicos
et coniunctos liberalis extiterit, num hie et clarissimus
et nobilissimus habetur" (p.23r° col.2). It should be
noted that by attacking the representatives of a new social
class, the nouveaux riches, Lanfranchino is not setting
himself up as a guardian of the old order and the panegyrist
of an ancient warrior nobility. Far from it. He does
condemn the nouveaux riches, it is true, for usurping the
title of milit e s, but his attack is in fact two-pronged.
He not only derides "tradesmen" for having the wrong
notion of nobility as wealth, but also for seeking
ennoblement in the wrong direction, since in any case
knighthood is not a dignitas. So it is of a "third order"
that Lanfranchino sings the praises, an order which,
regardless of social origins and circumstances, has
followed the only true pathway to nobility, the "sacred
study of letters".
Just as in his arguments Lanfranchino goes
beyond the traditional confines of the querelle, so too at
this stage does he turn to other sources for the confir¬
mation of his ideas. Instead of medieval Roman lawyers, he
now quotes classical Roman authors. He mentions Cicero's
contempt for riches in the De officiis, Marius's harangue
to the Senate (in Sallust's De bello ,j ugurthino) about the
greater worth of self-made nobility, and the oration Pro
habenda Lucretia in which Gaius Flaminius boasts of being
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noble, not of the deeds of others but of his own. And
was not Socrates noble, asks Lanfranchino, even though his
60
mother was a midwife and his father a marble-worker?
And Demosthenes, even though of unknown parentage?
Having soared to such heights, Lanfranchino
comes down to earth again with quite a thump and the ending
of the Tractatulus is disappointingly uninspired. We
return to Bartolus, Baldus and their peers with the
conclusion that "therefore" the doctor must precede the
knight. This statement is also accompanied by its usual
rider, Tartagni1s compromise:
aut contenditur de actu militari, quia aliquid discutiendum
sit bello vel armis, et certe miles debet praecedere
doctorem et eius dicto potius staretur; aut sumus in actu
doctoreo, puta quia aliquid disputandum et discutiendum
sit de iure, et eo casu doctor debet praeferri militi; ...
aut sumus in actu indifferenti, et ita doctori sicut militi
pertinenti et communi, ut est in sedendo eundo loquendo et
his similibus, et doctor de iure debet praecedere militem
ratione suae dignitatis (p.23r col.l)
Such lofty words,simply to resolve a question of straight¬
forward precedence: who may speak before whom, who may sit
before whom and who may walk in front of whom! The deflation
is bad enough, but it goes even further. In his final
paragraph Lanfranchino recants almost everything he had
said about true nobility, by now granting precedence to
knights of noble ancestry: "ego autem putarem hoc dictum
limitandum esse, nisi miles ille esset longe superior et
aetate et antiqua maiorum nobilitate dicto doctore, quia
eo casu putarem militem praeferri debere" (p.23r° col.l).
Lanfranchino is here talking about real milites, not
dubbed nouveaux riches, and in truth he does not contradict
his earlier conclusions altogether. He still maintains
that knighthood as such is not a dignity, but just as it
acquires dignity in a doctor by being conjoined to doctor-
hood, so here too does it acquire dignity through being
united with old age, the renown and prestige of a family
(from which the knight in question must not have degener¬
ated) and personal virtue and goodness. What Lanfranchino
actually seems to be attempting in his closing words is to
conteract any offence his Tractatulus might have caused to
members of noble families of Verona:
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"venerenda profecto semper est senectus, sed maxime
colenda in viro optimo et virtute propria decorato et
maiorum suorum gloria et titulis coruscante, quales plures
sunt in civitate nostra; cum quitus, propter eorum
praestantiam et integritatem, non arbitror aequum esse
de praelatura contendere, quos ut vere patritios ac
patriae patres venerari et coli censeo"
(p•23r° col. 1) .
In spite of its parochial genesis, the
Tractatulus was in due course to reach a wider audience
and to receive sanction as an authority on knights and
doctors. It was republished in a hefty legal treatise,
together with Bolognini and Homodeis, in Lyons in 15^-9
8 0
and in Venice in 158^. By that time however the
querelle had long since been reconfined to legal
commentaries, where it remained a familiar topic for
debate though until well into the seventeenth century.
The period of autonomy it had enjoyed at the end of the
fifteenth century was shortlived. No further work was to
be published independently on the subject after the first
edition of Lanfranchino's Tract atulus. The genre was
possibly too technical and rigid .to survive on its own.
No sooner had it detached itself from its original element
(the corpus of Roman law) than it was coupled with other
material: encomium in the case of Beccadelli, and a
discussion on nobility in Lanfranchino's case. Once let
loose in other words, it tended to become metamorphosed,
even at the hands of specialists. It is little wonder
therefore that, when seized upon by non-specialists
(i.e. people who were not lawyers), it should have become
something quite different. That is how the querelle of
Arms and Letters was born.
Arms and letters had already been in the air
for some time when the querelle of Knights and Doctors
sought independence at the end of the fifteenth century.
Indeed it is quite probably because they had been, as we
shall be seeing, that knights and doctors made their
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exceptional sortie into open ground, and then because of
the greater popularity and amenability of arms and letters
that knights and doctors were ultimately defeated as a
purely literary genre. Before we turn to arms and letters
however, we must go back in time,in order to investigate
some instances of the debate which occurred at the margins
so to speak of the querelle of Knights and Doctors proper.
They will show us that the theme was also well-known
outside strictly legal circles, and how it inevitably




THE MARGINS OF THE QUERELLE OF KNIGHTS AND DOCTORS
A. Flavio Biondo: Borsus.
The text which is closest in purpose to the
tradition of the querelle, although it is quite different
in its arguments, is Flavio Biondo's Borsus , It has "been
known to scholars for quite some time, but mostly under the
name given to it by Biondo's earliest biographers and
historians: De militia et iurisprudentia. There are three
extant manuscripts of it, one of them (in the Vatican) an
autograph, and two modern editions, one published in
Germany, in 1892, the other in Italy in 1927-"1" It has not
however, and understandably so, been ranked as one of
Biondo's most significant works. The Dizionario biografico
degli italiani actually dismisses it as an uninteresting
summary of the Roma triumphans, which Biondo wrote in
pressing economic circumstances to catch the benevolent
2
eye of Duke Borso d'Este. It is dedicated to Borso and
named after him, in the hope that it might be saved from
oblivion by the stamp of his authority. Borso is also
called upon, with all his wisdom and expertise, to act as
3the final adjudicator of the dispute with which it deals.
The dispute is said to have arisen out of a
disagreement over seating arrangements between knights and
doctors who were taking part in the Diet of Mantua. Biondo
was at that time in Mantua in the following of Pius 11
(he stayed there from May 27th 1^59 until January 19th
ll|6o), and the dispute was referred to him for settle¬
ment by some of the participants in the Diet. This at
least is the story which has been retold in connection with
the Borsus; but I have not been able to ascertain whence it
originated and the text itself does not give us precise
h
enough information to either prove or disprove it. It is
dated in Mantua on January l6th 1^60 and Biondo does indeed
admit to having been asked for his opinion on the matter, but
he does so in vague terms, which evoke more a long¬
standing social and literary debate than they do a particular
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instance of contested precedence:
peropportune accidit, mi Borse, dux illustrissime,
praestantes a me viros efflagitasse, solvi, quae diu multos
agitat cum alios turn maxime principes vires, quaestionem,
multis mihi rationis difficillimam, praesertim consideranti
una in parte armis, in altera legibus deditos decertare,
qui ambo consueverint non magis victoriam appetere quam
certamen. Pervetustaque est ea contentio et quae omnibus
in provinciis, civitatibus et oppidis saepenumero habeatur,
utra scilicet eorum pars praeferri honore et dignior haberi
debeat (p•131).
At first Biondo expresses reluctance to accept the task,
as he has had no experience of military life, little
practice in the law, and is not familiar with the terms of
the debate; but he then finds his inspiration in the
recently completed Roma triumphans, from which he makes no
secret of having cribbed the text of the Borsus: "ea, quae
in Triumphante de utriusque primariis viris semper in
Romana re publica plurimi habitis scripta sunt a nobis,
a vetustissimis vatibus sumpta, suo in cuiusque partis loco
accumulata afferemus, ut ipsi milites, ipsi pariter
iureconsulti ea legentes nostramque opinionem, quo ex
fonte ducamus, intelligentes, nobis aequiore animo
acquiescant" (p.131). The Borsus in other words might
have been a kind of publicity stunt for the Roma triumphans:
a "leaflet" (it is only some ten pages long) written to
whet the appetite of Duke Borso and other mighty moneyed
men for the Triumphans through the medium of a better-
known and more popular genre (the querelle). Certainly
the Borsus serves more as a display of Biondo's erudition
than as a useful guide to the solution of precedence
controversies. As we shall be seeing, its practical value
is almost nil.
On the surface, Biondo's method in the Borsus
is very simple. He begins with a definition of militia
and by sorting out the various types of milites which
existed in ancient Rome, and having then looked at the
privileges they enjoyed, he organizes them into a hierarchy.
With the lawyers he proceeds in very much the same way:
first a definition of law and justice, then a categorization
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of the different types of lawyers found in ancient Rome,
and finally their hierarchical organization. In the last
section of the Borsus he attempts to fit the lawyers and
milit e s of his own day into the old Roman categories, which
he then compares to-one another, whilst examining their
relative claims to precedence.
The militia comes first because Romulus, when
he founded Rome, created mi1it e s before he established laws
(Homodeis, it will be remembered, had begun his defence of
milite s with the very same point - see above p.32) . The
definition which Biondo gives of the mi1itia is also one with
which we are familiar:(see above p. 36 ) "militiam a milite
et militem aut a duritia, cui innutriri debet, aut a numero
mille militum, quos singulae trium tribuum conditae urbis
principio mittebant, dictum esse constat" (p.132). There
were seven categories of milites in ancient Rome, of which
the most exalted was that of the equites. The equestrian
order ranked second only to the order of senators, all
judges in capital cases were chosen from within its ranks,
and what is more tax collection in the whole empire was
the sole responsibility of equites. Apart from the equites,
there were the classici, who were not wholehearted milit es,
as they had to be paid. Then there were the dimis sanei ,
reserve milites for times of danger with an honourable
discharge to their credit. The tutuli, according to Ulpian,
were milites who had been granted the permission to stay
behind in order to protect the country; but according to
Seneca (whose opinion Biondo prefers), they were milit es
who had been dismissed for being useless when danger was
at hand. Milites appointed to stay behind for the sake of
procreation and to guard the country were called
proletarii. Beneficiarii were, by special grant from the
emperor, exempted from conscription but still ranked as
milites, and finally the 1egionarii were full-time milite s
who, once they had been ascribed to a legion, could not
leave it, whether in time of war or peace.
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To the milite s, especially the better sort,
Rome owed her greatness. She therefore showed them great
deference and gave them much praise, as we learn from the
mouth of Cicero in Pro Murena:
at nimirum, dicendum est enim quod sentio, rei militaris
virtus praestat ceteris omnibus. Haec populo Romano,
haec huic urbi aeternam gloriam peperit, haec orbem
terrarum parere huic imperio coegit; omnes urbanae res,
omnia praeclara nostra studia et haec forensis laus et
industria latent in tutela et praesidio bellicae virtutis;
simul ac increpuit suspicio tumultus, artes illico nostrae
conticescunt. Quod si ita est, cedant, opinor, Sulpici,
forum castris, otium militiae, stilus gladio, umbra soli. 5
The mi1it e s were therefore a class apart in Roman society,
a special group with special duties and special privileges.
The privileged position of the militia is evidenced,
according to Biondo, by the fact that all Roman imperatores,
whether in republican or imperial times, came from its
ranks, and by the fact that in theatres the best seats
were always reserved for milites, and the fact too that
milites could bequeath their belongings as and how they
wished. Of course these privileges were not an automatic
entitlement, but had to be earned through good behaviour
and upright living: "dignos vero tantis honoribus et tanta
gloria milites legum observantia et vitae sobrietas,
castitas atque integritas et erga suos innocentia ut
redderet, oportuit" (p.135). Severe punishments were
prescribed for milite s who infringed this code of
behaviour.
Just as their inward qualities were meant to
set Roman milites apart from the crowd, so too did their
external appearence. The next section of the Borsus
therefore deals with Roman military dress and its disting¬
uishing features, especially golden insignia, since the use
of golden spurs made this a contentious issue in Biondo1s
own time. Roman milites, says Biondo, would wear golden
rings, have gold on their horses' phalerae, on bracelets,
on their shoulders, or around their neck, but never at
their heels! This is not the only time he will aim his
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thrust at what he sees as the ignorant and showy pretence
of his contemporary Golden Knights ; and as if to undermine
their self-importance even further, he closes his remarks
on the sartorial habits of Eoman milites with the reminder
that when they returned to civilian life, they would doff
their military uniform and don their toga like normal
citizens.
Finally turning to their order of merit,
Biondo says that of all the milites the equites were the
most dignified and the dimis s anei only slightly inferior
to them. The legionarii came next, especially if their
worth had been enhanced by an honourable discharge.
Proletarii and beneficiarii, who may be said to have
belonged to the same category, were of little standing
and really used the name milites improperly. As for the
tutuli they were the vilest of the vile and outright
usurpers of the name miles. But the classici fare still
worse in Biondo's pecking order: they no longer even get a
mention.
With defining law and dividing lawyers into
categories Biondo faces a more difficult task. The ancient
authors (the "vetustissimi vates"), he warns us, are not
too clear on the subject. He gives us not one but eight
definitions of lex and leges, beginning with Cicero's "est
enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta
ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria" (p.137) and
"ut corpora nostra sine mente, sic civitas sine lege"
(p.138),^ to which he adds a few definitions of iustitia
and ius, ending up with the quotation from the Corpus juris
in which lawyers are called priests (see above p.37).
This is followed by a more thorough investigation of the
nature of law (public, private, natural, civil etc.) before
we are introduced to the various categories of ancient
Roman lawyers. A simple classification is to be found in
Cicero, but Biondo confesses to finding it unhelpful and
confusing: "legum ministri magistratus, legum interpretes
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7iudices". Who were these judges, asks Biondo? Have we not
just seen that equites too could perform as judges? He
therefore has to turn to other (unnamed) sources. At the
top of the ladder he finds the iureconsulti, always held
in high esteem, who were the guardians and interpreters
of the non-written legal tradition. As to those men who
were involved daily in legal practice, defending life
liberty and property, it is not clear to Biondo what they
were actually called, unless it be advoc ati or patroni.
They were what in modern terms one might call barristers-
at-law, and beneath them there milled a crowd of shady
causidici. First the obturbatores whose function it was to
cause delays in the proceedings so as to allow better
lawyers the time to get ready before making an appearance.
Next the sub scriptore s, who helped the prosecution by
whispering in its ears. The praevaricator was in collusion
with the defence and he would tell lies and give false
testimonies in order to have the charges transferred unto
somebody else. The cognitor would appear to have been some
kind of solicitor who instructed "barristers" on the case
in hand, and the procurator acted on behalf of an absentee.
Nowadays, Biondo concludes, all these lawyers, from the
iureconsulti' down, are called doctors of law or notaries:
"suntque hi iureconsulti patroni advocati obturbatores
praevaricatores subscriptores cognitores procuratores;
quibus omnibus unica nunc est doctoris legum aut notarii
appellatio" (p.l^l).
When modern lawyers first began to call
themselves doctors, Biondo finds it difficult to say, but,
he surmizes (wrongly), it cannot have been much before the
turn of the century, for in many papal documents of the
last three hundred years they are called iudic e s. As to
who first devised the method of conferring doctorates, he
was not able to find a single doctor who could provide him
with a clear answer: "quis autem primus fuerit, qui modum
vel potius artificium doctorandi et doctores auro ornandi
adinvenerit, nec invenire potui nec ab ipsorum aliquo
intelligere." ®
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Having thus shifted his attention to the
present, Biondo's next step will "be to classify present-
day milites. and doc tore s according to the ancient Roman
scheme. But first he feels compelled to introduce a
linguistic proviso regarding the modern usage of the words
miles and eques . Since the appellation of miles is "being
abused and usurped nowadays by even the unworthiest of
soldiers, with the result that many of wiser counsel
have begun to call themselves equites, when Biondo speaks
of equites, he will take the title as referring only to the
better sort: "eo militis nomine cuiusvis abiecti manipuli
contubernales commilitonesque profitentur, quamquam
nonnulli ex nostris doctiores prudentiore consilio se se
equites appellare coeperunt. Quo nos etiam vocabulo cum
utemur, praestantiores ex ipsis ubique per orbem terrarum
intelligi volumus" (p.lU2). This remark, which, as Biondo
proceeds, will turn out to have been neither too necessary
nor very useful, and which the modern reader could well
have wished to be less vague, is nevertheless revealing
in view of the sometimes indiscriminate use made by some
9
of our other authors of the two words m question; and
it will be worth bearing it in mind for a later chapter,
when we investigate the social background of the querelle.
At all events, modern equites, honest and rich though they
may be and however much they may fancy themselves as the
peers of the equites of ancient Rome, cannot in any way be
considered of the same standing, for the simple reason
that the universal Roman Empire has ceased to exist and
that they therefore belong to a totally different order of
things. If however they manage to imitate ancient equites
in integrity modesty faith liberality and other virtues,
they ought to be given precedence over their fellow-
citizens, except for top ecclesiastical prelates and top
magistrates; and this should apply as well to an eques
of small means and obscure origins who, through this
imitation of ancient examples, has shown himself to be equal
to a wealthy eques of ancient lineage. On the other hand
if there should be an eques who is neither outstandingly
good nor exceptionally bad, but who has served honourably
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as a paid soldier ( " st ipendiar i e.") or who has otherwise
le/d an honourable lifeJ and in the event that he be regist¬
ered as a Golden Knight, and as long as he sets greater
store by righteousness than by this distinction, defending
justice, protecting orphans and widows and at all times
seeking nothing but the honour and glory of his country,
he is to be ranked a dimissaneus. To the Roman proletarii,
beneficiarii, legionarii and tutuli Biondo equates two
categories of modern milites: men of little virtue who are
burdened rather than honoured with that title by princes
who hold it of little account, and men who, aware of their
own ineptitude but desirous of being honoured though unable
and unwilling to deserve it through virtue and honesty,
aspire to be decorated with golden spurs which, even
though they are unworthy of them and to the great
indignation of all and sundry, they manage to acquire by
simply producing the money. As for the doctors of law, only
a few nowadays can be compared to the iureconsulti of old.
They are the doctors who teach at universities, offering
legal advice and resolving difficult points of law. To
the ancient pat roni and advoc ati only the modern
consistoriales advocati can be equated, who take up cases
in the Curia before the Pope and the College of Cardinals.
The present-day obturbatores, praevaricatores and
sub s c riptore s are all those doctors who, through their
ignorance, "pollute" doctorhood to such an extent (because
of their numbers) that better doctors have become ashamed
of using that title: "obturbatores autem, praevaricatores
et subscriptores illi ex nostris aetatis nostrae legum
doctoribus videntur esse, qui, cum paucas aut nullas sciant
litteras, ipsum inquinant doctoratum; quorum quidem tanta
nunc est multitudo, ut nonnullos ex dignioribus nobis
amicissimos doctoratus proprii propter illos paenitere et
pudere viderimus" (p.li+3).
In Roman times the best equites had precedence
over the worthiest of iureconsulti, but the revolutionary
changes occasioned by the disappearence of the Roman Empire
("per factam insignem vel potius enormem imperii Romanorum
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status et condicionis mutationem") have caused equites to
fall from their status more so than iureconsuiti; yet if
one can find equite s and dimi ssa'nei of great virtue
rectitude and power, they are to receive preferential
treatment over iureconsulti patroni and advoc ati of the
same nature. If there should "be an equal amount of lesser
virtue, rectitude and power on either side, all are to be
equally honoured. Equite s and dimis s anei of even indiffer¬
ent authority and life-style are preferable to obturbatore s
praevaricatores and subscriptores, and even mediocre
iureconsulti patroni and advocati are superior to proletarii
beneficiarii legionarii and tutuli. If however, in this
day of immoderate ambition and iniquity, someone, because
of the golden spurs he happens to have at his heels, should
want precedence over even the worthiest of iureconsulti
patroni and advocati , it will be up to the prince or
whoever has authority at the time to restrain such impudence.
But if proletarii beneficiarii legionarii and tutuli
should be contending for precedence with obturbatore s
praevaricatores and subscriptores, there can be no other
remedy than to let them fight it out amongst themselves
with strikes and blows, to the great amusement of the
assembled multitude:
sin vero proletariis beneficiariis legionariis et tutulis
comparati milites nostri, obturbatoribus praevaricatoribus
et subscriptoribus legum doctoribus se praeferent; si e
contra etiam hi resistere illis et anteponi contendent,
nullam meo consilio curam vel princeps vel praelatus
quispiam assumet, sed utrosque cum auro suo invicem
contendere et rem non quidem gladiis sed pugillis agere
cum adstantium cachinno permittet (p.1^1+).
These are the closing words of the Borsus.
Reading them one cannot help but feel that Biondo could
not get himself to take his subject-matter too seriously.
His solution to cases of disputed precedence is at best
a wrestling match and at worst would have required the
setting up of a special commission to investigate the life¬
style ancestry wealth integrity and education of knights
and doctors in order to establish whether they were equites
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or dimissanei, iureconsulti or patroni or worse, and to
grant or deny them precedence accordingly. What it was in
fact which Biondo could not take seriously was the actual
querelle. It seems to have mattered little to him whether
knights really had precedence over doctors or vice versa,
as long as he could write a history of ancient Rome. He
was, as we said, trying to kill two "birds with one stone:
to satisfy those who had asked him for his opinion on the
question of precedence and at the same time to draw the
attention of men of influence (Borso in particular) to the
existence of the Roma triumphans. That is why he ends up
"by nullifying his own endeavours (if we consider them
strictly from the perspective of the querelle, i.e. of
establishing priorities between knights and doctors).
Having gone to great lengths to discover all the categories
of milites and lawyers which existed in ancient Rome and
to organize them into a hierarchy, when it came to
applying these categories to his own day and age, he had
no alternative but to lump together again what he had so
painstakingly sorted out, because they simply did not make
sense in modern terms. Biondo had been presented with a
legal problem and he tried to solve it as a philologist and
historian, who was aware that the gap between the past and
the present was unbridgeable, in a way which the Roman
lawyers who were writing on the querelle were not. They
too in a sense were imposing an outdated model on to a
modern situation, but they did not see it in that way. For
them what had been, still was. Rome still existed; the
Corpus iuris was there to witness that. They could talk
of the Roman emperor, as we have seen, as though he were
still a living reality. Biondo on the other hand was only
too painfully aware that what had been, simply was no longer.
Rome no longer existed and he never tires of reminding his
readers of the "factam insignem vel potius enormem imperii
Romanorum status et condicionis mutationem". Because of
this Biondo does not take anything for granted as the
lawyers do. Everything is subjected to his philological and
historical scrutiny. Unlike the lawyers therefore it is
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not just knighthood which, he considers problematic, but
doctorhood too. Despite his different approach though,
Biondo owed a lot to the traditional querelle. After
Cicero it is the Corpus juris he quotes most frequently.
He does, it is true, try to conceal the fact, by referring
to it simply as the words of Ulpian. In that way he satis¬
fied his philological urge which impelled him to seek truth
in the original etymology of words and allowed him to quote
only from classical authors ("vetustissimi ?ates"), whom
he saw as the repositories of that truth, the non plus
ultra. And by presenting the Corpus juris as the work of
Ulpian, he manages to make believe it is a classical text.
Biondo could not help but approach the subject
according to the rules of his own craft, he could not help
but use terms and sources with which he was more familiar
(he himself admitted, as we saw, not to be conversant with
the legal tradition and jargon); nevertheless there was no
doubt in his mind that the Borsus was part of a well-
established genre. "Pervetusta est ea contentio" he says
in the opening lines, and the contentio is that between
knights and doctors.
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B. Giovanni d'Arezzo: De medieinae et legum praestantia,
and Leon Battista Alberti: Be commodis litterarnm
atque incommodis.
Another •well-established genre at the time
was the Law versus Medicine querelle, in which doctors of
law are brought to grips with doctors of medicine, though
not over a question of straightforward precedence but in a
debate about the relative nobility and utility of their
respective disciplines. This querelle, which has more in
common by its tenor with the Arms and Letters querelle than
it has with the querelle of Knights and Doctors, is better
known to modern scholars than either of these and has been
the object of more research."^ Its most famous contributor
was Coluccio Salut at i ,but the text which is of interest
to us is by the physician Giovanni d'Arezzo and is a
dialogue entitled De medicinae et legum praestantia. It
was written in Florence shortly after the death of Piero
12
de' Medici in 1U69 and was dedicated to Lorenzo his son.
It is only because of its concluding remarks, which are a
witness to the popularity of the querelle of Knights and
Doctors, that it is deserving of our attention, for it is
not otherwise relevant to the subject of this thesis.
The three interlocutors of the dialogue are
Carlo d'Arezzo, who does most of the questioning, Leonardo
Bruni, who provides most of the answers, and Eiccolo
Niccoli, who assents and dissents in turn. The discussion,
which aims to prove the superiority of medicine over law,
is said to have arisen out of the recent and sudden
metamorphosis of an ignorant Florentine silversmith into a
famous and respected physician, and the resulting amazement
of the speakers at the credulity of the masses. After many
and lengthy exchanges of views, they turn in the end to
commenting upon the ill manners of most contemporary
physicians, and just as Bruni has spoken his last words,
Carlo, quite unexpectedly, asks him to resolve one final
doubt: "quis dignior habendus, legum doctor an miles?" The
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informed reader would no doubt expect this question to
trigger off all the usual arguments. Bruni howeyer does
not wis;h to become involved in yet another controversy,
especially as his doing so is likely to arouse the anger
of knights. He therefore throws the ball back at Carlo:
"de hoc ego vel nescio, vel potius nolo in verba prorumpere.
Ham me forsan velles hodie malam aliquam gratiam cum
militia mea sponte emere. Tu tamen huius rei verior satis
arbiter esse potes; sed quod ipsi ex sese tantopere sunt
prolassi, aut sibi ab aliis concessum est, cedamus" (p.98).
Carlo, it turns out, is no keener than Bruni on.prolonging
the discussion and so he dismisses the matter in a few
words: "numquam ego hoc mihi suasi, quod unius vaginati
ensis ictus, maximum scientiarum decorem longo tempore
partum, ac magnis laboribus et sumptibus emptum, dignitate
praevincere debeat" (p.98).
Since the question is dispatched so cursorily,
one wonders why the author should have bothered to bring
it up in the first place. It certainly adds very little
to the dialogue as a whole, and being so brief it is not
of much interest in' itself. It may well be that Giovanni
d'Arezzo intended it as a form of apology to doctors of law.
Having spent so much time on "depreciating" their profession,
he did not want to end without paying them a compliment too.
But to introduce this compliment - if that is what it is -
he uses the very vocabulary of the querelle, and it is
really as though he did not want to let the opportunity
pass of adding his own opinion, however succinctly, to
a topical debate, The opportunity was a good one, since
he was in any case talking about doctors of law and their
claims against members of another profession, and the debate
must have been topical indeed to be mentioned quite so
abruptly and without so much as a word of explanation to
the reader.
It is difficult to gauge from these few lines
(as indeed it is even from longer passages and texts) whether
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the debate was topical in Florence at the time mainly for
literary reasons - i.e. whether Giovanni d'Arezzo touched
upon the querelle so as to be culturally a la page - or
whether it was actual social conflicts which made it so.
The way in which Carlo d'Arezzo phrases his question evokes
literary precedents, but in his closing remarks one can
sense real indignation at the insolence of knights who
claim that might is right. And Bruni's reluctance to
enter the fray also suggests a live controversy. It is
not the debate as such he objects to. He does not want to
descend to the level of obstreperous knights. "Let them
have what they want" he therefore says, as disenchantedly
as Pietro Zagni, twenty years later, will be saying to
the knights of Bologna: "precedete, poi che non vel veda/
la prava abusion de questa Terra" (see above p. 19 ),
There is also an echo of the querelle of
Knights and Doctors in Leon Battista Alberti's De commodis
litterarum atque incommodis, another text written against
the backdrop, it is presumed, of Florentine society, though
some fo/rty years prior to the composition of Giovanni
13d'Arezso's De medicinae et legum praestantia. Here
too the querelle makes a sudden and unexpected appearance,
and here too it gets dismissed after only a short while.
The man-of-letters who is the subject of the
De commodis is a man with a clear vocation, a man who will
devote his entire life to learning and knowledge, and spend
it "in litteris occupatus, inter libros involutus, atque
inter chartulas sempiterne sepultus" (p.6U),~'~^ but he is
not someone who has any obvious social function. Alberti,
it is true, does mention teachers writers ("scribae")
lawyers physicians and theologians (priests) as being
various types of men-of-letters , since their training is
predominantly literary, but the man-of-letters he mostly
has in mind is more likely than not to have no practical
experience and therefore to be unfit for public office,
whilst knowing all there is to know about the heavens the
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planets the gods and the souls, of men. He thus seems quite
above the fray of daily existence, when all of a sudden he
becomes involved in a mundane conflict for precedence with
the "order of knights":
qua igitur ratione compertum est, ut equester ordo in
publicis cetibus litteratos antecedat, aut quivis ex ordine
equestri litterato comparetur? Qua impudentia rudei,
inexpertum rerum, atque plerunque temerarium militem
litteratis omnibus anteponamus? Hec ego non institutis
maiorum, sed insolentia et temeritate quadam militum id
sibi arrogantium in usum accessisse arbitror. Nisi forte
maiores nostri iudicarint litteris quam auro minus habendum
esse honoris. Alioqui perversa ratio, turpis mos, iniusta
licentia est, hunc militem preponere, in quo nullus
virtutis, morum, aut sapientie splendor inest. Quive
tantum gemma et auro se velit. admodum conspicuum videri:
hunc vero litteratum postponere, qui moribus, virtute,
ingenio , litterarum ac rerum optimarum cognitione ac
ratione sit probatissimus atque clarissimus. Sed missam
faciamus hanc disceptationem recte ne miles preponatur,
quamquam quidem ea ipsa disceptatio esset hoc quoque loco
non negligenda (p.l2l+).
What, one wonders, would Alberti's single-minded absent-
minded scholars be doing in public processions ("publicis
cetibus")? And who are the knights who refuse to grant
them precedence? There can be little doubt about the
sincerity of Alberti's indignation, but one cannot help
but suspect that the inspiration behind this passage is
to a great extent literary. The very words with which he
dismisses the subject are an obvious verbal reminiscence
of the querelle; add "an doctor" and you have the title
of any of the works we have studied so far: "hanc
disceptationem recte ne miles an doctor preponatur." But
it was litteratos and not doctores Alberti was talking
about, and he therefore had to recognize that the querelle,
well-known though it may have been ("hanc disceptationem")
and however much he would have liked to debate the matter
("quamquam ... ea ipsa disceptatio esset ... non negligenda"),
was not relevant to his argument. Indeed it was not even
real knights at whom he was aiming his invective: an
equester ordo maybe but not true milites. The function of
a true knight, as he then goes on to say, is to protect
the commonweal with his arms: "at dicamus militiam esse
publicum aliquod munus militisque ipsius munus et officium
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esse non mediocris negocii virgines, viduas., destitutas
atque indefensas, atque pupillos, atque pauperes omnes,
eiusmodique afflictos omnes una et rempublicam omnem sua
ope, rebus et armis tueri , tegere, atque defendere" (p.l2i+).
The equites whom we see contending for precedence with
litterati in the De commodis were not, it would appear,
fulfilling this function, and their mark of distinction
moreover was not arms but gold. This could be a reference
to the golden spurs of Golden Knights , but the expression
is ambiguous and could equally well refer to the gold with
which those spurs were purchased. Certainly when Alberti
reprimands his forebears for showing less respect to
"litteris quam auro", one imagines florins rather than arms
as the real rivals of letters in Florence, and one is
reminded of the words of Adovardo in Delia famiglia: "non
patisce la terra nostra che de'suoi alcuno cresca troppo
nelle vittorie dell'armi ... Ne anche fa la terra nostra
troppo pregio de' litterati, anzi piu tosto pare tutta
studiosa al guadagno e cupida di ricchezze.^ There is
no doubt that wealth is seen as the main enemy of learning
in the De commodis and the wealthy as the chief usurpers
of precedence. Having written but half a page about
knights, Alberti spends a good four pages on the
indignities and affronts which men of letters have to
suffer at the hands of rich men. The rich man says of the
man of letters: "quid illi assurgam? Quid cedam e via?
aut discopriam? Quid mihi cum illo est negocii? Novit
litteras, quid ad me?" (p.126). Here again the problem is
at first presented as one of straightforward precedence
("quid cedam e via?"), but what then becomes the main butt
of Alberti's harangue are the prejudices of the rich man
who says:"novit litteras, quid ad me?" It is not in fact
the contest for precedence as such which preoccupies
Alberti, but the contest for precedence insofar as it
signifies a conflict of ideologies: smug ignorance
opposed to learning, materialistic values against spiritual
ones, barbarism versus civilisation. Like Lanfranchino
some seventy years later, Alberti wanted above all to attack
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the insolence and pretensions of the nouveaux riches.
Unlike Lanfranchino however, Alherti had not broached this
theme from the angle of the querelle and he need not at all
have introduced an echo of the querelle into his discussion.
He soon realized in fact that it was quite out of place in
the context of his argument, but talking of social com¬
petition and disrespect for men-of-letters he too, like
Giovanni d'Arezzo, must have felt that it was a good
opportunity to contribute his own opinion to a topical
debate. At the time of writing the De commodis Alberti
might still have been in Bologna, and if he was not, he
had only just left that city. The querelle of Knights
and Doctors was a regular subject for discussion there,
amongst the lawyers of the university. This could explain
why Alberti, who was only a fledgling writer and probably
keen therefore to advertise his knowledge, should have
wanted to mention the querelle and why, having done so, he
should then have cast it aside, when he came to consider
the realities of the Florentine environment about which he
was writing.
It was against this same Florentine background,
and only a few years later, that one of Alberti's friends,
who was also a friend of Flavio Biondo, Lapo da Castiglionchio
the younger, wrote an entire work inspired by the querelle
of Knights and Doctors, which he entitled Comparatio inter
rem militarem et studia literarum. Lapo was not a lawyer
and his arguments in the Comparatio are not at all the
usual arguments of the querelle. Indeed his terminology
belongs to a totally different world from the traditional
world of Roman lawyers. Yet it was to their very tradition
as we shall be seeing, that Lapo himself assigned the
Comparatio. If it ended up as something quite different,
it is because, as we have already noted, when released from
its bonds with the body of the law, the genre naturally
tended to undergo a transformation.
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C. Lapp da Castiglionchio; Comparatio inter rem
militarem et studia literarum.
Lapo da Castiglionchio was by no means a
prominent figure in his own time and he cannot rank as a
great writer; nonetheless he has been the object of
considerable attention by scholars. His life was sketched
out by Vespasiano da Bisticci and more recently in a
somewhat superficial "profile" by Lauro Martines; he
receives a mention in Tiraboschij a work of his, the
Dialogus de curiae commodis, was edited by Garin in 1952 j
and the latest volume of the Dizionario biografico degli
italiani devotes five pages to him."'"^ Most of what we know
about him is derived from his own epistolario, in which not
all the letters are dated and many contain vague allusions
instead of specific statements. There have been two
studies of the epistolario, one in 1899 by Francesco Paolo
Luiso, the other an unpublished tesi di laurea of 1971 by
E. Rotondi which provides the basis for Riccardo Fubini's
17
article m the DBI. Luiso worked from the five manusc¬
ripts known to him (four in Italy and one in France),
containing 37 letters in all, whereas Rotondi was able to
consult a newly discovered manuscript from Como, which
18
contains a total of 75 letters. Despite this discovery
there are still many uncertainties about Lapo's biography
and one significant one as far as we are concerned: the
circumstances and date of composition of the Comparatio
inter rem militarem et studia literarum are unknown.
Lapo came from a long dispossessed family of
the Florentine feudal nobility, originally from the
Valdisieve. His grandfather, Petrarch's friend Lapo the
elder, who was a famous lawyer and played an important
part in the city's administration, regenerated through his
learning the waning nobility of his family. This at least
is what he taught his children to believe, the eldest of
whom, Bernardo, wrote admiringly to him - and in terms
taken straight from the Knight and Doctor querelle: "sete
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adunque, Padre, cavaliere, essendo avvocato; sete Conte,
19
avendo letto venti anni". Lapo the elder's success was
short-lived however. During the revolt of the Ciompi his
house was burnt down, and he sent into exile. Thereafter
the family fortunes were never quite the same again.
Lapo the younger was born in 1^05 or IU06,
and died in 1^38 of the plague, in Venice. Vespasiano
da Bisticci describes him as a melancholy character little
prone to laughter ("era.di mediocre istatura, malinconico,
di natura che rade volte rid:eva, se non per forza") , and
indeed his short life did not afford him much cause to
rejoice. He was poor, in constant search of employment,
and repeatedly seeing his hopes dashed or his expectations
disappointed. He was a self-acknowledged victim of the
"Roman dream", who had believed that to a man-of-letters
like himself all avenues would be open as they had been to
his Roman for/bears. When the dream turned sour, as it
did again and again, letters would turn bitter. Towards
the end of 1^36, for instance, he wrote to his friend
Leonardo Bruni:
haec nostra studia, quae semper coluissem et in quibus
bonam aetatis meae partem versatus essem, et a quibus omnia
praesidia ornamenta decus dignitatem quietem denique petenda
esse statuissem, odisse iam coeperim. Etenim quamquam ab
initio nulla honoris et gloriae cupiditate, sed tantum
voluntate et delectatione adductus et spe quadam excolendae
vitae, contemptis abiectisque ceteris rebus omnibus, me ad
harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium studia contulissem;
attamen paulo in his provectus, cum et legissem saepissime
et audissem quanto ea in honore apud maiores extitissent,
quanta et quam amplissima praemia splendorem dignitatem a
clarissimis eius aetatis principibus earum studiosi homines
assequi consuessent, non immutata quidem priori sententia
sed mehercule labefactata parumper, ad ea ipsa sic animum
intendere coepi, non ut prae illis honestatem abiiciendam
putarem, sed cum illis coniunctam appetere. Itaque veterum
exemplis propositis, horum temporum horum hominum horum
morum, totius denique rationis ignarus, fore existimabam
ut, cum his litteris non dico imbutus et ornatus sed leviter
tinctus prodirem, ad omnes vel amplissimos honores et
dignitatis gradus facilis pateret aditus; nec eos petendos
esse aut desiderandos, sed ultro vel invito recusanti
deferendos esse. Hac spe et cogitatione ubi iam tantum
profecisse visus sum, quantum ab homine non omnino otioso
ad usum vitae ac dignitatem afferendum esset, temptare
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institui et ad eum, quem ipse proposueram, cursum
incumbere. In quo longe aliter evenit atque eram opinatus.
Incidimus enim in ea tempora, in quibus nullus non modo
rectis studiis bonisfque]] artibus honos propositus, sed
nec virtuti quidem et probitati locus relictus esse
videatur; ut qui sperassem, me omnia sine ullo labore etiam
facile adepturum, idem iam annum aut eo amplius huic rei
toto £animo3 atque omnibus ut ita dixerim nervis intentus,
nullis laboribus nullis vigiliis nec per me nec per amicos
quicquam assequi potuerim. Neminem enim ex iis principibus
reperi , non qui me praemio peteret, nam id iam antea
desperaram, sed qui gratis orantem id atque obsecrantem
tecto tantum ac victu dignum duceret. 20
The disillusion could be dispelled by renewed hopes of
employment, but Lapo's ambitions were never fulfilled,
largely through want of the right connections, often because
of unfortunate circumstances. After an early spell in a
bank at Bologna, which belonged to relatives of his friend
Leon Battista Alberti (at whose behest Lapo began a serious
study of Latin and Greek), and after several years as a
student of Filelfo's, in Bologna Florence and Siena, Lapo
first set his gaze upon a position in the Curia, which was
then in Florence. For a few months he managed to hang on
to two cardinals, but the first one died and the second
followed the Pope to Bologna leaving Lapo behind in Florence.
Next Lapo aspired to succeed Filelfo in his chair at the
University of Siena, upon the latter1s departure for France,
but with the death in June 1^36 of the Cardinal of Santo
Sisto, through whose influence Lapo had expected to secure
the position, those hopes too were dashed. On the 24th
of June Lapo wrote a bitter letter to a friend of his in
Bologna, Angelo da Recanati, telling him that he had given
up all hope of ever finding a job in Florence or at the
21 ...
Curia. Angelo invited him to Bologna and Lapo went there
with the expectation of starting a new life. By September
however he was still unemployed and was casting his ga&e
as far afield as the Council in Basle. Finally, in November
of the same year, his dreams seemed at last to have come
true. Thanks to the intervention of yet another mighty
ecclesiastic, he was appointed to a lectureship at the
University. On November the 2nd he delivered his inaugural
lecture, full of hope and optimism, "de studiorum commodis
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et utilitatibus": "quLs erit igitur ant tam stultus, tarn
arrogans aut tam sui despiciens, tam desidiosus, tam iners,
qui non sibi ad eas artes omni studio, opera, labore
incumbendum esse existimet, in quibus virtutes, opes,
honores, dignitates plurimae ac maximae continentur, cum
praesertim, etiamsi nihil afferre huiuamodi possent, auo
tamen decore atque specie quaerendae nobis atque excolendae
2 2forent?" But three days later, for reasons of ill-
health, Lapo was forced to relinquish his appointment.
Thereafter he hovered from menial task to menial task.
For about eleven months he was tutor to the nephews and
administrator of the household of yet another papal official,
T'owards the end of 1^3T5 and thanks to the intercession of
his friends Leonardo Bruni and Flavio Biondo, he entered
the household of the Cardinal Chamberlain, Francesco
Condulmier, nephew of Eugenius IV. This too was a
disappointment, mostly because of Condulmier1s hostile
attitude towards Lapo; but Lapo stuck it out willy-nilly
for almost a year. When the Council moved to Ferrara, Lapo
went along and found himself a "prisoner" of the papal
palace, with lots of work and no pay. In September ll+38,
having completed his De curiae commodis, he dedicated it
to Francesco Condulmier, and shortly thereafter left the
Curia for good. One month later he was struck by the
plague and died in Venice.
Lapo's constant quest for employment is echoed
in the dedications of his works, all of which are addressed
to persons of power and influence (especially within the
ambit of the Curia) and each one of which is a disguised
job application. His main activity was as a translator,
in particular of Plutarch's Live s, but he is also the
author of some original works: the epistolario, the
Bologna inaugural." lecture, the De curiae commodis and the
. . . 2 3
Comparatio inter rem militarem et studia literarum. The
Comparatio survives today in six manuscript's, three of
which are in Italy (in the Riccardiana, the Marciana and
at Rimini) and three in England (at Cambridge, the Bodleian
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and Lambeth Palace). The Riccardiana and the Marciana
manuscripts bear a dedication to Gregorio Correr, the one
in Rimini to Eugenius IV and the three English ones are
dedicated to Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester. As the text
itself is undated and provides no information to speak of
on the circumstances of its composition, these dedications
may provide us with some clues as to when it was written.
It was most certainly not written for Eugenius IV. The
Rimini manuscript is a copy of one dedicated to Gregorio
Correr: the copyist remembered to substitute a "clementissime
Pater" for the "eruditissime Gregori" of the first line,
but he then forgot to make the appropriate substitutions
and even the long passage of the introduction praising the
qualities and virtues of Correr is left untouched and is
nowhere replaced by the equivalent for the the Pope
(no wonder Lapo failed to deserve the patronage of
2 5
Eugenius). In the English manuscripts on the other' hand,
instead of every apostrophe to Correr there is one to
Humphrey, and it is Humphrey's praises which are sung in
the introduction and not Correr's. The fact that the
Rimini manuscript is copied from one dedicated to Correr
but has significant variants from both the Riccardiana and
Marciana manuscripts, and the fact that an autograph or
original is missing, could induce one to surmize that it
was this original from which the Rimini manuscript was
copied and that the work was therefore initially intended
for Correr. This' supposition can be confirmed from other
sourc e s.
Gregorio Correr, whom Lapo considered at one
time to be his best friend, was another of his unlucky
connections.^ He came from a noble Venetian family, was
educated in Mantua by Vittorino da Feltre (he was later
to write a small treatise on education inspired by
Vittorino's ideals) and he took holy orders in 1^31, when
his father's cousin was elected pope and appointed him
apostolic protonotary. In l!+33 he went to the Council of
Basle, where he chose to side with the coneiliarists against
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the papal party, a rash move which., upon his return to
Italy, effectively debarred him from further advancement
in the Curia despite his family ties with the Pope. This
move also meant that he was unable to be of any assistance
to Lapo, when the latter sought his help in finding a
position at the Curia. He died in Verona in 1^6U, prior of
San Zenone and having recently been elected Patriarch of
Venice but prevented from entering into possession of his
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see by long wranglings with the then Pope, Paul II.
The correspondence between Correr and Lapo consists of
three letters: one from Lapo in Florence to Correr in
Bologna dated May i+th 1^36, Corner's reply from Bologna
dated July 1st 1^36 and a final reply from Lapo dated
2 8
July 7th 1U36. In this last letter Lapo tells Correr not
to write to him any longer, as he will soon be in Bologna
himself. A couple of weeks later Lapo did indeed go to
Bologna, and thereafter we must assume that the two friends
were in close contact, if of course Gregorio remained in
Bologna (we are even less informed about his movements than
we are about Lapo's) and if their friendship had not cooled
off (Gregorio's letter to Lapo is rather curt). In his
letter of May ^th Lapo had informed Correr that he was
about to dedicate some special work to him: "cum primum
Romuli vitam interpretatus fuero, quae propediem nisi quid
aliud accidat absolvetur, aliquid tuo nomine edam, quod et
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tibi iucundum et mihi etiam honorificum sit." There
are three works of Lapo's dedicated to Correr: translations of
Lucian's De longaevis and Patriae laudati.o " and the. Comparatio.
Luiso, who knew of the existence of the Comparatio and of
its dedication to Correr but dismissed it in a mere foot-
30
note, took this sentence of Lapo's letter as referring
to the translations from Lucian (which he therefore dated
to before May 1H36). It would seem more likely however
that the sentence is a reference to the Comparatio, since
Lapo mentions the work as something special, which will
bring both pleasure to Correr and honour to himself. Lapo
had already produced quite a number of translations and he
would hardly have viewed another one as particularly
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exceptional and capable of throwing the spotlight on to
its author. He must haye had something new and original
in mind, something which, would single him out as an author
in his own right. This, can only have been the Comparatio ,
of which, in the dedication to Correr, he says once again
that this is a work which should be particularly close to
Correr's heart: "ego vero nunc, si quid ad te de iis rebus,
que tu tibi studio ac. diligentia comparasti, scriptum
perlatum sit, opinor non invite te esse lecturum"
(p.65v^). J What this does not tell us of course is
whether, in May 1^36, Lapo was just thinking about writing
the Comparatio or whether he had already started to work
on it. He could not have completed it yet, for the
wording of the letter suggests that there was still work
to do. Again the text itself offers little assistance.
In the introduction Lapo talks of "gravissimos nostre
civitatis casus" and "multa ac varia domestice rei
incommoda" (p.65r°), which Riccardo Fubini understands
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as a reference to Cosimo de Medici's coming to power.
This could give us a terminus post quern of October 1^3^-s
if these words did not appear in the introduction and had
therefore possibly been added after the work itself had
been written. In the last resort it is probably the mood
of the Comparatio which is our safest guide to dating it.
It is a mood of faith and optimism, faith in the rejuven¬
ating power of letters, optimism for a better world to be.
There would appear to have been only two periods in Lapo's
life when he displayed such confidence: early in lU3^, when
he made his literary debut, and towards the end of 1U36,
when he had been appointed to the lectureship in Bologna.
The optimism of the latter period is reflected in the
inaugural lecture and of the earlier period in a letter
. 33
to Simone Lamberti. The subject of the letter is very
similar to that of the Comparatio. Lapo wrote it to
encourage the young Simone to stay firm in his resolve to
abandon the career of arms, regardless of what his bigoted
detractors might say, and to devote his time to studying
and learning. It may be therefore that Lapo conceived of
88
the Comparatio and even began to write it in the immediate
wake of his letter to Lamherti, and that he took it up
again and completed it in Bologna during the second half
of 1^36, and dedicated it to Correr in the course of those
months during which the two young men were still in
3^
contact. In the following year, as Lapo had not been
able to get anything out of Correr and was once again on
the look-out for employment, he re-dedicated the Comparatio
to Humphrey of Gloucester and dispatched it to him in
England. Zenone da Castiglione it was, Bishop of Bayeux
and one of Henry VI's envoys to the Council of Basle, who
had sung the praises of Humphrey's generous patronage to
Lapo. He had recently arrived in Bologna from Basle and
'35met Lapo m the corridors of the Curia. Together with
the Comparatio Lapo sent Humphrey his re-dedicated
translations of three orations by Isocrates, and later
that year he was still to send him a translation of
3 6
Plutarch's Life of Artaxerxes. But again Lapo had
picked an unlucky number. Ho word came back from Humphrey.
Humphrey may well have been a man of learning
and a patron of the arts, but he was also a professional
soldier and he had probably been offended by Lapo's
defamation, in the Comparatio, of the art of war. By its
title the work purports to be a "comparison" of arms and
letters, but it is far from being an objective assessment
of the two callings. Lapo lays bare his sympathies, not
to say prejudices, in the very opening paragraphs, and
after that the Comparatio turns into an enthusiastic
panegyric of letters and a strong indictment of arms.
Having commented on the difficulty of his appointed task,
since great advantages have accrued to mankind from both
arms and letters, and apologizing for the seeming arrogance
of debating a matter in which he is no expert, Lapo
proceeds to justify himself:
verumtamen non ingenio fretus nec arrogantia aliqua aut
temeritate hoc sum adductus ut facerem. Sed cum mihi a
puero ii sapientissimi viri idemque facile beatissimi
semper visi essent qui, nature ac doctrine presidiis ornati,
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cum se non modo a bellicis rebus verum etiam a negociis
publicis et ab omni ambitione ac contentione civili
removissent, in hoc studiosorum optimo ac quietissimo ac
saluberrimo vite statu omne suum studium atque ocium
collocarent exercendi ingenii gratia, suscipiendam mihi
causam horum studiorum ac defendendam putavi. 37
To indict the art of war (as practised in his own day
and age) had also been Lapo's main purpose in the letter
to Lamberti where, after a lengthy introduction in praise
of Lamberti's outstanding qualities, in particular his
intelligence and exceptional memory, Lapo launches into a
bitter attack on the degeneracy corruption and effeminacy
of contemporary soldiers:
ilia scilicet disciplina sanctissima, et incorruptissima,
ilia propugnatrix libertatis, ilia expultrix tyrannorum,
ilia conservatrix salutis, vindex scelerum, patrona
civitatum e medio se removit, nec cum his hominibus ullum
sibi statuit esse commercium. Eius autem comites, et
ministrae virtutes pariter cesserunt, eamque consequutae
sunt. Itaque non immerito his, qui nunc in hac rei
militaris umbra versantur, nulla religio est, nulla
sanctitatis, nulla divinarum rerum cura, nulla pietas,
nulla observatio dignitatis; sed contra summa impietas,
plurimae superstitiones, maxima contumacia, intolerabilis
arrogantia: nulla fides sancta, nulla inviolata foedera,
nulla ratio aequitatis conservandae. Omnia pretio
exaequant, omnia sua libidine metiuntur, omnia denique
iura et divina, et humana pervertunt. Hos non matrimonii
sanctitas, non legitimi liberi delectant: quin et illud
iam sanctissimum castrorum nomen abutuntur, quod a
castitate ductum putatur. 38
"Where are the great captains of the past?" laments Lapo,
and to a host of Greek and Roman military commanders he
confronts the military commanders of his own day, who by
comparison cut a despicable figure. Many of the ancient
captains also retired from the profession of arms to a
quiet life of learning, and Lamberti would only be
imitating their example. What is more many cultivated
both arms and letters, and why should Lamberti not do the
same, now leaving arms for letters and later returning to
arms? This combination is a tried educational method,
which both Greeks and Romans used to remarkable effect.
A.nd would that it be applied once again, so that modern men
could measure up to the "orators" of old: "si igitur illis
viris ea res laudi tradita est, quum pari in honore, aut
etiam maiore res militaris, et studia doctrinae versabantur;
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cur non idem tibi concedendum putem, hoc praesertim
tempore, quo post interitum veteris illius, singularisque
doctrinae haec studia a nostris hominibus summa cum laude
revocata, atque adeo exculta sunt, ut non desperem fore
39quin perbrevi Oratores optimos habemus." After further
encouragements and exhortations, Lapo ends his letter by
dangling before Lamberti's eyes the rewards he may expect
to reap from his endeavours in the field of learning:
"hinc enim opes maximas, hinc honestissimas divitias, hinc
plurimas amicitias, hinc honores amplissimos, hinc decus,
et dignitatem sumus habituri." ^ All of these .things , of
which Lapo himself dreamt and for which he himself craved
but which never came his way, were never to be enjoyed by
Simone either, who was cut down in the flower of youth.
The admiration for earnest scholars above the
fray of worldly existence with which Lapo prefaces his
Comparatio would seem to clash with the rather utilitarian
conclusion of the letter to Lamberti, and there is no doubt
that in the Comparatio a shift of emphasis has taken place.
Arms have ceased to be commendable and Lapo no longer
advocates the classical model of education: arms and
letters are now decidedly pitted against one another. Yet
Lapo's basic premise has remained the same - excitement
at the dawning of a new age and at the infinite possibil¬
ities it will offer ("hec nostra studia, que quasi ex
baratro quodam in luce revocata 'paululum' respirare
ceperunt") ^ - and the Comparatio is far from being a
simple eulogy of the contemplative life. Rather, it is a
defence of the forces of light against the forces of
darkness, of Life against Death.
The Comparatio is longer than any of the
texts we have studied so far, but much of it is repetitive,
a simple display of the author's erudition: whenever he can,
Lapo will always give ten examples taken from classical
antiquity instead of one. It is divided into four uneven
parts, which correspond to the four angles from which Lapo
approaches the problem: the origin ("ortus") of arms and
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letters, their utility ("utilitas"), the praises ("laus")
they engender and the pleasure ("iucunditas") they give.
Despite this methodical approach all four sections resemble
one another, and in this study we shall proceed as though
the work were one. Arms and letters have so far been
used as convenient shorthand, but they are not in fact the
terms which Lapo himself uses. The comparison is between
"rem militarem et studia literarum". The author never
actually defines these t erms and in their vaguene s s "they
tend to be quite all-embracing. The res militaris is that
which pertains to warfare and the art of war, studia all
that pertains to learning.
At the very beginning of his essay Lapo
acknowledges the positive and even beneficial aspects
of warfare: "cum nostri temporis res gestas mihi ante
oculos pono , animadverto non parum commodi ac emolumenti
rem militarem 'turn' privatis hominibus turn civitatibus
attulisse. Et cum vetustiora ilia atque illustriora maiorum
facta mente ac cogitatione repeto, invenio a re militari
sepe acerbissimos ac immanissimos hostes profligatos,
patrie salutem, incolumitatem civium conservatam,
crudelissima bella restincta, permultas 'edificatas' urbes,
clarissimas res publicas, florentissima imperia
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constituta." This is soon followed however by the
observation that the uses of warfare are limited (to times
of danger and conflict) and that in any case the advantages
of the res militaris are insignificant compared with the
harm it does: "ea ipsa que in ea insunt commoda, si quis
cum 'damnis1 detrimentisque comparare conferreque velit,
3inveniet ea ne 'minimarri' quidem maiorum partem adequare."
From then on only the negative aspect of warfare is
mentioned. Lapo will find no more good words to speak in
its favour. Even what in the letter to Lamberti had been
to the credit of ancient captains - the dangers they
faced so bravely - is now turned against them, to show how
perfidious their fate and vulnerable their .-existence was,
which unrolled amidst blood death and destruction. The
reality is now exclusively that which in the letter to
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Lamberti had applied only to contemporary soldie s: "inter
nequissimos ac inquinatissimos homines vivendum est, 'in'
latronum parricidarum homicidarumque ac, quod fedissimum
est , lenonum aleatorum cetu ac turba, ubi non sanctitas,
non religiio, non honestas, non fides, non gravitas, non
denique sermo pudicus versetur." ^ Arms are seen as the
tools of fallen angels, warfare as human, not divine,
and worse still, of the beastly part of human nature, the
body. Anyone who boasts of strength, glories in brute
force and in qualities which are better developed in
animals than they are in men: "quanto igitur animus corpori
dignitate prestat, tanto eius opera illis 'preferenda sunt'.
Ea enim non proprie sunt homxnis prestantie, sed sunt
communia nobis cum belluis, interdumque multo melius ab
illis explicantur quam a nobis." And just as the
practice of warfare is unworthy of man, so too are the
origins of the art of war ignominious (these are the words
which must have been particularly pleasing to the ears
of Humphrey of Gloucester). The first soldiers were
"highway-robbers, covetous of their neighbours' goods and
too lazy to earn a living. When they took to organizing
themselves into bands, they so terrorized the population,
that people had to shelter behind walls and ramparts, thus
giving birth to the first cities. It was not long before
these cities began to contend amongst themselves for
property and territory, but having no experience in
fighting they were forced to hire the services of their
former enemies. The erstwhile bandits were now regular
soldiers, and they bequeathed to their profession the
customs and practices of their earlier days, "quorum ars
aucta atque inveterata res militaris 'est appellata'." ^
The art of war is thus the child of crime and cupidity.
It is greed which always drew and still draws men to
warfare, and all the suffering which men have ever had to
endure was thrust upon them by men-of-arms: "quecumque mala
incommoda excidia detrimenta bella clades post hominum
memoriam evenerunt, ea fere omnia merito rei militari
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accepta referemus. Not everyone, Lapo recognizes,
is likely to be convinced "by his theory on the origins of
9i
soldiery, but there is one thing of which he at least is
irremovably convinced, and that is that the res militaris
is not the product of violence but its cause. It is not
the liberator, but the oppressor of mankind: "non enim
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totiens ab ea servata libertas est quam erepta." Even
the Romans, who otherwise rank so highly in Lapo's mind,
are accused by him of having abused the res militaris
in order to subjugate the world to their rapacity: "hac
freti Romani omnes gentes ac nationes vexarunt, hac totum
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terrarum orbem sue parere libidini coegerunt." The
res militaris is thus something perverse un-natural and
impure. It is impure because it is not all of one kind,
engendering as it does both joy and grief, joy to the
victors and grief to the losers. What is more monstr/ous
still however is that it can cause grief and joy at the
same time to one and the same person. The Thebans rejoiced
at their defeat of the Lacedemonians, but their joy was
mingled with sorrow for the death of Epaminondas. "Sic in
re militari nulla unquam dies omni ex parte leta, nullum
integrum aut diuturnum gaudium, nulla expers doloris
voluptas; 'omnia' miscet, omnia confundit; res insuper
nemini salutaris, pernitiosa omnibus, victis victoribusque
luctuosa." ^ The res militaris moreover is the play¬
thing of fortune. The outcome of war is always uncertain,
and the fame of generals only lasts as long as it happens
to be talked about. Indeed, if it were not for the
succour of writers, great feats of arms would never be
known to have taken place: "qui enim res geste maiorum 'a'
memoria nostra propter vetustatem remote in hanc etatem
servari incorrupte potuissent, nisi eas eloquentissimi
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scriptores suis monumentis illustrassent?" Arms with¬
out letters in other words are imperfect. There is proof
of this in the fact that no great captain of old ever felt
he could be proficient in his duties, if to a mastery of
arms he did not also add a thorough education. This point,
which in the letter to Lamberti serves to highlight the
degeneracy into which contemporary soldiers have lapsed,
in the Comparatio simply becomes a confirmation of the
inferiority of the res militaris. So too does the example
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of the many generals who abandoned the career of arms for
a life of study, all the more so (Lapo now adds) since
history does not tell of anyone who ever followed the path
in the opposite direction. And to those who might contend
that to enjoy a life of leisured study men-of-learning
need the protection of men-of-arms, Lapo retorts that
servants were never deemed to be more noble than their
mast ers.
If the res militaris is unnatural, knowledge
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("studia" and "doctrinae") is very Nature itself, simple
pure and perfect. Creation and being are both an express¬
ion of knowledge. Nothing can exist if it is not known
and nothing can be if it does not know. "Cognosco ergo sum"
is what Lapo might have said in reply to j>e s c artes'y "cogito
ergo sum". In the beginning there was the Word, which
conceived everything into being, and it is the power of
the Word which sustains creation:
inveniemus in ipsa mundi origine, cum omnia procreata sunt,
opus scientie permaximum fuisse, rei militaris nullum, cum
elementa ante confusa et permixta 'secreta' sunt eisque
certa quedam et 'definita' regio attributa est, cuius
terminis septa 'tenerentur'. Ex illis vero herbe ac plante
fereque ac pecudes ac homines ipsi generati sunt. Itaque
deinceps perpetuo quodam nature cursu fieri statutum, 'turn'
celum ipsum lac qua videmus forma rotunda fabricatum 'est',
sideraque ei affixa, motusque proprii ortus ac obitus
singulis distributi, turn varietates vicissitudinesque
temporum statute. Que omnia non sine maxima cognitione ac
scientia nec 'creari' ab initio nec postea conservari
pot uis sent. 5 3
For every living creature the first act is an act of
perception and this, sensory though it may be, is a form
of knowledge. Animals therefore and infants too, as the
first manifestation of their existence, cognize the world
("in ipsis brutis quanta cognitio apparet"; "num enim ea
parva sunt cognitionis signa ac inditia, que ipsi sensus
'in' pueris pre se ferunt?"). ^ For man too and for man
above all existence is knowledge, but it is knowledge of
a superior order, for througb his intelligence, through
studia and doctrinae he partakes of the divine: "que
animis hominum nature ipsa concessit, ea 1removit a
ceteris' tantumque nos voluit 'participare cum deo'." ^
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In the image of God man is a creator - the works
("opera") of God are reflected in the arts ("artes") of
men - and man's tool is his knowledge: "eum igitur ipsum,
qui primus res singulas 'novit' eisque pro uniuscuiusque
natura nomen 'indidit', quis dixerit non infinitam quamdam
ac immensam peritiam tenuisse?" ^ Naming is knowing,
knowing is understanding and to understand is to control.
Man is in a position to control his existence and his
environment precisely because he is capable of underst¬
anding them. Knowledge means control of self (self-
knowledge is self-control) and of others. To control
others, man's specific instrument is oratory (Lapo views
man truly as homo sapiens, but at his best as homo
rhetoricus). The orator is not of course a word-
spinning pulpit-thumper, but Cicero's and Quintilian's
good man who gives perfect enunciation to what he knows
well and has clearly grasped. There is a long and
fervent passage in the Comparatio on the powers and
benefits of oratory, which reaches an excited climax in
the proclamation that the word is mightier than the sword:
"hec omnia denique oratio conficit, que hostile ferrum
5 Tconficere non potest." The word (spoken and written)
is the cause of all that is good and just. It is the
bestower of civilization and the guardian of society:
his £i. e. doctrinarum studiisj enim ex'culti atque ornati
homines primum ac ipsi recte vivendi rationem assecuti sunt
ac ceteros idem facere docuerunt. Idem genus hominum in
agris ac montibus vagum atque dispersum ac passim ferino
more ex radicibus atque ex bacis silvestribus victum
queritans in unum coegerunt; ii a fera agrestique vita ad
humanum cultum civilemque traduxerunt; idem in urbibus
collocarunt. Ab iis divini cultus religio, ab iis
sacrificiorum ritus ac observantia, ab iis cerimonie
sacrorum phanorum reperte, ab iis coniungiorum ac nuptiarum
sanctimonia, ab iis liberorum educatio eorumdemque ingenua
eruditio, ab iis amicitie comparande colende retinendeque
ratio profecta. Ex eodem quoque fonte equabilis iuris
utilitatem exhausimus atque expressimus, ex eodem domestice
rei conservande regende amplificande precepta. Ex eodem
prudentiam , iustitiam, fortitudinem, modestiam,
temperantiam, magnificentiam, liberalitatem, beneficentiam,
mansuetudinem, clementiam profectam inveniemus. A quibus
docemur preterita meminisse, 'uti presentibus', futuris
prospicere, suum cuique reddere, ab alienis mentes oculos
'manus' abstinere, pericula pro honestate subire, vulnera
excipere, mortem servituti preferre, concitatos animi
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motus ac supra modum 'se' efferentes continere, voluptatum
appetitus sedare, alta ac excelsa ac splendida spectare,
humilia abiecta depressaque aspernari, in viros bonos ac
dignos nobisque 'coniunctos' beneficos 1ac liberales1 esse,
bene meritis ac bene merentibus gratiam referre. Quid rei
publice administrande, quid rei militaris (de qua plura
dixi), quid belli gerendi disciplinam nobis ab iisdem
traditam proferam? Quid legum ac iudiciorum descriutionem
commemorem, qua nescio an ulla. res utilior aut' preclarior
aut magis salutaris hominum societati potuerit inveniri,
que bonos viros ac rei publice utilitati ac commodis
consulentes premiis honoribus laudibus splendore dignitate
prosequuntur, improbos ac seditiosos cives 'damnis'
ignominiis suppliciis morte afficiunt. 58
Anything which brings about such wonders must undoubtedly
be man's most precious gift, and indeed Lapo calls it
"hoc maximum ac absolutissimum vel potius solum bonum". To
those who possess it, it brings "verissimam ac plenissimam
beatitudinem". ^ The expression may be other-worldly,
but its meaning is of this world. The studia which Lapo
has in mind are exclusively studia humanitatis (theology
and the Holy Scriptures,for instance, do not enter into
his scheme, and "metaphysics" play but a small part) and
the contentment they engender is to be enjoyed here below.
It is closer to the voluptas of the Epicureans than to the
beatitude of the Christians: "in studiis cognitionis ipsius
voluptas".^ To seek out this happiness all sacrifices are
justified, even abandoning family home and riches, for he
who possesses it needs nothing else; he is sufficient unto
himself, above the vicissitudes of life, beyond the sway of
fortune. This is the port of life, to which all aspire,
but which can only be reached over the calm sea of learning:
"omnibus qui civilem vitam vivunt idem propositum CestJ, in
ocio libere ac cum dignitate versari; studiosi 'quidem'
homines hoc ipsum iam consecuti sunt, quasi in portum
aliquem vite delati." ^ This ocium is a state without
travail, a state of even peace and quiet. But it is not a
life of isolated contemplation with one's gaze fixed on
the here-after, and the Comparatio is not, as was already
mentioned, a straightforward defence of the contemplative
against the active life. Ocium, it is true, is the goal
towards which everyone should strive, but it is an ocium
with a dynamic quality about it. It is a power-store from
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which energies are released for the improvement of men, the
creative and life-giving energies of the logos: "cum autem
ilia legimus , que 'maiores nostri1 de natura rerum, de "bonis
rebus ac malis, de sedandis cupiditatibus componendisque
hominum moribus scripta nobis reliquerunt, quibus apparet
eos omne suum ocium ad nostram utilitatem contulisse,
quibus laudibus efferimus, quibus studiis 'prosequimur1,
6 2
qua benivolentia amplexamur." Lapo owes his entire
admiration and affection to these men, not to bloodthirsty
men-of-war who dispense but death and destruction.
We have come a long way from knights and
doctors contending for precedence. It is as though we
were in a totally different world, and to a certain extent
we are. We are no longer in the traditional world of
jurists and their plurisecular heritage of Roman law
drawn from the Corpus iuris and handed down from generation
to generation in almost unchanging terms. Lapo does not
once quote from this tradition or use actual terminology
reminiscent of the querelle. His is the world of poetarum
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1ibri , of historie , of exemplorum vetustas , the
world of the new learning which gave its name to the
Renaissance and whose rebirth he so jubilantly proclaims.
He is the friend, as we have seen, of Leonardo Bruni,
Leon Battista Alberti and Flavio Biondo, and his Comparatio
has more in common, by its tenor, with Biondo's Borsus
than it has with any of the other texts we have studied so
6k
far. Yet, just as the Bor sus was conceived m the
perspective of the querelle, with Biondo avowedly assigning
it to that tradition whilst offering a new interpretation
of it , so too can the Comparatio be seen as belonging to
the same genre, although, it is true, this may not be
immediately perceptible. If, as is likely, the Comparatio
owed its inception to the letter to Simone Lamberti and the
controversy which lay behind it (the letter, as well as an
encouragement to Simone, is a reply to his many critics in
Florence, "ineptissimi homines" who, had he given up the
career of arms for "mercaturam ... agriculturam ...
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venationem, aut ... alium quemyis illiberalem, et
6 5sordidum quae stum" , would not have "been so ready to
disapprove of his decision), then it was born against a
bachground similar not only to that of Alberti's De commodis
but also to the background of much of the querelle over
the centuries, a background of contests for precedence and
social prestige, which may seem petty to the modern on¬
looker, but were no doubt crucial to those who were involved
in them, based as they were on the latters' valuation of
their own worth and usefulness to society. And that is
precisely what the Comparatio is about. Lapo may well
approach his subject from the ostensibly different points
of view of ortus utilitas laus and iucunditas , and he may
well dwell at some length on the more selfish advantages
and enjoyments to be derived from studying and learning,
but the basic gauge of his comparison is utilitas: who
contributes most and who therefore is most to be honoured
by society. There is no doubt in Lapo's mind that
neither men-of-means nor men-of-war can in any way measure
up, in this respect, to men-of-letters. The particular
function of men-of-letters is to teach other men to
distinguish between right and wrong, i.e. between just and
unjust, good and bad, natural and un-natural (these
constitute the two poles of Lapo's own reasoning in the
Comparatio, in which he himself can be seen to be
performing the appointed task of a man of letters, an orator).
Th.e expression of that discrimination within the context
of society is the law, which is therefore, as we have
already seen (above p.97), society's most precious
commodity: "qua nescio an ulla res utilior aut preclarior
aut magis salutaris hominum societati potuerit inveniri."
Lawgivers therefore deserve more praise than generals:
"quamvis enim Miltiadis et Themistoclis gloria illustris
sit eorumque res geste iure laudentur, neuter tamen eorum
cum Dracone aut Solone (mea quidem sententia) comparandus
est, a quibus leges Atheniensium constitute sunt,"
To be sure, we are a long way away from the actual terms of
the querelle; but in a manner consonant with his own
99
approach and with his own "profession" Lapo is here
addressing a problem not all that dissimilar from the one
which Bolognini Beccadelli and Lanfranchino were to deal
with in their own works. We come even closer to the terms
of the querelle in a passage of the last section of the
Comparatio (the section on iucunditas), in which Lapo
is quite clearly taking issue with other participants in
a topical debate. He is arguing that the joys of learning
are greater than the joys of warring and that whoever
possesses knowledge owns a store of happiness for times of
peace and war, "ac in ocio ac in negocio". If anyone should
claim, he then adds, that both in peace and in war men-
of-learning depend on the protection of men-of-arms, he
would reply that in that case men-of-learning would be
using men-of-arms just as men-of-arms use weapons horses
and the like; and nobody would ever pretend that these in
themselves are more useful or praiseworthy than the men
who wield and use them. But, he continues, what is the
point of such arguments if in any case the subject is
now iucunditas and not utilitas? And with a disenchanted
conclusion, which runs counter to the entire thesis of his
work, he shrugs off the obstinacy of militares homines by
granting them what they want, just as Leonardo Bruni was to
do in Giovanni d'Arezzo's De medicinae et legum praestantia
(see above p.78) and Petronio Zagni in Beccadelli's
Pis put at i one (see above p.19): "sed quid diutius huiusmodi
argumenta conquiram, que ac supervacanea sunt in re
'perspicua' ac ad hunc locum non pertinent? Concedatur
militares homines eruditis antecellere. Concedatur vitam
salutem incolumitatem civium 1ibertatemque rei publice
quietem ac ocium civitatis eorum disciplina maxime contineri.
Concedatur eosdem inter suos cives virtute utilitate
/T rj
dignitate principatum tenere." There is no doubt that
the question at stake here is precedence ("antecellere",
"principatum tenere"), and this, one feels, is the reality
(both social and literary) from which the letter to
Simone Lamberti and then the Comparatio emanated, and
against which Lapo constructed his defence of learning, to
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convince himself just as much as others that all honours
should he due, as they were in ancient days, to men-of-
letters, a point he repeatedly makes in his correspondence
too. Who exactly the adversaries of his men-of-letters
were however, and whether his militares homines were
actually knights, it is difficult to say. Etymologically
they are kin to the mi1ites of the querelle, hut they seem
more hardened in hattle than many of the duhhed nouveaux
riches we have come across so far. This could he because
Lapo, like Biondo, was arguing suh specie antiquitatis,
and in ancient days, as far as they hoth could tell, milites
were well and truly what their name said they were and not
intruders hiding behind a forged identity. But with his
opening words Lapo quite firmly sets the Comparatio in the
context of a well-established tradition: "diu inter
doctissimos homines ac summis ingeniis preditos duhitari ac
queri solitum est, eruditissime Gregori , disciplinane
militaris an studia doctrine essent preferenda." He could
of course have had ancient models in mind, of which there
were a few (see below chapter V) but he never explicit/ly
mentions them nor implicit/ly seems to be evoking them.
It is more likely therefore that these words are a reference
to the Knight and Doctor querelle, since it was the only
such debate current at the time and with a long tradition
too. ^ Lapo took his cue from it, but he gave to it his
own, non-legalistic interpretation.
Despite his endeavours at publicizing the
Comparatio as far and wide and high as possible, Lapo's
interpretation of the querelle remained an isolated
phenomenon. Neither his nor later Biondo's attempt to
rejuvenate the terms of the debate had any lasting influence
on the genre, no more than did Beccadelli's attempt to
popularize it through the medium of Italian. Rejuvenation
and popularization were brought to pass however, not many
years after Biondo had written the Borsus and in the very
same city, Ferrara, though from rather unexpected quarters
perhaps: a commentary to Petrarch's Trionfi.
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Chapter III
THE EARLY STAGES OF THE QUERELLE OF ARMS AND LETTERS
A. Bernardo Lapini da Montalcino, detto Ilicino:
Comnento sopra 1 Trionfi del Petrarca.
The Trionfi, which Petrarch began composing
in the 13^0's and which he was still retouching in the
very year of his death, were, besides his Latin compositions,
his most popular work during the Quattrocento, until their
renown was eclipsed at the turn of the century by the
Canzoni ere. In the fourth Triumph the poet attends a
parade of famous men of the past. Lady Fame heads the
parade and on her right-hand side she has Caesar and Scipio,
followed by a host of valorous warriors:
da man destra, ove gli occhi in prima porsi,
la bella donna avea Cesare e Scipio;
ma, qual piu presso, a gran pena m'accorsi;
I'un di Vertute e non d'Amor mancipio,
l'altro d'entrambi. E poi mi fu mostrata,
dopo si glorioso e bel principio,
gente di ferro e di valore armata.
One by one Petrarch learns the names of all these heroes
and their glorious deeds. The sight of them so enthralls
him that he cannot detach his gaze from them until a voice
bids him behold the other side of Lady Fame, where Plato
and Aristotle lead a multitude of philosophers and other
men of learning:
io non sapea da tal vista levarme,
quand'io udi' : - Pon mente a l'altro lato ;
che s'acquista ben pregio altro che d'arme. -
Volsimi da man manca; e vidi Plato,
che'n quella schiera ando piu presso al segno
al qual aggiunge cui dal cielo e dato;
Aristotele poi, pien d'alto ingegno;
Pitagora, che primo umilmente ^
filosofia chiamo per nome degno.
Again Petrarch is srhown these famous men one by one.
That they should be on the left of Fame and shown to him
only after the men of arms is not a point out of which he
chooses to make an issue. He may well have held, like a
late sixteenth century commentator of his, that the right-
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hand side was a position of greater dignity and honour
("luogo di piu honore. Onde dice il padre al figliuolo 2.
Salmo, 'sede a dextris meis1. Et nella credenza apostolica,
'sedet ad dexteram Dei patris omnipotentis'."),^ hut he
certainly does not say so in so many words, and any
suggestion that, by putting warriors before philosophers,
he is establishing an order of priority and settling a
question of precedence, cannot but come from a reader
predisposed to understand the text in that way. Such an
interpretation is precisely what we find in two of the
earliest commentators of the Trionfi.
In the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence
there is an anonymous fifteenth century manuscript of a
patchy commentary to the Trionfi , which must be a copy of
another (mostly illegible) manuscript, for its text is
peppered with blank spaces. But rather than an actual
commentary, this work could more properly be termed a
compendium of highlights from the Trionfi, since it only
comments certain passages and does not provide the full
text of the poem but just the beginning of the relevant
lines. It is entitled Brieve expositione et dichiaratione
di alchune favole et ystorie delle quali si fa subcintamente
mentione ne Triomphi del claro et laureato poeta fiorentino
Messer Frances'cho Petrarcha. It is unfortunately totally
anonymous, and attempts to identify its exact date and place
of origin as well as its author have borne no fruits.'' This
is particularly unfortunate given the nature of the
commentary to the beginning of the third chapter of the
Triumph of Fame, into which the author not only introduces
an echo of the Knight and Doctor querelle, but in which
he makes remarks concerning a specific social context.
The passage reads as follows:
io non sapea da tal vista. In questa tertia et ultima parte
del quarto Triompho, della Fama, prosequendo il Petrarcha
come la Fama trionfa contro alia Korte, si narrano et
nominano molti huomini, i quali sono stati famosi per loro
scientie liberali et de quali, doppo la morte loro, la
fama e rimasta al mondo per le loro virtu et scientie,
dimonstrando che non solamente gli' huomini dopo la morte
acquistono fama per li grandi facti d'arme et per virtu di
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re militare, come e decto disopra nelle due parti del
presente Trionfo, ma etiandio s'acquista fama delle
scientie liberali, lequali sono sette, cioe Grammatica,
Rethorica, Loyca, Musica, Astrologia, Arismetrica et
Geometria. Avendo adunche il Petrarcha nelle due proxime
precedenti parti del presente Trionfo della Fama come per
virtu et grandi facti di arme et cose bellicose s'acquista
doppo la morte al mondo grande fama, soggiungne hora questa
presente tertia et ultima parte del quarto Trionfo, della
Fama, nella quale fa mentione di molti huomini famosi per
qualche scientia liberale. Et per questo si puo notare,
come 1'arme vanno inangi alle scientie. Et cosi uno
cavaliere per la militia debbe ire inangi a uno doctore
per le scientie sue, il che oggidi veggiamo observarsi
nelle parti nostre, peroche i militi et cavaliere sempre
vanno inangi a doctori et altri scientiati huomini, il
che etiandio dalle leggi e approvato. Et questo s'intende
et nota, perche il Petrarcha nel presente Trionfo prima
parla de gli huomini famosi in re militare et facti
bellicosi, poi soggiungne et fa mentione di quelli, che
sono stati famosi in scientie liberali (fols.l2Uv - 12^r ).
Anyone reading this, who would not also have a text of the
Trionfi before his eyes, may well be forgiven for thinking
that Petrarch is confused and inconsistent and for getting
a wrong impression of what the text is about. The commen¬
tator is clearly interpreting it on his own terms and using
it for his own ends, by introducing notions which are alien
to the intention and expression of the poem and by slowly
twisting their meaning in order to bring them into line
with a contemporary situation which has nothing whatsoever
to do with Petrarch's original. Petrarch is talking of
philosophers poets orators historians and the like, but
his commentator is thinking in terms of the traditional
liberal arts ("scientie liberali"), which he then general¬
izes as learning ("scientie") by dropping the liberali ,
and finally personalises as the knowledge and profession
of a particular man, the doctor (of law), by means of the
possessive adjective ("le scientie sue"). He operates a
similar transformation on Petrarch's warriors: from
re militare , the synonym of facti d'arme , he draws
militia (still understood in a general sense), whence he
derives the knights of his own day ("militi et cavaliere").
Thus we find our well-known knights and doctors incongruously
contending for precedence amidst a crowd of ancient famous
men. It would seem as though the anonymous commentator,
1 Qj
whose conclusion ("e.t per questo si pud notare") is entirely
of his own making, is simply using Petrarch's poem as yet
further evidence in the well-tried querelle of Knights and
Doctors and as a further boost to the privileges of knights
in his own city ("nelle parti nostre"). This is where more
information about the manuscript would be so useful and is
so unfortunately lacking. What are these "parti nostre"
where knights have precedence over doctors and "altri
scientiati huomini"? We are reminded of Alberti and Lapo,
both of whom had suggested that it was not simply doctors
of law but men of learning in general, litterati , who had
to give way to knights. Might these parts therefore be
Florence? And if they are, do the words "il che etiandio
dalle leggi e approvato" refer to the actual laws of the
city or simply to the laws adduced by the experts in the
querelle? If the evidence itself is lacking to solve the
mystery- of this text, at least it may be used as evidence
itself, to confirm the popularity of the Knight and Doctor
querelle, which would appear to have surfaced wherever
there was the slightest suggestion of contested precedence.
In this text however the querelle seems
decidedly out of place. Petrarch's commentator seems to be
uneasily toying with various similar though incompatible
notions. Arms and letters, science and warfare would have
been more appropriate to the context of the Trionfi, and
he does actually use such expressions ("arme", "scientie"),
but in the end he cannot prevent himself from reducing the
argument to the traditional dimension of knights and doctors.
It is as though he were trying to make a new departure from
a rather stifled tradition, to expand the scope of the
debate, but without managing to find the appropriate
vocabulary. Where he failed though, IIicino, another of
Petrarch's commentators, succeeded. Taking his inspiration
from the legal tradition, but employing different cultural
and lexical tools from those of the jurists, Ilicino struck
out on his own and in so doing he produced a new genre,
the querelle of Arms and Letters, which became almost
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immediately popular and which, remained so lor well over a
c entury.
The son of a famous physician and himself a
physician of some repute, Bernardo Lapini da Montalcino,
otherwise known as Ilicino, was horn around 1^4-30. Little
is known of his life.^ It was spent in central and
northern Italy with Siena, his home town, as its main pole
of attraction. He held office there on several occasions
and in 1^60 was professor of medicine at the university.
In August of that year he moved to Mantova to take up
appointment as court doctor to the Gonzaga. He may also
at one time have served in the same capacity at the court
of the Sforza in Milan. In 1U68-69 he held a chair at the
University of Ferrara, where he established close links
with Borso d'Este and his court and where, on February 1st
1^69, he was knighted by the Emperor Frederick III, on the
same occasion on which titles of nobility were conferred
7
upon the father of Lodovico Ariosto. There is no docum¬
entary evidence of his still being alive after 1^7^ but
the date of his death is unknown.
8
Poet and prose writer as well as practising
physician and university professor, Ilicino owed his
literary fame, which lasted well into the sixteenth century,
to the monumental commentary which he wrote to the Trionfi
some time between 1k66 and 1^71 and which he dedicated to
9 ...
Duke Borso. It met with immediate success. There are
seven extant manuscripts of it and it was published twenty-
four times within the space of fifty years. The first
edition was printed in Bologna in 1^75 and the remainder
mostly in Venice but also in Milan. With the exception of
that first edition, Ilicino's commentary always appeared
together with Francesco Filelfo's to Petrarch's Rime ,
written in the lU^Os."^ Unlike the anonymous "Florentine"
commentary Ilicino's includes the whole text of the poem,
though "drowns" may be the more correct expression, for
it is like some medieval work of theological, philosophical
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or juridical exegesis,- with, each -page containing but a few
lines of the actual text surrounded by a sea of annotations.
The Trionfi merely serve as a pretext to the commentator's
display of erudition. He is not interested in Petrarch's
language or concerned about his style, but simply wants to
draw from the poem as much as he may of the "admiranda
doctrina" which, he says, lies concealed beneath the verses.
He hardly seems to notice that the Trionfi are in fact a
poem; he treats them as a cryptic encyclopaedia, every new
word, every new personage calling forth a mass of informa¬
tion. Digressions are the rule rather than the . exception,
and as a result Ilicino's style becomes often laborious.
One critic went so far as to say of it: "Messer Francesco
aveva le sue buone ragioni di dir male dei medici, se
dovevan rendergli, anche da morto, di siffatti servigi."
But readers of the time were obviously more lenient or more
receptive. And they were certainly attentive readers, to
notice, as many did, one of Ilicino's lengthiest digress¬
ions, tucked away at the very heart of the work, in the
introduction to the third chapter of the Triumph of Fame:
the first literary manitestation of the que relle of Arms
ana Letters.
Ilicino's querelle of Arms and Letters was
influenced by the querelle of Knights and Doctors, as we
shall be seeing, and Ilicino no doubt saw himself as
writing in that same tradition, but he brought to the
debate new concepts and a new terminology. These he
obtained from the cultural background which was specific •
to his own profession. A physician in those days was not
the specialized technician he is nowadays. He received the
broadest of educations, and a major component of his
training was philosophical. He therefore often styled
13himself "physician and philosopher". Ilicino, in the
title of his commentary, is called "medicinae ac
philosophiae discipulus" and in the chronicle which tells
of his knighthood, "philosopho et phisico". He, like the
other authors we shall be studying in the course of this
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chapter, set at least as much, store "by the one title as jy
the other. Indeed it is true to say that they saw them as
indivisible from one another, because medicine was a
science which not so much derived from experience and
experiments as it was deduced from philosophical first
principles. This is a point on which Ilicino himself
insists in his commentary, when he inveighs agajiriat the
so-called physicians of his day, mere empiricists who do
not, as they should, abide by the canons of medical science,
but simply derive their knowledge (and what is worse, their
reputation) from experimentation:
a ragione deplora il poeta, ne nostri tempi l'arte di
medicina essere guasta. Cunciosiacosache tanta e la
cupidita e avaritia de li medici che, tirati piu dal
guadagno che dalla scientia, pretermettano gli studii
necesarii 'bonarum artium1, senza dequali e totalmente
medicina imperfecta ... Ma certamente molto magiore e
la colpa e piu con effecto conduce alia ruina sua lo errore
de principi e delle altre republiche, equali non fanno
distinctione ne infra i periti medici e puri experimentatori,
dequali lo effecto solo governa fortuna. Onde spesse volte
piu rendano di credito e premio ad uno simplice experimento
provenuto per beneficio di natura regolante lo errore
dello empirico, che a molti, equali cum ragione a pe'
canoni sono stati operati da medici. Ladonde interviene
che la necessaria diligentia di medicina si lassa e
ciascuno corre a fare nothomia di corpi humani, per chiarire
se della virtu d'uno simplice. 0 come e perduto il debito
e laudabile timore scripto da Ippocrate nel primo
aforismo, quando dice: experimentum falax! lU
Philosophy as taught in the fifteenth century at the
traditional seats of learning, the universities, was still
overridingly Aristotelian and it is not surprising there¬
fore to find Aristotle as THE Authority throughout
Ilicino ' s commentary. II philosopho ( i i i , 7-8 ) ^ is the
ultimate arbiter of any sentence. When, in the second
chapter of the Triumph of Death, Ilicino wants to prove the
immortality of the soul, he invokes Aristotle first, then
Averroes, and only at the very end, after four more pagan
authors and two Old Testament figures, a single Christian
16 .
authority, St. Augustine. It is Aristotle too, towards
the end of the commentary, who testifies to the infinity
17 •
of God, and in the querelle passage Aristotle is the
author most frequently quoted. He admittedly has to share
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this privilege with Cicero, hut it is always Aristotle
18
who adjudicates on the most important issues. More¬
over it is a world-view of predominantly Aristotelian
persuasion which constitutes the foundation on which the
querelle is constructed.
Nothing new, and certainly familiar to
readers of Dante and other medievalists, this world-
view posits that every creature according to its nature
(iii,16-19) seeks its perfection (i,13 + ii,15-17)•
In other words it has a goal, an end (iii,19) which it
aims to achieve and which is termed its good (v,9-ll).
When in possession of its good, it is said to he perfe¬
cted and fully established in its dignity (viii,lU).
This state engenders felicity (iii,21+iv,8). In the
case of man, the picture is complicated hy the fact that
he has two ends (v,9-ll)» because he partakes of two
natures and exists in two orders of reality. Kis body is
the medium of the temporal dimension (iv,9) in which he
operates. This is of a material, contingent and
transient world, a world subject to decay and the play¬
thing of fortune (ii,26ff.). The standard of this order
is not the individual but the community, and the goal
which is aimed at, political felicity (vii,6-7+xi,12),
the well-being that is of society. The goal of man's
second dimension is contemplative felicity (xi,12-13),
19bliss as experienced by Dante m Paradise, the
contemplation of abstract substances (iii,22). It is
an end which the individual seeks for himself in the
immaterial unchanging and eternal world of the spirit,
which lies well beyond the reach of fortune. Man's first
dimension is the sphere of action, in which primacy is
granted to the will (vii,19), the materialization of which
is the act (vii,7). The will acts at the suggestion of
moral virtues (viii,l-2), which are the subject of
moral philosophy (xi,18-19). Any branch of learning which
is related to this order, and which therefore admits of
practical application, is an art (ii,17-18) or a discipline
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(i , 19+xi i , 18 } , Th.e contemplative order, on the other hand,
is the sphere of pure learning, of sciences (ii,17).
This is the domain of the intellect and intellectual
virtues, whose field of enquiry is natural philosophy
(xi,18-19)- The infallibility and immutability of the
truths with which the intellect deals and the indubitable
reliability of its logic are signified by the concept of
habit(iii,U+xi,16), which also indicates the inurement of
the intellect to that form of logic and truth.
Arms and letters in Ilicino1s text typify,
albeit imperfectly, these two dimensions of man's
existence. The actual word littere however (e.g.ii,12)
only designates the material instrument of man's quest
for knowledge. The quest itself is described as studio
( e . g . ii , 3 )and the ob j ect of that quest, the possession of
which equals wisdom ('s api ent i a" - xi,13) and generates
contemplative felicity, are le scientie (e.g.ii,U + iii ,
2 0
5-6), Ilicino does not use these three terms in any
systematic way but their individual meaning is clear, and
it is equally clear that together they refer exclusively
to that type of knowledge which is comprised under the
heading "natural philosophy" and is maintained within the
bounds of the otio litterato (iv,2l) being an end unto
itself. Those men who lead their lives along this path
are called huomini scientifici (iv,27), huomini
speculativi (vi ,,19-20) or speculanti (xii,2l). Their
rivals in the querelle are huomini armati (iv,27) or
mi1iti (vi,2l), and if letters are understood in a rather
21
narrow sense, arms ("militia", "arme") are given a
meaning which in a way is even more restricted. The only
type of fighting which the author accepts to take into
consideration is the virtuoso combatere (viii,23-2U),
fighting that is which is informed by the virtue of
prudence (viii,7-9 + ix , 1U ) , one of the moral virtues, and
thus derives its being from moral philosophy (x,l6-17).
In other words fighting is reduced to a kind of mental
exercise (ix,lU-l8): the profession of arms is an art
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(e.g. ii,17-18) and a learned discipline ("disciplina" -
e.g. i,18-19), with the stress on learned.
The duel of these rivals is, as one might
have expected, conducted syllogistically (ii,13-1*0.
Ilicino takes his cue from the same lines of the Trionfi
which inspired the anonymous "Florentine" commentator
(see above p.103) and he organises his arguments in a way
not too dissimilar from the authors of the Knight and
Doctor querelle. In a first section he puts forward four
arguments in defence of letters (ii,9 - iv,27); ,in ^he
central section (v,l - vii,23) he clarifies his position
by means of two axioms and two definitions, on the basis
of which, in the last section, he refutes the pro-letters
arguments and proves the superiority of arms (vii,2U -
xii,3). Finally, in a sort of hazy postscript (xii,*t -
21), he manages to disavow, without patently doing so,
the conclusions at which he had arrived or, to be more
precise, at which he was induced to arrive by the authority
of Petrarch.
What Petrarch says cannot be dismissed lightly,
yet Ilicino is clearly embarrassed by the fact that such a
man appears to be giving precedence to arms over letters:
"in questo luogo occorre una necessaria e degna dubitatione,
quale e, per quale cagione Messer Francesco attribuisca
piu gloria e piu fama alio exercitio delle arme che a
quello delle lettere, cunciosiacosache molte ragione pare
che sieno in contrario" (ii,9-13). The four arguments in
favour of letters are almost identical to arguments used
by Lapo, but because they are conveyed by a totally
different terminology, they have quite a different ring
2 2
about them. The first one (ii,15-25) is that, the mind
being nobler than the body and letters an attribute of
the mind, whereas arms are an attribute of the body,
letters deserve more praise than arms. In the second
place (ii,26 - iii,15), letters are commended for being
beyond the reach of fortune, whilst arms are beneath its
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sway. Thirdly (iii,l6 - iv,5) arms are said to be
repugnant to the nature of man. They are disruptive of
human society and destructive of friendship, to which man
is naturally inclined, whereas letters are the bond of
society and the cement of friendship and moreover lead man
to his appointed goal, the contemplation of abstract
substances. Finally (iv,6-15) only letters can engender
man's felicity, which lies in the possession of knowledge
and wisdom, where arms beget but worldly power. There¬
fore - concludes Ilicino, with words from Cicero which will
become part of the stock-in-trade of the querelle -
2 3"cedant arma toge, concedat laurea lingue" (iv,25).
In this first section Ilicino is very much
at ease with his subject. Everything is straightforward.
The major premise of each one of his four arguments is
so self-evident - "la prima parte dello assumpto nostro
e manifesta" (ii,19); "e medesimamente la prima parte
dello assumpto nostro notissima" (iii,6-7); "ancora la
prima parte dello assumpto nostro e evidentissima"
(iii,23-^0; "la prima parte dello assumpto nostro per
se stessa e nota" (iv,10-11) - that they hardly bear
contradiction. No doubt Ilicino would have liked to cut
short the querelle at this stage, but had he done so,
Petrarch would have been shown to be in the wrong
(iv,25-7). As this would clearly have been unacceptable,
he was obliged to continue:, against his better judgement
and against the grain of sound philosophical reasoning:
"nui nientedimeno, non ci partendo dalla intentione del
poeta, confessaremo il vero, quantunque troppo siamo
obligati a' philosophi, dicendo in fama 1'armi alle littere
dovere essere superiori" (v,l-U).'
The first of Ilicino's two axioms in the
central section of his discourse (v,9 - vi,8) is that
the well-being of the individual is less deserving than
that of the community, with arms aiming at the latter,'
and the second(vii , 5-1^) that "political felicity" is
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achieved, through the exercise of the virtue of prudence.
Of the two definitions, the first concerns the main datum
of this instance of the querelle, fame, which is said to
consist of the praises given to men for the sake of their
past deeds. To which it is- added that military deeds are
always known to the public and are therefore necessarily
susceptible to praise (vi,9-17). Finally (vii,15-24) we
are told that for the purpose of the argument the profess¬
ion of arms ("militia") will be understood to mean only
the perfect and virtuous exercise of that profession, and
that the same will apply to the profession of letters.
On the basis of these two axioms and two
definitions Ilicino proceeds to counter the four arguments
with which he had introduced the querelle. Thus (vii,24 -
viii,2U) moral virtues too, and not just "scientific"
learning, are said to be an attribute of the mind. The
chief moral virtue is prudence and there are five
categories of prudence, one of which is military prudence.
This puts the "art of war" ("militare disciplina") on a
par with letters, but because arms exist for the sake of
the commonweal the "art of war" is in fact superior to
letters. Ilicino's answer to the second argument (viii,25 -
ix,27) is that only the outcome of the battle is subject
to the whims of fortune and not military prudence itself,
which is actually capable of controlling them by means of
proper strategy. In reply to the third argument (x,l -
xi,9), arms are claimed to have been instituted only for
the sake of defence and protection, which justify the
undertaking of war, and in that respect cannot be
accused of being disruptive of human society. The fourth
and last counter-argument (xi,10 - xii,3) is that, just as
individual (contemplative) felicity is obtained through the
possession of knowledge and wisdom, so political felicity
is gained through the exercise of prudence, and that
philosophy does not simply consist of natural philosophy
but of moral philosophy as well.
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Ilicino is thus able to exculpate Petrarch.
"II nostro poeta e absoluto da ciascuno errore", he procla¬
ims triumphantly. But he has not had an easy task of it.
The arguments in this final section do not flow as fluently
as those of the introductory section. Not even to their
author, let alone the reader, are they self-evident any
longer. When defending letters Ilicino had naturally
bolstered his arguments with quotations from authorities:
that was the correct deductive procedure. But he now has
to enlist the support of many more authorities (there are
twice as many quotes in the latter part as there are in
the beginning) as though to convince everyone, including
himself, of the veracity of what he is saying. Not even
the major premises of his syllogisms go without' saying
any more; they too have to be supported with citations.
What is more, whereas the pro-letters arguments had been
presented as absolute truths, the pro-arms arguments are
no more than qualified truths, for they only hold on
certain conditions. Where in the beginning there had been
talk of only one ultimate felicity ("ultima felicita" -
iii,2l), Ilicino now has to introduce the concept of a
twofold felicity. He also has to circumscribe the acce¬
ptation of warfare, making it into something quite unreal
(just war prudently fought), and to insist on the notion
of fame as central to the debate, thereby depriving it of
any substance, for to be famous is simply to be talked
about(vi,11-13). In this way the pre-eminence of arms
becomes quite harmless and does not impinge upon the true
superiority of letters. Ilicino's conclusion is benign
indeed. The question he had asked himself at the beginning
was "per quale cagione Messer Francesco attribuisca piu
gloria e piu fama alio exercitio delle arme che a quello
delle littere" (ii,10-12), By the end gloria has been
forgotten and fama, instead of a quality which resides in
the beheld, has become an instrument of the beholder. The
stress has shifted from being famous to being considered
famous: "il nostro poeta ..., sicome e debito, prima gli
armati che li speculanti ha descripti famosi" (xii,19-21).
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More important still, it is Ilicino's description of
letters and men-of-letters which at the end of the day
deprives his conclusion of any real significance. Men-of-
letters, as we saw, are huomini speculativi and letters
natural philosophy, but not moral philosophy, not any "art"
or "discipline" which pertains to the world of action.
Men-of-arms on the other hand are entirely of that world
and fame is an exclusively worldly notion. To compare
huomini armati therefore with huomini speculativi is like
attempting to square the circle, as they belong to two
entirely different orders of reality. But in granting
precedence to men-of-arms in the Triumph of Fame,
Petrarch is simply and rightly (according to Ilicino)
rendering unto Caesar what is his. Fame is the stuff upon
which men-of-arms survive and thrive, whereas it does more
harm than good to men-of-letters who are unduly concerned
about it, by directing their gaze downwards to mortality
instead of upwards to the "contemplation of abstract
substances" (vi,ll—17). In a worldly cortege of famous
men therefore men-of-arms must justly precede men-of-letters;
but this is a mere formality, a simple question of
ceremonial precedence. Man's ultimate goal ("ultima
felicita") remains the contemplation of abstract
substances and men-of-letters alone can guide him thither.
A final seal is set on this true conclusion
to Ilicino's arguments in what we have called the postcript
of his querelle (xii,h-2l). Here he is answering Cicero's
"cedant arma toge, concedat laurea lingue." Cicero's
quotation - says Ilicino - is irrelevant to the debate,
because it applies only to a worldly context, in terms of
which it confronts military matters not with pure learning
but with civil matters (i.e. law and government). And
Ilicino would not wish to contest the fact that, in a city,
judges and glders must have precedence over soldiers:
"nui concediamo i giudici et i prudenti sempre essere la
prima parte e piu degna della republica, sicome ancora
Aristotile dimostra nel sicondo della Pollitica, e i
11b
militi la terza in degnita o la quarta" Cxii ,11-15) •
Judges and elders, however, and civil matters are not
what the dabate is about. It is about "gli habiti
speculativi delle scientie". In the end therefore Ilicino
manages to establish a three-fold order of precedence. In
absolute terms, in terms that is of man's final raison
d'etre, huomini speculativi are superior to both militi
and giudici e prudenti. In strictly worldly terms
giudici e prudenti are superior to militi; and in what
one might call promiscuous terms (for one is reminded of
Tartagni's compromise) huomini speculativi must .give way
to both giudici e prudenti and militi for, as long as
they live in this world, their activities, which are
2b
strictly speaking useless, come under the aegis of men
unto whom the government of this world has been entrusted.
Well may one wonder why Ilicino needed to
construct such a convoluted argument, when all Petrarch
had done was to put men-of-arms on the right-hand side
of Lady Fame and men-of-letters on her left, without so
much as suggesting that this implied preference or
superiority. Naturally, if one is of the opinion oneself
that to be on someone's right is a sign of honour, one
would tend to understand Petrarch in the way in which
Ilicino did. And Ilicino, as we saw, was not alone in
giving that interpretation of Petrarch's motives in the
Triumph of Fame. Since he disagreed with Petrarch however,
yet dared not admit it openly, he could presumably have
ignored the question, or at least not have stressed it so
conspicuously, and no one would have thought twice about
it. But Ilicino obviously felt compelled to explain how
it was possible for a poet like Petrarch seemingly to show
more respect for warriors than for his own kin. Petrarch's
word was holy writ for Ilicino. It spoke the truth and
therefore required careful exegesis whenever it was liable
to be misconstrued. This could be one reason for such a
lengthy digression at this stage of Ilicino's commentary.
Another was probably Ilicino's desire to sport his knowledge.
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He does so throughout his work, and what he wanted to show
at this particular stage was that he was familiar with the
querelle of Knights and Doctors and capable of emulating
it .
We now know that the querelle was a popular
topic for debate at the time and that it had been so for
many centuries, that it was known to laymen as well, but
that it was above all a subject for specialists at
universities. Ilicino was a university man himself, likely
to have come into contact with the querelle in that
environment. Hot many years had gone by moreover since
Biondo had made his own idiosyncratic contribution to the
debate and dedicated it to the same prince to whom Ilicino
was to dedicate his commentary. It is far from improb¬
able therefore that Ilicino should also have wished to
supply his own interpretation of the question, using the
methods and tools of his own trade. What he produced may
seem too peculiar to owe anything to the traditional
jargon of the jurists, but there are several passages of
his text which show him quite clearly to have been
acquainted with that tradition.
Many of Ilicino's basic philosophical princi¬
ples are identical to ones enunciated by Homodeis who, like
Ilicino, also used the syllogism to conduct his arguments
(see above p.34). This though is likely to be a coincidence.
It does not mean that Ilicino had necessarily read Homodeis's
Quaestio. Rather it confirms Homodeis's indebtedness to
the culture which was Ilicino's own, the Aristotelian
25
culture of the Schoolmen. The resemblance between
Ilicino's final solution and Tartagni's compromise solution
may be no more than a coincidence either. Tartagni spelt
his solution out explicit/ly, whereas Ilicino seems to
have arrived at his almost unwittingly. Other points of
contact however between Ilicino and the querelle of Knights
and Doctors are by no means coincidences. Ilicino quotes
the famous "imperatoriam maiestatem non solum armis
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decoratam, verui eciam legibus opportet esse armatam"
(vi,25-T; see above p.27), which he can only have got from
the Corpus juris itself or one of its Commentators. His
text contains three other mentions of the Corpus iuris, in
the very style of the legal experts: a ciphered reference
to the relevant law (x,10;x,15;xi,3-^Throughout his
text moreover he uses the words militi and militia in
preference to arme, which is the word used by Petrarch
(see above p. 103), and this too suggests familiarity with
the terminology of the querelle, although, is is true, the
etymology he gives of militi is derived from Plato (x,6-7)
and not the Corpus juris (see above p.36). His militi are
also huomini armati , like Lapo ' s and. Biondo's; not
just knights that is, but warriors in general. He makes
sure however that only the worthiest of mi1iti enjoy the
privileges of the militia, which is not unlike the jurists'
denying knightly privileges to all but true knights.
Finally, and most revealing, when Ilicino says "nui
concediamo" that judges and elders must be given priority
over militi in a city (xii,ll) , he would appear to be
taking issue with particular individuals rather than
addressing himself to his readership at large; and since
the concession he makes concerns the very crux of the
querelle of Knights and Doctors (precedence), it is more
than likely that the interlocutors he has in mind are the
authors of that querelle and through them all doctors of
law, to whom he wants to make it quite clear that his
recognition of the pre-eminence of militi in the context
df the Triumph of Fame must in no way be interpreted as
a denial of doctorial privileges in real life. But more
important at this stage is Ilicino's concern to take his
distance from the tradition of the querelle. He mentions
the disputed precedence of judges and militi only to
emphasize that this is not what his own argument is about.
His argument is "solo degli habiti speculativi delle
scientie". Nowhere else does he provide such an explicit
clue on how to read his text, and his doing so in the same
breath, so to speak, with which he had recalled and then
repudiated the querelle of Knights and Doctors, would tend
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to suggest that that was the tradition from which, he had
drawn his inspiration and from which at the same time he
wanted to break away. For anyone who might have felt
tempted to understand his argument in the perspective of
knights and doctors (which would have been the natural
thing to do) Ilicino gives a warning that one is now trea¬
ding on different ground.
The ground was both different and new. None
of Ilicino's ideas, it is true, are particularly original
in themselves. It is the way he fitted them together,
creating the querelle of Arms and Letters, which is new.
And he was quite aware of his originality. Of all the
authors in this study (with the exception of Homodeis)
Ilicino is the only one not to say that the question he
is discussing is an old and much debated problem. To be
sure, Ilicino's originality and his importance in the
history of the querelle might not have been so obvious, had
his successors and imitators not drawn attention to his
text. They not only drew attention to it, as we shall be
seeing; they quoted from it and sometimes even plagiarized
parts of it. It may seem strange that it should have
attracted notice, tucked away as it was at the heart of his
voluminous commentary. But there were certainly plenty of
opportunities for readers to discover it. The commentary,
as we saw, was immensely popular. It went through twenty-
four editions in the space of fifty years and was read all
over Italy. There are copies today of its first fourteen
editions in no less than fifty-one Italian towns, all the
way from Udine and Trieste to Palermo and Siracusa, from
Albenga and Mondovi to C-alatina in the very tip of the
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heel. The last edition was published m 1522, but half
a century later Ilicino's querelle was still being cited
as an authority of the subject (see below pp-2 5^- 5 )•
As well as setting the querelle of Arms and
Letters on its course, Ilicino had a significant influence
on the very querelle of Knights and Doctors to which he was
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indebted. When his commentary was first published in
1^75, the querelle of Knights and Doctors had not yet
achieved"full independence. It was still confined to
legal commentaries, and the chances are that it would never
have gone any further but for Ilicino's commentary. The
first edition of the Commentary appeared in Bologna, the
home town of the querelle. Another fourteen years were to
elapse, it is true, before that same city witnessed the
publication of Bolognini's and Beccadelli's works, but
meanwhile Ilicino's commentary had securely established
its claim to fame, being republished five times, two in
lU88, the year preceding the appearance of Bolognini's and
Beccadelli's texts. Bolognini and Beccadelli, and later
Lanfranchino, were presumably encouraged therefore by
Ilicino's success to produce larger and popularized versions
of a theme which until then had been mainly of academic
interest. Faced with the challenge of an outsider, they
decided to "counter-attack" and provide an "authorized"
model of the querelle. Their endeavours bore no fruits
however and the independence of the querelle of Knights
and Doctors was short-lived, as we saw. On the one hand
this was because Knights and Doctors were little amenable
to more literary requirements and almost inevitably became
metamorphosed once outside their natural habitat (legal
textbooks); on the other it was because of the very success
of Ilicino's commentary, which set the fashion for arms and
letters in a world which in any case was probably more in
tune with those terms and what they could stand for than it
was with the jargon of jurists. Knights and doctors did
not suffer a total defeat however and were not solely
confined again to legal commentaries. They continued to
inspire the querelle of Arms and Letters and we will find
mentions of them in every subsequent work on the subject
right up to the end of the sixteenth century.
This hypothesis regarding Ilicino's influence
on the querelle of Knights and Doctors will become more
plausible in later sections as we get to see. ■. just how
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often he was in fact cited. But we already have one piece
of evidence to lend it support. It is Cicero's "cedant
arma toge, concedat laurea lingue", the war-cry of the
contending parties in Bolognini's dramatisation of the
querelle. This is Bolognini's only non-legal quotation
and he does not otherwise show any particular familiarity
with the classics. It is not preposterous therefore to
suppose that he borrowed it from Ilicinos where it figures
so prominently, and that it was Ilicino who thus inspired
him with the idea of presenting the querelle in the way he
did.
Ilicino's version of the querelle became very
popular, but there was one field in which it remained
conspicuously unanswered: the field of Petrarchan scholar¬
ship. By the early 1520s, when the last edition of Ilicino's
commentary appeared, the vogue for Petrarchism was well
under way and the reading public had become more interested
in the voice of the poet than in the opinion of his
interpreter. Commentaries were therefore reduced to the
status of footnotes, while the poems were restored to their
rightful • position , both proportionally and typographically.
Anything which detracted attention from the words of the
master no longer being acceptable, Ilicino was bound to
pass from fashion. He was replaced in the public favour
by Alessandro Vellutello,, whose edition of Petrarch's
vernacular poetry (Trionfi and Canzoniere) , which first
appeared in 1525, proved as enduringly popular as Ilicino's
commentary had been. It was republished at least twenty-
2 8
two times in the following sixty years. Regarding
the order in which Petrarch introduces men-of-arms and
men-of-letters in the third chapter of the Triumph of
29 . „
Fame, Vellutello has little to say: ha ll Poeta ne'
precedent! capitoli detto di tutti gli huomini eccellenti
in arme, che vide esser alia destra della trionfante fama,
come quelli, ch'a gli huomini togati, c'hora in questo
30
nostra haver alia sinistra di quella veduti, li propone."
There were to be numerous other editors of Petrarch's
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Trionfi in the course of the sixteenth century, besides
Vellutello, but almost none of them committed themselves
31
more on this point than Vellutello had done. Only two
interpreted Petrarch's presentation of famous men as
signifying precedence and superiority. In a 1533 Neapolitan
edition the expositor, Sylvano da Venaphro, wrote: "et e
da notare, che disse dalla banda manca, per mostrar che
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maggior dignita e quella dell'armi che delle lettere."
And in an edition of 1582, published in Basle but prepared
some years before in Italy by Lodovico Castelvetro
and dedicated to Alfonso II d'Este, we find the words
quoted at the beginning of this chapter: "da man dextra,
come in luogo di piu honore. Onde dice il padre al figliuolo 2.
Salmo, ' sede a dextris mei.s ' . Et nella credenza apostolica,
1sedet ad dexteram Dei patris omnipotent is. ' ... Da man
manca. Et qui non ha dubbio, che il P. ditermina, che
piu honore seguita dall'arme che dalle lettere, riponendo
i capitani da man destra della fama et i letterati da
... „ 33
s mi stra.
Ilicino, as the initiator of the querelle of
Arms and Letters, may have had no following amongst his
fellow commentators of Petrarch, but he did (be it or not
a coincidence) amongst fellow physicians of his. The next
three contributions to the genre were all made by
physicians. All three moreover were composed for and
dedicated to members of the Neapolitan aristocracy. The
querelle, in its second stage, thus unfolded in southern
Italy and in the ambit of the royal court. Its first
contributor, in that new environment, was the court
physician Antonio de Ferrariis, who is usually known,
after the region of his birth, as Galateo.
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B. Antonio de Ferrariis detto Galateo: De dignitate
disciplinarum.
Galateo's version of the querelle, which was
most probably inspired by "Ilicinum ... qui Franciscum
^ 3) i .
Petrarcham ([nuperj interpretatus est", never achieved
the publicity enjoyed by Ilicino's. It was a letter to
a friend which today only survives in manuscript form.
But Galateo, unlike Ilicino, gave his heart and soul to
the matter, and as a result his version is much livelier
than Ilicino's, much more interesting and also more
revealing as a social document. Since it is so closely
connected with Galateo's feelings and beliefs, to know
something of his life and times is a necessary prerequisite
to understanding the text.
Galateo was born in l444 in Galatone. He
spent all his life in the south of Italy, at Nardo ,
Gallipoli and Lecce, when he was not in Bari or in Naples.
He only ventured to the north on a couple of occasions.
The first was in 147*+, when he spent just enough time in
Ferrara to be examined and graduate "in artibus et
medicina". Graduation was cheaper at Ferrara University
than anywhere else in Italy and graduands were not
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required to have been students of the university.
This is what might have prompted Galateo to go there,
and his informant on the matter was probably Gerolamo
Castello, the court doctor of the Estensi "on loan" to
the Duke of Calabria (the future Alfonso II), in whose
company Galateo had travelled to Ferrara. Galateo's second
trip to the north of Italy was in l*+76, when he went to
Venice (and probably Padua) at the invitation of his friend
Ermolao Barbaro, who had been living in Naples for a
couple of years (as a token of their friendship Barbaro
was to dedicate to Galateo his translation of Themistius
published in Treviso in l48l). Venice made such an
impression on Galateo that as many as twenty-five years
later, in 1501, he was able to write to Alvise Loredan:
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"ego, sunt fere viginti quinque annis, paucis diebus
Venetiis moratus sum. Mallem litteras nescire, unicum
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infelicit atis meae solacium, quam Venetias non vidisse" ,
which is no mean statement for someone whose lifeblood
letters were. Galateo's last escape from the south was in
1510, when he went to Rome, but for what precise reason we
do not know. On that occasion he met and befriended
Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, the future Leo X, and wrote
a letter to Julius II, offering to give him a copy of a
Constantinople manuscript containing the text of the
Donation of Constantine. Whether he ever did give it to
him though, the story does not tell. Otherwise Galateo
remained in the south, wandering from town to town as the
vicissitudes of his career and the fortunes of his
masters dictated.
He began his studies at Nardo, which had a
studio famous for "physics" and medicine, and completed
them in Naples. In 1^71, although not yet a graduate, he
was already a practising physician, in Naples. In 1^90 he
was appointed court doctor by Ferdinand I and he held the
position throughout the last troubled years of the Aragonese
rule. In 1501 he was forced to flee the capital and in
1503 we find him as court doctor to the Duchess of Bari,
Isabella, daughter of Alfonso II and widow of Gian
Galeazzo Visconti. He did not stay in Bari for very long,
but to the end of his life Isabella remained his protectress
and Galateo her devotee: "heroinam meam Alphonsi filiam,
cuius opera, si hoc vivere appellandum est, Galateus
3 7vivit." He died in 1517, in Lecce, where he had lived
his last years and which, for many years before that,
had been his home base: "ego praeteritis quadraginta annis -
he wrote in about 151^+ - administrationi lupiensis
3 8
reipublicae saepe affui."
Unlike Ilicino, Galateo never held any
academic posts. For the whole of his life he remained
a practising physician, and medicine not only provided for
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his livelihood, wherever he lived, hut it also tempered
his mental outlook and beliefs. "Ego medicus sum" is a
leitmotiv of all his writings. At the same time he was
very conscious of being a philosopher too and not simply a
doctor: "nos qui medici et philosophi appellari et haberi
39cupimus", he wrote to some friends in 1513-14. As a
physician cum philosopher, he would have studied not just
man the physical being but man in his totality: man the
social, moral and spiritual being, and man the creature of
God in God's multifarious creation. As a result he was
in a position to discourse with some authority on anything
ranging from diseases to moral philosophy or from
geography to metaphysics, and indeed such a wide range
of interests is well reflected in Galateo's writings, above
bO
all m his charming and homely epistolano. He also
wrote a treatise on gout (De podagra) , several works of
geography (e.g. De situ elementorurn, De mare et aquis,
De situ terrarum, De fluviorum origine), a couple of relig¬
ious works (Esposizione del pater Noster and the dialogue
Eremit a - the latter more a satire of the Church than a
theological work) and the ubiquitous Renaissance treatise
on education (De educatione). ^ One of his biographers
claims that he invented relief maps, but this has been
denied by another, who nevertheless calls Galateo "un non
comune cartografo", whilst admitting that next to nothing
of his cartographical production has survived for us to
k2 ...
admire. Still, the wide scope of his interests is
beyond doubt. Mario Santoro comes close to saying that
Antonio was a typical uomo universale of the Renaissance
(if such a creature ever existed), in terming him one of
the most eminent representatives of what he calls
1). 3"enciclopedismo umanistico". Galateo just saw himself
as a man-of-letters, though a man-of-letters par excellence:
a man brought up on letters, a man whose raison d'etre
was letters and who believed that only letters could
lead men on the path to salvation. There was a long
tradition of learning in his family, which was of Greek
origin. Galateo was a Greek Orthodox and his forbears had
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been Greek Orthodox priests and men of erudition and
culture: "avus meus et proavus et ceteri progenitores
mei sanctissimi sacerdotes fuere, philosophiae et
sacrarum scripturarum scientissimi." He never allows
his readers to forget that he is at heart a Greek and that
Greek culture is his culture: "ego, ut ad philosophos redeam,
veteres Graecos amo: hos colo, hos quotidie animo et oculis
verso et me italograecum esse fateor ex hac parte Italiae,
quae quondam Magna Graecia dicebatur." ^ So much a Greek
did he feel to be, that on several occasions not even the
achievements of the otherwise admired Romans seemed to him
of much account when compared to those of his own nationals:
"tanta- erat apud Graecos phi-losophiae reverential Romani ,
si verum fateri velimus, verbis tantum et ad ostentationem
philosophati sunt." ^
Galateo was the surname given to de Ferrariis
when he joined the Accademia Pontaniana in the early ll+70's.
A convinced academician, he remained attached to the
Pontaniana for the rest of his life and even when absent
from Naples kept in touch with other members of the Academy.
Most of his friends and correspondents belonged to that
circle, like Belisario Acquaviva Duke of Nardo (whom we
shall have the opportunity of meeting again), like Marino
Brancaccio, the dedicatee of his De dignitate disciplinarum,
or like Sannazaro, to whom he dedicated his De situ
terrarum (1501-02) and to whom several letters of his
epistolario are addressed. He was friendly of course with
Pontano, but no letters survive which the two men might
have exchanged. So fond was Galateo of the Academy that
he established an academy of his own in Lecce, which he ran
along very much the same lines as the Pontaniana and which
he describes with great affection in the letter De academia
lupiensi et de Ingenuo (1^96-1500), addressed to
17
Crisostomo Colonna.
The academic was the brighter side of an
otherwise trying life. Despite the protection of mighty
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friends and despite his official appointments, Galateo's
material situation was never good and grew worse. He had
to live through the difficult years of the French and
Spanish invasions and throughout his life, "but especially
after lH80, he was obsessed with the thought of a Turkish
invasion. The Turks had occupied Otranto in lU80 and
Galateo, it would seem, had been an eye-witness of the
hQ
invasion. Thereafter he was m constant fear that they
might come again, and another recurring theme of his letters
is that something must be done once and for all to ward off
any further threat of Turkish attack. This theme reaches
its climax in a call for a crusade addressed to Ferdinand
/ . s U9
of Aragon m 1510 (De capta Tripoli). It was not only
as a Christian and an inhabitant of the most vulnerable
part of Italy that Galateo feared the Turks, but as a Greek,
who bewailed the fall of Constantinople as the loss of his
motherland.
Greece meant one thing and one thing only to
Galateo: philosophy. Philosophy had b'een invented by the
Greeks and they had taught the world to philosophize:
"Graecorum inventum philosophia est habetque cum his nescio
quid cognationis. Graeci philosophari docuerunt adeoque
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illis peculiare est philosophiae studium." The Greek
of Greeks, the philosopher of philosophers is naturally
Aristotle, and Galateo is an Aristotelian to the very
marrow of his bones, who believes that Aristotle is none
else than the oracle of God: "quicquid Aristoteles
decrevit, non ab imperatoris ore, aut a praetoris edicto,
aut a senatus consulto, aut ab aliqua quavis optima
republica sancitum esse putes, sed ab ipso Dei et naturae
oraculo." Galateo's faith in Aristotle is such that there
is no mountain it will not move, if the spirit of Aristotle
be with him: "si mihi Aristotelis numen aderit, vel cum
5 2
ipso Hercule luctari non formidaverim." True,.Galateo
never forgets that he is a Christian (indeed one of the
striking features of his writings is just how often he does
quote the Scriptures and Church Fathers), but Aristotelian
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doctrine has such a firm hold on him that more than once
it will take him beyond the brink of heresy, if not out¬
right blasphemy. In a passage of the De dignitate
disciplinarum (censored by one of its earlier editors for
being too unorthodox) he maintains that, moral virtues
being specifically human and God super-human, God is
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incapable of justice. At times it is really as though
God were the oracle of Aristotle and not Aristotle the
oracle of God. But the might of Aristotle's genius can
become too formidable. Anticipating La Bruyere's
"tout est dit" by a couple of centuries, in a letter to
Belisario Acquaviva Galateo confesses to be awed into
silence by the prospect of having to plod where Aristotle
had trodden so divinely: "certe divinus ille vir calamum
scribentibus, qui fuerunt, qui sunt et qui futuri sunt,
5 ^extorsit de manibus." The awe was soon dispelled
however and Galateo's creativity visited most every
field of learning, never stifled by the looming influence
of the Stagirite. To be sure, everything he wrote is a
variation on a peripatetic theme, but the spirit of
Aristotle always vivifies the words of his disciple. ^^
As a Christian Galateo may well stray from
the path of Catholic orthodoxy, but his belief in Aristotle
will not allow of any deviation from the Peripatetic creed
as handed down by the Master himself. Any follower who
has adulterated the original purity of his philosophy
must be cast from the fold. Averroes is "barbarus hie"
and Albert the Great an impudent bel esprit, educated
"sub frigido crassoque caelo", who knows nothing of
Greek letters and yet dares to pose as judge and censor of
"ingeniorum Graeciae". As for Scotus, his only achievement
is that he has depraved the "sacrosanctam peripateticam
disciplinam". But if they who have erred by excess of zeal
deserve such invectives, woe be to those who have dared
measure swords with the Master.' On "insanus Valla" Galateo
casts anathema: "abi hinc, Laurenti, in rem malam
castigandus es tua ferula, non verbis!" It is the effrontery
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to denigrate Aristotle which brings upon Valla such abuse,
but it is also his belonging to that clan of "novitii
atticissantes grammaticuli", superficial triflers who
mistake the means for the end and rest their gaze on the
empty shell of words (so says Galateo) without attempting
to explore the true mysteries of Mother Nature ("arcana
omnium parentis naturae"). ^ Knowledge truth and wisdom:
that and that alone is deserving of our attention.
Niceties of style or language are expendable. "Bonum
librum non auri bractea, non purpura, non docta pictoris
manus, non fucata verba, non ipsa elocutio, sed eruditio
5 7facit." Valla's attack on the Donation of Constantine
ia a typical example of a work with mistaken priorities,
a work which treats surface as substance (for even if the
Donation were a forgery - which is unlikely - its message
5 8is true). Coluccio Salutati, a pretentious liar who
believes he knows everything of which he is ignorant, meets
with the same fate as Valla; he too was an enemy of
Aristotle and, what is more, he dared (in his De nobilitate
legum of 1399) to claim superiority for the active- over
the contemplative life. Cicero, for the same crime, is
59accused by Galateo of lese-majesty, but Ilicino,
strangely enough, is let off with a mild rebuke and is
given the benefit of the doubt over the conclusions of
his querelle in the commentary to Petrarch's Trionfi: he
was either trying to flatter his prince or he was simply
thinking in terms of fame. But he no doubt owed this
indulgence less to the ambiguities of his argument than to
the common heritage he shared with Galateo of Aristotelian,
physician and philosopher.
There is much in common between Galateo's
De dignitate disciplinarurn and Ilicino's introduction to
the third chapter of the Triumph of Fame, which as we
6 0
have seen, Galateo had read. Since Galateo mentions
Ilicino's querelle in the context of the De dignitate
disciplinarum it is more than likely that he was
influenced by it, but whether he would not have written
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the De dignitate "but for Ilicino's commentary, it is
hard to say, especially as his contribution to the debate
is by no means exclusively theoretical (as is Ilicino's),
but derives from a particular social context and owes a
lot to Galateo's own experiences. It is therefore safer
to explain the similarities of thought and expression
between the two texts in terms of the cultural tradition
common to both authors.
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Written some time between 1^90 and 1^9^,
the De dignitate was addressed to Marino Brancaccio
(Marinus Pancratius), a Neapolitan nobleman, who was a
faithful servant in arms of the Crown (he fought against
the Turks at Otranto in lUSO, against the Venetians in
li+8U, and against the rebel barons in 1^85-86), a diplomat
(sent by the King on a couple of missions to Rome and
Florence in 1^93) and a member of the Accademia Pontaniana,
6 2
who died in 1^97- It survives today in only one
ft Q
manuscript of the period, but there are likely to have
been more, since it was read by other friends of Galateo's
apart from Brancaccio, as we shall be seeing. Its title
tells it to be not just about arms and letters. But it is
mainly so. Several of Galateo's biographers have
dismissed it as a confusing muddle because the thread of
6h
the argument is not always easy to follow. It may have
its inconsistencies, but it only carries a semblance of
confusion. The clue to a correct understanding of it is
provided by the allegory with which it closes. It is
the allegory of Paris and the three goddesses. Paris is
mankind and the three godesses, the three paths of
life: pleasure (Venus), action (Juno) and wisdom or
contemplation (Minerva). The multitude (Paris) chooses
pleasure, those who are of a better mould ("excellentioris
ingenii") opt for the life of action, but the happy few
elect wisdom. As we know from Ilicino, the active life is
the sphere of moral virtues, the contemplative life the
realm of intellectu/al virtues. There are four moral
virtues, prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, all
151
of which are needed to live well and happily ("ad tene
beateque vivendum"). The intellectual virtues for their
part only apply to speculation and cognition ("speculationi
et cognitioni rerui tantum"), which is of three orders,
the mathematical, the physical and the metaphysical.
This is the scheme into which Galateo fits his querelle of
Arms and Letters as Ilicino had fitted his. But in
Galateo arms are the epithet of only one of the moral
virtues, fortitude, whereas letters designate moral and
intellectual virtues altogether: "quaestio haec non de
terminis est, sed de tota possessione. Qui arma aut rem
militarem nominat, unam tantum pronunciat ex virtutibus,
quas philosophi morales appellant, fortitudinem scilicet,
qui vero litteras dicit et moralem et intellectualem
virtutis partem comprehendit" (p.50). The duel of arms
and letters thus becomes a contest of virtues.
The reader can be in no doubt any longer as
to which side Galateo supports. He had no choice really,
as Aristotle had already passed judgement on the matter.
And there is no appeal against a sentence of Aristotle's:
"utra autem illarum dignior sit non oportet disputare:
ab Aristotele enim lata sententia est, a qua non licet
provocare" (p.50). Moral virtues are human and belong
to man the rational social and tribal being ("homini
inest, qua homo est animal rationale et sociale et
gregatile" - pp„51-2). What is more, men share moral
virtues to a certain extent with beasts ("quae circa mores
versatur, hanc cum beluis quodammodo communem habemus" -
p. 5*0. But intellectual virtues are divine and abide in
man insofar as there is a touch of the divine in him
("in quantum aliquid divinum in illo est" - p.52). As
gods are superior to men, so then is contemplation to
action: "tanto contemplativam vitam activae praestare puto,
quanto intellectum sensibus, animam corpori , quanto
hominibus deos immortales. Ilia sola nos diis similes
facit" (p.5^)- This statement however should not be read
as a deprecation of the active life as such. Indeed moral
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virtues have their own excellence and arms are an
"ingenua disciplina" just as letters. The courageous
("fortis") man is a hero willing to lay down his life
honourably for God King and Country ("fortis est qui audet
... pro diis pro patria pro suo rege honeste mori" -
p.5l) - like Ilicino, Galateo denies the quality of true
warrior to anybody whose motives are none but the purest
(say amorous or lucrative). The difference between action
and contemplation is one of utility and dignity, the two
categories which typify the two dimensions of man's
existence and his dual finality. To choose the active
life is to have regard for public utility and for the well-
being of man here-below. To choose the contemplative life
is to bear in mind the very magnificence of that life and
the true perfection and ultimate felicity of man. Utility
has connotations of servility: if something is of use, it
does not exist for its own sake. The more useless a thing,
the less need it has of anything else, the more noble it
is. Here again Galateo is quoting a dogma of the
peripatetic creed: "peripatetici non id quod utilius, sed
quod honestius est et nobilius anteponunt. Unde et
disciplinas quanto minus serviles minusque utiles, tanto
nobiliores putant: illae enim propter se sunt, non
aliarum gratia. Sed metaphysica omnibus praestat: quoniam
nulli servit, omnibus dominatur: aliae propter ipsam,
ipsa non propter alias. Unde non improprie sapientia
appellatur, quam vel solus Deus vel Deus habet maxime"
(p.6l). Those therefore who take the way of contemplation,
who strive to know all things human and divine, lead their
mortal lives in the company of immortals and live like gods
in human bodies ("hoc est vitam mortalem cum immortalibus
agere , hoc est in humano corpore divinitus vivere" -
p.67). They cultivate that quality of ours which, alone
of all our qualities, will accompany us into the life
beyond ("ilia sola virtus nos in futura vita comitabitur" -
P • 5^ ) •
The De dignitate, we said, is not solely about
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arms and letters. It also contains a short passage in
which, instead of comparing arms to letters as such, and
as though in response to the Knight and Doctor querelle,
Galateo compares arms to laws. Here too he applies the
scale of virtues. Both arms and laws (as in Ilicino)
pertain exclusively to the active life. Yet laws, which
comprehend all four moral virtues, have a certain affinity
with intellectual virtues, and arms, as we know, only
comprise one moral virtue (fortitude). Therefore arms must
acknowledge the ascendancy of laws. To this same conclusion,
reached from theoretical premises, Galateo also- comes "by
way of the experimental route. Living at the time he did
and where he did, he could not fail to appreciate the
benefits derivable from a brave and strong soldiery. He
knew only too well how certain occasions in life demonst¬
rated the indispensability of troops under arms. When the
Turks attacked Otranto, he says, as though to deflate
the pretensions of doctors of law (but also no doubt to
flatter his patron), they were not driven back by
quotations from the Digest: "cum immanissima gens
Turcarum Italiam invasit, quid nobis profuisset Scevola,
Paulus et Ulpianus, nisi Alphonsus fuisset, qui a barbaris
nos redemit?" (p.63). However^ this does not mean that
soldiers should at all times have the upper hand. It is
precisely occasions like these which warn us of the perils
of unrestrained might. Wars must not be waged for the sake
of waging war. They must protect us without ("foris"),
that we may live in peace and enjoy protection from the
law. According to the axiom enunciated above (and with
which both Lapo and Ilicino would have been in full
agreement) warfare is useful, but the more useful it is,
the more servile it must be deemed. It is not, like
metaphysics, an end unto itself. And, as Cicero said
(Pro Milone IV,10): "magis arma propter leges sunt, non
leges propter arma" (p.65).
Having compared letters to arms and arms to
laws, and in compliance with the generic title of his letter,
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Galateo also gives some space in the De dignitate
dis ciplinarum to that other and even more popular querelle
of the time: the querelle of Law and Medicine (see above
p. 76 ) . Here too he poses the problem in the established
manner of the text. Medicine has two elements, the
practical and the theoretical. As a craft ("opus") it
haridles the human body, but is inferior to laws (and
"political science" - "civilis disciplina"), whose subject
is the human body and also the human soul, and cities
republics kingdoms and empires. In its other guise, it
studies "elementa et regiones, situs urbium, na.turas
locorum et temporum et ventorum, vires herbarum metallorum
et animalium, denique opificium humani corporis" (p.63),
all works of God and Nature. In this respect it comes so
to speak ("quodammodo") under contemplation, whereas laws
deal with the works of men and belong entirely to the
active life.
So far Galateo1s text may not appear
particularly original or dramatic, rehearsing as it does
commonplaces of peripatetic thought. But when these get
converted to the expression of social preoccupations, then
the De dignitate comes to life and leaves behind the text
of Ilicino in the field of academic discourse. Although
the logic is dialectic, the syllogism is absent and the
second person singular lends an air of urgency to the
debate. Through the correspondence of two friends the
reader is introduced to the royal retinue of Ferdinand I,
where questions like these (like arms and letters) were
often discussed to while away the time until the King's
return: "hae quaestiones saepe nos otiosos, ut scis, dum
regem expectaremus, sollicitabant" (p.50). And the
De dignitate may well owe its conception to an interrupted
reading of Aristotle's Ethics (in which the problem "de
dignitate virtutum" is mooted in the first book and solved
in the tenth), which Galateo and Brancaccio had one day
engaged upon on the banks of the Volturno, when accompanying
the King ("cum Ferdinandum sequeremur ad ripam Vulturni
135
amnis" - p.5l). Beyond the royal reti.nue.? wh.e.re eyeryone
supports his own side in the old ("vetus") and pending
("adhuc sub iudice") debate of arms and letters our atten¬
tion is drawn to the open rivalry ("dissensio") of two
professional groups, each arrogating absolute primacy to
its own vocation, and we realize that the debate was not
as otiose as its leisure-time function for Ferdinand's
retinue may suggest or as certain modern critics have
proposed. ^ The passage is so interesting that it deserves
to be quoted in full.
Qui regibus serviunt, qui auspicatu suo magnas res gerunt,
multas legiones ducunt, qui regna custodiunt, qui hostes
propulsant, omnes rem militarem praeferunt, eoque
argumento utuntur, quia tam sacrae litterae quam gentiles
et ipsi divini poetae nonnisi fortium virorum facta
continent, singularia certamina, pugnas , incursiones,
obsidiones et expugnationes urbium, victorias et ex victis
gentibus triumphos: quae omnia ad rem militarem pertinent.
Ipsi heroes diis, ut aiunt, geniti, hac via caelum petierunt.
Tot'insignia, tot hastas, tot oscilla, tot vexilla et scuta
in ipsis templis pendentia, tot titulos, tot praeclaras
familias, tot principatus, tot imperia, nonne aria
pepererunt? Denique, ut Aristoteles ait, militaris vita
multas habet partes virtutis. Contra qui litteras
tutantur, obscura esse omnia dicunt, nisi sint litterae,
quae cuncta illustrant, quae deos hominibus conciliant, quae
caelestem illam patriam, quae elementorum unde nos constamus
et vivimus plantarum animantium omnium, denique ipsius
hominis naturam hominibus nobis demonstrant. His constant
regna, res publicae, urbes et ipsi exercitus. Leges, sine
quibus ne vivere quidem possumus, ipsis litterarum
monumentis servantur. Sine litteris nec reges, nec duces,
nec milites, nec classes, nec ipsi piratae suo munere fungi
possent. Nisi litterae essent, nec clarorum virorum facta
nosceremus. Hae lucem humanis rebus ministrant, hae nostri
memoriam plus quam aut aera aut marmora prorogare possunt.
Sicut nec sine armis tuta, sic nec sine litteris clara aut
beata potest esse vita (pp.1+7-8).
At this stage Galateo is simply presenting the case for
either party without taking sides, but before long he will
lay bare his sympathies and deliver a strong attack on those
whose mental horizons do not stretch beyond the edge of the
battle-field. The attack is in retaliation against the
abuse (or what they believe to be the abuse) with which
these people like to afflict those who wield the pen and
not the sword by calling them "pen-pushers" ("calamarios"):
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"nec dub.itant non jnodo ii , qui magnis rebus gestis clari
habentur, sed viles mercenarii milites, qui non pro gloria,
non pro salute patriae, sed pro vili nomismate, pro tenui
mercedula vitam exponunt, nos foeda ut putant appellatione
calamarios nuncupare" (p.56). To this Galateo retorts by-
casting aspersions on the vacuous ideals of the warrior.
Fortitude is a virtue which men share with beasts.
Animals fight and fight well and have good reasons to fight,
for prey and mate. Men say they fight for glory, but no
stories tell of anyone who ever waged war against an
impecunious people. Alexander attacked the wealthy
Persians and Indians, not the Scythians. It is for silver
gold and gems that men go to war, and to conceal their
cupidity they call it glory, as though the thirst for glory
were more excusable and more honourable than the appetite
for riches."Haec est ilia heroica virtus, ut iugulemus
homines" (p.56). Truly men should not fight at all, let
alone for the sake of glory, for in so doing they counter
the design of Nature, which created them "inermes et
imbelles". Man's business lies elsewhere. Philosophy
is the test of virility ("philosophi non multitudinis
opinionem sequuntur, sed eorum qui vere sunt viri quamvis
pauci sint." - p. 53 - my italics), contemplation the
polish of humanity ("qui vero contemplativam fvitam
praetulerunt^J . . : ad perfectam homi ni s . felicitatem
(respexerunt]" - p.6l - my italics). Man's true form is
neither fortitudd nor any of the moral virtues, but his
intellect. His life is justified by knowledge, not by
good works, and his salvation is to understand, for Christ
said: "haec est vita aeterna, uti cognoscant" (John 17,3).
What Christ in fact said was: "uti cognoscant te Deum",
and Galateo does quote the verse in full a few pages later,
but his initial ommission speaks clearly for his conception
of God. God is not the Rightful Judge, He is not the God
of Hosts, or the God of Love and Charity. He is the
All-Knowing, whose nous is the ordering principle of the
universe and in whose image man was created. The power
which h.e gave man over the rest of creation is the power
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of intelligence not of might, and it is -with his intellect
that man will return to him again. Only if man falls in
combat for the true religion will he reap a just desert,
but otherwise he must not be lured by the sheen of swords
from the path which will lead him to his one and only
goal. The goal is the reading of that volume which
brought bliss to Dante, and the only path the one plotted
out by true philosophy: to "science" and "wisdom"
("scientia", "sapientia") by way of "speculation" and
"cognition" ("speculatio", "cognitio") with the help of
"intellectual virtues". Anything which does not show man
this correct Aristotelian way, is not worthy of his
consideration. The poems of Homer and Virgil are full of
fire and destruction, Greek and Roman histories replete
with war and death. Even the Holy Scriptures picture waste
and devastation. The use of grammar we know from Valla.
If his care for the empty shell of words owes him but
contempt, Cicero and every other orator are of no more
account, who love the hollow sound of words. They all
speak to please the ears of men. Philosophers alone write
what is pleasing to the gods ("philosophi ea scribunt et
tractant quae plus diis quam hominibus grata sunt" - p.57).
Philosophy alone is the beacon of salvation. And
philosophy, more particularly "natural philosophy" is what
Galateo, like Ilicino, really means by letters.
Because of his devout cult of letters, Galateo
has frequently been cast as an archetypal specimen of that
elusive thing, "humanism" (Gothein's opinion that "appunto
pel suo punto di vista greco, il Galateo e riuscito a
divenire il piu notevole rappresentante della cultura
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umanistica", is typical of the interpretations usually
given of Galateo's "thought"). But we have just seen how
in fact he does not simply exclude grammar, rhetoric and
history (the traditional pillars of the "humanist" edifice)
from his scheme of salvation, but actually condemns them
for being more harmful than beneficial. However much he
might have been exposed to the so-called "humanist" culture,
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ae makes a firm stand against Cicero and passes lightly-
over Plato to recognize only Aristotle and peripatetic
philosophy as the hallmark of truth. And if that philosophy
needs no seconding from behind, it does not either require
assistance from above. Its' teachings are never supplanted
by the lesson of theology, its wisdom never superseded by
the faith of the believer. Whereas Dante, in his ascent
to God, at one point outgrows the habit of philosophy, for
Galateo philosophy alone is the highway to beatitude. And
although he is a professed Christian, there is little he
entrusts the Church to do: his conception of the. contem¬
plative life is totally lay and secular. ^
If letters (philosophy) beget salvation, it
must follow that those who turn their backs on letters
procure their own damnation. A life without letters is a
man's death ("sine litteris ... vita morti aut brutorum
vitae similis est" - p.1+8), and to escape eternal death
there is but one solution. This, one feels, is the prime
message of the De dignitate, clothed though it may be
with a scholarly garb and addressed to one already
converted. Men-of-arms need not abandon their profession
(indeed Christendom would be the worse off if they did),
but would that they tempered their hostility to letters
and learnt to "simul discere et militare", like the men
of old! The reverence of Alexander's army for the gods was
equalled by its veneration for philosophy, and the Greeks
and Romans did equal homage to arms and letters: "Graeci
et armis et litteris, post captam Troiam usque ad
Romanorum tempora, per totum orbem clari extiterunt; sed
nec arma sine litteris, nec litteras sine armis exercuerunt.
Mecnon et Romani litterarum avidissimi fuere" (pp.56-7)•
Greeks and Romans despised as barbarians all nations which
lived "sine litteris et humanis moribus" (p.U8). We
Italians - says Galateo - have inherited their usage of
the word, but at the same time have contracted from the
barbarians the taint which brought that appellation upon
them: "nos Latini, immo potius semibarbari, quamdam a
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barbaris ipsis labem contraximus. Qui arma exercent, nescio
cur litteras despiciunt; qui autem litteras colunt , armorum
et rei bellicae laudes praedicant" (p. 57). Galateo does
not question the meaning of the word barbarian. He simply
expresses doubts as to the propriety of its current
application. The whole world (the whole of Italy) has
lapsed into barbarity., and ignorance is the rule (with but
a few exceptions). The fault though is not of men-of-
arms alone. Their taste has been pandered to by those who
trade in letters; by those who write what is sweet to the
ears of men? that is , by poets and historians, not by
philosophers. If true learning were now given its fair due,
not only would a remedy have been found to the ills of
Italy, but men might even be saved. Man's true form is
his intellect, and everybody must therefore turn to
philosophy, for there is no-one who is not capable of
receiving its teachings. Galateo's design is to open
men's eyes to their real mission, and in so doing to
rehabilitate learning in the eyes of those who deride
"pen-pushers" and to restore it to the prestige it had once
(as he sees it) enjoyed amongst the military.
Written in a mood of hope and optimism, the
De dignitate yet sounds a note of scepticism. A universal
redemption of this nature might never come to pass. Few
will see the light and the multitude will continue to grope
in darkness. But if men will persist in their obduracy
and swords will not sometimes be turned into ploughshares,
Galateo would turn philosophers into kings. Smarting under
the insults of the soi-disant nobility, whose vainglorious
ignorance rules unabated all around him, he pleads with
passion for the restoration of natural legitimacy. Society
may be divided into commoners and noblemen, but distinction
should not be awarded in merit of social origin or military
feats. A nobleman's mark is his allegiance to truth, where
the people is blinded by error. The chief delusion of the
multitude is its attach/ment to the life of action, with
its meretricious pomp and deceptive splendour. Anyone whom
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this glitter dazzles is a plebeian and so is therefore the
self-styled aristocracy, which acknowledges no raison d'etre
but its sword.
Quite evident in the De dignitate, where he
opposes the plebs , the vulgus, the multitudo to the
philosophi, Galateo's conception of a cultural nobility
comes to the fore in some of his other writings and in two
of them in particular, which are more or less contemporary
with the De dignitate: the letter De distinctione humani
generis et nobilitate of c. i486 addressed to Marco Antonio
Tolomei (Antonius Lupiensis), bishop of Lecce from 1U85 to
1498, ^ and the letter De nobilitate written in 1495-96
from Galateo's academy in Lecce and addressed to one
"Gelasius", of whom nothing is known except that he was an
69
intimate of Belisario Acquaviva Duke of Hardo. Both
letters contain a host of pithy sentences, all of which make
tempting quotations. In the De nobilitate Galateo
re-asserts with vigour what he had stated in the
De distinctione and implied in the De dignitate, namely
that only philosophers, lovers that is of wisdom and truth
have a rightful claim to nobility, that only they can be
true kings, only they real men: "philosophia est vera et
constans nobilitas; philosophi igitur sunt vere nobiles,
ne dicam cum Stoicis et Platone, vere viri , vere reges ;
ceteri omnes plebei atque ignobiles" (De nob. p.288).
Neither wealth nor descent are valid titles of nobility,
no more than strength beauty or honours, says Galateo,
re-writing Aristotle's hackneyed discussion of nobility
and claiming consistency with the conclusions of the
Ethics, which give a definition of true nobility (whereas
the Politics present only conventional nobility -
"secundum communem opinionem"). In the De distinctione
he had gone even further than to use philosophy as a yard¬
stick of social classification. Philosophers and non-
philosphers are the only two categories of human beings he
will recognize: "ii vero, quibus, si qua est in rebus
humanis, inest sapientia, in philosophos et non philosophos
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mortales omnes divisisse videntur " ( De dist. p.104).
This division is intended to do away with all divisions of
race, creed or nationality. A Christian has more in common
with a Gentile, if "both are philosophers, than he has with
another Christian who is not a philosopher. If a Latin and
an Ethiopian both love wisdom, they share more between
them than they do with any non-philosopher of their own
race. To speak of Greeks and barbarians makes no sense,
for there is more affinity between a Greek philosopher
and his foreign counterpart than between Greeks and other
Greeks who only have a partnership in their place of origin.
Sometimes Galateo wavers in his definition of barbarians.
Here and in the De dignitate non-philosophers alone,
whatever their nationality, can qualify. At other times
however - as in the De nobilitate - he gets carried away
by his feelings as a Greek and an Italian to snub all Goths,
Franks and other invaders of fair Italy as barbaric
barbarians. But in all cases the trademark of barbarity is
ignorance - "barbari, ut nunc quoque, semper oderunt
litteras" (De dist . p.109) - and ill-manners the sympton of
barbarism - "perniciosior barbarismus est in moribus quam
in sermone: minus malum est in grammatica peccare quam in
philosophia" (De dist. p.113). Such a definition is said
to derive from a clear perception of what is essential to
man's nature and what is incidental. The essence of man,
that which distinguishes him from other creatures, is his
mind; and it stands to reason that he should be rewarded
with greater or lesser dignity the more or less he employs
his substance. The better use he makes of it, the more
virtuous he becomes. Virtuous is not only meant in the
strictly Aristotelian sense of "applying the (moral and
intellectual) virtues" but in the wider sense of "being
good and just". In the De distinctione and the
De nobilitate Galateo gives greater weight than in the
De dignitate to this third element of the nobility-
literacy equation: goodness. But it was always understood
that the equation would be incomplete without it. Nobility
is knowledge, knowledge brings truth, what is true is right
and right is good. No more than he is ignorant, can a
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philosopher he wicked: "nemo enim philosophus aut
indoctus aut malus est" (De dist. p.105).
If knowledge, truth and goodness are the
hallmarks of philosophy, their opposites are the staple
diet of those who scorn philosophy. Ignorance, falsehood
and evil are the basic elements of the life of action and
arms their steadfast agents, the tool of usurpation and
repression. Arms brought to power men who had no right to
it and enslaved people who were entitled to their freedom.
Every secular authority, from the mightiest to the most
humble, owes its being to the force of arms and maintains
itself by external injury and internal injustice: "liberos
omnes nos natura genuit, servitutem sibi ipsi peperit
mortalitas ... per vim, per arma, per caedes et scelera et
fraudes et dolos, malos astus, proditiones, simulationes
et mendacia orta sunt regna, imperia, divitiae et omnis
quae sic appellari gaudet nobilitas" ('De nob. p.27*0.
Arms do not serve, as they should do, to defend the true
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religion, but only to uphold the perverted will of
the mighty plebeians who bask in the ostentation of their
embezzled nobility ("populares, ...ii barbari a quibus
nostri proceres nobilitatem traxisse se iactant" -
De dist. p.107). Society, according to Galateo, is
divided not, as we might say nowadays, into "haves" and
"have-nots", but into "cans" and "may-nots", and Galateo is
in no doubt as to which side he himself is on: "nobis
villanis peccare non licet" (De nob. p.28l). The indignat¬
ion which this causes him comes out in a steady flow of
abuse against the sham ideals of the noble sse d'epee -
their spurious sense of honour (De distinctione), their
vain belief that it is glorious to die in battle
71(Alphonsi II epitaphium), their fanatical recourse
to the duel (Ad Ioannem et Alphonsum Castriotas), their
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patronage of firearms (De situ elementorum) - and builds
up to a crescendo in an invective where Galateo's social,
grievances mix with his cultural resentment and his national
prejudices to produce what is almost a call for revolution,
for to do obeisance to those, whose master you of right may
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be, is more than one can tolerate ("ferre imperium
eorum, qui tibi iure servire deberent, difficillimum est
et bene instituto animo intolerabile" - De Pist. p.Ill):
0 infelicem hanc Italiae partem! Rarus est, de quo non
possit dici: maiorum primus quisquis fuit ille tuorum,
aut pastor fuit, aut id quod dicere nolo. Quis est ex his,
qui nobiles appellari volunt, qui possit ultra centesimum
annum suae stirpis initium demonstrare? Cuius non pater
aut avus ab externis, ne dicam a barbaris, Gallis aut
Germanis venerit nudus, inops, famelicus, squalidus,
pannosus, et hie locuples factus et clarus per caedes,
furta et rapinas , nihil ubi unde venerat reliquit, nihil
secum tulit nisi rubiginosum ensem et hastam. STec fuere
magna virtutis opera: vicere nos exteri non repugnantes,
sed ultro vocantes ope et industria pontificum et principum
romanorum, qui semper student exitio Italiae et iis nos
servire cogunt, qui leges, litteras et bonos mores et
ipsam humanitatem a nobis acceperunt. Vis ut his me
comparem, qui nosti et patriam et patrem meum graecis et
latinis litteris instructum, virum iustum, bene moratum,
alieni abstinentem? Avus meus et proavus et ceteri
progenitores mei sanctissimi sacerdotes graeci fuere,
philosophiae et sacrarum scripturarum scientissimi.
Audebitne aliquis venerando sacerdotum generi conferre
latrones, praedones, sicarios, violentos, iniurios et
barbaros? (De Dist . p.ll6).
The nobility which Galateo claims for himself
and his peers is not a restricted privilege. Anyone may
accede to it, provided he is correctly initiated; and
correct initiation is by way of education. In the
De distinctione Galateo swears to the indispensability of
good instruction, for man is what he is brought up to be:
"videmus potissimas in omni re partes habere institutionem"
(p.115). This message is particularly intended for the
magnates of his country, and Galateo provides them with a
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curriculum m his De educatione of 1504. To readers
familiar with educational treatises of the Quattrocento,
the proposed course of studies will have an air of
deja vu. The pupil is encouraged to "graecis et latinis
literis operam dare, musicam discere, gymnasticam exercere,
equitare, venari, rem familiarem curare" (p.15). But
Galateo is not content simply to rehearse common-places.
Everything is channelled to the formulation of his message
and no excuse is overlooked to recall the deliverance
attendant upon the cult of letters. All ills are born of
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letters rejected and education neglected: "omnium malorum
causa est mala educatio, contemptus literarum, et
pessimorum virorum consuetudo" (p.31). In this instance
the ills are those of Italy and its sad plight beneath the
yoke of foreign barbarians. The pupil, whose tutor is the
dedicatee of the De educatione, is an Italian and it is
imperative that he should remain Italian and not be
allowed to suffer foreign misteachings: "Italum accepisti,
italum redde, non hispanum!" (p.23). The chief miscon¬
ception of the foreigners, of the Goths and Franks (read:
French and Spanish), is of course their disapproval of
letters, not simply as useless but as actually harmful to
the profession of the warrior. They are plainly not
familiar with the lessons of history:
pace Gothorum, dixerim, et Francorum, quod impedimentum
praebent studia literarum ad bene pugnandum, nisi ut
fortius pro patria, pro libertate pugnare, mortem
contemnere, et nonnisi iusta suscipere bella discamus, et
temperantius, et clementius uti victoria, et bella gerere
pro libertate, pro imperio, pro gloria, non, ut barbari
solent, pro caede, et sanguine, rapinis, stupris et
sacrilegiis? A literis ad arma Graeci, Macedones, Romani
transire soliti sunt: qui quales fuerint, literarum
monumenta declarant (p.ll).
Whether Galateo's prejudice against foreigners owes more
to literary tradition than to personal experience matters
little, for beyond the Goths and Franks his message is
aimed at all barbarians, be they transalpine or cisalpine.
Who would have guessed that a mere ten years
later Galateo was to commit a complete volte-face?
"Ego cum Gallis et Hispanis sentio, qui negant decere
nobiles et proceres viros litteris operam navare: esse
aiunt ignavissimorum et miserorum hominum cum libris
clypeum, cum tabellis thoraca, cum pugillaribus pugiones,
cum calamo gladium telumque conferre." The pen after all
is not mightier than the sword and the noblesse d'epee
was right all along. This is the disillusioned postscript
to Galateo's thoughts and writings. It comes in a letter
(the so-called Vituperatio litterarum) written in about
151^ and addressed to Belisario Acquaviva, the same person
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to whom many years before Galateo had sent his De dignitate
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for approval. Now he imagines what his friend will say
to him: "was it not you who, against my better judgement,
preferred letters to arms?" And Galateo would answer:
"res humanae variae sunt atque mutabiles et, ut philosophi
quidam dicebant, omnia esse in continuo fluxu et propterea
nihil veri posse pronunciari" (p.205). On the surface
this letter is an address to princes and it is in his
capacity as a prince that Acquaviva is warned off letters
(one reason being that when princes are too learned, they
take the food from the mouths of those for whom .learning is
a livelihood). Galateo still maintains the distinction
between utility and dignity, which he had introduced in
the De dignitate, but he now informs princes which end of
the stick is theirs to grasp: "qui arma litteris anteponunt,
quamvis non recte, ut duo antistites sapientiae Plato et
Aristoteles existiment, utiliora tamen suadent et quae
vitae et libertati magis conducere videntur. Haec enim
mihi videtur esse ars principum: donare primum et parcere,
strenuos esse et peritos rei bellicae, opprimere malos
ne aliis noceant, iuvare bonos ut aliis prosint" (pp.208-9).
A prince's .function' is to look after the well-being of his
subjects, to be useful to the people. This does not affect
Galateo's hierarchy of values: dignity is still better than
utility, letters are still superior to arms (in absolute
terms), and philosophy and goodness are still synonymous,
but a subtle change has now occurred in the way Galateo
poses the equation. Philosophy equals goodness not because
it makes a man good, but simply because it is indicative
of the goodness which is inherent in that man, for only
good men choose to study philosophy (and here the letter
ceases to concern princes alone). In other words, education
is to no avail. Man is not what he is brought up to be.
He will die as he was born and letters, if he has any, will
only shed light on his innate propensities. If he is born
to virtue, letters will encourage hi.m in that direction,
but if he is born to vice, letters will be his pander:
"litterae, qualem virum invenerint, talem relinquunt , sed
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perfectiorem in utraque qualitate" (p.201). At best,
letters may conceal one's faults ("litterae ... tegunt,
non tollunt vicia" - p.205), at worst they are the cause
of much evil. From past experience of two-score and more
years in the administration of the city of Lecce, Galateo
is forced to admit that all misinformed decisions were
taken at the behest of men-of-letters ("literati"), who
have now joined up with the magnates on the bench of those
guilty of the ills which afflict Italy: "siquid male
consultum aut male decretum est, illud nonnisi ex sententia
aut ambitione aut pervicacia et impotenti.a et cupiditate
aut potentum aut literatorum accidisse" (pp.199-200).
And Galateo would seem to count himself amongst the guilty
too, defining as he does 1it erati as "theologi,
philosophi, medici et iurisconsuiti" (p.204). None of the
old idols are now spared the fury of Galateo's iconoclasm.
The Greeks and their philosophy are made to bow before the
simple Scythians ("Scythae sine litteris sanctius quam
Graeci cum tot inter se dissonantibus dogmatibus
philosophorum, magistra et duce natura, sanctius vivebant"
- p.207); the traditions of the family are being lost and
it is better so ("scito me fateri multum debere filiis meis,
quod paternas et avitas et, ita dicam, iamdiu haereditarias
litteras neglexerunt" - p.2l4); and fault is even found
with Aristotle ("maximum apud Aristotelem vicium est in
investiganda veritate servare positum sive positionem" -
p.206 ) .
What was it which brought Galateo to this
pass? Personal and national humiliation, no doubt. The
more the barbarians crossed the threshold of his country
and upset his way of life and of conceiving life, the wider
did he see the chasm grow between the World and the Hook,
between contingent reality and ideal reality, until no
key was left to reconcile the two and one had to be
discarded in favour of the other: "nunc inter tot immensa
volumina, inter tot, ut dicunt, medicinae et legum
canones intemperate et turpiter vivimus. Quid igitur
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prosunt litterae?" (p.207)- His veneration of Aristotle
had never blinded Galateo to the value of experiment, and
with the passing of time he came to realize that experience
afforded a better reading of life than the word of
authority; and as he looked back over his years he
wondered what he had gained from being a man of learning.
Letters were finally put to the test of utility - and
failed. And so our last memory of him must be his parting
(written) words to Belisario Acquaviva and their tone of
bitter disappointment: "contemne, abiice, abominare
litteras, non minus viciorum quam virtutum genitrices et
paupertatis comites (divinas semper excipio). ... Valeat
philosophia falsa, fallax, loquax,mendax, nugatrix, stulta,
nescia, vesana, arrogans , "ignava, malesuada, famelica,
nostri fundi calamitas, nutrix paupertatis et multo
pluribus invisa quam probata. Bene vale!"(pp.213-lH).
The De dignitate disciplinarum, even though
addressed to Marino Brancaccio, was, as we said, also seen
by other friends of Galateo1s. How many actually saw it,
it is impossible to say, but fifteen to twenty years after
it had been written Galateo, in the so-called Apologeticon
to his friend Hiccolo Leoniceno, could drop its name with¬
out further ado, as though referring to a well-known text:
aliud est apud ignaros iudices, ut. ait Quintilianus , aliud
apud philosophos disputare. Hon possunt de philosophicis
dissentionibus decernere qui civilibus detinentur. Ipse
Cicero, absque dubio praestantissimi ac divini ingenii vir,
contra duorum sapientiae antistitum Aristotelis et Platonis
sententiam, activam vi.tam sanctissimae ac divinissimae
contemplativae praeposuit quod, meo iudicio, lesae divinae
maiestatis crimen est. Ham deorum vita ... contemplativa
est. De hac re satis multa dixi in libello "De Dignitate
Disciplinarum". 76
This short passage, which is a succint summary of all of
Galateo's prejudices (against the Romans, against shallow
orators, against the detractors of Aristotle and against
the active life), is also a confirmation in his own words
of what in any case should by now be quite obvious,
namely that for him the querelle was not a question of
precedence (which to a certain extent is what it was even
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for Ilicino and Lapo), but quite simply a debate about the
active and contemplative lives. These are the very terms
in which Galateo presented the De dignitate for approval
to his close friend Belisario Acquaviva, and the story of
their correspondence on the' matter and of Belisario' s
involvement in the controversy of arms and letters is not
without interest.
Galateo sent the Be dignitate to Belisario
some time after 1^97 and in a covering letter he wrote:
"in praesentia nihil occurrit, nisi ut sententiam meam de
armorum litterarumque et de contemplativae et activae
vitae dignitate, quam Pancratio nostro olim scripseram,
7 7tibi quoque impertiar." Since Belisario was an expert
in both fields, he was bound to be the best judge on the
matter and Galateo was therefore particularly keen to have
his opinion: "litterarum enim ab ineunte aetate
studiosissimus at amantissimus semper fuisti atque eos qui
in aliqua doctrina praestare tibi visi sunt maximo semper
honore prosecutus es. In re bellica quantum valeas omnes
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noverunt." Well versed in these two fields Belisario
certainly was. He and his elder brother Andrea Matteo
(who was also to be Galateo1s friend and to become involved
in the querelle) were born, in lb6k and 1^58 respectively,
to Giulio Antonio Duke of Atri, one of the most powerful
lords of southern Italy, and Caterina Orsini Countess of
Conversano. They received their literary education from
Pontano and their military training from their father.
Andrea Matteo, who inherited his father1 s- lands and titles
after the latter's death at the hands of the Turks in 1-481
at Otranto, followed the path of rebellion throughout his
career. He was one of the leaders of the rebel barons in
1485-86 , but was defeated and had some of his lands
confiscated to reduce his power. He sided with Charles VIII
when the French King invaded Naples in 1^95 but was again
defeated and this time saw all his lands confiscated. He
retrieved them all however under a general amnesty a few
months later, but when the French and the Spanish were
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contending for control of the kingdom, he sided with
Louis XII and was taken prisoner for two years in 1503.
He managed to return to the favour of the Spanish by
"courting" Ferdinand the Catholic when the latter came to
Naples in 1506, but they kept him away from political life
because they always suspected him of French connections,
and sure enough, when Lautrec invaded in 1528, Andrea Matteo
set out to join forces with him and was therefore immediate¬
ly decreed contumacious by the Spanish. He died shortly
thereafter at Conversano, in January 1529. Following his
enforced retirement in 1506 he had devoted most of his
energies to literary pursuits. He was an active member of
the Accademia Pontaniana, he collected a splendid library
in his ancestral home at Atri, he patronized the establish¬
ment of a printing-press in Naples in about 1525, and he
wrote and published at that same printing-press in 1526
79
a commentary to Plutarch's Moralia. As for Belisario
he, unlike his brother, always remained faithful to the
legitimate rulers of Naples (probably for want of
anything more lucrative to do). He fought with them
against the French, and was rewarded for his services with
two counties which had been confiscated from his brother.
When these were returned to Andrea Matteo under the general
amnesty, Belisario was given the county of Nardo instead.
He stood by Federico I until the fall of the Kingdom in
1501, whereupon he transferred his allegiance to the
Spanish, taking part in many battles under the Grand Captain
Gonzalvo Fernandez de Cordoba. When the latter fell from
favour and was removed to Spain in.1506, Belisario also
retired from active political life. In 1516 Charles V
created him Duke of Nardo in reward for his services to the
Spanish, and he died a few months before-his brother,in July
1528. He too had been an active member of the Pontaniana;
like Galateo he too set up his own academy (the Accademia
Del Lauro in Nardo), and like Andrea Matteo he too
8
swapped the sword for the pen when forced into retirement.
When Galateo sent him the De dignitate to
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read, Belisario was still a busy man, and his reply as
therefore brief. Being a mah.-of-arms by profession, he
felt it incumbent upon himself to defend his own calling
and he justified the superiority of arms by remarking that
that person deserves more praise who uses at once the
power of his mind and the strength of his body: "ne tamen
a nostra nostrorumque professione aberrare videamur ...
arma litteris preponenda esse censemus. Hoc enim uno
praecipue argumento coniectari potest: tanto praestantiorem
armorum dignitatem esse habendam, quanto majori dignos
laude, qui animi simul et corporis viribus praestant, quam
eos, qui tantum animo serviunt, existimanus." Better than
to confront arms and letters however, according to
Belisario, was to see them united in one and the same man:
"ne litterarum neve armorum dignitati detrahamus, eum qui
et arma et litteras pariter amplexatur, majori dignum
laude judicamus." As a paragon of such a man, or of a man
rather who partook of both the active and contemplative
lives, he cites Galateo himself, with his medical practice
and his literary pursuits. And amongst his reasons for
'advocating an alliance of arms and letters (he also
mentions the joys of reading and the necessity for
philosophers to be kings or kings philosophers), Belisario
stresses the need for comfort in adversity, when circum¬
stances may have obliged a soldier to abandon his career:
"etenim accedere aliquando potest, ut vel morborum eventu
seniove vel aliis animi perturbationibus arma tractari non
possint, quare ad litteras recurrendum esse, quis neget?"
It is as though Belisario had premonitions of what was in
store for himself, for in 1506 he was forced into retire¬
ment and turned to his books again. Before long he was to
write a fourfold treatise for princes on how to educate
their children and rule their state (De instituendis
liberis principum), how to manage their household (Prefatio
paraphrasis in Economica Aristotelis) , how to deal with
their free time (De venatione et de aucupio) and how to
organize their profession (De re militari et singulari
certamine). These pamphlets, which are not dated, were
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published in a single volume in Naples in 1519- They
are preceded by a letter from Pietro Summonte, in which
Belisario is commended for taking up his studies again
after having endured the blows of fortune and for having
managed to write his work in such a "short time. This would
8 2
mean that it was written shortly after 1506. As well as
Summonte's letter, the edition of Belisario's work contains,
at the end, the letter Galateo had sent him to accompany
the De dignitate together with Belisario's reply (to which
the above quotations belong). Both these letters seem
strangely out of place here. They are of a private nature
and do not at first sight appear to be connected with the
subject of the work. They must however have been included
at Belisario's own request (how else would the printer have
got hold of them?) and there must have been a reason for
his doing so. The reason is probably that Belisario
wanted to inform his readers that his treatise was to be
seen as a reply to Galateo's De dignitate (an expansion of
the ideas he had but adumbrated in his earlier reply) and
as a contribution to the same debate on arms and letters
and the active and contemplative lives. Indeed, as we
shall be seeing, the dialectic of arms and letters is
central to Belisario's argument. The intriguing question
is whether, by recalling Galateo's De dignit at e, Belisario
was trying to cash in on its popularity or whether he was
attempting to help his friend by drawing the public's
attention to his work. On this point unfortunately even
Galateo is silent. There is no mention in his epistolario
or anywhere else of Belisario's treatise.
In his introduction Belisario explains the
circumstances which gave birth to his treatise, in which
resentment is mingled with great reluctance at having to
wield the pen instead of the sword. Unfortunate events
and the wickedness of men having forced him to give up
his military career, and so as not to moulder in solitude
and inactivity, he has turned to "litterarum ocium". But
he would much rather be on the battlefield than at his
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desk, and had it teen possible, he would have gone abroad
to fight, despite the objections of his family. As the
laws of the land do not allow him to do so however, he will
try and seek fame in another field of activity, writing as
a prince what may be useful to princes. He is not writing-)
as the Ancients would have demanded, from the strong
position of a preceptor morally beyond reproach, but in
the capacity of someone who, despite his shortcomings,
has the well-being of future generations in mind. He will
teach princes how to administer their estate, starting
with the education of their children, "pueri namque bene
instituti, facti iam viri modestius rectius prudentiusque
, it 83vivent.
The De instituendis liberis principum begins
with the infant, follows him through childhood adolescence
and youth, and ends up with precepts to the mature prince,
on how to act and conduct himself. It is the traditional
Renaissance treatise on e ducat ion together with a Mirror
of Princes, in which paramount importance is attached to
virtuous behaviour, from which the well-being of all those
subjected to the prince will necessarily derive. Despite
the all too familiar phraseology, the words seem to have
a new and more authentic ring from the mouth of one whom
we know was submitted to that type of education himself
and who was moreover a prince and a master of both arms
and letters. The children of princes should only play
games consonant with their future career, "ad futuram
pugnam", such as gymnastics war-games riding hunting and
the like. They should be trained to endure both the heat
and cold, but as soon as they are ready, they should under¬
take the study of letters, which will teach them all the
virtues and qualities they will require:
multum enim pro regendis civitatibus rebusque publicis
faciunt litterae. Niciphoro visum est regni
philosophiaeque eandem esse rationem, ita ut affinitatis
aliquid cum regno habeat philosophia. Ham scientiarum
scientiam artemque artium philosophiam nominamus. Regnum
vero aliis regni provintiis ac regem caeteris regni
principibus dicimus imperare. Neque enim aliud qui sciens
fest dum imperat, dici potest quam philosophantium usum
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exercere. dum maxime leges qui sta-tuet, moralis philosophiae
expers esse noii deb eat. ... Et quamvis par em non omnes
ingenii bonitatem a natura sortiti sunt principes, ut quae
subditis conducant satis perspicere possint, legendo tamen
interdum quae praeclare doctissimi viri scripsere aut
percunctando, maximam laudem assequentur. Dumque
administrandarum rerui curis animus subtrahendus est, ad
libros contemplandos tamquam e fluctibus tempestatum in
pertranquillum portum animum traducant .... .Qua de re
conandum est omni etate discendum esse (pp.4v - 5r ) .
The stress throughout this short pamphlet (it is some
twenty pages long) is in fact on the mental and moral
education of children. Bodily exercises and arms are only
mentioned briefly at the beginning, but they will receive
a fuller treatment in the De re militari. Aristotle is the
authority most often, not to say exclusively quoted by
Belisario - "semper enim Aristotelis tui memor" he had said
in his letter to Galateo - and it is Aristotle who presides
over the next section of the treatise, the Prefatio
paraphrasis in EconO'ffli c A. Ar 1 s t o t el i s . This section deals
with the relationship between husband and wife, the role of
the wife in the household and the function and treatment of
servants, and is therefore not relevant to our subject.
Neither is the following section (De venatione et de
aucupio), which gives technical advice on horses hounds
hawks hunting and falconry. The De re militari too contains
much technical advice (on setting up and breaking up camp,
on deploying troops for battle, on dealing with mutinies
etc.), but a great deal of it is about the mental qualities
required of a good general; and here once again Belisario
advocates a necessary alliance between arms and letters.
Its opening words proclaim that it is the duty of a
soldier raised on letters and reduced to inactivity, to
commit to paper what he knows about the art of war: "non
minus turpe nos ducimus eos milites qui a primis annis
litteras didicerint in ocioque versentur, non mandare
litteris quae rei militari conveniant, quam patritium
virum togatum suae civitatis iura nescire et artifices
artium, quas exercent, rationes ignorare" (plr°).
These things need to be committed to paper because they
are useful to other soldiers, because in other words a
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literary education is as much a part of a soldier's
training as is practical experience, if indeed not more
so. A few pages later, coming back to this subject,
Belisario quotes the example of Federico di Montefeltro,
who was the best Italian general of his day because he
was a learned man: "legimus Federicum Urbinatum Ducem,
temporibus nostris, ea litterarum disciplina valuisse,
ut inter Italiae imperatores primum obtinere locum
diceretur. Litteris enim adeo incumbendum censuerat,
ut historiarum Aristotelisque tui Ethicorum libros semper
prae manibus haberet, quod videretur nulla in exequendis
rebus deliberatione uti imperatorem posse, si virtutum
ipsarum effectus cogniti non essent. Dicere autem solebat:
multo magis ratione atque artibus quam nimis milites
imperatoris dicto audientes effici" (p.3r°). Belisario
goes so far as to say that in a general at least intelligence
and strength of mind are the first requisite: "ingenium
animique vires imprimis imperatorem habere decet" are the
opening words of chapter II ("Imperator qualis"). This
means of course that he must be perceptive and virtuous,
but also that he must be educated. His education will
bear most fruits whenever he manages to sway his men with
the power of his orations- (here again we meet, as in Lapo
though within a more confined context, the classical ideal
of the orator): "sit etiam ingenio imperator litterisque
pollens: ut ad dicendum ac persuadendum aptissimus habeatur,
si quidem non tam ad arma capessenda insonans auribus
tubarum clangor militurn animos erigere atque ad ineundam
pugnam impellere poterit, quam apposita et pro tempore
accomodata imperatoris oratio" (p. 2v°). If letters
however are an indispensable ingredient in the make-up of
a perfect general, the military profession is second to
none .
In singing its praises in the first chapter
("De militiae laudibus") Belisario (and he is the only one
of our authors to do so apart from Biondo - see above p.68 )
had quoted what would appear to be the only ancient example
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of an actual querelle, or at least of what comes closest
in classical literature to resembling the medieval and
Renaissance examples of the querelle, with its confrontat¬
ion of res militar is and ius civile, the profession of the
soldier and that of the lawyer: Cicero's Pro Murena.
"Cicero dum pro L. Murena orationem habuit, rei militaris
virtutem, ait, coeteris praestare. Ipsa namque populo
Romano aeternam gloriam peperit , ipsa Romanorum imperio
terrarum orbem parere coegit; omiaque in tutela et
praesidio tandem bellicae virtutis ponenda esse
commemorat. Quod autem imperium sine militurn arte
8U
viribusque stare diu potest, aut quod regnum stabile?
Belisario further praises the militia and milites in
terms which remind one very much both of the Borsus and of
the more traditional versions of the Knight and Doctor
querelle:
qum militibus honor praecipuum praemium sit, virtutem
ipsam praecipuam rem militarem esse censebimus. Tanta vero
militiae est dignitas tantumque ei ab omnibus tribuitur, ut
etiam obscurissimo loco natos earn ipsam exercendo quotidie
illustriores fieri videamus. Quippe in antiquis legihus
scriptum est, eos qui aliquo iuditio publico dannati sint
adulterive fuerint inter milites recipiendos non esse, si
quis vero militum in aliquod flagitium conspirarit vel si
legio defecerit militia avocari, qui stationis munus
reliquerit e militiae gradu reiici, qui sacerdotem
interfecerint avocandos militia esse, sed nec in furcam,
aliquo facinore comperto, damnandos. Unde facile iudicari
potest tanti militia fieri, ut pro gravissimis etiam
criminibus poena constituta sit solum e militiae gradu
militem deiici (p.lv ).
It is not clear which if any "antiquas leges" Belisario
had in mind or how ancient he believed them to be or where
he had got his information from, but certainly most of what
he says here could have come straight from the Corpus juris
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or from some other contributor to the querelle. He also
mentions the legal bar on merchants becoming milites,
though he has a touch of condescending indulgence for those
who do not observe it, as things are in any case no longer
what they used to be: "nec minus et ii qui mercaturae
operai dare depraehendantur seque eiusmodi vilioribus
negotiis deturpent, ex ipso militiae gradu pellendi
putantur. Quod si aliqui tempestate nostra mercari milites
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solent excusandi erunt, qum at illis interdum nunc militia
exerceatur, qui vitam utilitate non autem decore
metiantur" (p.lv°). Belisario might have got his infor¬
mation at second-hand (from Pontano, for instance, whose
words he frequently quotes in the De re militari - "ut
Pontani nostri verbis utar"), but he pretends at least
to be familiar with the literature on the subject and
with the Corpus juris in particular. His last sentence
is a referral to the Digest for those who might wish to
know more: "si quis autem scire volet quae nam res sint a
quibus militem cavere oportet ne infamis habeatur, is
Digestorum libros, ubi de militum excessibus tractatur,
legat. Ibi enim causas quibus milites infamia notantur
adiscet scietque a quibus cavere oportebit" (p.8v°).
Is this sentence, one wonders, meant to
conceal the author's ignorance (he knows where the
information is supposed to be, but he has not bothered
to look it up), or does it simply denote a certain
weariness with the subject he is writing about, a
feeling that there is not much point in pursuing it,
since it is anyhow all unreal? A few lines earlier he had
in fact said that, his own treatise notwithstanding,
there was in truth no better guide to warmanship than
actual experience: "quae igitur militis sint partes, quae
ducis, quod equitum, quod peditum sit officium diximus.
Experientia tamen omnia melius docet, neque enim voce aut
librorum copia sed militandi exercitio armorumque usu
quae ipsis magis conveniant acquirere melius possunt" (p.8v°).
Reading this in conjunction with his introduction (see
above p.152 ) } one cannot help but suspect that his heart
was not wholly at one with his pen. We have seen how he
had in fact only taken up the pen for want of something
better to do. Wow we can just imagine little Belisario
sitting on Pontano's lap and b&irig told the story of brave
Duke Frederick and how he won all those battles because
he had read all those books. With the innocence of youth
Belisario took the story in; with the maturity of experience
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hardened in .battle he throws it up again. He cannot
really get himself to believe in it, but it makes a nice
story and it is as good a way as any of passing the time
in the illusion of still being active and useful. His
education - his indoctrination one might even say -
at the hands of Pontano (whom he always recalls with
affection) certainly left its mark, and in these pages
one can sense him wrestling, not unlike Lapo or even
Galateo, with the dream with which he had been imbued in
his early days, and then finally rejecting it. But with
him at least letters were a consolation of sorts in
adversity (wheras they betrayed Lapo and finally deserted
Galateo); even if his treatise did not tell the truth
and even if it was- to remain unread, at least it saved him
from lethargy for as long as he was engaged in writing it:
"ocium ac litteras amplexati simus ... ne ocio torpere ac
ventri tantum Cut Salustius ait) et somno dediti vitam
sicuti peregrinantes' transire videamur" (introd. p.lr°).
What kind of readership Belisario's treatise
is likely to have had, it is difficult to say; but it must
have enjoyed some degree of popularity for it to have been
reprinted half a century or so later in Basle. His brother
is certainly likely to have read it, for it is addressed
to him (the treatise has no dedication as such - a
nobleman needed not to seek patronage - but Andrea Matteo
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is apostrophized throughout). It must also have been
Belisario's wish that his book be read by the Neapolitan
aristocracy, since beyond his brother it appears to have
been intended primarily for them. Their most prized
entertainment, we are told, was the discussion of matters
of war, and the De re militari wants to be a contribution
to that discussion too:
qum de iis rebus disserimus, vel cum hostibus propemodum
manum conferere vel cum nostris Neapolitanis nobilibus
colloqui et disceptare videamur, qui quidem ita de pugnantium
causis iniuriisve saepe disputant, ut in maximis ducant
rebus de militari inter se loqui posse disciplina, qum
nihil militia praestantius, nihil laudabilius nobiliusque,
nihil honorificentius inveniatur. Qua ex re omnia quae
inter nos saepe numero agitata sunt ad te scribimus
destinamusque (introd. p.lr ).
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In Ilicino the querelle of Arms and Letters
appeared on the whole as a rather arid school exercise,
but it was by no means so in Naples, and the pages of
Galateo's and Acquaviva's works, despite their sometimes
trite jargon and their frequent recourse to literary
commonplaces, introduce us to a live social context, in
which the champions of learning like Galateo had to endure
at best the indifference and at worst the scorn of a proud
and "sword-happy" nobility prepared to stand by the dignity
of its rank and calling. In this context the querelle
acquires real vitality, becoming as it does the .vehicle
for topical preoccupations. We will have further proof
of the liveliness of the debate in the following section,
in Agostino Nifo's De armorum literarumque comparatione
comentariolus, which was commissioned by no less a personage
than a one-time Lieutenant-General of the Realm with a
view to settling the controversy once and for all, and
in the indignant reply which the Comentariolus elicited
from Luca Prassicio, another member of the Accademia
Pontaniana, who dedicated his Impugnatio contra Augustinum
Niphum to the very brother of Belisario Acquaviva,
Andrea Matteo Duke of Atri. In the meantime however the
correspondence between Belisario and his friend Galateo
on the subject of arms and letters and the active and
contemplative lives had been brought to a close in Galateo's
Vituperatio litterarum (see above p.l45ff.), in which
Belisario is cynically advised to give up all attempts at
engendering wisdom and to concentrate instead on generating
wealth:
ego, illustris princeps, relictis litteris, et inani ,
captiosa, incerta et, ut Horatius ait, "insaniente
sapientia", rei rusticae vaco, iam iam futurus rusticus.
Tu si sapis, idem facito. Scio enim te ex hac re magnam
capere voluptatem. Contemne, abiice, abominare litteras,
non minus viciorum quam virtutum genitrices et paupertatis
comites (divinas semper excipio); da operam, si quicquid
credis Galateo, rei rusticae et oeconomicae,cuius finis,
ut Aristotelis ait, sunt divitiae, quae solae hac tempestate
in magno pretio habentur. 87
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C. Agostino Nifo: De armorum literarumque comparatione
comentariolus; and Luca Prassicio: Impugnatio contra
Augustinum Niphum asserentem arma prestare Uteris.
The one-time Lieutenant-General of the Realm
who commissioned Agostino Nifo to write a report on the
subject of arms and letters was Andrea Carafa Count of Santa
Severina. The report, entitled De armorum literarumque
comparatione comentariolus, was completed on August 3rd
1525 and published in Naples on May 22nd of the following
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year by Evangelista Papienses, successor of Sigismund Mayr.
Nifo's brief was to provide a discriminating review of the
issues in this long-standing dispute and to impose a lasting
settlement on the contending parties. In his dedication
of the Comentariolus to Carafa we find him accepting these
terms:
magna inter mortales et quidem diu, Andrea Illustrissime,
digladiatio fuit, Armane an Litere praeferendae sint ? Et
pro Literis quidem rationes sunt non faciles, quibus literati
viri se militibus praeferunt. Milites vero atque armati
contra vi atque rationibus se literatis praeponunt.
Exflagitas igitur, ut in tarn gravi certamine definiam, quidve
iuris sit decernam, perpetuumque silentium, si fieri potest,
imponam, arbitrans iustiorem iudicem reperari posse neminem,
cum Armorum non minus quam Literarum studiosus semper praeco
fuerim (p.Iv ).
The outcome of Nifo's labours is what today we might call
a consultant's report which, before drawing any conclusions,
surveys "objectively" and in considerable detail all the
evidence available on the matter. By adopting this procedure
Nifo contributes to the querelle the first work which sets
itself consciously and explicit/ly within a well-defined
tradition, and the first work to acknowledge its sources
of inspiration. In so doing he allows us to confirm the
thesis of this study regarding the origins and development
of the genre.
In a first section of the Comentariolus Nifo
presents the views of others ("aliorum sententia") on
the subject. After fourteen arguments in favour of letters
and four in favour of arms, bolstered by many quotations but
without specific assignation of paternity, five chapters
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are devoted to the opinions (and their refutation) of
particular individuals or groups of people. The first
chapter (pp.V.III v° - Xr°) is entitled: "Quae M. Tullius
sentiat quidve iuris doctores arbitrati fuerint de
proposito a nobis problemate disputatur." Cicero in the
De officiis, says Nifo (clearly referring to the "cedant
8 Q
arma togae, concedat laurea linguae"), ' defended the
pre-eminence of the toga, i.e. of letters and in
particular of laws and "political science" ("civilis
scientia") over arms, and of the tongue, that is of
eloquence, over the laurels of military victors.. Cicero's
opinion, he continues, was taken up by more recent
lawyers ("iuniores legum interpretes"), like for instance
Angelo Aretino, who claim that the superiority of doctors
of law is evidenced by their automatic right to ennoble¬
ment after twenty years of public service (a reference
to the law of the Code "De professoribus qui in urbe
Constantinopolitana docentes ex lege meruerunt
comitivam" - see above p.38) and by the fact that even
a doctor who has not occupied public office may bear the
9 0title "Imperatoris Antecessor". These arguments do not
impress Nifo however. It is their logic above all which
he finds unconvincing, for these "legum interpretes ...
ex bonarum artium inscitia distinguere nesciunt inter id
quod per se est et id quod est per accidens" (p.IXv°).
Arms are good in themselves - as Nifo will soon be
demonstrating - but letters only accidentally so. Moreover,
the power which an emperor has of creating a doctor count
derives from the force of arms, without which no laws can
be effective. Cicero and Roman lawyers are thus summarily
disposed of and Nifo next turns to Petrarch. The second
chapter (pp.Xr° - v°) is entitled: "Quid Petrarcha de
problemate a nobis proposito senserit et an fuerit ita
disputatur", and it explains that Petrarch in the Trionfi
gave simple and absplute precedence ("simpliciter ac
absolute") to arms by placing warriors on the right-hand
side of Fame. A few discerning people ("nonnulli
disertissimi"), quips Nifo, have concurred with this
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opinion, claiming that the interests of the public are
of greater account than private interests and that
arms attend to the former. But their way of reasoning
is frivolous ("frivolum"). Fountains and benches also
exist for the welfare of the community, but no-one
would ever dream of rating them higher than the
individual good ("bonum"). It is only in terms of utility
("in utilitate") that the common good may be said to be
superior, not in terms of perfection and dignity ("in
perfectione ac dignitate"). Having thus disposed of
Petrarch as well, Nifo next takes on the Romans ("Quid
Romani de problemate nobis proposito senserint
disputatur": pp.Xv° - XIv°). They too were misinformed,
maintaining that man's supreme good ("summum bonum")
lay in the possession of power and strength ("potentia
et vires"). It was natural of course that they should
have thought so and that they should have had greater
faith in arms than in letters, since the Roman empire
was the child of force and violence. Their faith however
was misplaced, for if letters do not serve greatly the
cause of hegemony, they are nevertheless the light and
perfection of men ("hominibus tamen, quo homines sunt,
perfectiones sunt et lumina" - p. XIv°). Power on the
other hand can be the cause of much unhappiness
("plurimum miseriae"). Between these Romans and Cicero,
there are those who take a half-way position. They are
the "disciples" of Sallust ("Quid de problemate
senserint qui Salustium sectantur disputatur":
pp. XIv° - XIIIv°), who interpret his words "vires ingenio
praestare cognitum est, cum bella geri coepissent" as
having the following meaning: letters are preferable to
arms "simply and absolutely", because they are the perfec¬
tion of man qua man, and as such they remained unchall¬
enged for the whole duration of the Golden Age, but in the
post-lapsarian Iron Age in which men are living now and
in which power and strife are the rule, it is arms which
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must have precedence. According to Nifo, this argument
too has a flaw. It rests on the erroneous proposition
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("haec positio supponit falsum") that at one time in its
history mankind did not have recourse to means of defence.
And to disprove this proposition, Nifo proceeds to recount the
story of defence from the beginning of Time through the
Four Ages of man (with reference to Plato in Laws III).
The last chapter of this section considers the views of
"other Peripatetics and Platonists" ("Quid alii
Peripatetici ac Platonici de proposito problemate senserint
hie disputatur"1: pp. XIIIv° - XIIIIv°), who give priority
to letters, though not to all of them, but only to those
which they call theoretical or contemplative, of which
metaphysics have pride of place. In so doing they claim
conformity with Book XII of the Metaphysics, Book X
of the Ethics and Book VII of the Politics, where Aristotle
puts contemplation before action. To this Nifo retorts
with Book I of the Ethics, where pre-eminence is conceded
to "political science" ("civilis facultas"), Book VI of
the Politics, in which philosophers are not granted the
right of citizenship, Book VIII of the Politics , which
asserts that to study too much is harmful, and with
Plato's Gorgias , which advises one to philosophize with
moderation.
Ilicino, it will have been noted, has pride
of place amongst the originators of the querelle as listed
in this section by Nifo. His name may not actually be
mentioned, but there can be no doubt that it is his
commentary which Nifo has in mind when he cites Petrarch
on the subject and those who agree with him. And it is
with a reference to a quotation given currency by Ilicino
(Cicero's "cedant arma togae") that Nifo starts the review
of his precursors. Moreover two of the fourteen pro-
letters arguments with which the Comentariolus begins
are a straightforward crib of Ilicino's own opening
9 2
arguments; and the tripartite organisation of Nifo's
text (l. the opinions of others - "aliorum sententia";
2. the clarification of the truth - "dilucidatio veritatis" ;
3. the refutation of the pro-letters arguments from part l)
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is identical to the division of Ilicino's text. This of
course might be no more than a coincidence (the product
perhaps of Ilicino's and Nifo's similar formation and
cultural background), but even if it is, there can be no
doubt of Nifo's debt to Ilicino, which may in fact be
even greater than appears at first sight. Nifo for instance
quotes exactly the same number of words from Justinian's
"imperatoriam maiestatem non solum armis decoratam ..."
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as Ilicino had done, from which one could hazard the
guess that it was Ilicino who, as it were, introduced
Nifo to the querelle of Knights and Doctors. Be that as
it may, what is particularly revealing in this section is
the fact that Nifo should mention knights and doctors
at all in the context of a discussion on arms and letters,
and more important still that he should mention them as
though they were one and the same thing as arms and letters.
He quite obviously saw the querelle of Knights and Doctors
and the querelle of Arms and Letters as part of the same
tradition. What is more, his placing the opinion of
juris doctores at the beginning of his survey of earlier
writers on the subject clearly suggests that it was the
doctors of law whom he viewed as the originators of the
genre, and this is no mean evidence in support of our
thesis regarding the origins and development of the
querelle. It is true that Nifo is not always the most
reliable of witnesses. He is a. known plag;iari zer of
9^Machiaveili's Principe, and it is difficult not to
suspect someone guilty of that kind of offence of not
forging his evidence at times. Who, one may wonder, are
those "disciples" of Sallust who misrepresent their master's
words? And who are those "other" Peripatetics and Platonists,
whom Nifo so undiscriminatingly lumps together? More to
the point: were they really contributors to the querelle.,,
as Nifo implies they were? Their opinion as such is not
implausible, but it is so unspecific as to belong almost
anywhere. Maybe Nifo was trying to impress his patron
with the depth of his knowledge and to make it appear as
though he had done much research into the matter. Modesty
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never was his strongest point, it would appear; but
in any case he must have been expecting remuneration
commensurate with the apparent extent of his labours.
Nifo not only presents himself as a widely-
read expert on the subject. He also poses as the victim
of unjust attacks from his adver sarii , and much of the
Comentariolus is a rebuttal of their opinions. He never
mentions any names however and we have no way therefore
of discovering whether these enemies were real or whether
they were simply invented by Nifo in order to give him¬
self and his work more importance. If they were real and
if all of them (there would appear to have been many) had
made contributions to the querelle, then it must have been
a very lively debate indeed in Naples at the time. We
know from Galateo and Acquaviva that arms and letters were
a favourite topic for discussion amongst the Neapolitan
nobility, and it could be therefore that Nifo was taking
revenge in writing against individuals who had crossed
swords with', him in conversation but whom, he did. not want
to run the risk of offending by revealing their identity.
It would seem more likely however that the opponents he
was taking to task were not actual contributors to the
querelle but philosophers from rival schools, for it is
usually general misconceptions of his adversaries and mis¬
taken ways of reasoning which he criticizes rather than
specific points. There is only one name which we can
venture to put on any of these adversarii. It is that of
the philosopher Luca Prassicio, of whom we know for sure
that he was engaged in ideological conflict with Nifo, and
what is more, that he used the querelle (amongst others)
as a means of exposing what he saw as Nifo's dangerously
unphilosophical (unperipatetic) and heretical thinking.
As a rejoinder to Nifo's Comentariolus he wrote an
Impugnatio contra Augustinum Niphum assereritem arma
prestare licteris. This work will be the subject of the
latter part of the present section, but there is an unre¬
solved mystery surrounding the duel of Nifo and Prassicio
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(one which also seems to have passed unnoticed by other
scholars) ^ and it requires attention at this stage.
Prassicio's Impugnatio was published (in Aversa) on
June 25th 1520, six full years before the publication of
the work it was meant to be answering. There are no other
editions of the Comentariolus and no known manuscripts
of it, but if the date of Prassicio's reply is correctly
printed and an "0" has not mistakenly replaced a "6"
(which would still mean that the Impugnatio had been
published before the Comentariolus, though not before its
official date of completion), or a "2" replaced a "3"
(which is improbable as it does not square with the
biographical information we have on Prassicio), then
the Comentariolus must have been in circulation in one
form or another before 1520. In that case the 1526
edition is likely to be a later and probably a revised
version of Nifo's work: and it could well have been
revised in the light partly of the often scathing criti-
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eisms which Prassicio levels at Nifo m the Impugnat1o.
There is not, it is true, the slightest overt indication
in the 1526 edition of the Comentariolus that Nifo had
either read or was aware of the existence of Prassicio's
reply but, as we shall shortly be seeing, a closer study
of the two texts makes this a not improbable conjecture.
And if indeed Prassicio was one of Nifo's unnamed
adversarii , and if there were others like him, it is
hardly surprising that Nifo should have preferred to avoid
the embarrassment of drawing his readers' attention, and
especially his patron's attention, to a work which did not
portray him in the most flattering of profiles.
Galateo as well could, one feels, have been
one of Nifo's adversarii. They express themselves
identically, which often makes it seem as though Nifo is
echoing Galateo, yet Nifo defends arms and the active life,
whereas Galateo had defended letters and a life of
contemplation. We have no proof however that Galateo and
his De dignitate disciplinarum were knowa to Nifo, and as
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in the case of Galateo and Ilicino, our safest bet is to
explain the similarities between them in terms of the
cultural heritage common to both of them. Like Galateo
Nifo was a physician and a philosopher, and like Galateo
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Nifo recognized only Aristotle as his master.
"Nifo who was one of the most prolific and
influential philosophical writers of the early sixteenth
century, certainly should be made the subject of a
monograph." Thus Oskar Kristeller in 19^5, and the
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monograph has yet to be written. In the meantime one
still has to resort to a variety of mostly unreliable
sources for information about Nifo's life, from which one
draws a picture which is none too clear. There is
disagreement about the place of his birth but it was
probably Sessa (he is often called Sues sanus in the
titles of his works) and wide disagreement about the date,
which has variously been put at between lb62 and ll+73.
There is no more agreement about the date and place of
his death, which might have occurred in Sessa or at
Salerno some time between 1537 and 15^6. On what happened
in between however we are slightly better informed,
although the dates remain uncertain. Nifo may have been
a student in Sessa and in Naples but he was definitely at
Padua, where he attended the lectures of the ardent
Avveroist Nicoletta Vernia. He himself began to
propound Averroistic views before long; they brought him
into conflict with the Paduan ecclesiastical authorities
and he was talked into recanting them. He then entered
into polemic with Pomponazzi on the immortality of the
soul, and over the years he came to adopt an Aristotelian
outlook of Thomistic persuasion, which always remained
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tinged however with a hue of Averroism. No sooner had
Nifo graduated than he was appointed to a chair at Padua,
where he taught from 1^92 to 1^99 (with a leave of absence
from 1U96 to 1^98), and thereafter success followed upon
success. He was professor at Sessa (1^99-1503), Naples
(150U-5, 1510-13-?, 1531), Salerno (1507-10), Pisa (1519-
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21-(?)25)» Rome (under Leo X) and Florence (probably). In
1525 he even turned down an offer from Bologna University.
His reputation was mainly as a philosopher but he did also
teach medicine (in Naples for instance). Whether he was
ever a practising physician though, it is hard to tell.
In 150U-05 he was in receipt of a salary as personal
physician to Gonsalvo Fernandez. It was probably in that
capacity that he accompanied the Grand Captain on his
campaigns against the French (see above n.9T)5 hut if the
couple of remarks about the occasion in the Comentariolus
are anything to go by, Nifo's services were primarily
required as astronomer-cum-astrologist. None of our
sources tell us either whether, as the opening words of
the dedication of the Comentariolus would weem to suggest
(see above p.160), Nifo ever bore arms and took part in
battle. He was certainly a knight, though whether simply
of the honorary kind, we do not know. In any case honours
followed fast upon the heels of fame. In 1521 Leo X
invested Nifo with the rank of Count Palatine and on the
same occasion granted him the privilege of adding the name
Medici to his own name, the right to confer bachelor
degrees in theology, civil law and canon law and the right
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to ennoble three people. Charles V was to dub him
Councillor and Grandee of Spain, and Naples twice or three
times rewarded him with titles of citizenship and
nobility (1518, 1528(?), 1531). In 1525 he was awarded an
annual pension of 200 ducats from the customs' revenues of
Salerno by Ferdinand Sanseverino, the city's prince. He
was a prolific writer on all aspects of philosophy (in the
widest sense) and his works are too numerous to be recor¬
ded here. The Comentariolus belongs to a second stage of
his literary career, in which he turned from writing more
specifically philosophical (scholastic) works to writing
10 U
works of a more moral or political nature. It is a
minute part of his total production and not a very signif¬
icant one either. In the context of this study however,
as we have seen and shall be seeing again, it has consid¬
erable importance.
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Of the three sections of the Comentariolus
it is the central one which is of greatest interest, for
that is where the author's own opinion on the question is
to be found. In the first section he merely recounts the
views of others on the matter ("aliorum sententia" )> and in
the last section he refutes those views on the basis of
the definitions and clarifications propounded in the
central section. This section is entitled "dilucidatio
veritatis" and consists of four parts: a definition of
arms, a definition of letters, a decree ("decretum") and
its demonstrations in favour of the supremacy of arms,
and finally a discussion on the desirability of combining
arms and letters.
We have seen that when Nifo presented the
arguments of his predeessors in the querelle, he refuted
each one, regardless of whether it advocated the superiority
of arms or of letters. This was not because he always
disagreed with the conclusions of these arguments, but
because in each instance he could not approve of the way
in which those conclusions had been reached. As far as he
was concerned, they had been reached illogically; and so
as not to be guilty of the same error, he decided to
proceed cautiously and to leave no room for misunderstan¬
ding. That is why, first of all our authors to do so,
he begins by clearly defining his terms: "quid pro fsic}
Arma in problemate intelligendum sit" (pp.XIIIIv° - XVIr°)
and "quid per Literas in problemate intelligendum sit"
(pp.XVIr° - XVIIr°).
Arms are "all those things which brave and
high-minded men are prepared to resort to in honourable
combat in the face of death" ("ea omnia, quibus fortes
viri ac magnanimi honesti causa pugnando parati sunt
sese exponere periculis mortis" - p.XIIIIv°). There are
three components to arms: the totally corporeal, the
totally incorporeal and the non-corporeal which exists
potentially in the body. Weapons ("instrumenta ferrea
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aut lignea") are the corporeal element; the qualities
("habitus") and powers ("vires") of the mind, i.e. the
moral virtues of prudence fortitude and magnanimity, are
the incorporeal element; while muscle strength and might
("robur, vires, vastitas") are the body's potential,
which one has naturally ("ex natura") but which must be
trained and disciplined ("ex habitu et disciplina
militari bene institute"). These three elements cannot
properly be termed arms however, if three conditions
are not at the same time satisfied. First of all the
cause (the end) of war must be legitimate ("honesti causa")
and the terms of legitimacy are the following: "tyrannos
exuperando, iura quae in legibus continentur defendendo,
patriam parentes religionem pietatem tuendo, uxoris ac
filiarum et sororum pudicitiam servando, ac iniurias
omnes propulsando, quibus humanum genus deturpatur"
(p.XIIIIv°). If the end is not lawful and arms are used,
say, in the service of tyranny theft or robbery, they
cannot justifiably be called arms ("aequivoce Arma dicuntur
The means too must be proper (and this is the second cond¬
ition). The three virtues are therefore to be untarnished
(only equivocally speaking can violence, for instance, be
said to equal fortitude) and good and thorough instruction
is essential. No-one can be a true soldier unless he is
familiar with the precepts of making war ("nemo enim bene
militare potest, qui praecepta militandi ignoraverit" -
p.XXIIIv°); "disciplina militaris" is indispensable to
genuine warfare. Finally, it is only on the battle¬
field that all these qualities actually come into their -
own. Where there is no action arms are dormant ("Arma,
cum in pugna non fuerint, potestate Arma sunt" -
p.XVr°) and the soldier does not deserve his name
("milites ... a certaminibus dicuntur" - p.IXv°). To this
it must be added that the good soldier is not always
and necessarily he who wins but he who does not omit to
do anything within his power in order to obtain victory
(since victory itself lies beyond his control in the hands
of fortune). If he does all he can and no more than he
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maj (keeping in mind the above conditions), then warfare
is perfectly legitimate and is sanctioned by natural law,
moral law and the law of nations. Mankind has always
needed to protect itself, and to fight is part of being
human.
It is also human to want to learn, and
letters provide for man's instruction. Under the heading
"letters" Uifo includes all branches of learning
("scientiae docentes"), which he divides into two
categories, the theoretical and the practical. The
purpose of the theoretical or contemplative sciences is
the acquisition of truth ("veritas"): mathematics reveal
the truth about numbers, physics the truth about
"natural things" ("rebus naturalibus"), and metaphysics
deal with supernatural and divine truths. On the practical
or operative side the aim is good work or action ("opus
aut actio"). Moral philosophy for instance instructs one
how to live well, medicine teaches one the proper way
to restore health, and military science ("disciplina
militaris") imparts the correct rules of warfare (it is
to be noted that, although it pertains to warfare, the
"disciplina militaris" belongs to the category of letters
and not of arms, because it instructs but does not "do").
In respect of their learning men-of-letters are called
"literati, scientes, magistri ac doctores" (p.XVIIr°), but
when they put their learning into practice they go by
the name of their trade, e.g. civiles or medici . This
distinction between learning and doing is an important one
in Nifo's definition of letters. Letters as such have
nothing to do with action. Their use is only "accidental"
("utimur Uteris et consilio, sed per accidens" -
p.XVIr°), that is at second-hand, and they are not to be
identified immediately with the acts or qualities which
may derive from their possession. For example moral
philosophy is about virtues, and the knowledge of moral
philosophy does not necessarily imply virtuous behaviour.
Letters, shall we say, are like a recipe-book, which is
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only "accidental" (incidental) to the preparation of a
good dinner. What per se makes a tasty dish are the
ingredients, and you are a good cook if you know how to
mix them well and not if you are simply able to read and
understand the recipe. Similarly lit erati are not good
qua 1iterati, that is with regard to their knowledge, but
only "quatenus ... ex Literis ad actiones se conferunt"
(p.XXr°). The comparison is therefore between arms and
action on the one hand and letters and instruction on the
other: "est ergo comparatio definienda inter Arma ipsa,
quibus milites armatique viri dicimur, quibusque utimur
honesti causa ad opera fortitudinis ac magnanimitatis pro
iustitia tuenda, et Lit eras sive do c eant virtutes, sive
res naturales, sive quodvis aliud, ex quibus literati
scientes magistri ac doctores appellamur" (p.XVIIr° -
my italic s) .
Nifo is an advocate of the primacy of arms.
His defence of them is built around a "decree" which is
given a twofold justification and the benefit of two more
"probable" arguments. The decree ("Decretum in quo pro
Armis decernitur": pp.XVIIr° - XVIIIr°) says that there
exist two kinds of dignity (Wifo, like Machiavelli ,
is fond of schematizing). There is private dignity and
there is public dignity. Private dignity makes a man
more excellent ("excellentior" , "praestantior", "dignior")
than other men, but as such does not give him the power
to rule over them. Letters are of this nature. A
philosopher for instance is superior to non-philosophers,
but in his capacity as a philosopher he cannot be a
commander of men (so much for philosopher-kings!). Public
dignity on the other hand not only makes men more excellent
than other men but invests them with the power to rule.
The public dignities are tyranny, monarchy, aristocracy,
oligarchy, republic and democracy. Even though the common
good may not always be worthier ("dignior") than the
individual good (although it is always more useful), a
public dignity is in every instance more useful worthier
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and more excellent ("utilior" "dignior" "praestantior")
than a private dignity. Arms therefore are more eligible
than letters, for they not only enable one to assume
("potiri") a public dignity, but they perfect one in the
best of private dignities: fortitude, magnanimity and
justice, which is the sum of all virtues ("tota virtus
integra" - p.VIv°).
The first proof of the veracity of the decree
comes from the godhead ("Testimonium decreti ex numine":
pp.XVIIIr°-v°). When a huge crater suddenly burst open
in the middle of Rome, threatening to engulf the whole
city, the oracle, according to Livy, announced that it
would only be sealed by the gift of the most perfect
thing which the city possessed. Curius, realizing that
arms were Rome's most prized possession, armed himself
from head to toe and bravely rode into the abyss, which
immediately closed in upon him. According to Ovid, the
same also happened to Callisthenes in Frigia. The
second proof of the decree comes from Aristotle Pliny the
Romans and other nations ("Testimonium decreti ex
Aristotele et Plinio et Romanis et aliis gentibus":
pp.XVIIIv° - XXr°). It presupposes a distinction between
fame and honour. Fame ("fama", the popular name for
"gloria") is the good opinion one has of that quality
in a person which most people would like to possess
("opinio bona est, quae de aliquo habetur, quod sit
bonus ea virtute quam omnes vel plures expetunt" - p.XXv°).
Honour ("honor") on the other hand is the token of the
opinion one has of a person's powers of benefic/ence
("inditium ... eius extimationis, quam quis habet de
benefactiva alicuius potentia" - p.XIXv°); it is the
honour, as it were, of the "Honours' List". Since benefi¬
c/ence can only take place in terms of welfare ("salus")
and wealth, 1iterati as such cannot be benefactors, for
they do not have the means of looking after people or of
providing for them, which armati do (literati, as we have
seen, can only do good "accidentally" in so far as they
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pass from letters to action). That is why histories (of
the Romans and other peoples, in Aristotle or in Pliny)
do not tell of any honours received by men-of-letters but
are full of honours given to men-of-aris. Soldiers
therefore deserve both fame and honour, literati only
fame .
Of the "probable" arguments, the first derives
from the definition of happiness ("Persuasio decreto £sicj
ex definitione foelicitatis et 'expositione eorum, quae
foelicitatem efficiunt, servant et quae foelicitatis sunt
indicia": pp.XXv° - XXIIr°). A city, by means of just laws,
aims to secure the happiness of its citizens. A happy life
is a "virtu-ous" life, but it cannot be perfect if it does
not know "sufficiency" ("sufficientia"). Therefore the
definition of happiness is, according to Aristotle
(Rhetorics I): "vita secundum virtutem cum sufficientia"
or "fortuna secunda cum virtute". "Sufficiency" is to
command the gifts of fortune ("cognitio bonorum fortunae"),
and what fortune bestows is nobility friendship riches
glory honour prosperity and power. Arms are more capable
than letters of ensuring the acquisition of these gifts
and it is through the ministry of arms that the virtues
come to realization. Arms are therefore superior. Their
superiority is also confirmed by the definition of
"honesty", which provides the second of the "probable"
arguments ("Persuasio decreti ex parte honesti atque eorum,
quae honesta dicuntur": ppXIIv° - XIIIr°). This definition
is again taken from Aristotle (Rhetoric s i). What is
honest is praiseworthy, and that may be anything which
produces virtue, is a sign of virtue or is generated by
virtue. As we have already seen, arms are the instrument
of fortitude magnanimity and justice, whereas letters are
only so "accidentally". Moreover what serves the common¬
weal (like arms), is more commendable than that which
merely gratifies private enjoyment (as do letters). And
finally the properties ("bona") which bring praise to the
dead are preferable to those which do not bring such praise.
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Many a mortal was praised and even deified by the gentiles
for his feats in arms, but "per Literas vero nec mortui
nec vivi laudati sunt" - with the usual rider however:
"nisi quatenus ad actiones se contulerunt" (p.XXIIv0).
Action is the dispenser of praise ("virtutis enim laus
omnis in actione consistit" - p.XXIIv0), and arms outshine
letters as deeds do words: "tanto Literis Arma praeferenda
esse quanto facta dictis praestant" (p.XVIIIr°).
If one were to interrupt the reading of Nifo's
Comentariolus at this stage, one might justifiably conclude
that, philosopher and man-of-letters though he was, he
did not hold learning of much account. Before he reaches
the end of his dissertation however, he will have dictated
a complete about-turn to his arguments, or at least to
the conclusions to be drawn from them. Arms and soldiers
so far enjoy unrestricted precedence over letters and
literati. But not all soldiers may in fact benefit from
this privilege. We saw a short while ago that one of the
three conditions set for the proper exercise of the
profession of arms was that the soldier be well instructed
in the art of making war. Learning in other words is one
of the soldier's necessary duties. Now Nifo almost turns
it into the paramount requirement of his vocation. The
Spartans were of the opinion that for soldiers to be good
and strong ("forti"), all that was necessary was that they
be inured to violence and hardship, that they learn to
become ferocis simi ("Lacedaemoniorum opinio de Literarum
cum Armis convenientia": pp.XXIIIr° - v°). Their convict¬
ion, says Nifo giving vent to the same prejudices as Galateo,
is shared today by foreigners, by the Spanish the French
the Germans and all barbarians, who as a result have totally
ignored letters. Had they but known how wrong the
Spartans were, they might not have imported their loathsome
customs into Italy. Roman history abounds with examples
of victorious generals learned in military science, and
the more recent Italian history is not without its great
captains either, who have followed in the footsteps of the
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illu3triou3 Albcrico Romagnolo, the fir at in Italy to
have practised the art of war: "ex iis vero, qui memoria
nostrorum patrum militarunt, ex Italis praecipui magistri
fuerunt Sfortia, Brachius, Franciscus Sfortia, Hicolaus
Piccininus, Bartholomaeus Collionus, Federichus Urbinatum
Dux magnus armorum doctor, Catamalata, Robertus Sanxeverinus,
Robertus Malatesta Ariminensium Dominus ... et alii
plurimi celeberrimi, qui tanquam ex Equo Troiano emerserunt
ab Alberici Romandioli viri illustris disciplina, qui in
Italia primus militavit" (p.XXVIv° - my italics).
A knowledge of the art of war, then, is
indispensable to the proper conduct of battle. But it is
only one of the three branches of learning with which the
soldier - and the captain in particular - should be totally
familiar. The other two are moral philosophy and history
("Moralem philosophiam, historicam ac disciplinam militarem
esse militibus necessariam, praesertim imperatoribus qui
exercitus regunt": pp.XXVIr° - XXVIIv°). Moral philosophy
will teach him to behave virtuously ("fortiter", "strenue",
"magnanime"), to be fair to the vanquished and to establish
just laws, without which neither war nor peace are safe.
War moreover must be waged with prudence, and history is
an ingredient of prudence, which consists of the memory
of things past, of the understanding of the present and
of provision for the future. History is the memory of
things past.
In addition to history moral philosophy and
military science, there are some letters which are useful
to arms, although they are not altogether indispensable.
They need to be learned by a captain only up to the point
at which they are still of benefit to his profession.
Beyond that they do more harm than good. First amongst
these is "divine science" ("divina scientia"), which imparts
the knowledge of things divine, earns respect for them and
induces one to lead a holy life, which in swaying men is
more potent than an ornate oration. But orations also have
their part to play and therefore eloquence ("eloquentia")
is not without its use, to calm or arouse the soldiers'
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passions as the need may be: "omnia conficit oratio, quae
hostile ferrum neutique efficere valeret." In the
event furthermore that disagreements should arise between
the men, a captain must have some knowledge of "political
science" ("civilis scientia"), which is about litigation
("de causis forensibus"). It can also be of assistance
though in the drafting of treaties or the conclusion of
alliances. "Physics" too can prove valuable to a general.
Nifo knows it from personal experience. When the Spanish
were encamped near Montecassino, they received great fright
from a shooting star (or a comet - "columna magna ignea"),
but Nifo, with his explanations, was able to arrest their
fears and turn the event into tidings of good things to
come. A knowledge of physics can thus help to restore the
army's courage or not to shake its confidence. The last
of the useful arts is mathematics, especially that branch
of mathematics which studies the stars, i.e. astronomy.
But mathematics may also be useful to calculate the dimensions
of fortifications and to work out the functioning of
machines. "Discere igitur tales scientias oportet milites,
quousque' utiles, sunt. r.ei. milit.ari , nam si. ob. alium finem
Literas huiusmodi discunt, sordide (ut Aristoteles inquit)
et illiberaliter agunt et ad Arma non conferunt" (p.XXVIr°).
No soldier therefore, and especially no general,
is worthy of that name if he is not well versed in both
arms and letters. But since both are necessary to warfare
(in Nifo res militaris is not a synonym of arma as it is
in Ilicino or Galateo), another problem arises ("alia
digladiatio emergit"), namely: which of the two is more
necessary? Here again Nifo comes out without reservations
in favour of arms, for the active cause of any action is
more effective than its moving cause: "ad agendum potiorem
causam earn esse dicit [Aristoteles] quae agit , quam quae
consultat" (p.XXVIIIr°). Nifo though is an unreserved
champion of arms only at a theoretical or ideal level.
If all is well in the best of worlds, then arms and
soldiers must indeed have precedence over letters and
literati. The best of worlds however is long bygone. The
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men-of-arms of to-day have dubious claims to authenticity.
Their fighting is wicked and their motives are impure.
They are therefore not only inferior to 1iterati but they
deserve total extermination:
ex iis patet, quam aequivocae Arma nostri aevi dicantur
Arma, militesque qui eis utuntur aequivocae milites. Son
enim pro religionis defensione, non pro patriae pro parentum
pro amicorum quis iusti conservatione, sed pro tyrannide
tuenda pro rapinis pro depopulationibus pro ruinis ac
ominium malorum generibus pugnant. Qua ratione fit, ut
milites nostri aevi non modo literatis viliores sint, verum
etiam e medio tollendi ac omnino posthabendi penitusque
exterminandi sunt (p.XXIIIr ).
This banishment order, which brings to mind the attacks
by Lapo and Galateo on the unworthiness of contemporary
soldiers, Biondo's refusal to accept the military of his
day as in any way comparable to the military of Roman
times, the limits imposed by Ilicino on the notion
of militia, and to a greater extent perhaps the exclusion
of all but true knights from military privileges in the
Knight and Doctor querelle, is served quite casually by
Nifo half-way through his text, and he almost immediately
reverts to the plane of theory to pursue his defence of
arms as though nothing had been said. He obviously did not
want to leave the sting in the tail, hoping perhaps to
avoid embarrassing the recipient of his Comentariolus
who, if he had commissioned Nifo to write it with the
purpose of settling disputes of precedence between soldiers
and men-of-letters, would obviously, if he was honest,
have to draw his conclusions from this casual remark rather
than from the overall purport of the treatise. At the
same time he was given sufficient leeway to disregard
the logical consequences of the contemporary mode of
warfare, if they were not to his liking, and by turning a
blind eye to the imperfections of the soldiery he knew, to
take refuge in the legacy of past generations of warriors
which gave pre-eminence to the profession of arms.
What was primarily to the discredit of
contemporary soldiers, according to Nifo, was their total
contempt of letters, a taint with which, he says, they
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seemed to have been contaminated through contacts with
"barbarians": "exterae gentes, ut Hispani Galli Germani
barbarique omnes, arbitrantes ferocitatem magis Armis
quam Literas prodesse, penitus Literas neglexerunt.
Hanc ob causam eorum milites prima elementa vix noruat.
Signum autem nobis afferunt, nam qui corporis viribus
plurimum valent ingenio rudes sunt. Hac pernitiosa ac
barbarica opinione labefactati nostrates viri praecipui
ingenii, qui hodie militant, Literas profiteri
erubescunt" (pp.XXIIIr° - v°). Nifo here appears to be
urging men-of-arms who did possess the rudiments of learn¬
ing not to be ashamed of admitting that they did, and
those for whom learning was anathema to reconsider the
reasons for their bigotry. The Romans after all, who
became masters of the world, owed their supremacy to an
equal cult of arms and letters. It is only barbarians who
keep letters and arms apart, and that is the surest recipe
for enslavement: "qui Literas ab Armis disiunxerunt, a
sapientibus barbari dicuntur et natura servi" (p.XXVIIv°).
What is this but a thinly veiled allusion to the situation
of Italy? Indeed, despite Nifo's greater detachment and his
stricter method, one gets the impression that he was aiming
at the very same result as Galateo in the De dignitate
Ai s ciplinarum. His prime concern was not really to establish
the superiority of arms. What he wanted was to see
men-of-arms, his contemporaries and fellow-countrymen,
devote some of their energies at least to those studies
which could improve them as men and at the same time make
them better fighters in defence of their homeland, since
arms without letters are like a sword without its blade.
If it should seem strange to see Nifo expending so much
ingenuity on constructing such an ambiguous defence of
arms, one need only think back to Ilicino and to what he
had had to contrive in order not to give the impression
that he was disagreeing with his Master, when in fact
he was. But Ilicino had nothing to fear of a master who
only lived through the words of his poetry (unless he too
was mindful, as Galateo in fact suggests, of what might
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or might not have been acceptable to the dedicatee of his
commentary"). Nifo on the other hand had constantly to
remember that the person to whom the Comentariolus was
addressed, was a professional soldier, who was no doubt
prepared to swallow so much of the truth only on condition
that the pill be properly coated in sugar.
If both Nifo and Galateo were aiming at
the same result, the likeness between them however stops
at their respective definition of letters. When Galateo
spoke of letters, he had in mind the contemplative
other-worldly and immortal dimension of man. Nifo
understands letters in purely worldly terms. He sees
them as the light and perfection of men all right, but
only "quo homines sunt" (see above p.162 ). He does not
take account of the divine potential of man. The
theoretical or contemplative sciences are certainly a
part of his scheme (see above p. 171 ) but, despite their
more exalted object, they are on a par with other sciences.
They are of human not of divine inspiration; the truths
they reveal are consonant with, human understanding; they
do not lead man beyond his earthly horizon, but merely
satisfy his needs as a rational and mortal being. This is
where traces of Nifo's Averroistic thihk.ing.are still
manifest. Towards the beginning of the Comentariolus
he had discussed the contention that those letters which
lead to beatitude must receive preference over arms
("Literas quae ad beatitudinem parant praeponendas esse
Armis hie disputatur": pp.VIIIr° - v°). His reply was
simply that there is no amount of learning which can ever
bring man any closer to God: "quandoquidem et animus
et Literae omnes, et quae sunt et esse possunt, ab ilia
divina infinitaque luce per infinitum intersunt"
(p.VIIIv°). Without God's gift of quidpiam we are
incapable of catching a glance of his eternal light in
this life, and there is no other way we can do so.
Learning therefore is an activity of purely human dimensions.
This fideist profession allows Nifo to dispose for the time
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being of the after-life and concentrate on man's existence
here-below. As a result the dual finality and dual
felicity of man is not a concept one encounters in his
text. Happiness is to be found within the confines of
the city alone (see above p.174), and felicitas is
synonymous with beatitudo which, it is stressed, is
human a and is defined as "vita sufficiens et secundum
virtutes" (p.XXIXv°). Even the summum bonum is only that
"quo maius in vita haberi non potest" (p.XXXIr°),
namely the "actus fortitudinis". Given that man only
has control over his earthly existence, the choice between
action and contemplation is not a dilemna with which he
must contend: life is action. That is why the relationship
of letters to life is "equivocal". Letters do not equal
action (anymore than they do contemplation): they equal
inaction, and it is arms which are action. Therefore
"tanto Literis Arma praeferenda esse, quanto facta dictis
praestant" (p.XVIIIr°). Arms then win the day. But, as
we have seen, their victory is a hollow one, for not only
is their superiority merely theoretical in the context of
Nifo's own day and age; what above all receives commen¬
dation in the Comentariolus are the moral virtues. Dignity
may be better than utility, and public dignity worthier
than private dignity, but virtue is always what matters
most and one's constant target must always be the bonum.
Luca Prassicio, in his reply to Nifo's
Comentariolus, also argued that the purpose of man's
existence was to seek the bonum. Yet he was in total
disagreement with the conclusions of the Comentariolus
as he understood them, or pretended to understand them.
If it was the 1526 edition of that work which he had read,
or an earlier but identical version, he certainly chose to
see in it only what he wanted to see. He did not pay
attention to Nifo's banishment order on all contemporary
soldiers for wicked conduct , and neither did he give heed
to Nifo's strong defence of letters as an indispensable
component of the warrior's education. For him Nifo was
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quite simply an enemy of learning and a partisan of arms.
This so incensed him that he felt compelled to vent his
anger and to strike "back in support of letters. His count¬
erblast to the Comentariolus was the Impugnatio contra
Augustinum Niphum asserentem arma prestare licteris, cum
lictere omnes sive speculative sive liberarie necnon et
morales, inter quas legalis scientia est preclarissima, sic
prestant armis sicut celum centro (the "legalis scientia"
has no part to speak of in Prassicio's argument, but it is
mentioned in the title as an advertisement no doubt for the
reading public: to inform it that this work too, despite
its more abstruse title, is about that well-known subject,
or at least akin to that well-known subject, the querelle
of Knights and Doctors). Was it the 1526 edition of the
Comentariolus however which Prassicio had read? The
Impugnatio, we saw (above p.166 ), was published on
June 25th 1520 (in Aversa, "per Antonium de friziis
Corinaldensem"). Nifo's Comentariolus, on the other hand,
claims to have been completed in 1525 s on August 3rd. There
are hardly any clues to solve this mystery, but a closer
look at the two texts may help to bridge the gap. From
the point of view of overall structure and arguments,
Prassicio is clearly addressing a version of the
Comentariolus which is very similar to the 1526 edition.
After an introduction (p.89r° i-ii), in which he sets out
his own arguments in support of letters, there comes a
refutation (p.89r° ii) of Nifo's definition of arms and
letters, which contains near literal quotations from the
Comentariolus. This is followed by a refutation
(p.89v° i-ii) of Nifo's deereturn , in which Prassicio
queries the distinction between public and private dignity.
The body of the Impugnatio (pp.90r°i - 102v°i) is an attack
on the third part of the Comentariolus and Nifo's own
refutation of the fourteen arguments he had initially
introduced to defend letters. Here again we find passages
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taken almost word for word from Nifo's work. In a
final section (pp.l02v°i - 103r°ii) Prassicio answers the
case made by Nifo at the beginning of the Comentariolus
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for the pre-emience of arms and ■which, according to
Prassicio, Nifo had left unresolved "credens frationesj
esse demonstrativas moraliter" (p.l02v°i). In part III
of the 1526 edition Nifo does not refer "back, it is true,
to the arguments of part I in defence of arms, "but the
actual arguments which Prassicio impugns in this section
do not match the contents of the 1526 text too closely.
Unfortunately, in order to prove Nifo's ineptitude as a
philosopher, Prassicio does not always confine himself
to the Comentariolus but often looks for examples in
some of Nifo's other writings. At times he may make an
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explicit reference to another work} but frequently he
does not, and although every now and then it is clear that
he is no longer attacking the Comentariolus itself
(at least the version of it we know), one can never be
absolutely sure that he is not being carried away into
fields other than the querelle by a casual word or remark
from the Comentariolus. Towards the end of the Impugnatio
for instance he introduces a long discussion on whether
or not God is capable of knowing anything beyond himself
("extra se"). This topic does not appear in the
Comentariolus of 1526, but Prassicio could well have been
inspired to debate the matter by the following few words of
the Comentariolus: "facere enim Deum dicunt omnia, non
autem cognoscere omnia sed seipsum dumtaxat" (Comentariolus
p. VIIv°). Just as it is not always possible to tell when
Prassicio is referring to the Comentariolus and when he is
not, it is hard to decide whether he chose for polemical
reasons not to comment on certain passages of the
Comentariolus, or whether he did not mention them because
they did not appear in the version he had read. For
instance, he accuses Nifo of corrupting the morals of the
young by discouraging them from studying and learning:
"videtur retrahere iuvenes ab illarum £i . e . scientiarum
speculativarum nec non et liberalium disciplinarunQ
adeptione, quod quamtum sit detestabile, bene dispositi
considerent" (p.l00v° i). But Nifo, as we know, does quite
the contrary and could not have been more emphatic in his
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insistence on the necessity of cultivating letters: "qui
Literas ab Armis disiunxerunt, a sapientibus barbari
dicuntur et natura servi" (Comentariolus p. XXVIIv°).
One is therefore left wondering who is deceiving whom.
There would appear to be only one safe clue
in reply to this question. It is an argument attacked by
Prassicio which is definitely on the subject of arms
and letters but which definitely does not figure in the
1526 edition of the Comentariolus. It runs as follows:
soldiers, when they are worthy ("digni") and very rich
and in the suite of kings or princes, are quite superior to
poor scholars ("licteratis docentibus miseris"), who can
hardly afford to feed on barley bread. There
is no argument even remotely similar to this in the 1526
edition, and unless Prassicio invented it (and there
is no reason to suppose that he did), it is most probable
that the version of the Comentariolus he had seen was in
fact an earlier one, which Nifo later revised (probably
quite drastically) and whose whereabouts are still a
mystery. To be sure, this is very slight evidence on
which to rest a case, but at least it is unambiguous.
There is unfortunately no extraneous evidence
to prove the point or to confirm that the Impugnatio was
indeed published in 1520. The only mention it contains of
contemporary events is an extremely vague reference to
"his miserrimis et calamitosis temporibus in tota nostra
Italia" (p.l02r° ii) and an equally vague allusion to more
personal problems of the author: "infortunia mihi adiis
inflicta" (p.88v°). Whether these were simply the problems
of old age, of which he speaks in the introduction to the
work published together with the Impugnatio, or whether
they were of a different order, it is impossible to say,
for almost nothing is known of Prassicio's life. He was
from Aversa in the province of Naples , where the Impugnatio
was published, and he belonged to the city's patriciate
(in the colophon he is called "patricius aversanus"). His
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grandfather Paolo had been chamberlain to King Ladislaus
and his brother, another Paolo, became canon of the metropo¬
litan church of Aversa, but it is not clear what Prassicio's
own occupation was. By training he was a philosopher (as
he himself never tires of pointing out), which means that
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he was probably a physician too. He is the author
of three other works besides the Impugnatio, one of which
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was also written m reply to Nifo. He dedicated
the Impugnatio to Andrea Matteo Acquaviva, brother of
Belisario (see above pp.149- 50 ) _ "Illustri Hadrie Duci
omni scientia omnique militari disciplina pollenti ac
decorato" -, but no more can be inferred from the dedication
than that his relation to Andrea Matteo was one of protege
to patron. He was, like Galateo, a friend of Pontano
and a member of the Accademia Pontaniana, and he has been
described as "il piu cospicuo rappresentante dell'Averroismo
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m seno all'Accademia . It is presumed that he died
in 1521 or shortly thereafter, and if that is so, there can
be no doubt at all that it was not the 1526 edition of the
Comentariolus which he had read.
Even to someone totally ignorant of the
philosophy of Averroes the text of the Impugnatio speaks
clearly of Prassicio's obedience to him. Leaving aside
unspecified references, there are in all some hundred and
fifteen quotations in the work. Of these, sixty-two are
from Averroes and only thirty-six from Aristotle. Of
course it is Averroes the Aristotelian whom Prassicio
reveres and through him therefore the Master himself.
Aristotle is auctor , Averroes expo sitor (e.g. p.93v°i),
but more often than not they are put .on a par and called
uterque magister . Averroes's privileged position is that
of the Son who speaks the Father's Truth to man in human
terms. Nowhere is Prassicio's indebtedness to Averroistic
principles more evident than in his demonstrations that
faith and philosophy may lead to totally different
conclusions, without either being rendered invalid in its
own terms. He is always at pains to express his allegiance
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to the Catholic creed hut it is to the Peripatetic creed
that he owes it first and foremost. When he does present
divergent Catholic and Peripatetic views on a certain
subject (for example on the relationship of reason to
intellect or faith: pp.l01r° - 102r°), both are set side
by side but neither is said to contain more truth than
the other. It would of course have been unthinkable,
not to say heretical, to claim that the Catholic opinion
was wrong, but not to say the same of the Peripatetic
point of view is no doubt to accredit it with greater
probability. There are instances, as in the case of the
eternity of the world, where it is the Catholics and not
"either master" who hold the truth, but more often
than not the Catholic belief is dismissed in just a few
lines when the Peripatetic one is discussed over several
pages: "omicto nunc nostros catholicos asserentes
creationem nulli operi nature commisceri posse, nisi in
generatione hominis propter creationem anime intellective
in mistam necessario generationi hominis. Sed nunc
de positione perypatetica ..." (p.96v°i). And St. Thomas
is actually rebuked at one stage for getting carried away
by "zelo fidei" (when discoursing on celestial bodies:
p.95r°ii). In his dedication Prassicio claims to be
bringing Nifo to justice both for his attacks on the
Catholic revelation and for his attacks on the Peripatetic
revelation: "et sic in hoc parvissimo codice seu libello
impugno determinationem Augustini tamquam veritati
perypatetice ac catholice regugnantem." It goes without
saying that it is an act of heresy to go against the
teaching of the Church, but it is heretical too, according
to Prassicio, to go counter to the philosophy of Aristotle
and Averroes, and in his mind it is the latter which is
worse and needs most to be confounded: "nam hoc est horrible
monstrum in doctrina Averrois" (p.95v°i). The aim of the
Impugnatio is to do precisely that: to reveal how confused,
how un-philosophical, how un-peripatetic the reasoning of
Nifo is. "Domine Augustine, hec comparatio armorum ad
licteras non est scientifica sed potius abusiva ac
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impertinens" (p.89r°ii). "Propter hoc mihi videtur esse
dicendum, ut perypatetice sentiamus, quod tain Aristotiles
quam Averroes movent questionei..."(p.90r°i - my italics).
The purity of the Masters' thought and logic is what
Prassicio seeks to redeem, from the obscurity into which
it has been dragged, by Nifo mainly, but also by all other
"moderns": "nemo ante me ex modernis advertit quod ..."
(p.l01r°ii) is the recurring refrain of the Impugnatio.
Only Prassicio therefore is the true continuator of
Averroes, he the only legitimate heir to Aristotle. It is
in that capacity that he hands down his reply to- Nifo's
Comentariolus.
Nifo had been instructed to impose a lasting
settlement on the querelle and he had planned to do so by
unmasking the illogicalities of his "adversaries" and
replacing them with irrefutable logic, but he failed in his
endeavours even before he had begun, and the voice which
rose to indict him found him guilty of exactly the same
offence with which he had charged all the other partici¬
pants in the debate: muddled thinking. To prove how
muddled Nifo's thinking in fact was. Prassicio in the
Impugnatio invalidates one by one each of Nifo's arguments
against letters. His indictment of the Comentariolus
however rests on a single accusation, to which he returns
again and again in the course of his harangue. By granting
precedence to arms over letters, Nifo reveals, according fo
Prassicio, a complete misunderstanding of no less than the
entire order and process of creation, as well as the nature
of man and the essence of God. Man was created in God's
image and intellect is the essence -of God, who is
"intellectus agens": pure intellect simply and eternally
active (p.102v°ii). The separate substances who inhabit
the heavens are also intelligentes and scientes , and
they are not and cannot be (no more for that matter than
God is or can be) mi1ites (p.91r°), because their essence
too is intellect (hence their proper name "intelligences").
They are potential intellect however, for they cannot exist
and continue to exist unless they receive and continue to
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receive intellectum from the Prime Form and Mover, God
(p.l03r°i). And they constitute different species, the
greater or lesser their gift of intellection: "secundum
rationem intelligentis et intellecti seu sciti et
scientis" (p.l01v°ii). Man, who lives in the sub-lunary
world and therefore suffers the impact of matter (the
cause of all evil and imperfection, "causa omnis maleficii
et imperfectionis" - p.l02r°i), nonetheless partakes of
this superior order of "being through his mind and intellect,
which in his case too is his true form. Like the
intelligences, the more he employs it the more exalted is
his position in the order of creation. A learned man
therefore, i.e. a man who makes use of his intellect,
almost belongs to a different species from an ignorant man:
"homo doctus, cum sit constitutus in ordine et gradu entium
intellectivorum, iure subit rationem ingenerabilis et
incorruptibilis; indoctus vero subit rationem generabilis
et corruptibilis, enumerandus inter res generabiles et
corruptibilies" (p.91r°i). Science and knowledge (letters)
are thus the specific nature and destiny of humankind, and
to ensure the implementation of God's design, this global
pre-destination is re-asserted for each individual at the
time of his birth through the agency of the stars:
hanc partem pro Licteris contra Arma, Illustris Dux,
assumunt astra ipsa, cum per se notum sit etiam apud parum
in astris exercitatos: Mercurium, discipline et rationis
dominum, super puerum quatriennem a lune regimine
dominioque relictum ac exeuntem habere dominium, qui, cum
sextum intraverit annum, tradendus est magistro eum docere
incipienti licteras discipiinasque liberarias , quibus
ducatur ad theoricas, maxime methaphisicam, qua ut proxima
dispositione ducatur ad ultimam felicitatem. Ecce astra in
principio nativitatis movere ad licteras, quod non aliter
nisi ut prin-cipium sup fine perficiatur (p.88v°).
Whereas no one is born to arms, we are all born to letters
and a man alive is a man "aptus natus habere fliteras et
virtutesj" (p.l00v°ii).
God being intellect, his creation is an
emanation of his mind, and science (knowledge) is the
cause of all things: "scientia dei est causa rerum"
(p.95v°ii). In that he understands himself, God who is
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the All, "brings his creatures into "being and "by a
continuous act of intellection maintains them in existence.
They in turn exist in that they understand and will continue
to understand themselves and God. lous is therefore the
"bond of creation, reason the "course and order of nature"
(p.l01r°). Nature in other words has a prescribed course,
which can be maintained only insofar as the will of God is
known and abided by. In human terms this means that man
must be guided in his conduct by his reason, which allows
him to understand what he must do or believe and enables
him to believe it and do it the way he should. Man's
reason is particularly responsible for his virtuous
behaviour. Nifo had maintained that the virtues come about
through action, and he thus granted primacy to arms,
for arms empower man to commit, for example, the act of
justice, i.e. to be just. For Prassicio this is to
mistake the effect for the cause. One cannot be virtuous
unless one understands what virtues are and how they are
acquired (i.e. how to become virtuous), and an
understanding of virtues is only given by the so-called
speculative sciences: "non possunt acquiri virtutes nisi
prius sciantur acquiri, sed sciri non possunt nisi per
scientias speculativas, quibus essentie rerum
comprehenduntur et speculantur" (p.l01°ii). It is science
and knowledge which make us good and live well. Those men
therefore, those "licterati docentes" who lead us on that
path, are superior to all other men. Indeed they are no
mere mortals but earthly gods - "hi sunt fere dii terrestres
potiusquam mortales homines" (p.89v°i) - , for to
understand the good and bring it to pass is to participate
in God's act of creation.
Understanding is a two-way process. By
understanding, superior entities create inferior ones, and
through understanding, the lower orders of creation are
bound to the higher ones and ultimately to their one and
only creator. Man's intellect is his instrument to a
happy life on this earth and to a blessed life hereafter,
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knowledge his path down through the world and up through the
universe. The supreme form of knowledge is metaphysics
(the speculative sciences), whose object is the bonum
divinum , by acquiring which man comes into his
"perfectioneessendi" (p.89r°i). To claim, as Nifo had done
(see above p.181), that man's summum bonum was purely humanum
and was brought about through the agency of arms, and to
question the superiority of metaphysics over military art
(which, according to Prassicio, is synonymous with arms -
see above p.177 5 is to verge on insanity: "si cui verteretur
in dubium speculativam scientiam ceu methaphisicam prestare
armis, is certe non esset sane mentis compos" (p.89r°i).
The infinite excellence of letters is so obvious that it
should become dogma and no-one allowed to question it. On
those who do, Prassicio casts anathema: "igitur, ex
solemni ac definitivo decreto omnium scientiarum maxime
methaphysicarum mandatur esse perpetuum silentium
imponendum sub notabili pena, ne unquam in posterum de hac
re loquendum sit, cum etiam ad hanc definitivam sententiam
influant atque concurrant ipsa corpora celestia necnon et
eorum motores tarn primus et totalis quam etiam et partiales,
ut in prologo nostri codicili declaravimus. Et in hoc finem
facio, literas excellere arma inproportionabiliter sicut
infinitum finitum" (p.l03r°ii).
These closing words of the Impugnatio bring us
back tosquare one again. Prassicio ends his discussion in
exactly the same way as Nifo had begun his (see above p.160 ):
with an exhortation to perpetual silence, since the final
word on the matter had now authoritatively been spoken. The
reader for his part is left wondering who did in fact have
the last word. The evidence, such as it is, points to a
re-writing of the Comentariolus in the wake of the
Impugnatio; only the material proof is lacking.
Prassicio was no more successful than Nifo in
imposing silence on the querelle. Despite his threats of
excommunication, voices were still to be raised in defence
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of arms, though many more would be taking the side of
letters. The querelle in fact was only just getting off
the ground and was to witness its moment of greatest
popularity in the second half of the Cinquecento. It is
true that no further contributions (with one exception)
were made to the genre from the south of Italy, though
whether as a result of Nifo's and Prassicio's menaces it is
impossible to say, but it seems unlikely that they could
have had such an effect. No other writer either (with one
exception again) was to take the matter quite so
seriously as Prassicio had done, or even GaLateo or Lapo .
Returning to northern Italy, where it had originated, and
to the fold of the vernacular, where Ilicino had set it,
the querelle of Arms and Letters (bearing knights and
doctors in its midst) was set to become a favoured
literary topic, but iis popularity brought with it a
certain degree of superficiality. The purpose of the
genre would no longer be to settle questions of precedence,
be they strictly ceremonial or more truly existential, but
simply to provide entertainment and to meet the demands of
fashion. Despite these changes it kept up links with its
past and in some cases; as we shall now be seeing, the links
were very strong indeed.
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Chapter IV
THE LATER STAGES OF THE QUERELLE OF ARMS AND LETTERS
A. Antonio Brucioli: Dialogo della preminentia dell'armi
et delle letters.
Agostino Nifo may have had adversaries, hut he
also had friends, if indeed a plagiarist may he called a
friend. His name has already heen associated, though
indirectly, with that of Antonio Brucioli, because of a
common deht they owed to Machiavelli,1 hut it had never
heen noticed that in fact they had something much more
tangible in common. Brucioli's Dialogo della preminentia
dell'armi et delle lettere is a straightforward plagiarism
of many parts of Nifo's Comentariolus.
Although Brucioli has not received much
attention from modern scholars and everything yet remains
to he written about him, and although the Dialogo of Arms
and Letters is an insignificant part of his total
production (it is one of one hundred and five dialogues,
not counting his other works), the fact of its existence
at least has heen more common and divulged knowledge than
the existence of Nifo's Comentariolus; hut what little
information is provided about its contents has on the whole
been misinformed. Frances Yates, quoting Delio Cantimori,
wrote that "the dialogue on Letters and Arms 'revives the
old contrast between the active life, especially political
and military, and the contemplative life'," which is only
superficially correct as we shall he seeing, and Giorgio
Spini dismissed it as a "raccolta di luoghi comuni di
modesto interesse", little suspecting no doubt how common
2
the places indeed were. There were three staggered editions
of Brucioli's Dialogi , the first (1526-29) in four hooks,
the second (1537-8) in five hooks and the third (l5.U^-5)
in four hooks, all three published in Venice. These Dialogi
may not he very original in terms of contents, hut there is
no other work quite like them. They are a veritable
encyclopaedia, in the vernacular, of all contemporary
knowledge ("philosophy" as they called it), ranging in
subject from man, society and the world through the heavens
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right up to God the Creator. When timid/ly releasing his
first dialogues in June 1526 for public purview, unsure of
his readers' response and of the reaction of the powers that
be, especially in his native Florence from which he had been
exiled and in Rome where the Medici were also in control (his
fears are expressed in a kind of envoi printed at the very
end of the volume after the colophon: "tempo e horamai poveri
e rozzi miei figliuoli, nello aggiramento delle nostre
traviate cure statimi gia due anni di dolce fatica, che da i
maggiori e piu reverendi vostri frategli disgiungendovi, a
vedere quello che per altri di voi si senta andare vi lasci "),
Brucioli was aware of the originality of his undertaking,
which he justified in his dedication to Massimiliano Sforza:
a viva forza spinto a scrivere di questa santissima Philosophia..
nella materna lingua, essendone infino a nostri tempi stata
poverissima... Et cosi per tutte le parti di quella con
diversi miei Dialogi passato sono, de quali volendo hora una
picciola quantita mandare a vedere cio che di questo nuovo
et tanto inusitato modo di scrivere si senta, gli altri a
tempo piu tranquillo riservando, come quegli che sono di piu
alto sentimento et di maggiore consideratione hanno b.isogno.
The public must have responded favourably, for these thirty
dialogues were followed in August 1528 by a second book
of twenty dialogues dedicated to Francesco d'Este, younger
son of Duke Alfonso I, by a third book of twenty-five
dialogues in July 1529 dedicated to Brucioli's Florentine
friend Giovanni Serristori, and a few months later by a
fourth book of twenty-six dialogues dedicated to his
friend of Orti Oricellari days, Antonfrancesco degli
1+ ...
Albizzi. The last dialogue of this book is the Dialogo
della preminentia dell'armi et delle lettere, interlocutori
le Armi et le Lettere. The success of the first edition
led to a second edition some ten years later, which is of
a far less tentative nature. The dialogues are re-organised
(to what extent they were re-written still remains unexplored
territory), ^ some have been taken away and some new ones
added (the total being increased from 101 to 105), and the
books, which are now given titles, are set in a more logical
and progressive order. Book I of July 1537 (the
equivalent more or less of Book I of the first edition)
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is Delia morale philosophia; Book 11 of October 1537
(the former Book IV with modifications) is Delia naturale
philosophia humana; Book 111 of November 1537 (the rough
equivalent of the previous Book III) is Delia
naturale philosophia; Book IV, published in 1538 (an
approximate copy of Book II of August 1528) is Delia
metaphisicale philosophia. Book V, which is a new addition,
is entitled Dialogi faceti and consists of five dialogues
of a less serious or more satirical nature collected from
the first edition, the last of which is the dialogue of
Arms and Letters. The other four are a "Dialogo della
sapientia et della stultia interlocutor! la Stultia et la
Sapientia" (taken from Book I of the first edition), a
"Lamento della virtu, interlocutor! la Virtu et l'Angiol
Michael" (from Book 111), an "Esserapio della vita humana
interlocutor! Theogeno et Carmene" (from Book I) and one
"Delia conditione dell 'huomo interlocutori due formiche"
(from Book IV) . ^ With the exception of this last book,
in many of the dialogues (and in all the dialogues of Book I
in which the speakers, reflecting Brucioli's nervousness,
had originally been fictional Greek characters) old
speakers, most of them from Brucioli's former Florentine
environment, have given way to new ones. What significance
this has for a reading of the text or whether it merely
reflects Brucioli's shifting political alliances and
expectations of patronage is another point which has not
been studied and needs to be investigated. The various
books too have been re-dedicated and this undoubtedly is
indicative of no more than new hopes of employment and
protection on Brucioli's behalf, for the wording is often
left unchanged. The first four books are dedicated to
members of the ducal family of Urbino (Duke Francesco Maria,
his sons Guidobaldo and Giulio, and his wife Eleonora Gonzaga
respectively), and the last one to the ^en-year old Alfonso
d'Este, the legitimized youngest son of Duke Alfonso I.
The third and final edition is a replica of the second
one, with new speakers in some instances and new
dedicatees for each book. According to Carlo Dionisotti
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the first dedication (to Cardinal ,Otta?iano de ' Medici)
is still politic hut "thereafter Brucioli gave up hoping
in men of influence and dedicated his work to simple
friends of his in his new home-town of Venice (Vincenzo
Cappello, Niccolo and Agostino Kale of Ragusa and Luca
7
di Cerva also of Ragusa). The third edition differs
from the second in one important respect: the fifth
Book, the Dialogi faceti (including therefore the dialogue
of Arms and Letters), was not reprinted. The printers/
publishers this time were Brucioli himself and his
brothers, who in about 15^1 had set up a printing-press of
their own in Venice, and Brucioli must therefore have
decided that the Dialogi faceti were of little account or
had not been popular enough to warrant the expense of
Q
a further edition. That they had indeed not been too
popular we may gauge from the fact that in some copies
of the 15^^-5 edition Book V of the second edition is
bound together tale quale with the new version of the
first four books; copies must have been left over, which
the Bruciolis were now trying to get rid of. The reaction
of the public is understandable. At the best of times
Brucioli can hardly be called a good writer - "ncn era nato
col bernoccolo della letteratura" says Dionisotti - and
when he attempts to be more light-hearted, his lack of
skill shows up even more, for there is no longer the
serious intent of the subject to detract the reader's
attention from the maladroit style.
Brucioli like Lapo da Castiglionchio belonged
to that unhappy class of Renaissance men (victims all
perhaps of the Roman dream), secular "clerics" who used
their learning and erudition to seek positions which often
did not exist and who were therefore reduced to living from
hand to mouth whilst begging protection and employment from
uncouth and sometimes illiterate grandees. Brucioli1s
erudition was considerable - he knew Hebrew as well as
Greek and Latin - and so too were his productive energies,
but they bore him little fruit. His difficulties were
compounded by political victimisation and religious
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persecution. Born in Florence around 1U98, he joined the
Orti Oricellari in 1512 and many of his Dialogi are said
to reflect the discussions and conversations in which he
took part there. When a plot was uncovered in 1522 against
Cardinal Giuliano de* Medici and members of the Orti
Oricellari were either arrested or forced to flee, Brucioli
fled and sought refuge in Venice, following his friend and
patron Luigi Alamanni (who is the most frequent speaker in
the Dialogi). The next two years he spent in Lyons and then
travelled to Germany, sent on a mission to the Emperor,
it would seem, to intervene in favour of the deposed and
exiled Massimiliano Sforza (the dedicatee of the first
Book of the Dialogi). It is here, in France and Germany,
it has been argued, that he first came into contact with
and was influenced by the Reformation, although Carlo
Dionisotti has recently suggested that his non-conformism
had already been stimulated in Florence by the publication
of works of Erasmus, of More's Utopia and of three anti-
Lutheran works, two of which contained many passages for
9refutation of Luther's own writings. Whenever and
wherever his pro-Reformation sympathies may have been
aroused, they are certainly well attested, as they
repeatedly brought him into trouble with the Inquisition.
He was later to translate the Bible (the so-called Bibbia
Brucioli of 1532 which became the most influential Bible
amongst Italian Protestants) and to write commentaries to
both the Old and New Testament, which brought upon him
accusations of heresy. He returned to Florence in 1527
after the fall of the Medici but soon became disillusioned
as the piagn/oni took control of the government. In 1529
he was arrested by the Otto di Guardia, accused of
Lutheranism and of being a French agent; he was tried and
banned from Florence for two years. He then settled
permanently in Venice, writing, translating, giving private
lessons and hoping for more lucrative positions. In 1538,
or even before perhaps,, financial necessity reduced him to
becoming an agent and informer for his one-time enemies,
the Medici. But economic difficulties did not affect his
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literary activities. The Dialogi were his first work,
after which he turned to what was to he his main activity,
translation into Italian. The Holy Scriptures came first
and they were followed by a series of pagan texts: Cicero's
Rhetoric s and Somnium Scipionis, Pliny's Natural History
and finally the whole of Aristotle. He also provided new
editions of the Decameron and of Petrarch's Rime and Trionfi.
The last twenty years of his life were marred by repeated
vexations from the Inquisition. In 15^8 the Tribunale dei
Savi condemned him to two years' exile, which he spent in
Ferrara around the court of Renata di Francia. In 1555
they tried him a second time, on thirty counts of heresy,
and he was made to recant. His abjuration however was not
sincere enough for the Savi, who tried him yet again in
1558 and this time sent him to prison. The sentence was
commuted shortly thereafter to a house arrest which, as
far as we know, was not lifted before his death in
Dec emb er 15 66.
We have come a long way with Brucioii. His
world in the north of Italy, the heart of Europe, is quite
a different one from Nifo's cosy niche in the conservative
and very Catholic Kingdom of Naples. It is the world of
the Reformation and Counter-reformation, a world with a new
spiritual dimension and new intellectual horizons. Yet,
far apart though they may have been, there was one obvious
bond between Nifo and Brucioii: Aristotle. Already
manifest in the subject of his early Dialogi , Brucioli's
interest in Aristotle receives its most obvious expression
in the steady stream of Aristotelian translations which
will flow from his pen from the late 15^0's onwards.
Speaking of the Dialogi della naturale philosophia humana,
the Dialogi della naturale philosophia and the Dialogi
della metaphisicale philosophia, Giorgio Spini wrote:
"aristotelico appare in massima parte il pensiero del
Brucioii, pure accogliendo in se voci ed echi di
provenienza diversissima, sia dall'antichita classica, sia
dal pensiero fiorentino a lui piu vicino. I problemi pero
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che il nostro pose per primi alia propria riflessione
furono ... i problemi, tipicamente fiorentini, dell'uomo,
la sua moralita, le sue relazioni familiari, sociali,
civili. Coll'esilio ed il contatto del Brucioli con
l'ambiente veneto, il suo aristotelismo doveva uscirne
rafforzato, fino ad eliminare presso che interamente le
influenze di diversa provenienza, che abbiamo detto piu
sopra. Logicamente percio il Brucioli doveva essere
condotto a dirigere la propria riflessione verso quelli
che erano i problemi piu discussi dell'aristotelismo dei
suoi tempi: il problema dell'intelletto umano e
dell'anima, che divideva allora averroisti, alessandristi
e tomisti, il problema del mondo e della sua coetanita
o meno con Dio. Ed ancora una volta sara forse il modesto
ed oscuro poligrafo fiorentino quello che, meglio di piu
famosi ed originali pensatori , potra darci 1'impressione
di quanto fermentava nella coscienza generale della societa
colta del suo tempo.It is not unlikely that it was
through Aristotle that Brucioli came into contact with
Nifo and his Comentariolus. Nifo was the author of many
commentaries on Aristotle, and one of the two works which
were published and bound together with the Comentariolus
is an Apologia Socratis et Aristotelis. It is intere¬
sting to note that in his dialogue of Arms and Letters
Brucioli, who otherwise left out all Nifo's quotations from
classical sources, mentions only one authority by name, and
that of course is Aristotle. "Come il vostro Aristotile
pone" say Arms to Letters - vostro as if to underline
that anything to do with learning had necessarily to be
12
Aristotelian. When Brucioli is likely to have read Nifo's
Comentariolus and composed his own plagiarism of it, we do
not know, but it cannot have been before August 1526 (the
date of publication of the Comentariolus),unless Brucioli
saw the version Prassicio had seen, and must obviously have
been before 1529 when the dialogue was published.
What Brucioli did to Nifo's Comentariolus is
no different from what he did. say, to Aristotle's Politics,
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except that it must be called a plagiarism instead of a
translation, because Brucioli tried to pass it off as his
own. The barefacedness of Brucioli's pilferings is
immediately obvious to anyone but slightly familiar with
the two texts. A couple of examples will suffice as
illustration. The first argument which Brucioli's Letters
adduce in support of their claim to superiority is the
following:
noi siamo tanto da essere anteposte a voi Armi, quanto
sono da essere anteposti i beni dell'animo a quegli del
corpo, essendo le lettere da essere connumerate fra i
beni dell 1animo, dove voi Armi, se per le forze del corpo
siate prese, sarete da essere connumerate fra i beni del
corpo, et cosi, quanto avanza di nobilta 1'animo il corpo,
tanto vegnamo ad avanzare noi Lettere voi Armi; et se per
gli strumenti dell'arte militare et non per le forze del
corpo siate prese, fra i beni della Fortuna piu presto che
altrimenti e da connumerar.vi, sotto l'arbitrio della quale
noi Lettere non fumo mai (p.33r ).
The very first argument which Nifo, in the first section of
the Comentariolus, had presented in favour of letters (and
which he in turn had "borrowed" from Ilicino) reads as
follows:
Litere inter animi bona abAristotile et Platone enumerentur,
Arma vero, si pro corporis viribus roboreque intelligantur,
inter bona corporis, si pro instrumentis rei militaris
atque re ipsa militari, inter fortunae bona ... At constat
tanto animi bona praeferenda esse fortunae atque corporis
bonis, quanto animus corpori atque fortunae antistat.
Literas vero fortunae nequaquam subesse testatur
Aristoteles, summus naturae interpretes.13
In Brucioli Arms then answer with the following argument:
hor vedete, Lettere, quanto voi siate ingannate, anchora
che tutte piene vi crediate essere di sapientia. La
prima cosa, noi non siamo strumenti bellici solamente
ma forze dell'animo et del corpo, coneiosiacosache nella
militia l'uno e 1'altro sia necessario et non poco si
adopri, et piu presto 1'animo certamente che il corpo,
essendo la virtu della fortezza, l'uso della quale
mirabilmente nella militia vale, piu conveniente all'animo
che al corpo, per laqual cosa noi Armi haremo da essere
numerate fra i beni dell'animo et del corpo, dove voi
Lettere fra quegli dell'animo solamente (p.33r°).
Nifo, in the third section of the Comentariolus, had refuted
the above argument in exactly the same terms:
per Arma non instrumenta bellica intelligimus solum, sed
vires etiam animi ac corporis, quippe cum in militando
animus et corpus agant, et quidem animus potius... Quae
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ratio docet Arma Literis esse preferenda, quoniam et animi
et corporis "bona sunt, Literae vero animi dumtaxat. 14
At one point in the Dialogo Brucioli's Letters claim that
God is called "blessed for no other reason than that he
knows and contemplates himself. Knowledge is thus God's
essence and knowledge therefore, which is acquired through
the medium of letters, is the perfection of man, who was
created in God's image. To this Arms reply:
questo [i.e. Iddio}, come voi medesime in piu luoghi
affermate, e parimente potente et sap'iente. ' Hora, in quanto
ch'egli e potente, principalmente impera al mondo,
perche non e Signore e Re del mondo, se non in quanto
ch'egli e causa di tutte le cose et principalmente in
quanto che somma et infinita e la sua potentia; et come
i Re del mondo per il loro potere imperano et con le
forze dominano et per la scientia governano, cosi Iddio
per la scientia provede, per la potentia fa, regna et
domina a tutta questa mondana macchina. Onde,
coneiosiacosache in ogni principe alio imperare sia di
maggiore valore la potentia che la scientia, le armi, che
sono la potentia dell'huomo, sono da essere anteposte
alle lettere; senza che piu principale causa e da essere
tenuta quella che opera che quella che consulta, et
coneiosiacosache le lettere ammonischino et consultino. et
le armi operino, le armi fieno da essere anteposte alle
lettere (p.3Hr°).
This is Brucioli's most literal translation of a passage
from the Comentariolus:
astipulatur autem Armorum excellentiae Deus ipse qui, etsi
pariter potens et sciens sit, non tamen quo sciens sed quo
potens est, principaliter orbi imperitet. Ron enim Dominus
est atque re mundi Rex, nisi quo rerum causa est. Est
autem rerum causa principaliter quo potens. Unde
quemadmodum mundi reges potentiis imperant viribusque
praecipue dominantur, sapientia vero gubernant. Ita Deus
scientia providet, potentia facit ac regnat. Ad haec
voluntas intellectu dirigitur libera potentia, qua libere
potest facit. Quare cum in omni principe maior ad
imperandum potentia quam scientia sit, Arma, quae sunt
hominis potentia, Literis sine controversia anteponenda
sunt, quae sunt hominis scientia ... Et Aristoteles
Physicorum Libro Secundo principaliorem causam earn esse
asserit quae facit, non earn quae consultat; at cum Literae
moneant consultentque , Arma faciant, Arma nimirum Literis
praeferenda sunt. 15
There are times when Brucioli's faithful, not to say un¬
thinking translation of the Comentariolus can give rise to
incongruities. Arms and Letters, who are the speakers in
the dialogue, always refer to themselves or each other by
their own name, Arms and Letters. At one point however and
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without warning Arms start to ta±k of knights and doctors:
quello che valorosamente combaLle per causa dall'honesto ,
fece bene, ma il dottore che insegno ben combattere et bene
militare, ne bene ne male combatte, siche i militi , che
cosf dal combattere sono detti, sono da essere anteposti a
dottori , che dallo insegnare sono cosi chiamati; et cosi
essendo per voi Lettere i dottori et per noi Armi i
militi, noi a voi saremo da essere anteposte, venendo a
essere anteposti i militi a dottori (p.35r°).
This sudden apparition of knights and doctors does not mean
that Brucioli was necessarily familiar with the querelle of
Knights and Doctors, for all he is doing here is to copy
the opinion of doctors of law ("iuris doctores"). quoted by
Nifo in the first section of the Comentariolus (and which,
incidentally, Nifo had immediately refuted):
at qui strenue certavit honesti causa, benefecit. Doctor
vero, qui bene certare ac bene militare docuit, nec bene
nec male certavit. Milites igitur, qui a certaminibus
dicuntur, Doctoribus praeferendi sunt, qui a docendo
appellantur. l6
From these few examples we can see how closely
Brucioli stuck to the original. He did not however make
full use of it: only a third of the Comentariolus has
ended up in the Pialogo. Most of the arguments which he
uses come from the first section of Nifo's work (the
section on the opinions of others: "aliorum sententia") , in
which fourteen anonymous views are first presented on the
superiority of letters, followed by four anonymous views
on the superiority of arms (see above p.160 ). Brucioli
borrows all four views on arms and ten of the fourteen on
letters. From the opinions which Nifo assigns to particular
individuals or groups of individuals (Cicero and the doctors
of law, Petrarch, the Romans, the followers of Sallust, and
other Peripatetics and Platonists - see above p.l6lff), Brucioli
only takes the short passage quoted above on knights and
doctors. From the central part, the body of Nifo's work,
Brucioli translates fairly faithfully and extensively the
definition of arms (see above p.169)} he leaves aside the
decree in favour of the superiority of arms but pinches a
couple of snippets from its proofs on the basis of the
definition of happiness and of the definition of honesty
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(see above p. 172). The definition of letters (see
above p.154)and the long section on the desirable
alliance of arms and letters is left unused (see above
p . 1 5 8 ff ) and so is the entire third section of the
Comentariolus (see above p.153 ). except for the first
counter-argument to the initial argument in favour of
letters. Brucioli seems at least therefore to have
skimmed through the whole text, but in the last resort
to have taken only what was most convenient and less
demanding. Had there been an equal number of arguments
supporting both arms and letters in the first section, he
might not have bothered to read any further. But as
there was a decided imbalance in favour of letters, he
needed to search for more points in defence of arms; and
indeed the passages he translated from the second and
third sections of Nifo's treatise, are passages which all
support arms. It was thus a quick job he intended to do.
He also left out the countless quotations which Nifo had
woven into his discussion. This was presumably so as to
lend more vivacity to the dialogue, but it was only partly
successful, for Brucioli seems on the whole to have given
little thought to producing an impression of fluency. His
dialogue is only a real dialogue, with the speakers actually
listening to one another and answering accordingly, for
about the first half; after that it becomes a dialogue de
sourds, in which repartee follows repartee without much
rhyme or reason. Brucioli was aware of this shortcoming
of his text and he tried to put an excuse for it in the
mouth of Letters: "noi non vogliamo le vostre ragioni
anullare confutandole- they say to Arms - accio che piu
dolce sia fra noi questa contesa, ma bene dimostrare quello
che e" ( pp.33 v°-3^r° ) . Having said this, Letters no longer
pay much attention to what Arms say, and Arms for their
part hardly bother any longer to listen to what Letters
have to say. This of course leads them nowhere, and in the
end they find themselves obliged to submit the case for
arbitration to a third party. In the first edition the
arbiter - who, it has been stipulated, must be an expert
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in both arms and letters - is none else than Antonfrancesco
degli Albizzi, the dedicatee of that edition, and in the
Dialogi faceti of 1538 he is the brother of the dedicatee,
Duke Ercole II. This is the only, important variant between
the two editions.
In the 1529 conclusion of their dialogue, Arms
say to Letters:
non molto lontano di qua, nella nobilissima citta di
Firenze, vive un valoroso spirto, il quale et noi et voi
honora et cole. Et perche gia e chi per altro in alcuni
suoi dialogi a lui vi invia, non sapendo a chi meglio
le sue compositioni mandare et insieme le honorate
discipline vostre, a questo anchora noi rapresentare ci
vogliamo et a quello rimettere tanta nostra lite,
sapendo quanto et di voi et di noi sia amatore et a
dentro ne intenda (p.226r°).
Many of Brucioli's dedications have this kind of ambiguity
which one could take to imply that the dedicatee was
selected faute de mieux. In the dedication for instance of
Book II of the first edition to young Francesco d'Este
Brucioli wrote; "essendo per mandare fuore alcuni miei
Dialogi, piu volte ho meco medesimo pensato, a chi (come
conveniente dono) mandare gli potessi, et mentre che
l'animo non bene resoluto andava cercando dove potergli
piu acconeiamente posare, veggendo quasi tutto il mondo
volto alle armi et nessuno tenere piu conto della Santa
Philosophia, mi occorse la S.V.." This must have been a
formula which Brucioli found particularly convenient, for
it is repeated almost word for word in the dedication of
the Dialogi della naturale philosophia to Don Iulio
17
Feltrio in 1537* But behind the conventional facade we
do probably detect the determination of the author to
retain some degree of independence and self-respect in
the humiliating task of soliciting protection. The
humiliation (and consequently the self-respect) is at its
most intense in the dedication to Cardinal Ottaviano
de'Medici of the first book of the last edition, in which
Brucioli does not in fact so much request patronage as
demand gratitude for the patronage which he, Brucioli, is
bestowing upon Ottaviano by associating his name with
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this work of literature. Men, Brucioli begins, are
different from other animals in two respects: they have
the use of reason and speech,and they may enjoy ever¬
lasting fame after their death.
Et questa seconda non puo succedere a alcuno senza gli
scritti che restino a fare fede della egregia virtu et
valore di quegli che sono degni delle loro lode, i quali
non solamente gli fanno illustri et notandi appo i posteri,
ma in gran benevolentia adducano essi et i loro descendenti,
tale che bene spesso grandissime commodita ne conseguono.
... Grande e stata certo et illustrissima la famiglia de
Medeci, ma non pensate che a s£ alto grido et fama sua non
giovassino assai i Marsili Ficini, gli Angeli Politiani,
i Pontani, i Platini et piu altri simili scrittori, che
a quegli dedicorno l'opere loro, inalzando et magnificando
la magnanimita et liberalita di tanti illustri huomini.
Et se si potessi vederne il vero, questi poterono assai a
indurre gli animi degli imperadori, papi, re et gran
signori et de popoli a essere favorevoli a tanto celebrata
casa, talmente che ne pervenne a sommi gradi della dignita.
If this, as Dionisotti has suggested (see above p.l7S)? is
the last politic dedication of the Dialogi, the choice of
words is certainly not the most felicitous to that effect,
and Brucioli must already have been having second thoughts
about the expediency of flattering important personalities
and in particular the offspring of a family to whom
economic circumstances had forced him to betray his former
friends. But at other times and in earlier days Brucioli
knew how to be perfectly obsequious. This is how he
appears in the close of the 1538 version of the Dialogo
della preminentia dell'armi et delle lettere. He no doubt
expected more from the Estensi than he had d_one from
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi and the latter 1s praises of
1529 are replaced in 1538 by three times as many compli¬
ments for the Estensi and Duke Ercole in particular,
un nuovo Hercule ... il quale, a prieghi della afflitta
Italia, come altra volta gia fece Giove, di nuovo l'ha
rimandato in terra a opporsi col suo sapere et valore a
quelle efferate fiere rapaci, che infino al vivo tutta
lacerare la vorrieno; il quale, doppo che un tempo hara
retta quella parte che dal suo padre Giove gli e stata
data in governo , con grande honore et gloria della casa
Estense, liberera il resto di quella dalla dura sua
servitu. Siche anchora noi contente siamo di tanto
honorato giudice, il valore et la prudentia del quale e
tanta grande, che l'armento che ne campi Italiani e
commesso alia sua guardia, sicuro tiene in mezzo di molti
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lupi, che in forma di pastori lacerare lo voriano, nessuno
lasciando entrare nel suo ovile (p.39r )•
In reality of course it is the reader who is to be the
judge of the dispute, for Arms and Letters wander off
hand in hand leaving him to. guess what the outcome is to
be. Neither has won the day, but neither was intended to,
for the purpose of the exercise had not really been to
find a solution but more to enjoy a conversation: "venute
\
siamo a trovarvi, perche noi vogliamo tutto questo giorno,
piacendovi, spenderlo in ragionare con esso voi della
preminentia et degnita vostra et nostra" Arms had said to
Letters at the beginning (p.32v°). The querelle has now
decidedly become a j eu de societe, having moved from the
classrooms of jurists and schoolmen and the battlefields,
as it were, of southern Italy to the courts and salons of
the north. In Brucioli the jocose and superficial tone is
set at the very outset in a small scene in which Arms
play the part of a courteous but determined seducer, and
Letters of a bashful virgin, reacting to the request of
Arms like Mozart's Eerlina to the advances of Don Giovanni
("vorrei e non vorrei ..."). When, having lost patience,
Arms become more menacing, Letters finally succumb: "noi
siamo contente di dire quello che di nostra degnita a
comparatione della vostra ne paia et vivacemente con le
ragioni difenderemo la causa nostra" (p.33v°).
The first argument of Letters, as we have seen,
is that they are a gift of the mind, whereas arms pertain to
the body and are subject to the whims of fortune; to which
Arms reply that, as a matter of fact, they are a function
of both body and mind, and of the mind in particular
through the virtue of fortitude ("fortezza") which is
especially connected with the art of war, and that they
are thus superior to letters, being an expression of man
in his totality. Moreover arms bring about most wond/rous
effects, such as fortitude magnanimity and justice (the
supreme virtue), and they are the cause of wealth too,
thanks to which men are able to study in peace and quiet.
Letters on the other hand, if they cause good effects, do
so only by accident: one can understand what virtue is,
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without necessarily being virtuous. But Letters are of
the opinion that it is they who generate what is best:
friendship and the contemplation and fruition of the
summum bonum. Arms turn man against man and bring about
only death and destruction. Naturally Arms do not agree.
It is thanks to them that men and states are maintained in
liberty; contemplation only corrupts. God and the superior
intelligences - Letters retort - are said to be blessed
precisely because they know and contemplate themselves, and
so too is man blessed, in imitation of God. But God, say
Arms (since you chose to rise so high), is both wise and
mighty and it is with his might and not his wisdom that he
rules creation, and likewise rule princes the world. Arms
are therefore superior to letters, for the real cause is
the one that does, not the one that advises. It is at
this stage that the dialogue loses any semblance of logic
and that argument starts to follow upon argument without
apparent rhyme or reason, often becoming repetitive.
Without military science ("disciplina militare"), which
is learnt from letters, arms are bestial and incapable of
winning victories and victories are arms' only avenue to
praise. Whatever excellence arms thus achieve, they owe
to letters. Arms though encourage man and train him for
the active and civic life ("civili attioni et tutte le
altre operationi"), whereas too much studying is an obstacle
and bar to that life. A man-of-letters ("huomo litterato")
however is as different from an uneducated one ("ignorante")
as is a portrait or a sculpture from a man of flesh and
blood. Letters in other words are the essence of man and
what is more, by perfecting his reason and intellect, they
render him truly divine , where arms but turn him into a
brute. All beasts have natural means of defence (horns,
teeth, claws etc.) but to man alone nature gave reason.
Is not he who does well - Arms now ask - preferable to him
who only teaches to do well? If he is, then, as we have
seen, knights are superior to doctors. But it is only
through the agency of letters that a man, a warrior, can
still be famous thousands and thousands of years after his
death: letters thus bring immortality to arms. And arms
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bring immortality to letters, for where would letters be
if there were no glorious deeds of which to sing? And in
any case, if you have committed a valorous deed, it is
sufficient for your conscience and God to know of it.
Neither of the contestants will yet concede victory, so
Letters continue by claiming that those who have a strong
intellect are natural leaders, whereas those who have but
a strong body must naturally obey. Arms however do not
mean just weapons, is the inconsequential reply of Arms,
which allows them to reel off Nifo's definition. Running
short of arguments, Letters reiterate that man alone was
born to friendship and that he alone was given reason and
intellect by nature, all of which are perfected by means
of letters. Letters are thus superior to arms as substance
is to accident. Such distinctions are too subtle for Arms
("noi non vi sappiamo tanto dire di sustantie o
d'accidenti") and they retort once again that glory
nobility honour power riches and virtue are gifts of arms
all and every one. Innumerable are the men who, from
poverty and humbleness, rose to fame and glory with the
help of arms; but there is not one who did so with the
help of letters. Finally Letters argue at length that it
was arms who put an end to the Golden Age and are therefore
the cause of the present miseries of humankind. But Arms
succeed in turning the same argument against Letters, and
the offices of an impartial adjudicator thus become
indispensible.
This is what the reader will find in Brucioli's
Dialogo della preminentia delle armi et delle lettere (and
in Nifo's Comentariolus). Amidst so much drudgery, there
are moments where the author manages to strike a more
personal note, not necessarily very original, but different
from Nifo and perhaps more sincere. The most heartfelt
innovation is the lament for the loss of the Golden Age,
a passage which takes up at least one third of the whole
dialogue. The arguments used on either side may differ,
but the intent is the same: the peace of the world has
been upset, man has lost his innocence, love and harmony
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have given way to violence and discord. The plea of
Letters is impassioned: "et chi fu quello, che mescolassi
e confondessi tutte le cose, una tanto lieta et felice
pace turhando, se non lo insolente furore dell'armi, per
la alterigia e insolentia delle quali niente sicuro o
lieto rimane al mondo, per voi piu volte venuto pieno di
lamenti e dolorose strida per lo efferato spargimento
dell'humano sangue" (p.37r°). The countercharge of Arms is
more pointed: "da queste vostre lettere grammaticali
vengono le pistole amatorie, corrompitrici dell'honesta
delle giovani, turhatrici de casti matrimonii e spesso
anchora de costumi de teneri giovanetti. Et oltre a questo,
quante lascivie, quante obscenita, quanti inganni, quanti
strupi, quante ruberie, quante iniquita, quante malignita
s'imparono ne vostri scritti, vadinsi pure a vedere i
corruttibili poeti, di lascivia e falsita pieni" (p.38r°).
Rhetoric daily incites princes to wage war and is thus more
responsible for spilling human blood than arms are. Law
with all its trickeries makes black of white and turns
friends into enemies. Because of dialectics and
philosophy "col Tomista pugna lo Scotista, col Reale il
Hominale", and theology is the cause of more heresies
than arms manage to put down, not to mention all the
frauds, charms and spells cast by letters.. Letters are
therefore just as responsible as arms for the fall of man.
It would be rash of course to attribute this excursus on
the Golden Age. without further proof, to the disillusion
of a man twice exiled from his native city, who knew his
country to be at the bloodstained hands of "barbarians"
and who was aware of the conflicts taking place all around
him in the name of religion, but this is the kind of thing
which cannot be proven and must therefore remain at the
stage of plausible hypothesis. But plausible it certainly
is for, as we have pointed out, this argument takes up a
good third of the dialogue and it is by far its liveliest
and most sincere sounding section. It is true that it is
an argument which we also find in Nifo ("Arma postponenda
esse Literis, quigperverterint auream aetatem ac
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libidinosa sint") , but Brucioli has expanded it beyond
recognition and in Nifo it is just one of many "scholastic"
arguments (Nifo's reply to it is that arms only vitiated
the Golden Age "per accidens", for in themselves they are
not bad and were invented for good purposes, but it is
man in his wickedness who has debased them), whereas in
Brucioli it takes on a special significance, both by its
dimensions and by its position at the end of the dialogue,
and also because it is the one point on which both Arms
and Letters agree. They may have different views as to
who the culprits were, but that paradise is lost neither
of them deny. There is another argument in the Dialogo
with a similar ring, for which Brucioli also took his cue
from the Comentariolus ("est amicitia homini maxime
propria")1^, but which he also chose to develop at greater
length (though by no means at such great length as the
discussion on the Golden Age), thereby giving it the
sanction of more personal feelings. Man alone of all
animals was born to friendship, wherefore he alone was
created of pleasant countenance, was given charming eyes,
the possibility to hug and kiss, laughter and tears to
express his feelings, speech to voice his sentiments and,
to top it all, the use of reason and intellect, which only
letters can perfect. True, none of this is terribly
original and it is more than likely that Brucioli pilfered
it from somebody else (Cicero perhaps?) - once found guilty
of theft, it is hard to make believe that you can be
innocent - but it is not in Nifo. Brucioli must therefore
have paused to reflect at this stage of his hurried
translation, in order to emphasize a point which he deemed
worthy of especial attention. A further passage which is
not in the Comentariolus is the reply which Arms give to
the claim of Letters that it is they who are the agents of
immortality. Nifo had himself countered this argument in
the third section of his work but in a way too pedantic to
be included in a sociable dialogue, and also perhaps in a
way not easily translatable into Italian, as it quibbled
with the meaning of a word. "Literas Armis praestabiliores
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esse, quia Armis nulla insit praestantia, nisi quam Literae
20
ipsis tribuerint' had been Uifo's argument, to which
his counter-argument was that, just as gold is more noble
than other metals yet anyone who says so does not bring
that superiority ("praestantiam") into being but simply
praises it, so anyone who writes of Caesar is simply
praising him but is not conferring upon him the worth
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which he already has of himself. Brucioli opted for
a simpler retort: that it is arms which bring immortality
to letters by providing them with an interesting subject-
matter to write about. Ludovico da Canossa, it -will be
remembered, uses a similar argument in the Cortegiano:
"i scritti, li quali forse non sariano tanto letti ne
apprezzati se mancasse loro il nobile suggetto, ma vani e
2 2
di poco momento." The Cortegiano had appeared for the
first time, in Venice, the year preceding the publication
of Brucioli's Dialogo of Arms and Letters, and it is not
improbable that Ludovico da Canossa's repartee is what
gave Brucioli his inspiration (indeed the Cortegiano might
well have given currency and helped to create the vogue for
a vernacular querelle of Arms and Letters and thus have
been the original impetus behind Brucioli's rushed
plagiarism, which sought perhaps to satisfy a burgeoning
demand), but we need not rob him of all originality, and
certainly the final touch of the reply of Arms seems to
reflect more personal preoccupations of the author. Arms
add that in any case it is sufficient, if one has committed
a good deed, for God and one's conscience to know about it.
This sounds strangely out of place in an otherwise
relentlessly boastful mouth and it could well be the
reflection of a man under the spell of the Reformation, as
Brucioli was. But even without this, we know from the
dedication to Ottaviano de' Medici that the question of
the bond between the singer and the sung was a problem of
particular concern to Brucioli.. Brucioli's final innovation
with respect to the Comentariolus is the inclusion of a
rather garbled passage oh the virtue of riches, which only
arms can empower man to acquire:
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cos£ per noi Armi s'acquistano le gran ricrchezze, per
lequali, oltre alia fortitudine e magnanimita, si conseguono
tante mirabili virtu, quante voi potete comprendere, senza
che, per esse ricchezze dalla virtu e valore nostro
acquistato, possono anchora venire gli huomini studiosi e
litterati e negli alti studii felicemente quietare
1'intelletto , la dove la vostra felicita ponete,
conciosiacosache nulla si possa senza questi negli honorati
studii operare, perche, come il vostro Aristotile pone,
un perfetto mezo sono a far che l'huomo pervenga a essa
felicita (p.33v°).
Here too Brucioli could have taken his cue from Nifo;
but if he did, he misunderstood what he had read or chose
to understand it in his own way. This passage is quite a
faithful reproduction of Nifo's first argument in defence
of arms ("Arma praeferenda esse Literis, quia ipsa sint per
se ut bene vivamus; Literae vero per se nec ut bene vivamus,
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nec boni fiamus") . It is only in the middle that
Brucioli strays from the text of the Comentariolus, where
it says: "patet igitur ex hisce, Arma facultates esse,
quibus turn fortitudo turn magnanimitas acquiritur. Insuper
facultates esse, quibus homines studiosi et fortitudxnis
s 2b
et. magnan imi t at i s opera emoliuntur." To lend weight to
his awkward departure from the original, Brucioli for the
first and only time avowedly enlists the support of an
authority, Aristotle. The departure it is true is not
very significant, but if we are looking for a personal
motivation behind it, we could well say that it is the
reflection of a man who, from bitter experience, knew only
too well that "nulla si possa senza questi negli honorati
studii operare." He had already wandered through Europe in
search of profitable employment and for the rest of his
life he would in vain be soliciting lucrative protection.
When all is said and done, these personal
touches do not amount to very much. Reflect more intimate
preoccupations of Brucioli they may well do, but they never
succeed in lifting the dialogue above the tone of gentle
badinage. Just as the discussion was becoming more earnest,
it is interrupted by Arms, who bring it back to the level
of polite entertainment which had been set in the opening
scene, by saying "non volendo che sia altro fra noi che pace
212
e amicitia, ci pare che si debba, per 11011 ci offendere,
lasciare questa contesa e rimettere ad altri tanta lite"
(p.38v°). Brucioli1s Pialogo, as we have said, was a
hurried job, to which he committed his pen but not his
heart. It did not really arouse his interest. This is
especially clear if we bear in mind that all serious
discussion about arms and letters - the relationship
between might and right, between the law and the military,
the importance of education and so on - he reserves to
other dialogues ("Del modo dello. instruire i figliuoli",
"Delia republica", "Delle leggi della republica", "Del
capitano", to mention but a few) and even to simple
dedications (see the dedication to Francesco d'Este p.l83
above). For him the querelle has become a set piece, a
genre with its own rules, and a game to be played without
regard for the reality of the world outside but only for
the conventions established by literary precedent. Of
course there had always been a degree of conventionality
in the debate - especially when its terms were knights
and doctors - and literary precedents had always had their
part to play, but never before had the querelle been so
totally divorced from any social context and so thoroughly
derivative. The address to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi
and the later one to Ercole II d'Este do not constitute
a social context. Rather, they re-inforce the impression
of estrangement from reality, as the dedicatees are
invited to participate in an entertainment which remains
unchanged whether it is meant for bourgeois Florence or
aristocratic Ferrara. And in the 1538 edition the reader
is clearly made to understand that what he is about to
read he should not take too seriously. The title of the
fifth book, in which the dialogue of Arms and Letters
appears, is Dialogi faceti, and in the dedication of that
book 'Brucioli says to Alphonso d'Este: "volendo io mandare
a vedere quello che i vulgari italiani sentino di queste
mie puerili fatiche, piu fatte per recrearne gli animi
di quegli, che le severe sententie degli altri quattro
libri haranno lette, che per utilita che esse apportino ne
loro scritti." This could be the false modesty of a
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Petrarch towards his so-called nugellae , but the reader
would undoubtedly be hard put to find much that is useful
in the Dialogo della preminentia delle armi et delle
1ett ere.
Not all the contributions to the querelle
written in the years and decades following the publication
of Brucioli's Dialogi will be quite as derivative as his
dialogue of Arms and Letters and none so totally out of any
social context, but all will be in the vernacular, not a few in
dialogue form and most in the style of genteel entertain¬
ment. The pattern of the genre is now firmly set, with
arms and letters squarely in the lead (though knights
and doctors never far behind), producing mostly
unimaginative variations on an often monotonous theme.
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B. Isabella Andreini: Amoroso contrasto sopra le armi e
le lettere.
By the turn of the century very little had
changed. In 1625 some Fragment! di alcune scritture of
the comedienne and authoress Isabella Canali Andreini
were published in Venice, twenty-one years after her death.
They had been collected in memory of her by her actor
husband Francesco Andreini, whose introduction to the
work ("A' Benigni Lettori") is dated April 23th l6l6,
25
from Mantua. They consist of thirty-one dialogues in
the form of small tableaux ("contrasti scenici") the sixth
of which is an Amoroso contrasto sopra le armi e le
lettere. Brucioli, as we have seen, had already dramatised
the querelle and turned it into a kind of love scene. At
the hands of Isabella Andreini both these aspects are
developed more thoroughly and consistently. Arms and
letters are personified, arms as a manly and gallant
though none too witted Capitano Alessandro, "il cui valore
avanza il valore di quel Magno, del quale degnamente
portate il nome" (p.Hi), and letters as a beautiful bright
and determined Signora Corinna, "la cui sapienza supera
il sapere di quella famosa Greca, della quale meritamente
porta il nome" (p.Hi). She is no longer the bashful
virgin of Brucioli's dialogue who blushes at the advances
of her suitor; it is she who now does the proposing and
she can stand up for her rights and defend them like
Bradamante, even though she may prefer to see herself as
Isabella facing Rodomonte (Alessandro however has nothing
of the wicked braggadocio of Ariosto's hero). Isabella
Andreini has also given more sprightliness to the
dramatisation of the confrontation; not that her dialogue
can by any means be said to convey much excitement and
suspense, but it does have that je ne sais quoi which makes
it more entertaining than Brucioli's dialogue and which
we may attribute to a lifetime on and back-stage. The
je ne sais quoi is probably no more than brevity (her
dialogue is not even half as long as Brucioli's and her
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actors do not beat about the bush), but it does have an
air of continuity and finality which is lacking in
Brucioli. This is provided first of all by more
theatrical repartee - there is even the odd aside to the
"audience" - and by the fact that the debate is subsumed
to the resolution of a love story: will he or will he not
love her as she loves him! The dialogue is also much more
of a real dialogue than it is in Brucioli. The speakers
actually do listen to what the other has to say, though
often their riposte is not by way of counterargument,
but is simply an attempt to outwit the opponent, to say
something cleverer or more to the point.
The scene opens with Corinna "walking on
stage" to greet Alessandro, who in turn greets her and pays
her compliments. If these compliments corresponded to
reality, she answers, then her only desire would be, by
means of her wisdom ("sapere") and writings ("scrivere") ,
to render Alessandro immortal. But Alessandro courteously
declines the generous offer, for he is already immortal,
"essendo, come io sono, Capitano d'essercito di soldati
a piede e a cavallo" (p.Ul). The challenge is thus
delivered and the duel may begin. After a few moments
Corinna interrupts it to say that they must proceed in more
orderly a manner, but first agree on certain terms:
"adagio Signor Capitano, mettiamo la contesa nostra in
termine e poi vi diremo sopra. Ma bisogna prima, che
occorra alcun patto come occorse tra Rodomonte e Isabella
tra di noi, accioche, s'io perdo, mi tocchi a star di
sotto e a voi di sopra come vincente" (p.^2). The pact is
that, if Alessandro loses, he will be obliged to love
Corinna as she loves him, but if he wins, he will have
complete power to do with her whatever he chooses. And
so the duel proceeds with each contestant in turn gaining
the upper hand and then being beaten back until they both
concede, since neither can be the victor and neither
defeated, that they must love and respect one another.
Says Alessandro to Corinna: "Signora Corinna, io non
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voglio far torto ne all'una ne all1altra honoratissima
professione, le quali , come dianzi dissi, hanno l'una
dell'altra bisogno, non potendosi l'una senza l'altra
mantenere; e perche la nostra questione rimane del pari,
mi contento d'amarvi, accioche del pari vadano gli amori
nostri e che pari sieno i piaceri, i diletti e gli
amorosi contenti" (p.U8). All is thus well that ends well
and, as in Brucioli, Corinna and Alessandro walk off
friends and lovers hand in hand.
The language of love in this Contrasto amoroso,
the language of courtship, is taken from the chivalric
world of jousts and duels. Corinna (in an aside to the
"audience") describes Alessandro as "forte, robusto,
gagliardo e di buon nervo" (p.UH), and he thanks her for
her "larga cortesia" (p.U2). They agree, as we have seen,
on a "patto" in their "contesa", in which the loser will
be he who "sta di sotto". When Corinna delivers a blow
which Alessandro finds it hard to parry, he whispers to the
"audience": "costei comincia a farmi toccar le corde dello
steccato, onde bisogna rincalzarla gagliardamente e
abbatterla" (p.Ui+). When it is Corinna's turn to be on the
defensive, she refuses to "arrendersi" and swears that it
will be Alessandro who will have to "piegar l'asta" and
having struck back, she exclaims triumphantly: "qui bisogna
un gran scanso di vita, a fuggir questa punta, Signor
Capitano" (p.U5). But she is unable to unhorse Alessandro
who retorts: "Signora mia, parate ben con la vostra rotella
questa imbroccata" (p.1+6). When Alessandro at last shows
signs of flinching, Corinna goads him on with the following
words: "alia fe, Signor Capitano, che voi cominciate a
lenare, a diventar pigro e lento nel menar delle mani, e
io all'incontro mi sento piu fresca e piu gagliarda nel
fine che nel principio" (p.i+7). And Alessandro's final
"surrender" is as chivalrous as one could have wished.
Of course there is nothing exceptional in the language of
war and the language of love being one and the same; but
what it does reveal in this instance is the type of audience
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at which Isabella Andreini's Amoroso co . trasto was
addressed. It is a form of aristocratic entertainment
intended for the self same people who whiled away their
time watching or taking part in jousts and duels,
courtiers for whom the whole world was the stage of
theatrically contrived situations. Having spent a
lifetime entertaining the aristocracies of northern Italy
and France, Isabella Andreini was presumably familiar with
their tastes and her Contrasti scenici are likely to
reflect what was popular with them. ^ Certainly there is
a great deal which is conventional about her Amoroso
contrasto sopra le armi e le lettere and many of her
arguments have an implied air of deja vu, for in their
brevity they do not make much sense unless they presuppose
a certain amount of familiarity and knowledge on behalf of
the audience. Such for instance are the opening words of
the dialogue which rehearse, incompletely, the familiar
argument about who brings immortality to whom. There is
in fact not one original argument in the whole of the
Amoroso contrasto. Most we have encountered already and
others, we will see, became popular in the course of the
sixteenth century.
Germane to the argument from immortality are
several other arguments of the "who-needs-whom" type,
be it letterati who to study need the peace and quiet which
only soldati can provide, or laws which are ineffective
without the backing of the sword, or soldiers who without
the succour of learning would fight irrationally,
endlessly and chaotically. The compromise is that arms
and letters have need of onianother, "conciosiache per
l'armi si difendono e s'amplificano le cittadi e i regni
e per le lettere si governano e si conservano" (p.UT) •
Akin to this are the arguments concerning the respective
utility of the two professions. Laws are of universal
benefit, whereas arms minister to the ambitions of a
single prince or state while doing immeasurable harm to
their enemies. On the other hand a soldier who exposes his
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life for the commonweal ("patria") is more useful than
the man-of-letters who "se ne vive sepolto ne suoi volumi"
(p. 1*3). Then there is the argument about which of arms
and letters are more natural. Arms are natural, for all
living beings have been endowed with natural means of
defence, whereas letters are artificial ( " art i f i c io se " ) .
Yet arms are the cause of death and destruction and are
thus contrary to human happiness, whereas letters, which
are the agents of virtue, lead man to his appointed
felicity in this world and the next (knowledge and
contemplation), being a function of the mind where arms
are but a function of the body. Arms moreover are subject
to the whims of fortune. Arguments which became popular
in the course o.f the sixteenth century, are the ones about
the origins of arms and letters (arms are more noble
because they were invented in heaven before the creation
of man; letters were invented later, on earth) and about
the titles which the two professions confer upon their
prac ticians:
quella professione e piu eccellente, che al suo professore
acquista titoli piu eccellenti. Uno che attenda alle
lettere, per molto studio che vi faccia, se non s'addottora,
non acquista titolo alcuno; e se si addottora, acquista
nome d'Eccellente ; e se publicamente segue leggendo a
lettura principale una quantita d'anni, acquista nome
d'lllustre, e questo e il maggior titolo del letterato.
Ma il professor della militia acquista subito nome di
strenuo, et s'e soldato a piedi, che e il men degno grado
della militia, in dieci anni si fa nobile; e s'e huomo
d'arme, in meno. Ad un Capitano o Colonello d'huomini
d'arme, si da dell'Illustre, et a un Generale da Mare o da
Terra si da dell ' Ec cell ent i s s imo (pp.1*5-6).
This point, which derives ultimately from the scholastic
axiom which has been common to the whole querelle in its
various manifestations, that "nomina sunt consequentia
rerum", is an interesting reflection on the linguistic
usages and social customs of the time. It is often
associated with another argument we also find in Andreini ,
namely that dottori are superior to cavalieri, because it
takes five to six years of hard labour to become a doctor,
where a hundred knights can be created in an instant.
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Except for the interesting innovations (in
respect of what we have studied so far) of letterato and
soldato, which, as we shall see, became slowly established
in the course of the sixteenth century, the terminology too
in Andreini's C ont ras to is very conventional. It is so
conventional in fact that it has lost any real meaning.
Letterato and dottore, leggi and lettere , soldati, cavalieri
and militia are used indifferently. There are still traces
perhaps of the Knight and Doctor querelle - in particular
when the instantaneous knighthood is unfavourably compared
with the hard-won doctorhood - but on the whole a dottore
is the equivalent of a letterato and it is no longer only
a student of law who s'addottora. In all their vagueness
arms and letters may well stand for two different
professions, but their language and their behaviour (the
language and behaviour of Corinna and Alessandro that is)
show them to belong to the same world. They are no longer
rivals from different social groups, as we had in the Knight
and Doctor querelle and in the early stages of the querelle
of Arms and Letters, but friends with different interests
from the same social environment. And if Isabella Andreini's
Amoroso contrasto has any significance at all, it is as a
witness to the enduring popularity of the querelle on the
one hand, but more particularly as a witness to the social
acceptability of the partnership of arms and letters. It
cannot even be said to be advocating the alliance of arms
and letters (it has none of the propagandism of, say,
Nifo's Comentariolus): it simply records a reality.
"Tanto l'una professione ha bisogno dell'altra, che 1'una
senza l'altra essercitar non si puo giustamente, e 1'altra
senza l'una mantener non si puo sicuramente" (p.^T)-
We should be careful of course not to take
this single instance as proof that the kind of conflict
reflected in the works of Lapo da Castiglionchio, Galateo
or Nifo was definitely a thing of the past. Other literary
evidence, more or less contemporary with Andreini's
Contrasti scenici, Traiano Boccalini's Ragguagli di Parnaso ,
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suggests that indeed it was not. The seventy-fifth
Ragguaglio of the first Century says that "con animi
ostinatissimi si tratta ancora in Parnaso tra i Letterati
e gli huomini Militari la maggioranza tra le Armi e le
Lettere" (p.319)- The men-of-arms ("huomini militari")
submit to the Ruota di Parnaso that their profession
(the "essercitio . della guerra") should be recognized as
a science and a discipline. After much deliberating the
Ruot a accedes to their request, whereupon all the butchers
of the universe come rushing forth with a similar petition:
essendo alia notitia loro pervenuto, che la Ruota di
Parnaso haveva deciso che l'arte di saccheggiar.e e
abbrucciar le citta, di tagliare a pezzi gli habitatori
di esse, e in somma, che il mestier crudelissimo di
macellar gli huomini, di disertare il mondo e di far
con la spada in mano del mio tuo, si chiamasse scienza e
disciplina, ancor'essi, che non la carne de gli huomini
per spegnere il genere humano, ma le vitelle mongane
macellavano per pascer le genti, domandavano che
co' medesimi illustrissimi nomi fosse honorata l'arte loro
(p.320).
The Auditors of the Ruot a are thus shamed into debating
the matter over again and into revoking their original
sentence. Their final decision is that "il mestiere della
guerra, ancor che molte volte necessario, era pero tanto
fiero, tant'inhumano, che non era possibile cohonestarlo
con le belle parole" (p.321). This satire is of course
just as much a reflection on the literary genre itself
(on the comicality to which convention had reduced it) as
it is on the pretensions.of men-of-arms, but it does suggest
that all was not always as well between the two professions
as Andreini had pictured it to be. At the same time it is
further evidence of how popular the querelle still was.
It would be interesting to know whether its
popularity was such that it was ever adapted for the stage.
Andreini, as we have seen, made of it a Contrasto scenico.
We have no evidence to suggest that this was ever performed,
but it may well have been a summary plot or outline
intended for the use of comici dell'arte , such for instance
as the company of Gelosi to which Andreini belonged for
most of her career after having joined it in Bologna in
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1576. The director of the company was Flamminio Scala and
his Teatro delle favole rappresentative, overo la
ricreatione comica, hoscareccia e tragica is a codification
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of scenarios for the use precisely of comici dell'arte.
The fourteenth of his fifty scenarios is that of a comedy
entitled II pellegrino fido amante. Its plot is unexcept¬
ional : Pantalone wants to marry off his daughter Flaminia;
she has two suitors, "Oratio gentilhuomo" and the "Capitano
Spavento", and she favours Oratio, whereas her father
prefers the Capitano. After much discussion and after
having sought the opinion of various other characters,
her father finally obliges her to accept the hand of the
Capitano. What is interesting for our purposes in this
plot is that Oratio is a letterato and the Capitano a
mi1ite and that the central scene is sketched out by
Scala in the following words: "Pantalone dice a Flaminia
sua figlia volerla maritare e contentarla e che sopra di
cio dica l'animo suo. Ella che vorrebbe un letterato,
Pantalone che vorrebbe darla ad un milite nobile ,
adducono molte ragioni sopra le professioni." The final
judge on the matter is Pedrolino, the servant of Capitano
Spavento, who says that "ogni donna doverrebbe amar' un
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milite e non un letterato". The approach here reminds
one of the medieval Knight and Clerk debate which, as we
shall be seeing in our final chapter, weighed the
relative merits of knights and clerics as lovers, but
this debate was long forgotten and the way the actors
filled out the plot must have had more in common with our
querelle than with anything else, and, who knows, they
probably got some ideas from Isabella Andreini. We cannot
say whether she herself might ever have played the part of
Flaminia in this comedy - she usually took the role of
Isabella - but her husband pmncesco Andreini, was always
cast as Capitano Spavento. That is the way in fact in
which he is described in the title of the edition of his
wife's Fragmenti di alcune scritture, the editor of which
SO
was the very Flamminio Scala himself. It is not
unlikely therefore that arms and letters did appear on
stage and that Isabella's Amoroso contrasto was in some
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way connected with theatrical performances of the querelle.
But whether or not it was, it is quite clear that Andreini's
version of the querelle was no more than an entertainment.
Andreini however was no innovator, for it had already become
so in Brucioli's day and such it had remained throughout
the sixteenth century.
The change which took place in the nature of
the querelle in the early decades of the sixteenth century,
from serious discussion to light entertainment, was not of
course occasioned by the publication of Brucioli's Dialogo
which was but a symptom of the transformation of the genre.
The mere fact that it was not published a third time when
all of Brucioli's other dialoges were, would seem to
indicate . quite clearly that it was never very popular,
and we certainly have no indication that it was known to
other authors on the subject. Everything suggests that it
was written hurriedly and in response to a particular demand.
The question thus needs to be answered as to why this
demand arose and why the querelle changed when it did.
The early sixteenth century was of course the
beginning of a new era in Italian literature, the era
par excellence of the vernacular, when convention and
imitation became the norm and the dialogue the most
acceptable, not to say the only accepted form of prose
writing. It is hardly surprising therefore to find
Brucioli writing a dialogue of Arms and Letters, "nella
materna lingua" and "in imitation" of an earlier Latin text.
The querelle of Arms and Letters moreover, and of the
Knight and Doctor, had already been in the air without
interruption for a very long time and its popularity, was
undoubtedly much greater than we are able to ascertain
at this stage from the known literary evidence; indeed
we have had intimations from this very evidence of its
popularity in the oral tradition too. When the time was
ripe therefore it became one of many commonplaces to be
adapted to the conventions of a new type of literature
and the demands of an enlarged reading public in search
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of entertainment. A particular model might well have been
Ilicino's version of the querelle, which was written in the
vernacular, in quasi-dialogue form, had been in
circulation since the lU/O's and was to remain so well into
the 1520's. Ilicino, as we have seen, was widely read and
had influenced both Galateo and Nifo (thus finding his
way unwittingly into Brucioli's dialogue); and even after
the last edition of his commentary in 1522 he was to
continue being quoted in the context of the genre. Another
theme which had been popular since the early days of the
Renaissance, and which is similar to, though not identical
with the querelle (although it had on many occasions also
become associated with it) was the debate on the educative
necessity of combining arms and letters, the physical and
the mental, for the formation of the perfect man. This
debate had received a boost in more recent years with the
circulation and publication of the Cortegiano, whose
"principale e vera profession" was to be "quella
dell' arms." (I ,xvii ) and for whom "oltre alia bonta, il vero
e principal ornamento dell1animo" were to be "le lettere"
(l,xlii). The Libro del cortegiano, the popularity
of which is too well known to need recalling, must also
have given renewed vigour to the very querelle itself,
for one of its more lively moments is a discussion between
Pietro Bembo and Ludovico da Canossa on the relative merits
precisely of arms and letters. This discussion, which
comes at the climax of the long passage on the importance
of literary qualifications, is not simply the logical
conclusion of that passage but it is its conclusion so
contrived as to allow for the inclusion in the text of the
querelle of Arms and Letters in well tried terms.
The actual querelle takes up very little space
in the Cortegiano : only two short chapters ( j 5 1+ 5_6')..
And it only really consists of two arguments, the mind/
body argument and a version of the who-needs-whom/
immortality argument. Pietro Bembo, in reply to Ludovico
da Canossa's claim that arms are the "principal professione"
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of the courtier and "l'altre bone condizioni tutte...
ornamento di quelle", says that surely letters, being a
function of the mind, must be "di dignita all'arme
superiori", which are but a function of the body.
Ludovico da Canossa's answer to this is the familiar "anzi
all'animo ed al corpo appartien la operazion dell'arme."
Then,commenting on Petrarch's "Giunto Alessandro alia
famosa tomba" which Bembo had adduced as further evidence
for the superiority of letters, Canossa says:
basta che i litterati quasi mai non pigliano a laudare se
non omini grandi e fatti gloriosi, i quali da se meritano
laude per la propria essenzial virtute donde nascono; oltre
a cio sono nobilissima materia dei scrittori; il che e
grande ornamento ed in parte causa di perpetuare i scritti,
li quali forse non sariano tanto letti ne apprezzati se
mancasse loro il nobile suggetto, ma vani e di poco
moiento (l,xlvi).
The reason Canossa had given for not wanting
to discuss this question at too great a length
was that it had already received much attention from
other people: "essendp gia stata questa disputazione
lungamente agitata da omini sapientissimi, non e bisogno
rinovarla." Since the relationship between arms and letters,
between the two professions of the courtier, is the very
dilemma of the courtier's existence and the very crux of
his quest for an identity (does he exist to fight or to
converse? Is his purpose to serve his prince on the
battlefield or in the council-chamber?), it may seem
surprising that Canossa should show so little eagerness to
argue the question any further at this stage. But he
realized (Castiglione realized) that "questa disputazione",
i.e. the querelle of Arms and Letters, was not relevant to
the wider debate about the raison d'etre of the courtier,
that it had become too rigid to allow for a meaningful
discussion of such an important issue. And in order to
underline its irrelevance, Castiglione presents it with a
certain degree of irony. The speakers become caught up in
its phraseology and are led off on a tangent. They move
from a consideration of the courtier's two main professions
to talking about two individually distinct professions,
and forgetting about the cortegiano they start to speak of
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litt erati and scrittori . Their exchange of views then
becomes quite silly, when Ludovico da Canossa says that the
superiority of arms would be irrefutably evident if men-of-
arms and men-of-letters were left to defend their own
vocation against each other with the help of their
respective weapons and tools. It finally becomes quite
confused when Canossa tries to explain that Alexander the
Great's envying the luck of Achilles in having had Homer
as the herald of his deeds does not mean that Alexander
actually deemed letters to be superior to arms. Alexander
knew that as a warrior he had nothing to envy Achilles
(he took it for granted in other words that that was his
own supreme perfection), but he realized too that he would
have had to be very fortunate indeed to find such a poet as
Homer to sing of his own feats (he only envied Achilles in
other words for being more fortunate in that respect).
Thereupon the conversation is brought to an abrupt end, with
Canossa saying that "omai si e parlato a bastanza", and
Ludovico Pio retorting: "anzi troppo". Canossa had been
aware all along, even while seemingly defending the
superiority of arms in great earnest, that the arguments
he was using were not altogether convincing. For instance
he almost robbed the immortality argument of any significance
by interjecting a "quasi mai", an "in parte", and by saying
"i scritti, li quali forse non sariano tanto letti." If
Castiglione found the querelle irrelevant, one. may wonder
why he did not leave it out altogether . The answer must
be that it was a "disputazione lungamente agitata", and
another aim of the Cortegiano being to provide a "ritratto
di pittura" of a court and its entertainments, the portrait
would have been incomplete if such a topical debate had
been omitted. And it is the very fact of its inclusion
in the Cortegiano as an established and well-known genre
("quest a disputazione") with its own terminology and
conventions, which is important for our purposes
proving as it does the popularity of the querelle (and
suggesting in fact that it was even more popular than
the extent of the evidence will allow us to surmise for
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the present). But the Cortegiano does not simply depict
the querelle as popular. It portrays it too in the
environment with which it had become closely identified:
an environment of polite aristocratic intercourse in the
vernacular. It is in that environment that w£ shall
continue to find it for the remainder of the century.
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C. The querelle during the latter part of the Cinquencento.
The querelle of Arms and Letters in the
vernacular was primarily a literary phenomenon of the
second half of the Cinquecento and the first work to
appear on the subject after Brucioli's Dialogo, was
published in Venice by Gabriel Giolito de' Ferrari in
1558. It was the work once again of a physician, one
Pompeo della Barba from Pescia in the province of Pistoia,
and it bore the title Dialogo morale, nel quale si esamina,
se sono di maggior pregio 1'armi o le lettere. It is a
short dialogue, some twenty pages long, and was published
at the end of another and much longer dialogue on the
secrets of Nature (De' segreti della natura), which is
dedicated, from Pescia on April 20th 1557 to Iacopo Salviati,
the great-grandson of Lorenzo il Magnifico. The dialogue
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on arms and letters has no dedication. In the first
dialogue four Florentines (Bernardo Segni, Lodovico
Domenichi, Pandolfo Martelli and Domenico Boni) talk
about the secrets of Nature whilst strolling along the
banks of the Arno. Towards evening Bernardo Segni invites
the others to join in the wedding feast which is about to
take place in his home and where they will be able to
continue in the guise of Academicians the conversations
they had begun that morning as Peripatetics. They are
thus comfortably seated and waiting to be sumptuously
regaled when they start to discuss arms and letters.
They have been joined in the meantime by three other
gentlemen, Benedetto Varchi, Giovan Batista Gello and
Captain Niccolo Bernardi. The subject is introduced by
the Captain and Messer Pandolfo, who had already argued
about it but not been able to reach an agreement and who
therefore ask the company to select two speakers to resolve
the problem. After much consultation the choice falls on
Messer Pandolfo himself and on Benedetto Varchi, who also
happens to have been one of the most frequent speakers in
Brucioli's Dialogi. The tone of the conversation is that
of pre-dinner talk and it is interrupted, before any
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settlement has been reached, by Bernardo Segni calling
his guests to the table and suggesting that they keep
something in store for the next day "che voglio ci
godiamo questi giorni di Carnovale allegramente , in
ragionamenti piacevoli e utili" (p.15^). The gentlemen
thus withdraw with Lodovico Domenichi whetting their
curiosity for the post-prandial game he has been
organizing.
The same work of della Barba's, but much
expanded, appears in a manuscript of the Biblioteca
Riccardiana in Florence under the title Della nobilta
dell'armi e delle lettere. It is dedicated to Francesco
de' Medici, the future Grand Duke, and the dedication is
dated April 10th 15&5 from Rome. Della Barba claiffls in
the dedication, that this is "un Dialogo nato nel ozio
delle mie molte occupazioni sotto la dolcissima e
volontaria servitu di Pio quarto Pontefice Santissimo
ottimo e rarissimo." All the speakers have been changed
and no reference is made to the earlier version of the
dialogue. The new participants would appear to belong to
the environment of the Curia - they are Monsignore Giovio
and il Conte Clemente Pi etr a , (who. do., most of the speaking),
il Signore Giulio Collonna fsicl and il Signor Giannotto
Castiglioni - and given the nature of della Barba's
additions (many of which, as we shall be seeing, are
taken straight from Rifo's Comentariolus ) , it is likely
that the Florence manuscript is a re-working of the Venice
edition in the light of new "evidence" brought to della
Barba's attention while he was living and working in Rome.
Pius IV was pope from December 1559 to December 15&5 an(^
della Barba must therefore have re-written his dialogue
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some time m the course of those years.
The work which should probably be put next
in line is Lo schermo by the Bolognese Angelo Vizzani
(Viggiani) dal. Montone, "nel quale per via di dialogo si
discorre intorno all'eccellenza dell'armi e delle lettere,
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intorno all'offesa e alia difesa, e s'insegna uno
schermo di spada sola da f ilo , co'l quale puo l'huomo
non pure difendersi da qual si voglia colpo del nimico,
ma anchora offender lui non poco." It was published in
Venice in 1575* but would appear to have been written some
fifteen years earlier. In a foreword to the Emperor
Maximilian II, the author's brother explains that he is
now bringing Lo schermo to light, fifteen years after
Angelo's death, in accordance with the latter's last
wishes, and addressing it as requested to the Emperor, who
at the time of its composition had been King of Bohemia
(the work is indeed preceded by a dedication from Angelo
to Maximilian as King of Bohemia). Maximilian was
elected King of Bohemia on September 20th 1^62 and held
the title until he became emperor on his father's death
in June 156^. The Schermo must therefore have been
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written at about that time. It is a dialogue, which
in part I rehearses all the usual arguments of the
querelle, between "i due piu eccellenti nelle lor
professioni all'eta loro, 1'Ilustrissimo Signor Aluigi
Gonzaga, detto Rodomonte, e 1'Eccellentissimo Messer
Lodovico Boccadiferro Bolognese . The one is a
philosopher, the other a warrior ( "un cavalliero" ), and
each takes the defence of his own profession, but their
conversation is most amicable. Gonzaga has come to
Bologna from Venice especially to meet Boccadiferro and
exchange views with him. After much inconclusive talk,
the dialogue ends with Gonzaga being shown around
Boccadiferro's study and with an invitation by Gonzaga to
Boccadiferro to join him for dinner ("desinar"), which
Boccadiferro politely declines as he never has more than
one meal a day. Lo schermo was re-published in Bologna
in 1588, unaltered except for the dedications to
Maximilian which have been replaced by a dedication to
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Count Pirro Malvezzi by one Zacharia Cavalcabo.
The next dialogue is not by way of an
appetizer but of a digestivo, with the two speakers,
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Atilio and Torquato, shading from the afternoon heat
to while away the lazy hours of the day with pleasant
conversation. It Is by Domenico Mora, who describes
himself as "Bolognese, gentilhuomo Grisone, e cavalliere
Academico Storditi". He was a professional soldier who
knew also how to wield the pen, energetically if not
always too fluently, and who has thereby earned himself a
mention in the Enciclopedia italiana. He is the author
of at least three books defending the honour of soldiers,
3 6
two of which fall within the pur.view of this study.
His first work, dedicated to Cosimo I de' Medici, was
published in Venice (by Giovanni Varisco e compagni)
in 1567 and is entitled Tre quesiti in dialogo sopra il
fare batterie, fortificare una citta et ordinar battaglie
quadrate, con una disputa di precedenza tra 1'arme e le
lettere. It purports to be relating conversations held
at Cosimo's court and its real subject is batteries,
fortifications and orders of battle. Arms and letters are
only discussed briefly at the beginning of the first and
second quesito. They are no more than a small section of
the whole book and not a well-defined and self-contained
section either. It is somewhat surprising therefore that
they should have been given such prominence in the title,
and one can only assume that it was the popularity of the
querelle which brought this about. Arms and letters would
prob ably have attracted a wider audience for the book than
too technical a title was likely to have done. It is
easier to believe this if one bears in mind that arms
and letters in this case are in fact a misnomer, for what
Mora is talking about is an updated and personalized
incident of the Knight and Doctor querelle. Arms and
Letters however was what the genre was now called and
what the reading public had come to expect and recognize.
The title and polite setting of the dialogue are also
misleading in another respect. They do not prepare us for
the virulence of Mora's invectives against doctors. The
virulence is born of resentment against the latters1
pretences and pretensions, and in Mora's other work,
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II cavaliere, the invectives will rise to an amazing
crescendo of hatred and bitterness. The circumstances
which occasioned the animosity are like the mirror image
of the circumstances behind Lanfranchino's Tractatulus:
"tutto il giorno veggo molti, forniti assai piu
d'arditezza che di giudicio, sforzarsi di dare ad
intendere al mondo d'essere d'acutissimo ingegno e di
profondissime scienze e volere antiporsi a soldati di
molto honore e dignita-^ con tanta mia mala s o di s fat t ione ,
che adirato molto ne rimango e simile ad un leone ferito
da pungente dardo" (p.25v°), says Atilio, who is the
author's alias. Together with their pretentious ignorance,,
it is the venality of doctors and their litigiousness
which particularly infuriate Mora:
le tante chiose, le diverse leggi, le varie opinioni e
gl'infiniti consigli fatti e mandati in luce da alcuni
dottori, non miga da tutti, sono cagione non solamente
d'una confusion grandissima di qual si voglia sottilissimo
ingegno, ma etiandio della ruina delle republiche con la
mercatura d'esse, laquale e hoggimai tanta e tale, che io
tutto smarrito e stupefatto rimango della toleranza sua
appo le genti, percioche per tal causa la maggior parte
del mondo e in lite (p.26r ).
Mora is adamant that it is soldiers who must have
precedence (even over the best of men-of-letters , i.e.
philosophers), but what he demands for them is not mere
ceremonial precedence. It is the right to rule, for,
as is obvious to anyone (Mora's thinking is entirely
empirical and experiential), "la forza domina la ragione."
On those who would deny this right to soldiers Mora casts
anathema, as Prassicio had done on those who conceded
it to them. But doctors are not the only enemies with
whom soldiers have to contend, they are not the only cause
of evil in the world. There are infidels and heretics
too, and soldiers alone can stamp out evil and heresy.
Since therefore princes and Christendom would be nought
but for the succour of arms, "qual lode maggiore si puo
dare all'huomo - Mora asks rhetorically - che dirgli
Soldato?" (p.2v°).
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GentiIhuomo could have teen the reply of
Girolamo Muzio Giustinopolitano. In his work which
appeared under that title in Venice in 1571 (dedicated
to the doge Luigi Mocenigo) and again in 1575 (with the
same dedication) "in tre dialoghi si tratta la materia
della nobilta, e si mostra quante ne siano le maniere,
qual sia la vera, onde ella habbia havuto origine, come
si acquisti, come si conservi, e come si perda. Si parla
della nobilta de gli huomini e delle donne, delle
persone private e de' Signori. Et finalmente tra la
nobilta delle arme e delle lettere si disputa qual sia
37la maggiore." The conversations are said to have taken
place in Florence in 1567, on the feast of St. John the
Baptist, between a citizen, Eugenio, and a foreigner,
Nobile, "nomi alle conditioni loro molto conformi" (p.l).
Once again it is after dinner, "levata la tavola e i
servidori partiti", that arms and letters are discussed.
Regarding nobility the speakers had decided that "niuno
e piu nobile dell'altro, se non chi ha miglior natura
e ingegno piu atto alle scienze e alle arti nobili" (p.66),
and in the course of discussing the origins of nobility,
when the authorities most quoted apart from Aristotle were
Dante and Bartolus, Nobile had made a distinction between
two kinds of nobility, natural and civic ("civile").
Natural nobility derives from one's virtu and is
universally recognised, whereas civic nobility is
particular to a given place (say Florence) and one has it
on account of one's name, one's family or the office one
happens to be holding. Arms and letters are grantors of
civic nobility. The nobility each calling bestows is at
first said to be of equal standing to the other, because
"ne l'una senza l'altra governar si puo giustamente, ne
l'altra senza l'una mantener securamente" (p.20.8). B.ut
as the dialogue proceeds , there emerges a muted but
definite condemnation of warfare and its horrors - the
sack of Rone is recalled and the battles of Pavia Marignano
and Ravenna amongst others - with Nobile finally
exclaiming:"et a cui pare, che le arme siano di beneficio
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universale, Dio mandi la guerra a casa sua" (p.24l).
By the end arms have "been all "but cast aside, as they are
simply no match for letters, which "di ornamento ci sono
nelle cose prospere e di refugio nelle adverse. Se 1'huomo
e solo, se e accompagnato, se e nella citta,. se in villa,
se in casa, se e fuori, sempre gli sono preste a porgere
e utile e dilettatione ; il che non so che la disciplina
militare, ne altro esercitio, sia atto a poter fare"
(p.275)« The speakers are aware too that in the hands of
evil-minded individuals letters can cause much harm -
wicked theologians "beget heresies, bad physicians poison
their clients instead of curing them and malevolent
lawyers steal our belongings instead of protecting them,
so that "la penna in mano di un maligno o di uno impudico,
e peggio che una spada in mano di un furioso" (p.206) -
and much stress is therefore laid on the necessity of
their being accompanied at all times by virtu, so that
a man-of-letters be truly an "huomo da bene". But when
letters are conjoined with virtue, nothing can measure
up to them. Letterati therefore should always and
everywhere occupy the first place, and what is more
they should always be at the helm of a city. Soldati
on the other hand must always come second and their proper
place is always at the oars. Did not Plato himself say,
in the Republic, that letterati are the natural rulers of
a state, whereas soldati are its natural defenders, its
natural guard-dogs?
It so incensed Mora to read of a soldier
being called a dog, that, from the depths of a Polish
winter where he was serving in the king's army and where
the cold weather kept him "piu che non vorei nelle stuffe"3
he hit back in anger, pouring forth his venom and his
contempt for all letterati in a continuous flow of
semi-1iterate Italian,three-hundred full pages long with
almost no full stops. The fruit of this hatred was
XI cavaliere in risposta del Gentil'Huomo del Signor
Mutio Iustinopolitano, nella precedenza del armi et
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delle lettere , completed in "Polozgo in Russia Bianca il
primo Aprile 1585" and published in Vilna four years later,
with a dedication to the Captain General and Grand
Chancellor of the Kingdom of Poland, Giovanni Zamoyski
Azamosche:
ho letto, Illustrissimo e Eccellentissimo Signore, il
Gentil'huomo del'Signor Mutio lustinopolitano, che tratta
della nobilta, e mostra quanto siario. le maniere , quale
sia la vera e sua origine , e come si acquisti, conservi
e si perda, e finalmente tra la nobilta del Armi e delle
Lettere quale sia la maggiore; e perche per qualche sdegno
ricevuto da alcun Cavaliere, egli parla contro la nobilta
del'armi in maniera che a Cavalieri serebbe vergognia a
lassare il gientilhuomo passare senza rispota, poi che dice
la loro professione assere simile a quella de Canni, io in
particulare, havendone sentito agravio, le ho fatto il
presente Cavaliere in risposta. 38
The Cavaliere is a page for page, almost word for word
reply to the Gentilhuomo and one can just imagine Muzio's
book lying open in front of Mora as his pen covers sheet
after sheet with resentment and invective to vindicate
the honour of soldiers, because "ho provato, che 1'armi
realmente sono piu nobilli delle lettere." The passion
of Mora's harangue makes the Cavaliere by far the most
original and entertaining work in this long series of
repetitive dialogues and because Mora, with the exception
of the more soft spoken Belisario Acquaviva, is the only
soldier to contribute to the querelle and to speak out
in defence of his own side, we shall take his Cavaliere
to be a reply not only to Muzio, but to the genre as a
whole with its often extravagant claims in favour of
letters, and we will therefore leave it for more careful
consideration at the close of this section.
With the next dialogue on the subject we
return to a more civilized and more articulate environment:
to the court of Ferrara as described in the Discorsi of
Annibale Romei, which picture giornate of entertainment
between "dame e cavaglieri" of the court. The first edition,
published in Venice in 1585 and dedicated to Lucrezia
d'Este Duchess of Urbino, contains five giornate. The
second edition (Ferrara 1586) was re-organized into seven
giornate, which is also the pattern of the five subsequent
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editions (Verona 1586; Pavia 1591; Venice 159*+, l60*+ and
3 9
1619). On the last day of each edition, "si tratta
della precedenza dell'Arme e delle Lettere." The
Discorsi open with a description of the round of
entertainments with which the court of Ferrara busies
itself throughout the year: the masks jousts tournaments
feasts comedies and music-making during carnival, the
shooting and hunting in spring, the strolls swims and
games of summer at the Palace of Belriguardo, and the
autumn fishing from a palace by the sea. It was at this
time of year that the conversations reported in.the book
are said to have taken place. In the Discorsi more than
in any other work the querelle appears as a subject with
no other significance than to amuse redundant courtiers,
the focal point of whose existence is the dining-table.
The flower of the court, having heard mass, is travelling
up-river on the Bucintaur, lead by the Countess of Sala,
who is the "queen" of the day. Come lunch-time, the queen
orders the table to be set and the courtiers to be
seated, "dall'una banda i Togati e le Dame, e all 1incontro
i Cavaglieri e huomini di cappa" (p.19*0. After the meal,
which was accompanied by music, the table is cleared and
cards chess-boards and draughts set before the commensals.
But just as they are about to start playing, the queen
interrupts them and suggests another game:
.si come due sono le conditioni delli huomini che degni di
vero honore sono istimati, l'una delle quali di lettere
e l'altra d'arme fa professione, cosi molte volte disputar
si suole a qual di questi si debba dar la precedenza.
Considerando io dunque, che in questo nobilissimo concerto,
dall'una parte si trova il fior de' letterati di questo
nostro secolo, e dall'altra Cavaglieri nell'arte militare
eccellentissimi, prendendo questa bella occasione, intendo
che hoggi per trattenimento del viaggio si habbi
disputando a terminare, qual sia degno di maggior honore,
o il letterato o 11 armigero (pp.l9*+-5)-
Each side is made to elect a spokesman. Francesco Patritio
is chosen by the letterati and Giulio Cesare Brancaccio
by the cavaglieri . Having at first demurred, as the
genre now requires, "stando che per le arme si difendono
e s'amplicano i regni, e per le lettere si conservano e si
governano" (p.196), Francesco Patritio then launches into
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superlative praises of his calling. He is followed by
Brancaccio who defends his own profession with equal
fervour. Both quote what seem like an inordinate number
of authorities for such a leisured occasion, and the
arguments they adduce are the ones with which the reader
is all too familiar. The 1etterato is "di quella virtu
dotato, che rende 1'uomo simile alle cose divine" (p.198);
on the other hand "l1arte militare e veramente un cumulo
di tutte quelle perfettioni, le quali in grado eminente
rendono l'huomo Heroico" (p.202) At the end the queen
is to pass judgement on the matter, but before she is
allowed to do so, the courtiers still have to listen to a
giuris c on suit o , Signor Renato Cati, take up the case of
laws, which he felt were not sufficiently vindicated by
Patritio who, "piu tosto partiale, che vero campione di
tutti i letterati, sprezzando le ferocissime arme de '
Gi ur i s consult i , ha', solamente sfodrata la debolissima
spada del Filosofo contemplativo" (p.207). When finally
the queen does hand down her sentence, it is quite in
keeping with the insubstantial nature of the dialogue:
"havendo noi udite e ben considerate le ragioni dell'una
e l'altra parte,... diciamo che i guerrieri honorandi e
i dotti venerandi si debbon' estimare" (p.215).
In the same style as Romei's Pis cor si and
almost as popular were Stefano Guazzo's Dialoghi piacevoli,
dedicated from Casale Monferrato on April 1st 1585
to Lodovico Gonzaga Duke of Wevers and published six times
between 1586 and l6l0 (the second time in Piacenza, the
other five in Venice)There are twelve dialogues,
the sixth of which is "Del paragone dell'arme e delle
lettere", between Cesare Scarampo and Carlo Rotario.
It has a touch of humour about it which is totally lacking
in our other works and which is due to the author's
awareness that the subject, in its well-worn garb, has
become somewhat irrelevant. Says Carlo to Cesare:
"quando io vi havro detto, che le lettere mi siano piu
in gratia che 1'arme, che ne seguira? Et quando
all1incontro havro detto, che piu mi dilettano 1'arme che
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le lettere, che ne seguira anche?" (p.l6?)- "That I
should know which to esteem more, following your wise
example", is Cesare's reply, to which Carlo retorts:
"posto che voi e io ci accordiamo nello stimar piu le
lettere che 1'arme, non per questo 1'arme rimarranno
inferiori, perche contra di noi si leveranno molti,
ch'antiporranno 1'arme alle lettere. Voi sapete che
questa e antica e non mai decisa quistione" (p.l67).
They finally agree that there is no harm in discussing the
subject "per honesto trastullo", even if nothing is
achieved in doing so. And certainly at the end - the
reader is no more enlightened than he was at the
beginning. Carlo's last argument, to show that arms
and letters have need of one another, is to quote (in
Italian) the proem to the Institutes ("Imperatoriam
mai e st at em. . . " - see above p .2 7 ) . This prompts Cesare to
comment, in the closing words of the dialogue, that
"questo nostro discorso s1 ha a terminar in giuoco, poiche
la sentenza di Giustiniano si conforma a quella d'uno
spensierato, il quale dimandato quali offele fossero piu
dilicate, quelle di Milano o quelle di Cremona, rispose,
tanto 1'une quanto l'altre, e forse anche di piu"(p.l8U).
There is a small shot of the quer'elle in
Guazzo's other and more famous work, La civil conversatione.
It consists of only one argument, the fame and immortality
argument with Alexander envying Achilles as in the
Cortegiano; but it is mentioned without much enthusiasm
by the speakers, as though no more than a literary
requirement, and they cast it aside for more interesting
1+1
things no sooner have they picked it up.
The century's last contribution to the
querelle is Gabriele Zinano's II viandante, overo della
precedenza dell'armi et delle lettere, dedicated to the
Duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria II Della Rovere, and
1+ p
published in Reggio (?) in 1590 (?). It is a
conversation between two travellers riding to Rome, the
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narrator and a viandant e he comes across, who is
progressing clumsily because of a "difetto di sproni" and
who "ne gli habiti e nel volto si mostrava lui essere piu
tosto amico dello studio di filosofia, che di quello de
cavallieri" (p.8). They engage in conversation and when
the narrator happens to say that he dislikes poetry, the
subject switches to arms and letters. The viandant e's
logic turns out to be as limp as his horsemanship and
he goes to abstruse lengths in order to prove nothing at
all. "Le lettere dividero secondo la divisione de gli
enti, e 1'armi secondo la diversita de i gradi" (p.l8),
he says. This gives him on the one hand the metafisico
who "versa circa" divine matters, the fisic o who deals
with natural matters, and the legista and legislatore
whose domain is the law; and on the other hand he has
"gli Imperatori d'es.serciti" (thereafter referred to as
"duce sovrano"), "i capitani particolari"("duee") and
"i fanti e i cavalieri privati" ("soldato"). Ke then
performs various permutations so as to compare each
member of one group to every member of the other. The
comparison is done from the standpoint of each individual's
four causes (material, efficient, formal and final) and
the duee for instance is said to be superior to the fisico
or vice versa depending on the combination of their
various causes. The efficient cause of the duee for
example is prudence (the supreme virtue) and of the fisico
experience. From that point of view the due e is superior
to the fisico. But from the point of view of material
causes it is the other way around, for the material cause
of the fisico is "cose naturali", whereas of the duee it
is war. The narrator ventures at one point to ask how
this method can possibly be applied to the settlement of
disputes about precedence, but the viandante is not put
off in the slightest.: "se tra loro il fisico e il Duce o
altro disputasse di precedenza, e 1'un piu nobil luogo che
l'altro desiderasse, si potria sopra la lor precedenza
sententiare assolutamente ponderando 1'una causa e l'altra,
perche non sariano mai si eguali nelle cause, che alcuno
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non fosse superiore" (p. 37)- As with the suggestions
contained in Biondo's Borsus , Zinano's proposals would
require the setting up of a very learned commission in¬
deed to adj udicate infallibly in cases of disputed pre¬
cedence and without so much delay as to make the decision
out-of-date by the time it had been reached. But it was
not precedence which was Zinano's main concern, it would
seem. Encomium was. The viandante's arguments are conduc¬
ted in such a way as to culminate naturally in the prai¬
ses of princes of Italy and her overlords. Having senten¬
ced that a duee is superior to a legista in all four
causes and a legislator similarly superior to a duee,
he then remarks:
et se questo non vorremo cos£ assolutamente affirmare,
diremo che Mose, Cecrope, Foroneo e Mercurio Trimegisto,
legislatori de gli Hebrei, de gli Egittij e de Greci
fossero superiori all'hora a i Duci Hebrei, Egittij e
Greci. Pur ci sar& bisogno d'alcuna consideratione ,
perche Alessandro Farnese, se ben dipende da Filippo
d'Austria, potentissimo tra i potenti, non cedera a
quei legislatori, essendo egli nel suo essercitio e ne
i populi vinti legislatore. Ma ne questi legislatori,
ne Saturno, ne Apollo, ne Cerere ..., ne s'altro legis¬
latore e stato maggiore tra gli antichi, potra aggua-
gliarsi ne ad Alessandro, ne a Cesare, ne a Carlo Quinto,
perche questi Duci furono liberi principi e duci e sol-
dati e legislatori universali. ... e se [Carlo Quintoj
trovera alcun legislatore che lo superi, sara il grande
figliuolo Filippo (pp.U3-M»
Apart from these dialogues, the querelle
also saw the contribution of two philosophical treatises,
one in 1567 and the other nine years later. Both are
strongly Aristotelian in inspiration and both have the
tripartite division we already encountered in Ilicino
and Nifo: statement of the problem in part I (i.e. presen¬
tation of pro-arms and pro-letters arguments), discussion
of principles in part II, and resolution of the problem
in part III (i.e. answer to part I on the basis of part
II). The first treatise, although written and published
in Bologna, is the only work of this latter period to have
been composed by a southerner and for the intention of
southerners (all be they Spanish). The author is Girolamo
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Camerata "da Randazzo Siciliano, Dottor dell'Arti", and
the work entitled Trattato dell'honor vero et del vero
dishonore "con tre questioni qual meriti piu honore:
o la donna o l'huomo, o il soldato o il letterato, o
I4 3
11artista o il leggista." The main dedicatee is
Ruigomez de Silva, "Prencipe d'Eholi, Camerier Maggiore
e Consegliero dello Stato di Sua Maesta Catolica", and
the dedicatee of the section on the soldato and the
letterato is the Viceroy of Sicily, Don Garcia di
Toledo, "Generale del Mare di Sua Maesta Catolica". The
central thesis of Camerata's treatise is that one may
deduce nobility from utility or necessity, in which case
it is necessary to distinguish between times which have
need not of letters but of arms and times which need not
arms but letters, which means that on occasions arms
and on others letters will be "da preporre". Another way
of reasoning is to consider a letterato simply and
absolutely and compare him to a soldato taken simply
and absolutely; in this case the letterato will have to
have precedence over the soldato, because letters perfect
the mind whereas arms only perfect the body. A third
solution is to compare the perfect letterato who has
knowledge of all things to the perfect capo militare
who satisfies all the required conditions. Here again
the letterato will come out on top, for he is "felicissimo"
and "similissimo a Dio". Such perfection however is not
to be found here-below and therefore we must consider the
letterato as he exists in this world. He will be of two
sorts, either excellent in one field (in which case he is
made for academic life) or good ("mediocre") at many (in
which case he is cut out for life at court): "si potria
ben dire, che il Professore di molte facolta possa riuscire
meglio nelle corti, e che quello, il quale e eccellente in
una sola professione, possa riuscir meglio in uno
studio" (p.bOr°). The qualities required of a letterato
in this world are that he be quick-witted, have a good
memory, be sagacious, studious and bright, articulate and
personable. The perfect general, for his part, must fear
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God, "be loyal to his prince and well-versed in the art
of war, which means that he must have a knowledge of
history cosmography geometry arithmetic astronomy natural
philosophy and law, that he must be familiar with all
instruments of war, be eloquent, sharp and well-travelled.
In addition he must have virtu , authority and be
fortunato . A general in other words must have both
"cognitione dell 1armi" and "intelligenza de lettere" , and
there are undoubtedly more generals to be found who
approach the Idea of a perfect general than there are
letterati approximating the ideal letterato. In a
comparison of the two, preference will therefore go to
the soldier, because he has knowledge of both arms and
letters; but that does not mean that every soldier is
superior to every man-of-letters. The first place must
go to the general, the second to the "letterato eccellente",
the third to colonels, the fourth to "altri letterati
Dottori", the fifth to "altri capitani", the sixth to
"altri letterati" and the seventh to "altri soldati".
"Appare dunque come sia vero in parte che il letterato
eccede il soldato in honore, e vero anco in parte sia, che
il soldato eccede il letterato" (p.50v°). Camerata's
reasoning is of philosophical inspiration and the majority
of his arguments are of literary derivation (is his
compromise solution, for instance, not reminiscent of
Tartagni's?). Yet he is aware, as we have seen, of the
gap which exists between the ideal and the real, and of
the necessity therefore to argue from the standpoint of
the way things are instead of what they ought to be.
This makes him sound at times more practical and realistic
than the authors of the other works of the later
Cinquecento. But it is only a fleeting impression and
because so much of his discourse is in fact philosophical
(and therefore "academic" and elitist), the querelle in
his hands is kept firmly within the ambit of refined and
exclusive entertainment.
Academic in the true sense of the word is the
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other treatise. It was presented on th.ee successive
occasions (one for each part) to the Florentine Academy
in 1576, under the consulate of Agnolo Segni. Its author
is Lorenzo Giacomini Tebalducci and the title, Delia
nobilta delle lettere e delle armi ragionamenti. It was
not published until 1821 - and then not so much on
account of its contents as of the purity, according to
its editor, of the Tuscan tongue in which it was written -
but it seems to have enjoyed considerable popularity
nonetheless, for there are at least seven extant sixteenth
. hh
century manuscripts of it. The author gives a
utilitarian justification to his undertaking: "ne dovera
esser giudicata.inutile, ne di poco momento questa nostra
considerazione, poiche non e inutile, ne di poco momento
al ben ordinare la vita, il conoscere quali cose meritino
esser piu apprezzate, e quali meno, accioche le piu
apprezzabili piu apprezziamo e ad esse principalmente,
come a fine, indrizziamo le azioni nostre" (pp.2-3). But
the more he becomes involved in the intricacies of his
argument, the further does the subject seem to recede from
the contingencies of human existence - Giacomini is the
only author not to make any reference to contemporary
events - and the less susceptible does it become of any
practical application. He reduces the debate to the dimen¬
sion of the virtues (moral and intellectual) and
thereby to a comparison of the active and contemplative
lives, and he proceeds by means of a dissection, as it
were, of man's soul ("anima"), to show that of its three
potencies (the vegetative, the sensitive and the
intellective) the latter, especially insofar as it
speculates, is the noblest, and that therefore contem¬
plation is the truest and purest expression of man. Of
course there are all the usual distinctions and provisos:
noi non neghiamo, ne abbiamo negato , che gli uomini forti
non siano piu nobili di coloro , che hanno la dottrina
morale, perche nelle morali e migliore la azione della
cognizione, e conseguentemente che siano piu nobili
de'grammatici, dei sofisti, dei retori , de'logici, degli
storici, dei poeti, e de'filosofi ancora, se saranno
filosofi imperfetti, che abbiano disposizione piu tosto
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che abito di scienza. Pero bisogna prendere nell'uno e
nell'altro genere di virtu uomini eccellenti. Cosi
concluderemo, che quella spezie sia migliore, il piu
ec.cellente individuo della quale e migliore del piu
eccellente dell'altra (p.90),
This enables Giacomini to pay homage to his master, for
the most excellent individual, we are told, is none else
than Aristotle, "perfetto in ogni sorte di virtu" and
"veramente maestro di coloro che sanno" (p.90)- The
pecking order (the order of nobility} at which Giacomini
ultimately arrives, is the most complex we have yet
encountered. Contemplation is at the top and it.is of
three kinds. The first is termed sapienzia , for it
meditates upon God, the Intelligences, creation and its
causes. The second is natural science, which speculates
upon natural substances and God as their principle. The
third is mathematics, which concerns itself with numbers.
After contemplation comes action, and in the first place
"azioni civili", of a prince in particular, who guides the
commonwealth towards happiness. Then there are as many
degrees as there are virtues; in the second place come
the actions of a liberale , in the third those of a
forte and so on and so forth. After that comes moral
science ("dottrina morale") which is, as we have seen,
cognizione but not azione•. It deals with 'virtu
and happiness, politics (the knowledge required of
magistrates), law and economics ("cognizione economica").
At the bottom of the scale come the arts, such as logic,
rhetoric, poetry, music, history and, very last, the art
of war ("arte militare"). In that they are crafts, these
are less noble than moral science, but their application
("le operazioni, nelle quali consiste il loro uso") is
more or less noble depending on the virtue which informs
each one of them (pp.57-8). Arms thus occupy the sixth
noblestposition, insofar as they are identified with
fortitude; but as the art of war, they rank lowest. It
is not quite clear how they would fare as the art of war
practised by a man endowed with fortitude; and indeed
Giacomini1s treatise leaves much to be desired in terms of
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the practical guide he had promised it would be.
The final work on the subject is neither a
dialogue nor a philosophical treatise but a short essay,
a Discorso sopra la lite delle armi e delle lettere, et
a cui si dee il primo luogo di nobilita- attribuire. It
is by Francesco Bocchi and was published in Florence in
1580 and dedicated at the end of the previous year to
Niccolo Nasi. Bocchi, who lived the precarious existence
of a professional orator and letterato, and who is known
to have had to pander more to the fancies of his patrons
than to the tastes of his own free will, is the only man-
of-letters in the querelle, apart from Wifo^to grant
4 5
supremacy to arms. But like Nifo, he does so without
actually impairing the nobility of learning and in such
a way that the superiority of arms appears merely
theoretical in the context of his own day and age.
Letters he interprets very literally, and the art of war he
reduces to a purely mental exercise. "Tutte le arti - he
says - sono nell'intelletto collocate" and therefore "il
guerriero principale poco ha di bisogno di questo aiuto
fi . e. l'operare del corpo^J per fornire le sue imprese;
anzi col consiglio solo adempie il tutto felicemente"
(p.12). To prove this he gives the example of Antonio da
Leva, who suffered from such severe gout that he had to
be carried onto the battlefield in a chair, and yet, with
the sheer strength of his mind, managed to rout innumerable
enemies and win countless victories. Bocchi further
vindicates the supremacy of arms by means of an argument
which, when correctly read, turns out in fact to be
detrimental to their cause. It is often maintained, he says
that the best is the opposite of the worst, that that polity
for instance is best (monarchy) which has the worst (tyranny)
as its opposite. Therefore the present "pessima condizione
di guerra" (p.27) must be a sure indication of the art of
war's nobility. On the other hand it is also often argued
that philosophy is the noblest of arts, and that philosophy
and letters are one and the same thing. But with the latter
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part of this proposition Bocchi does not agree. The
philosopher only needs letters incidentally, for his
function is to contemplate "la natura delle cose, senzache
gli scritti altrui l'aiutino e lo sovengono" (p.8). Letters
for their part are no more than an exchange commodity (as
Marxist critics would say nowadays): "le quali lettere,
peroche sono parole equivocamente dette, non sono per se
ordinate altrimenti, ma in cambio rappresentano i fatti
del tempo passato e per l'avvenire conservano di quelli la
memoria" (p.24). In other words letters (and literature)
have no intrinsic quiddity, but live only as parasites
off reality, whereas arms are a very real fact of life,
the very stuff in fact that life is made of. Bocchi drives
home this point by reminding his readers of the sad plight
of Italy under foreign arms and of the threat posed to
Christendom by the warrior Turks (two truths which few of
the authors of this latter period felt they could pass
over in silence, not even in the most superficial of
dialogues, although they preferred when they could to
turn a blind eye to "quello che senza dolor ricordar non
si po" - Co rt eg i ano , I, xliii):,
et la nazione Turchesca in questo tempo, prezzando poco
gli altri, studij tutti, con gran cura esercita. le armi,
per le quali ella e montata in grandezza e in honore, e
ogni giorno piu per le nostre rovine felicemente si
avanza, ne si porra giamai fine alle miserie, se prima
non si incomincia con le armi a ristorare i danni, che
habbiamo sostenuto; pero che non le lettere, le quali non
hanno vigore alcuno in questo affare (da quelle tuttavia
infuori, per cui si viene in cognizione delle cose
divine...), ma le armi con virtu esercitate e con valore
possono, come cosa migliore e piu sovrana, procacciarci la
felicita in questa vita e renderci tutto quello honore
parimente, che questo luogo e questa horrevole nazione
per le prodezze degli antichi nostri ha posseduto, e
con la ragione e con le armi raffrancare le forze
indebolite e abbattere tutte quelle genti, le quali
con barbara fierezza solamente hanno cotante provincie,
cotante isole e cotante terre in breve spazio di tempo
conquistato (pp.31-2).
Bocchi may be an exception for giving such
emphasis to the "facts of life" and for putting out a call
to arms, as a man-of-letters, but when all is said and
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done, his Discorso does not differ all that much from the
other contributions to the querelle made during the later
sixteenth century: it too is a harmless literary
entertainment, a play with words and definitions.
Arms and Letters are the words under which
all but one of the works of this latter period appear;
they have become the established title of the genre.
Inside the works however one encounters a whole variety
of expressions to designate one or the other calling and
its followers. Soldato and letterato , which figure in
the title of Camerata's work, are by far the most
frequent and their all-embracing vagueness (together with
the all-embracing vagueness of arms and letters) is an
indication of how the querelle has come, on the whole,
to deal with two general vocations instead of two
particular "classes", as was the case with its Knight and
Doctor precursor. But we still find, especially on the
side of letters, many terms which designate specific
professions. Members of the legal profession (legista,
avvocato, giurisconsulto) and legislators have been
joined by grammatici, sofisti, retori, logici , storici ,
poeti , medici, fisici, metafisici, filosofi and even
scrittori. On the side of arms, the professori della
militia are frequently referred to by their rank
(captain, colonel, general, duee, capo militare) but
often too they are described, unlike the dubbed merchants
or nouveaux riches of the Knight and Doctor querelle, as
being actively engaged in the mestier dell'armi: armigeri,
guerrieri, martiali, huomini armati, bellicosi , who fight
in guerre or in battaglie. Despite its practical nature,
their profession, it is always stressed, is to all effects
a learned one: arte di guerra, arte militare, disciplina
delle armi, scienza de soldati. Sometimes too they are
identified by the qualities they possess, in particular
their valore and the virtue of fortezza. They are thus
forti , whereas their opponents are dotti or savi because
they have dottrina, s cientie and sapere. The contending
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parties can also be singled out by the tools of their
trade (carte , scritti , 1ibri , penna or spada) or by
their "uniform" (togati and huomini di robba lunga against
huomini di cappa). But after soldato and letterato, the
words which recur most often and in every work without
fail are cavaliere and dottore; and this is because the
querelle of Knights and Doctors , despite the enlarged
scope of the genre, is still at the heart of the matter.
and his Cavaliere can be considered simply as updated
and slightly modified versions of the Knight and Doctor
querelle. His enemies all go by the name of dottori ,
and although this can at times mean men of learning in a
more general sense (and especially heretics and religious
reformers), the butt of his invective is in most cases
what he calls "dottori leggisti". His cavaliere too
is often termed soldato, but that is because every soldier
is a knight. What makes him so is not any insignia he
might happen to be wearing or the fact that he may have
been dubbed (Mora makes no allusion at all to such
the magnificence of the profession of arms, which sets
the soldier apart from the crowd and releases him from
obedience to all laws save those of honour. And it is
precedenee7as we saw (above p.232), which is Mora's main
concern, to ensure that the men on whose shoulders the
world rests get their proper due at all times: "favore
e sodisfacimento grandissimo mi farebbe, se qualche
spirito gentile mi facesse vedere in iscritto, che i
dottori per vere ragioni havessero da precedere i
soldati, laqual cosa io la niego e neghero sempre, e
mi offerisco prontissimo, quantunque questa non sia molto
mia professione, a rispondergli in iscritto." This is
the promise which he makes through the mouth of Atilio
in the Tre quesiti (p.27r°) and which he delivers in the
Cavaliere in response to Muzio's challenge.
In the case of Mora, both his Tre quesiti
but it is the very nature of his calling,
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The Gentilhuomo had been mostly about the in¬
trinsic nobility of arms and letters, but in certain
sections Muzio was clearly arguing from the perspective
of the Knight and Doctor querelle and dealing with
questions of ceremonial precedence. Eugenio remarks that
in Italy cavalieri usually precede dottori, which Nobile
says is an abuso but explains as being due to the fact
that knights are created by princes whereas doctors are
made by Colleges, which receive their authority from
princes. He goes on to praise the ordini of Bologna,
according to which doctors must have precedence over
knights on all occasions, both public and private, save
a few important feasts such as San Petronio , San Martino
and four or five others (p.2h2). The doctors in the
Gentilhuomo however are not just doctors of law. At the
beginning of Book II Nobile states explicitly that
that title is granted to anyone who has completed his
studies, be it of law, medicine or any other "science".
This explanation is contradicted somewhat in Book XII,
where only those who teach their subject publicly are
said to enjoy the title. But whatever may have been the
case, it is clear that Muzio has borrowed both arguments
and terminology from the Knight and Doctor querelle,
whilst widening its scope in order to include all men of
learning.
There are some texts in which the Knight and
Doctor querelle is distinguished from the querelle of Arms
and Letters. In Homei's Discorsi for instance, as we have
seen, it is first a letterato who defends his profession
against cavaglieri and then a giurisconsulto who does so.
Zinano's viandante, having compared metafisici to duci,
duei to fisici and so on, in the last resort turns to a
comparison of soldati and professori di legge, insisting
that this is a different matter from what had come before:
"alcuni, lasciando confusi i soldati e i professori di
leggi, hanno fatto volumi con inscrittione della precedenza
dell'armi e delle lettere, quasi che non siano altre lettere
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che le leggi, quasi che, ove il gran Duce precede, ogni
privato fante o cuciero o Capitano preceder debba, e quasi
che, ove alcun professore di leggi preceda, che preceder
debba ogni dottoruccio" (p.^l). This accusation of his is
clear evidence however of how the two querelles had on the
whole been blended and become undifferentiated. Indeed in
most texts, dottore and letterato , cavaliere and soldato
are used indiscriminately. The words within each pair
are often taken to be synonymous. There are times, never¬
theless when the arguments and expressions are unmis¬
takably those of the Knight and Doctor tradition.
Almost every text mentions the issue of
ceremonial precedence. Giulio Cesare Brancaccio for
instance, the spokesman for the knights in Romei's Dis c orsi,
says (illustrating at the same time the indiscriminate
linguistic usage now typical of the querelle) that "nelle
cerimonie dove si tien conto della precedenza, vediamo che
piu presso la persona del re o dell'Imperatore vanno i
gran Capitani e gli huomini di guerra, che non fanno i
Secretarij, i gran Canzellieri e i Consiglieri, ancora che
siano gran Dottori e gran letteratij segno manifesto che
dalli istessi Re e dallo Imperatore sono estimate molto
piu le arme delle lettere e gli armigeri de i Dottori"
(p.215). The privileged position enjoyed by knights at
the court of princes is confirmed by Carlo Rotario in
Guazzo's Dialoghi piacevoli, who adds that even republics
such as Venice Genoa and Lucca give preference to arms,
"onde siamo assai bene certificati che, per l'uso commune,
non solamente d'ltalia, ma di tutte le nationi, l'arme
prevagliano alle lettere" (p.l82). The one exception is
Rome, where the pope puts the toga before the spada
and grants precedence to Cardinals and Legates over all
"gradi cavaliereschi", "non solamente perche lo stato
ecclesiastico e piu degno del secolare, ma perche le
lettere sono di lui proprie" (p.182). Carlo Rotario
further illustrates his point with some specific examples.
In every city of Italy there is, he says, a "capo soprano"
with the title of Governor, Captain General, Viceroy or
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Viceduke, who is a knight and who has precedence over all
"magistrati togati", such as the Podesta, the Captain of
Justice, the President, the Grand Chancellor and Senators.
He also mentions the case of an embassy sent by the Duke
of Mantua to present condole^nces to the King of France,
Francis II, on the death of his father Henry. The two
ambassadors were the Conte di Gambara and Senator Fao and
the first to step forward in the presence of the King was
the Count, because he was a cavagliere.
The question of precedence did not 'merely
concern doctors in their relationships with knights; it
also affected each group individually. Mora, in the
Cavaliere, warns that the nature of each knight's knight¬
hood must be taken into consideration, "essendo che li
Cavalieri fatti dalli maggiori Prencipi doveranno
precedere quelli fatti dalli menori" (p.159)- According
to Nobile in the Gentilhuomo the same holds true for
doctors:
dicono i Dottori , che il Papa e lo Imperadore con la sola
parola danno il dottorato e che, se altri con debita
pruova e con diligente esaminatione tal dignita da alcuno
di loro conseguisce, ha da precedere a gli altri Dottori,
quantunque avanti di lui siano stati dottorati. II che si
ha da intendere anche di tutti i gradi, che da maggiori e
da minori Prencipi sono conferiti: che quale e dal
maggiore honorato, a gli altri debbia precedere. Et i
dottori creati da' Papi e da gli Imperadori, hanno da essere
a gli altri anteposti per la maggior dignita di chi gli ha
dottorati (p.9^)«
These various degrees in both professions give rise to a
complex hierarchical order of titles and dignities.
Camerata says that a 1ett erato who is not adottorato
(and we have already come across these specifications in
Andreini - see above p.219) gets no title at all, that a
doctor is called Ec cellent e , and if he has taught for
many years, he will be addressed as Illustre , which is
the top of the scale for men-of-letters. A "professore
della militia" on the other hand automatically gets the
name of Strenuo ; a colonel is immediately called
Illustre , a general Illustrissimo and a commander-in-
chief Eccellentissimo . From which it is deduced that
251
the profession of arms is more noble than the profession
of letters, for that profession is better which awards
superior titles to those who practise it, the name being
an indication of the nature and dignity of a thing
(pp.31r°-v°).
In relating matters of ceremonial precedence,
our authors seek confirmation of their views in contem¬
porary circumstances, but in the first instance it is from
legal precedent that they argue their case, and if their
knowledge of this is rather patchy, they are at least
familiar with the most obvious passages of the Corpus
juris and the most pertinent glosses and commentaries.
Camerata, in part I of his treatise (the section, that is,
which presents the views of his predecessors), argues that
in all the "laws of the emperors" (i.e. Roman law) arms
are mentioned before laws and are therefore more
privileged and superior. He proves his point by referring,
amongst others, to the proem of the Institutes (see
above p.27) and to the introduction to the Code (ibid.) .
He also quotes Baldus and Bartolus on the subject of the
h6
soldier's immunity from normal testamentary procedures;
and the compromise solution with which he concludes the
central section of his treatise (see above p.242) bears
a marked resemblance to Tartagni's compromise solution.
There is a watered-down and somewhat modified version of
Tartagni's compromise solution in Muzio's Gentilhuomo,
where Nobile explains that "trattandosi materie di arme"
knights ought to have precedence, whereas a doctor should
precede in "cose civili" and also "nelle indifferenti"
(p.2^2). Muzio would seem to have the legal tradition of
the querelle in mind too when he maintains (through the
mouth of Nobile) that knights who have simply been dubbed
but "mai non si vestirono arme, ne mai sfodrarono spada,
ne sono atti ad alcuna operatione di valoroso cuore" (p.9^)
should not enjoy knightly privileges (which, in this
instance, he confines to matters of precedence).
Unlike the jurists though, he applies the same rule to
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persons who have been granted an honorary doctorate but
whose ignorance precludes them from being considered
true doctors. Mora actually agrees with him on this
point. The dottorato , he says, has been "concesso a
molti bufali" (Cav. p.11^). This however he interprets as
an indication that no doctorate is of any value and
therefore that no doctors are entitled to any privileges.
Mora also gives his own twist to the question of the
soldier's legal immunities. According to the legal
tradition, these immunities applied mainly to matters of
inheritance. Mora's view is that soldiers need' submit
to no laws at all, except the edicts of their prince or
general and the laws of honour, "regolandosi li
Cavalieri con le loro leggi d'honore, con le sue pene del
biasimo, del vituperio e del infamia" (Cav. -p.kh).
From the legal tradition of the querelle,
the quotation most often cited is the phrase "imperatoriam
maiestatem non solum armis decoratam, verum etiam legibus
oportet esse armatam." We find it in Muzio Mora Romei and
Guazzo; and Camerata, as we have seen, refers to it too.
A catch-phrase which enjoyed even greater popularity
however was Cicero's "cedant arma togae" , which appears
in seven of the eleven texts of the second half of the
Cinquecento. Its popularity (which probably also extended
beyond the confines of the genre in its- written form) is
attested by the words of Atilio in Mora's Tre quesiti,
who says of those who defend the pre-eminence of doctors:
"essi altra ragione non sanno addurre in favor loro, che
questo verso, cedant arma togae, concedat laurea linguae,
onde pare, che il dicitore di tal verso fosse Evangelista
e che il credergli sia articolo di fede" (p.26r°). There
is further proof of the great popularity of this stray
verse of Cicero's in Giacomini's Ragionamenti. In his
introduction Giacomini had said that the querelle was a
"disputa ... molto divulgata per le bocche di tutti" (p.2),
and the very first opinion* he then addresses in the
treatise proper is Cicero's, which he prefaces with the
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words: "eedan l'arme alia toga".
It will be remembered that it was Ilicino
who first put this verse into circulation, and it may-
well be that it was via Ilicino that it reached the later
authors of the querelle. There is no doubt that many were
acquainted with his interpretation of Petrarch's Triumph
of Fame and that some at least had read his text at
first hand. Giacomini again, who, as has just been
pointed out, was aware in his Ragionamenti of rehearsing
a well-worn theme, concludes the first part of his
treatise with a recollection of Petrarch:
e finalmente il nostro Toscano Poeta nel 'Trionfo della
Fama' prepone l'arme, facendo prima menzione degli
armigeri e collocandoli da lato destro, ove dice:
a man destra, ove prima gli occhi porsi
la bella donna avea Cesare, e Scipio,
ma qual piu presso a gran pena m'accorsi.
E nella terza poi:
i' non sapea di tal vista levarme
Ne e da credere, che cio facesse a caso, ma
consideratamente e con giudicio, siccome suole in tutte
le cose (pp.25-6).
Petrarch's opinion is also part of the new evidence which
della Barba added to his Dialogo in the Florence
manuscript. But it was Muzio, one hundred years after
Ilicino's commentary first appeared, who relied on him
most heavily. He not only mentions the existence of the
Commentary, but he actually quotes from it verbatim.
Ilicino does not get the credit for it however, because
Muzio believed the commentary to have been the work of
Filelfo: "dicano quel che si vogliano gli altri poeti in
particolare de' letterati, che il Petrarcha in generale
prepone pur i cavalieri, quelli ponendo da man destra alia
fama e i letterati dalla manca. Sopra la qual sentenza
Francesco Filelfo fa un gran discorso, le arme alle
lettere anteponendo" (p.232). IlicinP's commentary had
always been accompanied, except in the first edition^by
Filelfo's commentary to the Canzoniere. The Canzoniere
usually preceded the Trionfi , and in several editions
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there is no separate title-page for the Trionfi , which
means that Ilicino's name only appears in small print
at the top of the dedication to Borso d'Este. It must
. . . . Ut
have been one of these editions which Muzio had read.
But that it was really Ilicino's commentary he had in
mind, there can be no doubt, as we may ascertain from the
following passage, which is a literal transcription of
the first axiom in the central section of Ilicino's
querelle (see Appendix 1, v, 9-13):
passando a quello, che hai detto del Filelfo, per non
havere egli saputo distinguer la fama dalla virtu e dalla
nobilta, e caduto in quell'altro errore di voler preporre
le arme alle lettere, e havendo proposti quattro verissimi
argomenti per le lettere, e di quelli provatene tutte le
parti, ne fa poi un tale in favor delle arme. II ben
publico e universale e molto piu degno di honore e di
laude che il ben privato e particolare. La arte militare
e per ben publico e universale, e le scienze e gli studij
sono per bene particolare; adunque la disciplina militare
e piu degna di laude, che qualunque altra faculta o
scienza privata. Cosx dice quel valent'huomo (p.235).
As one might have expected, Ilicino's words then found
their way, via the Gentilhuomo, into Mora's Cavaliere,
where they are quoted with approval:
vi aspetto dunque - says Mora to Muzio - per udire quello
che volete rispondere al particulare del oppinione de
Filelfo recusata da voi, la quale conclude, che il ben
publico e universale e molto piu degno di honore e di
laude che il ben privato e particulare, e che essendo
l'arte militare per ben publico e universale e le scientie
e li studij per ben particulare, che percio la disciplina
militare e piu degna di laude, che qualunque altra
scientia privata (p.238).
Ilicino, we have seen, had also influenced
Nifo, who in turn had inspired Brucioli. Brucioli for
his part does not seem to have impressed anyone, unless
it be his former friend and patron Luigi Alamanni who,
a few years after the publication of the last edition of
Brucioli's Dialogi and from his refuge at the court of
France, wrote an epigram on the subject of arms and
letters, which some time later was to find its way into
Guazzo's Dialoghi piacevoli:
molti furo a quistion, chi avanti vada,
o piuma ornata, o valorosa spada;
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se questa mette in opra e quella insegna,
l'una e l'altra di par chiamerei degna (p.183).
But if Brucioli's dialogue of Arms and Letters fell into
oblivion almost as soon as it had been written, the same
did not happen to the text which had fostered it, and
thirty years after it had first been published Wifo's
Comentariolus was still being plagiarized (such was its
fate!). Amongst the new material added to the second
version of his work, della Barba included a literal
translation of Nifo's definition of arms. In 1525 Nifo
had written:
per Arma itaque non intelligere volumus instrumenta,
quibus res militaris agitur, ut gladius, machina, equus,
thorax, galea etid genus, sed ea omnia, quibus fortes
viri ac magnanimi honesti causa pugnando parati sunt sese
exponere periculis mortis ... Hoc pacto Arma intelligendo,
ab his milites dici possunt. Quo fit, ut inter
disciplinam militarem et Arma. non parva differentia sit,
nam militaris disciplina docet, Arma vero in usum veniunt.
Disciplina militaris praecepta tradit, Arma in militando
praecepta servant. Disciplina militaris inter Literas,
disciplinas ac scientias enumerantur. Docet enim quid
rectum sit in militari ipsa actione. Arma vero sunt
vires, potentiaque, quibus milites militando ad victoriam
obtinendam in re militari honesti causa utuntur. Qua
ratione fit, ut a disciplina militari miles dicatur
nemo (pp.XIVv° - XVr°).
In 1565 or thereabouts Giulio Colonna is made to say:
io credero che per armi si debba intendere non gli
stormenti de la milizia, come sono lancie, spade, picche
e corsaletti, ma l'huomo valoroso, che giudiziosamente
combatte; cioe che per armi s'intenda il valore a la
potenza de soldati, e non la disciplina che ne da
precetti, perche allhora saria arte o scienza, ma la virtu
de l'animo e '1 valore con il quale gl'huomini prudenti
per honore e gloria non dubitano esporsi a la morte; e
per darli una intera e breve diffinizione, direi l'Armi
non esser' altro che l'huomo valoroso, che combatte
prudentemente (pp.55r -v ).
There are four or five such borrowings from the
Comentariolus in the second version of della Barba's
dialogue, including as well Nifo's definition of letters.
Since there are no traces of Nifo's influence in the
printed edition of 1558, we must assume, as was suggested
earlier on, that the Comentariolus was brought to della
Barba's attention during his Roman residence. This would
mean that it was still in circulation a good fo^rty years
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after it had been published.
One work whose star at that time was
certainly far from faded was Castiglione's Cortegiano.
The hypothesis was put forward in the first section of
this chapter that the Cortegiano was possibly instrumental
in creating the vogue for a querelle of Arms and Letters
in the vernacular. If this was indeed the case, one
could perhaps have expected to find the Cortegiano quoted
more often in the context of the genre than.i in fact it
was. But there is not much of course which is quotable
from the very brief version of the querelle as it appears
in Castiglione. It is most memorable for adducing
Petrarch's sonnet "0. fortunato che si chiara tromba /
trovasti e chi di te si alto scrisse" to prove Alexander's
envy of Achilles. Both della Barba and Guazzo; in the
Civil conversatione,quote this episode, but as they do
not mention the Cortegiano by name, one cannot be
absolutely sure that it was Castiglione they were copying.
There is in fact only one author who makes an explicit
reference to the Cortegiano. He is Lorenzo Giacomini,
who in his Ragionamenti wrote: "ne si dee in modo alcuno
dire, che la propria e principale operazione del Principe
sia guerreggiare fortemente, ma sibbene prudentemente
governare, come rettamente giudico il Castiglione nel suo
libro inscritto Cortegiano , autore non indegno d'essere
qui nominato, sebbene non rettamente giudica quando
attribuisce al Cortegiano per principale professione
l'esercizio dell ' arrne''( p . 66 ) . To be sure, this is slight
evidence with which to prove a point, but it must be
remembered that in his introduction Giacomini had
disclaimed any originality on his own behalf, saying that
he was merely following, albeit more methodically, in the
well-trodden footsteps of others. One may presumably take
it therefore that whatever he quoted was part of the
stock-in-trade of the genre (if only in its oral
manifestations), and it is thus not unlikely that the
Cortegiano , by the mere fact of its existence and
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popularity, played a part in keeping the querelle alive.
There is no doubt however that in measurable terms it
was Ilicino who, of all the modern authors, left the
greatest mark on the genre.
Enduring though the popularity of Ilicino's
commentary may have proved, there was someone whose
influence was still more pervasive than his, and that was
Aristotle. In della Barba's dialogue, Aristotle's
opinion is the main point of reference throughout.
Vizzani's Boccadiferro speaks of "questi nostri
Peripatetici" (p.lOr°). It is chiefly on the basis of
what Aristotle said that nobility is discussed and defined
in the Gentilhuomo. Mora takes it for granted that any
letterato belongs to the "scola d'Aristotele" (Cav.,0.56)
For Francesco Patritio in Romei's Discorsi, Aristotle is,
not exceptionally, il Filosofo . Zinano's viandant e
tells his interlocutor that, in order to grasp the
question of arms and letters, "bisogna che entri meco
nelle scuole de Peripatetici" (p.29). But it is above
all in the two works which are emphatically philosophical
treatises, Camerata's and Giacomini's, that the
ubiquitousness of Aristotle is most evident. Camerata
justifies his methodology - the three-fold division of
his questione - on the basis of the procedure taught by
Aristotle, "seguendo il modo dimostratoci da Aristotele"
(p.28r°). He uses the syllogism as his maieutic tool and
at one point he makes a distinction getween "parlare
fedelmente" and "ragionare naturalmente". The former,
which is of Christian inspiration, he dismisses as less
reliable than the natural reasoning of Aristotelian
derivation. To Giacomini, who also uses the syllogism
and divides his treatise into three parts, Aristotle is,
as we have seen, the most perfect human being ("perfetto
in ogni sorte di virtu") and "veramente maestro di coloro
che sanno", who has taught mankind all there is to know
and thereby earned for himself redemption and everlasting
salvation:
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egli n'ha dimostrato la virtu e scoperto la via della
felicita, ed ha insegnato che Iddio si dee amare con
quella amicizia, che e verso Csic.l un bene eccellente.
Cos! e da credere, che egli lo amasse ed onorasse, e
sebbene non ebbe osservanza della legge, non per questo
venne escluso dalla amicizia di Dio , perche ad un popolo
in particolare era data la legge, ne obbligava
all'osservanza se non quelli, che la avevano ricevuta
(p.91').
Certainly most of what our authors say, they would appear
to have learnt, either directly or indirectly, from
Aristotle, for the notions upon which they call to
establish an order of precedence are mostly borrowed
from a world-view of Aristotelian dimensions (such as
was sketched out in the chapter on Ilicino - see above
P.93) , in which the basic elements of discrimination
are the two levels of man's existence, typified by the
moral and intellectual virtues, action and contemplation^
and utility and uselessness, one thing being nobler than
another - depending on the view-point one accepts -
either for benefitting more people (i.e. for being
more useful) or for being intrinsically more perfect,
that is for coming closer to the simplicity and oneness
of God (i.e. for being, metaphysically speaking, useless).
To be sure, in"many of the more superficial dialogues,
these ideas are not consciously spelt out, but they are
unmistakably a part of the cultural vocabulary which the
authors take for granted.
It is of course nothing exceptional for
literature of the Renaissance to be derivative and
imitative, but the point needed to be stressed in this
case, in order to show that the querelle of Arms and
Letters, especially in its later phase, was born more
of literary precedent than of contingent circumstances.
There is very little to distinguish one work from the
other, except for its mode of presentation. From
Brucioli to Andreini the same arguments turn up time and
again and hardly any author ventures to innovate. The
genre is on the whole inward instead of outward-looking.
Naturally there are moments when contemporary events are
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touched upon, but the speakers usually shy away from
them, because reality is unpleasant. It is either, as we
have seen, the sad plight of Italy under foreign rule or
the Turkish threat to Christendom. At times it can also
be the unpalatable truth that, despite what it would be
nice to believe, arms in actual fact have precedence over
letters. Zinano1s viandante for instance assesses his
times in the following way: "a i tempi nostri, non diro
in Francia o in Hispagna, ove le lettere non sono in sommo
pregio, e non diro e in Germania e in Moscovia e in
Tartaria e in Persia, e non diro sotto 11Imperio Ottomano,
ma in Italia diro , dove le lettere piu che in altro loco
sono estimate, sono i Duci sempre a i letterati preposti"
(p.21). But this he considers irrelevant, "trattandosi
qua, non di chi precede, ma di chi merita precedere", and
so he retreats into the fantasy world of words. That is
the level at which the querelle unfolds. It is, as we
have stressed repeatedly, a social and literary enter¬
tainment, played according to established rules and the
purpose of which is not necessarily to resolve anything
but simply to be played. Nothing is achieved by
concluding that "i guerrieri honorandi e i Dotti
venerandi si debbon' estimare", but nothing more could
have been achieved, because the premises from which the
game moved precluded the possibility of any other
solution being reached. It is accepted by all that both
arms and letters are noble and the question therefore is
"a cui si dee il primo luogo di nobilita attribuire", as
the title of Bocchi's Dlscorso puts it; it is to find out
who, as we might say today, is "more equal", not who is
good and who is bad, who is better and who is worse, but
who is better and who is best. In the later Cinquecento
we no longer sense the animosity which opposed two social
groups, or two cultures even, in most of the texts of the
early phase of the querelle; and this is perhaps the most
significant feature of this later period. Soldati and
letterati are portrayed as friends not enemies: they talk
together, play together and eat together. Arms and
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letters are allies not rivals, and it is socially
acceptable to say so. On this point all (but one) of
our authors concur, and it also becomes a leitmotiv of
the genre to state that no soldier, especially no
commander, and in particular no prince can adequately
carry out his duties if, to a mastery of arms he does not
also add a knowledge of letters. More interesting still,
it has become the accepted convention to give praises
to one's dedicatee which stress his competence precisely
in one and the other field. Zinano for instance says to
the Duke of Urbino: "V.A. Serenissima, che saggia
nell'una e nell'altra facolta risplende di gemina laude,
quasi di gemina luce, sarebbe degno giudice dell'ancor
non decisa, ma per molti anni disputata precedenza delle
lettere e dell'armi" (p.5)• Having said so much, how
could one possibly proceed to disparage either profession
without offending the recipient of one's work? Not to
give offence to anyone is the rule of the game; and the
name is politeness, civil conversatione.
Amidst such civility and harmony, there is
one rudely dissenting voice. It is that of Domenico Mora.
Mora himself pays lip-service to the notion that a
cavaliere must have some letters and some knowledge of
what is necessary to his profession ("sapere quello che
le si appartiene" - Car., p.19). The c aval i er e ' s true
calling however is on the battlefield and letters should
be to him like the expendable "frutti pretiosi e
inzucherate vivande dopo il pasto" (p.20). Mora, like
our other authors, also chooses a dedicatee for his
Cavaliere who has had experience of both arms and letters.
As a young man, on Mora's own account, Giovanni Zamoyski
Azamosche served under the marquess of Marignano. He
later went as a student to Padua University, where he was
elected Rector and became a Doctor. He then returned to
the call of arms and in due course was appointed Captain
General and Grand Chancellor of the Kingdom of Poland.
But what Mora expects of this man's experience is a
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confirmation of his own view that arms have no equal:
"o tanta fede nella giustitia perfetta, che ho sempre
conosciuta in lei, che non manchera di spogliarsi
del'amore, che po havere piu ad una professione che
al'altra, o vero a tutte due, e che ne dira sinceramente
il parer suo, poi che il mondo tutto e sicuro, che la
professione del'armi e delle lettere non e equale."
Mora is asking him, in other words, to prejudge the
issue. But there is hardly an issue to judge in fact,
since the superiority of arms is so evident. It is as
clear to Mora as the light of day, because "ho provato
che 1'armi realmente sono piu nobilli delle lettere."
As was pointed out earlier on, Mora's reasoning is
entirely experiential, and if the works we have studied
so far can in any. way be considered as typical of the
Renaissance, with their faith in authority and their
belief in man's rationality, then Mora must undoubtedly
be seen to represent what Hiram Haydn has termed the
Counter-Renaissance, which rejected the teachings of
past masters and whose "historical, political and ethical
writers ... gave new and almost exclusive value to the
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evidence of 'fact' and pragmatic experience. It is
as the mouthpiece of that other culture that the Cavaliere
sets out to counterattack Muzio's Gentilhuomo and every¬
thing for which it stood. Mora is in no doubt that there
are two cultures, the one presided over by Aristotle, the
other typified by Orlando: "se voi non sete della scola
d'Aristotele - he tells Muzio - che sete leterato, che
rneno posso essere io , che varco le compagne a suono di
tamburo, con leggere d'Orlando alcuna volta le novelle per
passa tempo, senza pigliare la protetione da scrittori
sicome fatte voi ancho, ma solamente dir il parer mio a
campo aperto , come faccio hora, senza adulatione e con
un stile soldatesco, voto d'ogni politezza e legiadria"
(pp.56-7).
Mora is unhesitating in his condemnation of
the other culture; but his accusation of it is ambivalent.
He rejects the world of literature as sheer fantasy, yet
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be is uncomfortably aware of the power of the word -
and his decision to wield the pen is proof of that.
Literary authority, we have seen, he holds of' no account
at all. Plato he accuses of "una balorderia ambitiosa"
for claiming that philosophers should be kings, and of
Cicero he says that his death was the just desert of his
babbles: "sono tutte chiachiare de Cicerone, per non dire
chiachiarone, che non havea che fare, salvo che con le
parole a por fuogo di continuo nel Senato Romano, con la
perversa lingua sua, che nel fine si porto il premio
conveniente, che fu come un ribello mazacrato" ( pp., 223-'-0 •
Alongside with authority Mora discards reason, it being
"proverbio commune, che la forza supera la ragione" (p.253).
In other words he entirely rejects the idea, most clearly
enunciated by Lapo da Castiglionchio, that it is
knowledge which gives man his power to act, and that
understanding is man's way of controlling his environment.
Reasoning according to Mora simply creates a reality of
its own, which has no bearing whatsoever upon the reality
of events: "quello che con ragione si discorre nelle
camere e cossi' possibile al potterlo esequire
perfettamente e senza molte difficult!, nelle campagne, come
e possibile a me, di propria potencia, a farmi Imperatore
de Turchi" (pp.257-8). This is Mora's reply to the
argument of the querelle that the "counsellor" is superior
to the "executor", the letterato who advises on warfare
nobler than the soldier who actually fights the war.
Absurd though this argument may seem to Mora, he does not
find it nearly as absurd however as the contention that a
man-of-letters owes his eminence to the use of his
intellect, where men-of-arms only use their body. We all
use our intellects in what we do, is Mora's counter¬
claim, even the manigoldo , and there is no one, as far
as Mora knows, who operates with his nose.' Mora has no
patience at all for what he sees as the sterile casuistry
of his opponents. The distinction for instance between
liberal and other arts is sheer nonsense: "ne so io di
liberali e non liberali, tutte diffinitioni fatte dalli
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ambitiosi per pompegiar sopra gl'altri e havere la
magioranza" (pp.l5-l6). More nonsensical still is Muzio's
definition of nobility. To rebut it, Mora puts forward
a theory which few modern Marxists would care to fault.
All human beings, says Mora, are artigiani , including
letterati , and it is only the "dominatori delle
ricchezze" who possess true nobility, for only they can
afford the privilege of not having to work, whilst being
able to make anyone else work for them. And if true
nobility equals riches, perfect nobility is riches
combined with birth and ancestry. They who argue that
nobility is generated by virtue and learning "devono
esser' nati assai vilmente, e che per volere nobilitare
la sua basezza, vogliono fare il nero comparire per
bianco, volendosi con frotole e chiachiare farsi equali a
quelli che sono di sangue nobile" (p.27).
Yet, for all his disparagement of letterati ,
Mora knows only too well that their power is great. That
is why of course he is so obstreperous in his
accusations. Their power though is a power for evil,
which of course is all the more a reason for detesting
and resenting them, lawyers, heretics, infidels and the
lot. It is they who are responsible for all the ills of
the world, and what greater proof could there be of their
iniquity than the Reformation: "hor vedete, S. Mutio,
che conditione e questa, nata da alcuni di quei vestri
leterati, che tanto magnificate" (p.6j). Personal
experience it is, which has taught Mora to hate men-of-
letters: "veggo li sette ottavi del mondo vivere senza
letere con augumento di continuo e non senza l'altre
professioni, e vedendo dove leterati praticano esser
sempre in lite tutto" (pp.16-17). He is not writing as
a dispassionate observer however, but as an injured party.
He is fo/rty-nine years of age, "e li vostri leterati
30 anni mi hanno fatto littigare il mio" (p.151). He
talks of "le molte perdite che ho fatt'io alle guerre e
li danni che ho patiti da ladri servitori e da ingiusti
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ministri de Prencipi" (p.129), and he mentions the
injustices perpetrated against soldiers, some of whom are
paid in debased currency and others who receive reduced
wages by being made to serve "months" of thirty-six or
fo/rty-five days. He himself was obliged to seek his
fortune as far afield as Muscovy, "e sempre vo di male
in peggio consumando" (p.15). And as if to add insult
to injury, his chastened honour is now piqued by Muzio's
Gentilhuomo, who stands for all he despises in the
native land he was made to relinquish and which has
fallen prey to the machinations of letterati: "chi lo
vuole provare, non s'ingolfi solamente nelle astutie
delli studij della piciola Italia, ma vada atorno, ove
le letere non comandano, che trovera il secol d'oro;
s£ che tolte via le scienze leterali, il tutto
quietarebbe, e vivendo gl'huomini con le bone operationi
natural! e con la santa fede, si salvariano" (p.IT).
To ridicule his adversaries, Mora concludes
the Cavaliere with a series of mock-syllogisms. Whilst
parodying the form however, what he says, he means in
earnest. One of the syllogisms claims that it was through
the agency of cavaglieri that God offered redemption to
erring mankind, since Christ was born of cavagliere
stock. Man's deliverance from sin is therefore the gift
of knighthood:
Davit fu Re e fu Cavagliere:
della casa di Davit nacque Christo:
adunque de Cavaglieri naque Christo.
La nostra salute nata e da Christo:
Christo nacque in terra Dio e di Cavagliere:
adunque la nostra salute e nata da Cavaglieri (p.285).
That Christ came as a knight was confirmed during the
Harrowing of Hell, when his arrival in the underworld was
announced with the words "questo e quel Signore forte,
quel Signore pottente, quel Signore potente nelle battaglie"
(p.288). If this then was God's design, no one can
question the supremacy of cavaglieri without being suspect
of heresy. And like Prassicio, Mora ends his harangue
with a call to outlaw all those who dare disagree with him:
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gl'angioli del cielo fino alle furie infernali publicano
questa prima maggioranza essere de Cavalieri, e chi vi si
oppone , doverebbe come suspeto di Heresia esser carcerato
e fatto in publico abiurare, detestare e maledire
l'oppinione che havea per inanci, che le lettere precessero
di ragione al armi , percio che negando la sente.nza de
gl'angioli datta alia presenza di Christo, che l'affirmo
tacendo, viene di ragione ad essere scomunicato e ribello
di Christo e de gl'angioli, e in consequenza di Dio
(pp.28J-8).
Here then is someone taking violent exception
to the querelle just as it seemed to have become an
innocuous game. Mora it is true bore a personal grudge
against letterati and had quite a chip on his shoulder;
his reaction therefore may not have been too typical.
But how typical, one may ask, how true to real life is
the picture painted by the other authors who, after all,
must have broached the subject with as partial a mind as
he, since letters were their trade just as arms were his?
Could there be another picture concealed between the
lines? Is the harmony and consensus they portray merely a
fagade ? And" conversely, how significant is the rivalry
depicted during the early stages of the querelle? Who are
the knights and doctors who contend for precedence? How
frequently did they in fact measure swords and was their
confrontation a domestic matter, as it were, or was it
really the clash of two classes, a noblesse de robe
and a noblesse d'epee? And what do these knights and
doctors have in common with the soldati and the letterati,
the huomini di cappa and the huomini di robba lunga of
the later Cinquecento? To answer these and other questions
relating to a span of three centuries or more is an almost
impossible task and would require many years of pains¬
taking and more specifically historical research. They
will therefore have to remain unanswered until such time
as research of that kind is undertaken. Nevertheless,
there is a certain amount of information regarding the
social political and historical context in which the
querelle unfolded, which may be gathered from the texts
themselves. In our next chapter we will attempt to assess
the nature of this information, and to compare it with
what little external evidence is available to date.
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Chapter V
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QUERELLE
We can attempt to gauge th . significance of
the querelle in historical, social and political terms
from the information provided by the texts themselves, but
there would be no point in pursuing the investigaion more
thoroughly, if it were not possible in the first place to
establish how "real" the querelle was; whether in other
words incidents of disputed precedence between knights
and doctors (and letterati and soldati) did actually
occur and whether they occurred more than intermittently.
One would also have to find out of course whether they
were peculiar to certain towns or regions of Italy and
whether such towns and regions issued legislation on the
matter. This in itself is bound to be a mammoth task,
but it needs to be done, for the information available to
date is patchy and inconsistent. One might choose
initially to focus one's attention on one particular city.
Bologna would be an obvious choice, given its centrality
in the issue. That is where the problem was first debated,
and the prestige of its university must have given a
special edge to the conflict of knights and doctors. But
since it was precisely the presence of a university, and
therefore of large numbers of doctors, which must have
made the issue a particularly contentious one (with the
authorities likely to have been inclined to give
preferential treatment to those who fostered the renown
of the city), Bologna may not have been a typical case,
and one would therefore want to compare it to cities which
did not have a university. It has in fact been suggested
by Gaetano Salvemini that, unlike other cities, university
towns such as Bologna, Perugia and Siena did, on account
of their university, grant precedence to doctors over
knights. Salvemini cites a Bolognese provision of
September 15th 1301, which stipulates that in ceremonies
and processions doctors must follow immediately upon the
Podest a, the Captain and the An ziani and be followed by
the milit e s and other "proceres civitatis". ^ This
provision is also quoted by Fitting who, in so doing,
raises the question of the chicken and the egg, with his
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suggestion that Bartolus and other lawyers may have taken
their cue from this and similar legislation in their
2
handling of the querelle. This question too would
demand careful attention. Was the querelle horn as a
result of cities legislating on the matter or was
legislation (if it'existed) the sequel of the querelle?
Or did they proceed hand in hand as a consequence of
disputed precedence and litigation? A further point to
investigate in this connection would he the extent to
which, if at all, Roman law was taken into account in the
formulation of laws and statutes on the matter,-and more
interesting still, whether or not it was considered
relevant to the process of administering justice. In
Bologna for instance, did the oft-cited "Lex de
professorihus qui in urhe Const antinopolitana docentes
ex lege meruerint comitivam" (see ahove p.38) have
force of law? Was a professor who had held a chair for
twenty years really deemed to have thereby hecome noble?
And if he was, what good did it do to him? This raises
yet another question: that of the gap between intention
and practice, or between legislation and custom. If
there was a statute in Bologna which granted precedence to
doctors, why should a disillusioned Petronio Zagni say to
Bernardino Gozzadini in Beccadelli's Disputatione:
"precedete, poi che non vel veda / la prava abusion de
questa terra" (see above p.19)? Might the situation have
changed from year to year or from regime to regime,
'fch'a mezzo novembre non giugne quel che tu d'ottobre
fili"? A century or so later, on the evidence of Nobile
in Muzio's Gentilhuomo, the tables had turned in favour
of doctors again. Nobile praises the laws ("ordini")
of Bologna which on most occasions give the right of
precedence to doctors. At the same time however he
criticizes what he calls the abuse ("abuso") in Italy of
giving priority to knights (see above p.249). He does not
say whether this abuse extended to Bologna, but if it did,
her laws were clearly not being respected, and there was
clearly a discrepancy between what was and what ought to
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have been. Whatever may have been the particular
situation of Bologna, there was no doubt in Muzio's mind,
no more than there was in the minds of most of the authors
in this study, that in absolute terms the law was on the
side of doctors and that by claiming precedence knights
were being usurpers. The logical conclusion of this
argument is that there must have been a time when doctors
enjoyed uncontested pre-eminence. It is Bernardo da
Castiglionchio, the uncle of Lapo , who voices this belief
most articulately, in his letter to Lapo the elder, where
he bemoans the customs of the "corrotto mondo dloggi"
which allow knights to have precedence over doctors
(see above chapter I, n.67). Before the world was
"corrupted" therefore things must Iciave been different.
One could of course simply dismiss this as fanciful
harking back to a mythical golden age, but it does compel
us to query an assumption which would appear to have
gone unquestioned so far by those scholars who have dealt
with the problem of precedence and knighthood (scholars
whose names appear in the course of this chapter). It is
their implicit assumption that it was the doctors who,
by challenging the position of knights, were the first
to upset the status quo, for knights were a social
reality of longer and higher standing. In a way the
assumption is justifiable, if one considers that knight¬
hood (and feudalism) began to evolve in the early
centuries of the Middle Ages, following the disintegration
of the Roman Empire, whereas doctors, being an urban
phenomenon, only came to the scene much later. But it
is precisely in an urban context that the querelle unfolded,
and knights probably joined that context as outsiders and
intruders (depending of course on how one defines them).
The doctors may well have had a case therefore in claiming
that things were no longer what they used to be, and the
point certainly deserves further investigation.
If one were, for the sake of more detailed
research, to focus one's attention initially on Bologna,
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one would have two particularly interesting leads to
follow. The first is the mention of the public
disputation held on the subject of precedence under
Taddeo de' Pepoli (see above p.47). The mere fact of this
disputation having taken place (if indeed it did take
place), would be a sign of how important the matter was
considered to be. But if there were more circumstantial
evidence of the debate and its contents, we would no
doubt be in possession of many answers to our many
questions. The second lead to follow is the one provided
by Beccadelli's Pisputatione. The episode he recounts
did presumably take place, since he is hardly likely to
have invented a story about real people (including his
dedicatee) and to have set it so close in time to the
date of publication as to make it an obvious untruth to
anyone but slightly informed. If it did take place
though, was the case then pursued, as the speakers
threaten, in the courts of law? And in particular, did
it end up before the Sacra Rota in Rome (see above p.19 ) ?
This would naturally take us beyond the confines of
Bologna, but it would afford a good opportunity to compare
the customs of two different cities, and to investigate
whether canon lawyers also had an opinion on the matter
(for the querelle seems to have been the brainchild of
civil lawyers), and to test Guazzo's contention that,
alone of all cities, Rome gave precedence to the toga
over the spada (see above p.2S0).
The city for which we have most external
evidence so far is Florence. It is however rather
contradictory or at least ambiguous evidence and would
require detailed examination before we were in a position
to make positive inferences from it. What it does
suggest though is that rules concerning ceremonial
precedence did not necessarily apply to other circum¬
stances. The consensus of modern opinion seems to be that
knights were entitled to walk at the head of Florentine
processions, and that lawyers would have to follow them
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and "be followed in turn by merchants and notaries.
Salvemini for his part maintains that Florentine knights
were generally more privileged than Florentine doctors,
but this would not appear to have been uniformly the case.
While some laws made more concessions to knights, others
made the same to both knights and doctors. Only one
horse could follow the hearse of a doctor, whereas two
could follow the hearse of a knight. On the other hand
both knights and doctors (and judges too) could have their
coffins draped in cloth of gold. ^ It may be wrong
however to view the situation simply in terms of black
and white, and if a case of disputed precedence
submitted for arbitration to Grand Duke Cosimo I in 1565
is in any way typical, then it is true, as Mora said
(see above p.2 5.1), that there were different categories
of knighthoods and that not all had the same rights.
The submission to Cosimo concerns "le cause della
precedenza fra Messer Giovan Batista Concini Dottore di
Legge in 1'una e 1'altra faculta da una, e Messer
Lodovico Masi Cavaliere di Sant ' Iacopo dall ' altra", and
it contains a summary of the evidence heard by the
Magistrato Supremo in its sitting of December 26th
1565. According to the opinion of legal experts,
doctorhood, it is said, is superior to knighthood; "ii
grado del Dottorato, per la dignita e splendore che tiene,
attesa la disposizione di ragione e comune sentenza degli
scrittori iuris periti, si antepone al grado del Cavaliere
per molti fondamenti li quali per brevita non si
racontano." It is the Florentine custom however, and has
been for a long time, that knights should precede doctors:
"in Bologna, in Perugia e in altre citta d'ltalia, dove
non sia uso o consuetudine in contrario, li Dottori
precedono alii Cavalieri conforme alle regole di ragione.
Ma in questa citta di Fiorenza per antica consuetudine e
osservanza gli Cavalieri precedono alii Dottori." Local
tradition notwithstanding, the Magistrato Supremo
pronounces in favour of Giovan Batista Concini. It does
not do so however because he is a doctor, but simply
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because Lodovico Masi cannot be considered a true knight
in strictly Florentine terms. Although the Knights of
St. James are "illustri e ordinati anticamente dal Re
Cattolico e instituti da Sommi Pontefici", their knight¬
hood, like other foreign knighthoods, is not recognized
by the city of Florence unless it has been officially
re-confirmed by the authorities:
un cittadino fiorentino fatto Cavaliere dal Re di Francia,
dall'Imperadore o dal Papa, se voleva a valersi del grado,
supplicava di essere approvato e ammesso per Cavaliere, e
ottenendo faceva entrata solenne a cavallo con suoi
stendardi e livree, servitori e gran comitiva di nobili,
e si rappresentava al Palazzo e s'inginocchiava al Supremo
Magistrato, e fatte alcune cirimonie visitava gli Capitani
di Parte, e da quel Magistrato in segno di approbatione ri-
ceveva certe insegne; e in questa guisa fu Cavaliere Mes.
Ipolito Buondelmonti, Mes. Pietro Alamanni, Mes. Simone
Tornabuoni, Mes. Luigi della Stufa e molti altri , e
ultimamente Mes. Antonio Guidotti, che torno d'Inghilterra
Cavaliere, fu dal Duca Uostro Signore e suoi Magnifici
Consiglieri, servate le prenarrate solennita, ammesso
e approvato.
Since Lodovico Masi had not observed these formalities,
he was not to be granted precedence over Giovan Batista
Concini, who in any case, as well as being a doctor,
was a knight of the Order of St. Stephen, which had been
founded by Cosimo and which was therefore a truly
Florentine order. By virtue of that knighthood alone
Concini was. entitled to precedence over Masi. Cosimo
accepted the arguments of the Magistrato Supremo and
Concini therefore won the case. But he won it by default
as it were, not as a doctor but as a genuine knight
against a fake knight. In this respect the document is
very illuminating. It shows us of what little account
doctors were really held in Florence. Local custom was
against them and there was probably strong prejudice
against them as well. To argue the case of a doctor,
the Magistrato Supremo had to make him out to be a knight,
and it opted not to present the "comune sentenza degli
scrittori iuris periti" to Cosimo, preferring instead to
concentrate on the point which was likely to carry greater
weight with him, namely that Concini was a member of the
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order of which he, Cosimo, was Grand Master. That argument
however is produced at the very end of the submission,
as though the Magistrato Supremo had first wanted to make
it quite clear that doctors had the backing of the law.
For the sake of brevity it refrained from listing the
"molti fondamenti'" which explained the legal rights of
doctors, but it nevertheless pointed out that these
fondamenti existed (no doubt they were the very same
ones we have come accro'ss in the querelle). It also felt
compelled to mention that Florentine custom, unlike that
of other cities, was not "conforme alle regole di ragione".
As a result the submission sounds just as much like a
general plea to Cosimo to overturn Florentine tradition
in favour of the rights of doctors, as it is a report on
the particular case of Giovan Batista Concini and Lodovico
Masi. The prejudice against doctors (and learning) to
which it seemingly bears witness, brings back to mind the
complaints of Lapo da Castiglionchio, Leon Battista
Alberti and Giovanni d'Arezzo against the Philistinism of
Florentinesjand would tend to suggest that very little had
changed in the course of a century. What the document-also
suggests, and which is even more interesting, is that, in
the Florentine context at least, the rules which applied
to ceremony did not necessarily apply to other circum¬
stances. The Magistrato Supremo mentions, without any
sense of disapproval, the case of Florentines knighted
abroad, who exercise within Florence the privileges
attached to knighthood, such as the creation of notaries
and the legitimization of bastards, but who nevertheless
cannot claim precedence over doctors, because their title
has not been ratified by the city authorities. This would
confirm the suspicion one may have had upon reading the
texts of the querelle, that what was at stake was simply
a question of ceremonial precedence, of who was allowed
to talk, sit or walk in front of whom.
The distiction between local and foreign
knighthoods was not particular to Florence. In 1463 the
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College of Doctors of the city of Alessandria had
complained to their overlord . Francesco Sforza that swarms
of young and recently dubbed knights were usurping the
rights of precedence to which doctors were legally
entitled. More than the youth and newness of these
knights however, it was the fact that they had acquired
their knighthoods in far-off places which the doctors
expressely objected to: "cum dicti tales milites, qui in
dicta civitate Alessandriae pullulant, in provinciis
alienis e longmquis militias ipsas et gradus sumpserint. "
They therefore petitioned Francesco Sforza to ensure that
the rules which pertained in other parts of his territ¬
ories, and at Pavia in particular, be enforced in
Alessandria as well. The rules of Pavia did not actually
grant wholesale precedence to doctors, but at least they
made sure that precedence was bestowed on the basis of
seniority. They stipulated "ne quis miles junior
antiquiorem doctorem antecedat, sed secundum tempora
graduum adeptorum, ita ut antiquitati gradus dignitatis
deferatur." Here again the question seems to have been
one of straightforward ceremonial precedence. The
doctors were simply concerned that no one should try and
jump the queue. At times there could also be rows over
seating arrangements. Pius II, in his Commentaries,
mentions the rumpus which the scramble for seats caused
at the Diet of Mantua: "cum iam legati regum principumque
co.nveni.re coepissent, magna de sedibus orta contentio est;
nec reges regibus , nec duces duci.bus cedere, locum sibi
quisque in consessu primum arrogare verbis nutibusque
contendere; quod ne rebus gerendis officeret, Pontifex
legum edidit , ne vel postpositi detrimentum vel praelati
lucrum honoris iurisve aliquod ferrent; nec tamen hoc
g
pacto pacari omnes potuere." Pius, it is true, makes
no allusion to knights and doctors, but if any were
present, they are likely also to have joined in the fray,
accustomed as they were to fighting over such issues, and
the story of the genesis of Biondo's Borsus (see above
p.65) thus becomes quite plausible. There would appear
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to have been a similar dispute at the Council of Basle
in 11+31 j though specifically involving knights and doctors,
and legend has it that Emperor Sigismund resolved it in
favour of the doctors by pronouncing that it was easy for
anyone to create one. hundred knights in the. space, of a day,
but that it was impossible even in a thousand years to
9
create a doctor.
All the evidence we have adduced so far
concerns the north of Italy, and apart from a Florentine
sumptuary law, it does not deal with anything more
substantial than ceremonial precedence. Can it be a
coincidence, one therefore wonders, that the two pieces
of evidence which point to a conflict over weightier
matters - tax-exemption and administration of justice -
should hail from the south of Italy where, as we have
seen, the querelle went through its liveliest phase?
Further evidence would hardly have been necessary to prove
how real the conflict was in the Kingdom of Naples -
Galateo, Acquaviva, Nifo and Prassicio demonstrated it
quite convincingly - and it must be admitted that the
evidence which is about to be adduced is not of the type
one would want to accept too uncritically. Nevertheless
it deserves to be quoted, if only to provide an initial
clue as to how the rivalry between men-of-arms and men-
of-letters (which we have mainly seen so far as an
ideological rivalry) could manifest itself in more
concrete forms. During the reign of Queen Joanna I
(13^3-82), " essendo nata controversia tra Nobili e
Letterati della citta di Bitonto circa il pagamento delle
reali impositioni, i Letterati dimandavan di contribuire
co' Nobili, perch! sempre nobilmente havean vissuto.
La Reina Giovanna I, intesa la lor giusta domanda, gli
separa dal Popolo , ordinando che con la Nobilta
contribuiscano le collette, dicendo che 'plus valet
nobilitas morum quam genitorum'." A century or so
later, professional lawyers were appointed to sit on the
court of appeal in Naples, and the nobility having
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protested, the King found himself obliged to appoint some
of their members as well. Nob il i may not sound
exactly like men-of-arms and 1etterati not quite like
professional men, but we only need to recall Galateo to
realize that that is precisely what they were. What is
particularly intriguing is the suggestion that Queen
Joanna accepted the notion of letterato as the definition
of a particular class, and this raises the question as to
whether there existdd a socially and legally recognizable
noblesse de robe in Naples besides a noblesse d'epee.
Galateo, to whom the question of nobility (legitimate and
illegitimate) was of pressing concern, would seem to
suggest that there was, but this is a point which
obviously requires further investigation and to which we
shall shortly be reverting, as we try to find out who
exactly the knights and doctors, the men-of-arms and men-
of-letters were. What we have sought so far was to
establish, with the help of our limited resources,
whether the querelle was a social reality as well as a
literary reality. If we put the various bits of external
evidence alongside the information provided by our texts
(the Florentine bigotry, for instance, which is the butt
of Lapo's Comparatio, the Veronese backdrop to
Lanfranchino's Tractatulus, the "class" conflict which
is the setting of Galateo1s, Acquaviva's and Nifo's
works, the two cultures idenfified by Mora and the
numerous references to the question of disputed precedence
in the later Cinquecento), it does appear as though the
querelle in its literary form was indeed the reflection
of some kind of competition taking place within society
at large, but where and when this conflict was most accute
and under what circumstances it arose are obviously
problems which will only be solved by further research.
Once the social reality of the querelle has
been ascertained, the next step ought to be an assess¬
ment of its significance. This would mean finding out
the identity of the contestants. We know that initially
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at least they were knights and doctors, but can we tell
who exactly these knights and doctors were? Doctors do
not seem to have attracted the attention of scholars so
far and no one has attempted to give a reply to the
question of Biondo, "quis autem primus fuerit , qui modum
vel potius artificium doctorandi et doctores auro
ornandi adinvenerit?" (see above p.70)• Knighthood on
the other hand has caused many headaches to many genera¬
tions of scholars. Regrettably however most of the work
which has been done on the subject concerns France, and
even there the picture is still very blurred and opinions
still divided. A recent article has pointed out how the
thinking on the matter has latterly tended to revert to
12
square one. But even that is a 'progress of sorts,
for it confirms that the initial hypotheses were probably
the correct ones. In this instance the initial hypotheses
were those of Marc Bloch, the first person seriously to
. . . . . . 13
investigate the origins and significance of knighthood.
Bloch argued that knighthood, which was originally the
description of the social function and position of an
individual and was always loosely equated with the idea
of nobility, became in the course of time not only a
strict synonym of nobility but the actual definition of
nobility, the dubbing ceremony being regarded as the
seal of an individual's membership of that group and
later, when for various reasons dubbing had fallen into
disuse, the inherit^ed right to being dubbed (whether or
not the actual ceremony was performed) still being
retained as the distinctive mark of a nobleman. By that
time knighthood was no longer determined by the personal
status of an individual, but by a collective status: it
was the hereditary attribute of a class. A later stage
in the development of the concept of knighthood was its
acquisition of a sacred character (i.e. its transformation
into chivalry) through the intervention of the Church,
and then its legal definition. One meaning however which
knighthood had carried from the very beginning and which
it never ceased to convey was that of warrior (on horse-
2?8
"back). A knight in France therefore, according to
Bloch, by the latter Middle Ages - by the time that is
when the querelle was getting off the ground in Italy -
was the male scion of the upper class of society, whose
hereditary raison d'etre was to be armed and fight (in
the service of the Prince, the Faith and the Commonweal).
The closing of the nobility's ranks in the name of
knighthood took place, as Bloch sees it, under the threat
of a rising class of nouveaux riches buying its way into
fiefs and other traditional preserves of the military
aristocracy. This aristocracy therefore rallied around
what it felt was its most distinctive feature: knighthood.
By then the sense of caste was becoming so strong, that
it did not matter any longer whether or not one was a
knight oneself (i.e. whether or not one had been dubbed).
The important thing was to be a descendant of knights.
If one enjoyed this privilege, there was very little which
could deprive one of it; but there was one profession
which was deemed to be especially incompatible with high
rank. This was not trade, interestingly enough, but
agricultural labour. The rule preventing knights from
becoming tradesmen was imposed on them by certain urban
statutes aimed at protecting the monopoly of merchant
communities, according to Bloch, and was not a rule which
the aristocracy inflicted upon itself. Having become an
hereditary privilege, knighthood was as difficult to
acquire (in theory at least) as it was to lose, and
strictly speaking only the supreme lord, the king of
France, had the right to create new knights. This was a
right of which French kings availed themselves mnoie. arid moie
frequently, as it served their policies or could fill
their coffers, Philip the Fair (l268T13lM having
been the first monarch to turn knighthood into a saleable
commodity. Where the central authority was weak, dubbing
rights would be usurped by or handed over to lesser
authorities. This happened in the south of France for
instance,before the king's sway had reached that far. It
is also a phenomenon which was perceptible in the Empire
and parts of Italy. The commune of Florence for example
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- and still according to Bloch - possessed the right as
early as 1260. It would seem on the whole to have been
more freely used in Italy than anywhere else, and German
barons whose opinion is referred by Bishop Otto of
Freising (llll/lU - 58), were shocked to see how easily
knighthoods were distributed there to "men in trades and
1U
crafts". This is one of the very few points which
Bloch makes about Italy in his work which is to all
intents and purposes on French feudal society, but it is
a point of great interest in the context of this study,
where we have seen so many nouveaux riches denounced for
masquerading as knights.
In more recent years another Frenchman,
Georges Duby, has excavated more minutely in the field
originally surveyed by Bloch. ^ Unfortunately his
research is also concerned almost exclusively with France,
but it can still make a useful point of comparison for
the knights of the querelle. Like Bloch, Duby sees miles
- which originally had a purely technical meaning, that
of armed horseman (in some documents ordo militaris and
ordo equestris are used as equivalents, and in the south
of France caballarius was a synonym of miles) -
replacing at first vas s us and in due course nobilis , and
so becoming an hereditary quality instead of a personal
distinction. But the question which Duby asks is why the
aristocracy accepted that particular definition of itself.
What particular idea did the notion of miles convey? His
searches revealed that from a very early date the
specifically military meaning of miles ceased to be the
most important and was superseded by the idea of service
which the word implied and which it had in fact borne from
late Roman times. It is thus that mi1es came to replace
vas sus to describe the social function and position of an
individual. The next stage, which was the identification
of knighthood and nobility, happened, according to Duby,
not under the threat of a rising bourgeoisie, as Bloch
had claimed, but as a result of the ideological influence
of the Church, which fostered the concept of a tripartite
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division of society into orantes, laborantes and
bellatores or pugnatores. At first the warriors were
referred to by the Church precisely as bellatores or
pugnatores and not milites, because miles suggested
serving more than it did fighting. In the course of time
however and with the decline of royal authority,
especially in certain parts of France, those ordained
for war came to be seen by the Church as royal substitutes
providing an essential service to the commonweal, namely
to protect the orantes and the laborantes, i.e. truly to
militare. It was then that knighthood, with its more
exalted connotations, became a possible definition of
nobility, and the nobles readily accepted it, because they
recognised it to be their common denominator. Whether
big or small, rich or not so rich, what bound them
together and set them apart from the rest of society was
the fact that they served under arms, that they were mi¬
lites in other words. By the thirteenth century,
according to Duby, the members of the nobility were
consistently being described as milites and it was the
dubbing rite which set the seal upon an individual's
membership of that class. This is the picture which
Duby draws for France. For the Empire he points out that
the synonymity of nobility and knighthood was accepted
only very reluctantly, if at all. About Spain, England
and more important still, Italy, he has nothing to say,
since, as he points out, there have been no studies
of knighthood in those countries.
This is a point which is confirmed by as
recent a work as Lauro Martines's Power and Imagination,
in which the author shows an awareness of the problematic
identity of knights but demonstrates some confusion in
his own acceptation of the notion. His section on the
nobility begins as follows :
historians are not in agreement about the: nature- and
identity of the urban nobility. Was it a closed or an
open caste? A class in decline or one which reformed and
revitalized itself by means of shrewd marriages and
commercial enterprise? Was it a nobility of birth,
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claiming past or present feudal jurisdictions on the
basis of an imperial act or an act of enfeoffment by an
imperial agent? Or was it a nobility based upon old
wealth and public service? To what extent did noblemen
go into commerce or refrain from it altogether? Was there
a distinction inside the city between a municipal
aristocracy and an urban-warrior nobility, or between an
older urban nobility and one more recently arrived from
the country? Was knighthood a social or a military order?
Did mounted combat itself confer noble status? Or was
nobility a state of mind: wealth and prowess combined
with lordly ways and the qualities of leadership? The
stilnovlsti, the idealist poets of Dante's generation
(c.1280 -1310 ) , held that nobility resided in virtue, in a
'gentle heart' , but theirs was a moral posture and a
social subtlety. No one believed them. 16
A few pages later, again summing up the historians his
predecessors, he maintains that "nobility and knights
tend to be seen as one and the same class, so also popolo
and foot soldiers" (p.55). At times it is as though he
himself accepts the identity of nobility and knighthood,
when he talks for instance of the economic situation of
the nobility in the face of the growing power of the
popolo : "piracy prof it able public office, exploitative
investment in the public debt, and war loot saved and
maintained many a nobleman. These were the knight's
reply, so to speak, to the sources of dramatic profit
(long-distance trade and usury) tapped by the order of
rich merchants and merchant bankers" (p.63). At other
times he clearly makes a distinction between knighthood
and nobility, or at least between knighthood and the rest
of the nobility. Talking of the social fabric of the
early commune, he says that "the nobility stood at the
social forefront of the eleventh-century cities: bishop,
resident feudal magnates, episcopal clergy, the principal
knights, and the array of their surrounding kinsmen. ...
The principal knights - captains and vavasors - composed
the larger part of the nobility" (p.ll). He is also
suggesting in this passage that knights and vassals were
one and the same thing; but earlier he had talked of the
propertied class of "vassals and subvassals, knights,
small landowners, and random or itinerant country
merchants" (p.5). On another occasion he speaks of
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"leading knights"petty knights" and "knightlings" (see
p.6 for instance), thereby giving the impression that the
notion of knighthood is more a handy metaphor for the use
of historians than it is an accurate description of a
social reality. And yet what clearly emerges from .the
pages of Martines's study, especially when he adduces
documentary evidence, is not only that knights did of
course exist, but that they existed as a socially and
legally identifiable group. From very early on, it would
seem, there were orders and associations of knights. At
Brescia, for instance, there is reported to have been a
clash between the guilds and the order of knights in
1196, and one at' Piacenza in 1198 and another at Milan
between 1198 and 1201 (p.U9). At Pavia, by the early
thirteenth century, there were three recognized political
orders: the knights, the popolo and the notaries, each
with its own podesta and council of advisers (p.87).
At Verona in 1227 communal offices, which had previously
been restricted to knights, were made available to rich
burghers, that is to men who had assets of one thousand
pounds or more and who owned a horse and arms (p.59)-
And in Florence "the old association of Florentine
knights" was liquidated in the 1250's (p.65). This infor¬
mation, when put together with the information provided
by Bloch regarding the concession to the Florentine
commune in 1260 of the right to create knights, raises
the question of the virtue by which one was a knight.
Was knighthood the personal distinction of an individual
or the hereditary attribute of a class, or did it, as in
France, develop from "being the one to being the other?
And to what extent was knighthood a legal reality? For
these questions Martines does not have an answer, but he
does appear to take for granted that a knight was, and
perhaps had to be, a warrior: he was a man with horse and
arms. Martines does not say however that these were
attributes which the nobility as a whole came to regard
as its specific qualifications. Therefore not all Italian
noblemen of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance,
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as far as one can judge from tje evidence adduced by
Martines, were knights, but every knight, it would, seem,
was a nobleman.
This would appear at first sight to be quite
inconsistent with the evidence of the querelle. If there
is one thing on which all our authors agree and about
which they are all adamant it is that knights are not
noblemen, certainly not by virtue of their knighthood.
Following the lead given by Bartolus (see above p.29),
who had asked "utrum miles habeat dignitatem" and
•
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answered..with an emphatic non , Roman lawyers were
positive in their assertion that knighthood could not
confer nobility, and there is no way therefore in which
they would ever have defined nobility as knighthood,
neither the nobility (the personal merit) of an individual
nor the nobility (the pedigree) of a family, and
especially not the latter. The querelle on the whole
explicit/ly repudiates the notion of an inherited and
inheritable nobility, and instead proclaims the idea of
an individual and self-made nobility: "qui meruit sua
virtute nobilitatem habere, magis dicitur nobilis, quam
ille, qui descendit ex nobili genere" (see above p. 2 9 ).
It is the doctor of course who is the perfect embodiment
of this type of nobility, but even if the knight cannot
hope to achieve such perfection, he nevertheless has to
rely on his own devices. Birth is not one of the
requisites of knighthood (see above p.29). On the other
hand bearing arms is (at least a sword), together with a
readiness to use them in combat. On this point there
would seem to be some agreement between the authors of
the querelle and modern historians. It is true however
that modern historians hold it for a fact that knights
were armed. The querelle on the other hand suggests that
many of them may not have been, for almost every text
insists that knights ought to be armed, and implies that
those who passed as knights were in any case not real
knights. They may have carried a sword, but they probably
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did ncrb know how to wield it. Knights were also supposed
to know how to ride and to own a horse, according to
modern historians. To Bloch, D.uby, Martines and others it
goes without saying that a knight was a horseman, since
that was his very definition (chevalier, cavaliere) , and
judging from the evidence of the querelle, one would be
bound to confirm this assumption: miles and eques, milit e
and cavaliere are used as synonyms. , The one privilege
moreover of which Roman lawyers are careful not to deprive
the knights their contemporaries is the right to wear the
golden spurs after which they were named ("equites aurati") .
If they wore spurs, we must take it that they put them'to
some use, although they could very well have worn them
for the mere sake of display, and may not therefore have
had to own a horse and be able to ride. As the ownership
of a horse never becomes an issue in the querelle (indeed
it never so much as receives a mention), it is difficult
from that evidence alone to form an opinion on the matter,
but one thing is sure and that is that the ownership of a
horse and the ability to ride are not amongst the
conditions of knighthood as stipulated by Accursius and
accepted by his successors. This is in such fundamental
contrast with everything which has been said and known so
far about knighthood, that it must prompt us to question
whether the Roman lawyers of the Middle Ages were in
touch with the reality of the environment in which they
lived or whether they were shut in a world of their own
left over from the days of ancient Rome. It is
impossible of course that they should have been totally
shielded from what went on about them, and all
suppositions about knights and knighthood will therefore
need to be re-examined in the light of their pronoun¬
cements. Certainly if it is a legal definition of
knighthood in Italy which we are ultimately looking for,
theirs is not evidence which can be dismissed out of hand.
If the Golden Knights did not ride and did
not fight, what did they do? "Vadunt quotidie per plateas
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et vacant negociationibus et mercantijs", is the answer
which emerges clearly from every text and commentary, and
not just of the fifteenth century hut of earlier centuries
18
as well. It is no wonder that they could afford to
buy the golden spurs which, as Biondo informs us (see
above p.72), were available to the highest bidder. None
of our authors, surprisingly enough, ventured to make a
pun on the name "equites aurati", but there is little
doubt that it was the speciousness of their knighthoods
at which the main thrust of the querelle was aimed. They
were not genuine knights but, as has repeatedly been
stressed, dubbed merchants and nouveaux riches, and since
the very first of Accursius's knightly conditions was
"ut miles non sit negotiator", the lawyers were quite
simply doing their duty in unmasking false pretences.
One cannot help but wonder however whether the lawyers
themselves may not have been pretending and whether there
was not more to knighthood than they liked to admit.
After all they were not averse themselves to displaying
the title of"eques auratus"(Homodeis, Bolognini and
Lanfranchino all did it), and even though Accursius had
not said anything about doctors not becoming knights or
knights not becoming doctors, their doctorial skills can
hardly have qualified them for knighthood as they them¬
selves had defined it. They may have argued that in any
case Golden Knights were not and could not be knights in
the true sense of the word and that there was no harm
therefore in assuming that title even if one did not
satisfy the legal requirements of knighthood, or they may
have claimed that they were in fact doing knighthood a
favour by associating it with their own name, since "ubi
militia adderetur viro habenti dignitatem, et sic
adderetur dignitati, utputa est quidem doctor qui postea
efficitur miles" (see avove p.57). But why did they
bother? Why were they not content with their own title?
Did they not manage to convince themselves that doctor-
hood was the highest dignity to which one could aspire?
Did they not believe that it was their own merit which
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made them nobler than others, without needing to seek
recognition in the eyes of the public? That is what their
assumption of the title of knighthood seems to have been:
a public demonstration of their eminence. But if that is
indeed what it was (and the eagerness of merchants to be
knighted tends to suggest that it was), then, despite the
doctors' insistence to the contrary, knighthood must have
been seen at the time as the equivalent of nobility, and
knight must in people's consciousness have been a synonym
of nobleman. In this case the querelle would tend to
confirm rather than invalidate, as at first seemed likely,
the hypothesis of Martines and others regarding the
identity of knighthood and nobility. Nevertheless a great
deal of research still remains to be done in order to
establish whether this identity was formally recognized,
at least in certain quarters,; since it was quite
definitely not accepted as such by Roman lawyers, and if
it was, when the process of identification began and when
it was completed. In other words no less remains to be
investigated than the entire history of knighthood in
Italy. An implicit, and sometimes less than implicit
assumption of the querelle, is that there were two types
of knights in Italy, genuine and fake, the genuine ones
being those who were truly armed and really did know how
to fight, and the fake ones those who had bought their
title and were in fact merchants by profession. In
France too, as we saw, knighthoods were put on sale, but
this would seem to have been a more common phenomenon
in Italy and one of longer standing. Certainly as far
back as the querelle stretches, there is evidence that
knighthood was a purchasable commodity. It may be in fact
that the querelle stretched back as far as the time when
knighthoods first began to be traded wholesale and that
it therefore represents the conflict within an urban
context of two new social groups, merchants and
"bureaucrats", competing for nobility, i.e. for the right
to lead and rule. If this were so, its title would be
somewhat misleading, since it opposed not the pen to the
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sword but the pen to the florin.
One cannot say whether the merchants who
became knights and who were apparently so keen on dis¬
playing their golden spurs, also wore a sword, even
though they may not have known how to wield it. It is
certainly one of Accursius's conditions that a knight be
girt with a sword, "quod ei ensis cingatur", and sword
and knighthood therefore, even to Roman lawyers, were
seen to be inextricably linked. It was the same in
France, where a knight without a sword, according to
Bloch and Duby, would have been as unthinkable as a
knight without a horse. But whereas the horse was more
of a status symbol, the sword had acquired an almost
sacred character. It was by being girt with a sword, in
the course of the dubbing ceremony, that a man was lifted
to the rank of knight. The dubbing ceremony was therefore
the initiation rite into knighthood. Both Bloch and Duby
insist on the crucial role of dubbing in the development
of knighthood from a loosely defined position and
profession to a rigid caste, even though Duby admits that
"l'histoire de l'adoubement ... reste tout entiere a
19ecrire." The dubbing ceremony became in due course
the only gateway to the closed ranks of the nobility, a
nobleman being a dubbed man or a man with the hereditary
right to be dubbed. In Italy Accursius and those who
quote him also allude to some sort of ceremony which the
candidate has to go through in order to receive formal
recognition as a knight, but it sounds more like a test
than a rite, and more secular in nature than sacred. The
aspirant, it is true, is made to swear an oath. However
he is not dubbed but "examined" ("quod examinetur"), not
initiated but "registered" ("in numero aliorum debet poni
et scribi"). What actually happened during this ceremony
and whether it was in fact ever performed, is unknown.
These are only the words of Accursius, and even though
they may be frequently cited, no one ever goes into the
kind of details about the ceremony of knighting which
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Homodeis provides on the conferment of doctorates (see
above pp. 26-7). N° one provides any information either
as to the significance which may have attached to the
knighting ceremony, but since the conditions of Accursius
are usually enlisted to demonstrate the military nature
of knighthood and confirm the non-eligibility of
merchants rather than to draw attention to the ceremony
itself, it may be surmized (assuming of course that the
words of the Roman lawyers are reliable evidence as to
what went on around them) that dubbing never acquired the
solemnity in Italy which it had in France. Certainly if
knighthoods were as readily available as it would seem
they were, there cannot have been much mystery about
dubbing. But if it is true of France, it must be even
more so of Italy that "l'histoire de 1'adoubement reste
tout entiere a ecrire."
As well as the question of who was eligible
for knighthood, dubbing raises the question of who had
the right to create new knights. Given the extremely
complex political structure of Italy during the Middle
Ages and Renaissance, with its numerous and conflicting
sources of authority, both within the peninsula at large
and within individual cities or states, the answer to
this question is likely to be just as intricate. The
submission alone of the Magistrato Supremo to Cosimo I
de' Medici (quoted at the beginning of this chapter)
shows us how complicated the situation indeed was. It
mentions no less than five grantors of knighthood which
are recognized or potentially recognizable by the Floren¬
tine authorities: the Grand Duke himself as Grand Master
.of the order of St. Stephen, the Spanish King as Grand
Master of the Order of St, James, the King of France, the
Emperor and the Pope. This evidence admittedly belongs
to the later phase of the period with which we are
dealing, but it is nonetheless revealing that at a time
when the political situation of the country was more
stable and more ordered, there were still so many possible
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dispensers of knighthood. It is easy therefore to imagine
how much more variety there must have been in earlier
centuries. At the end of the fifteenth century we have
the case of the Bolognese Bernardino Gozzadini knighted
in Ferrara by the Duke of Ferrara (see above p.20),and a
few years earlier of Ilicino knighted in the very same
city by Emperor Frederick III (see above p.1 07). Bloch
mentions that in 1260 the commune of Florence acquired
the right (presumably from the Emperor) to bestow
knighthoods, and Martines speaks of the knightly orders
which existed in every city-state during the later Middle
Ages. These orders, which were obviously something quite
different from the chivalric orders of the time of
Cosimo I, would have been contemporary with the early
phase of the querelle of Knights and Doctors and it may
have been them which Accursius had in mind when he
stipulated that a knight "in numero aliorum debet poni
et scribi." Very little would appear to be known about
them either. Were they chartered and self-regulating
organizations with the right to admit (i.e. knight) new
members and possibly to expel non-conforming ones, or
were they simply loosely-defined kinship groups or
"professional" associations to which men belonged who
were already knights, however they may have become so?
These are yet further questions which remain to be
investigated, but what the evidence we have to date does
suggest, with its emphasis on knights as individuals, is
that knighthood in Italy, unlike France, was and remained
a personal status. One was not born into knighthood,
one became a knight. What made Gozzadini special for
instance in the eyes of Beccadelli, was the fact that he
had been knighted by the Duke of Ferrara in recognition
of his personal merits:
el Gozadin e molto piu perfecto
che l'altri cavalier e de piu orgulio.
Intendo che, fra mille, el fu gia electo
in Milite dal Duca de Ferrara
pel piu prestante, generoso e accepto (vv. k28-32).
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There is another major difference between
knighthood as it transpires from.the pages of the querelle
and knighthood as it is said to have evolved in France.
The ideological motivations of knighthood in the querelle
are neither those of feudalism nor those of chivalry;
they do not include notions such as fealty and valiance,
such as devotion and service to lord, lady or cause.
They would appear to be truly classical in inspiration
and not ecclesiastical or romantic. Duby, as we have
seen, insists on the crucial role played by the Church
in the idealization of knighthood as chivalry, while
others have sought to demonstrate the influence on that
20
process of the romances of chivalry. But m Italy, at
least within the confines of the querelle, it is only in
the latter part of the sixteenth century, and especially
in Mora's Cavaliere with its insistence on the specific
nature of the laws which govern the life of a knight,
that we encounter anything resembling this ideal of
allegiance to Lord, Church, Self and possibly Lady
(the fourfold allegiance which rends Orlando's personality
in the Furio so). Prior to that however the knight's
energies are seen to be channelled exclusively to the
protection of the commonweal, the classical res publica.
The oath which the new knight is made to take, according
to Accursius, is "quod mortem reipublicae causa non
evitabit." The raison d'etre of knights, according to
Homodeis, is to defend the state: "finis militiae est
quod provinciae vindi/centur" (see above p.36). In other
words the body of knights was expected to be some kind of
militia cum police-force, and this is most clearly
enunciated by Beccadelli in his long eulogy of knights
and chivalry (see abo ve pp. 21"2). i n carrying out their
duties, the knights were supposed moreover to be fear¬
less and brave, but this typical quality of theirs is not
the prowess of the preux chevalier. It is fortitude, one
of the four classical moral virtues. More important still,
although by defending the commonweal the knight could be
said to have been serving it, the idea of service as such
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is never emphasized in the course of the querelle and
nowhere is it suggested that the word mile s in itself
implies service, that militare means to serve. Duty,
as we have seen, claims that that was the primary
signification of the word, which thus qualified it as a
substitute for vassus,and that it was a meaning which it
had borne since late Imperial times. Our authors, in
their search for the etymology of the word miles, and
therefore for its significance and the significance of
knighthood in general, also turned to late Imperial
sources (the Digest), but the definitions which they
uncovered do not in the least connote the idea of
service: "miles autem appellatur vel a militia, id est
duritia, quam pro nobis sustinent, aut a multitudine, aut
a malo, quod arcere milites solent , aut a numero mille
hominum" (see above p.36). Roman lawyers in short
expected knights to be men-of-arms who were prepared to
fight for their country. But even to those who
satisfied these requirements, the lawyers refused to
concede that knighthood was a dignitas and they only
granted precedence to them "in actibus militaribus" and
sometimes "in actibus neutralibus". Since most contem¬
porary knights however were no more than disguised
merchants, the only privilege which they could legally
claim was to wear their golden spurs.
To the fake knighthoods and specious nobility
of dubbed tradesmen, doctors opposed the intrinsic and
quintessential nobility of their own calling. They had
not purchased and donned their title in an instant, but
earned it through hard and dedicated labour. It
corresponded to an inner reality, and whereas to knight
meant in fact to create something which had not previously
existed, to confer a doctorate was simply to confirm what
was already there. This is the message which all our
authors seek to put across and which the ceremony of
conferment, as described by Homodeis (see above pp. 26-7 )5
was supposed to convey. The book which was handed over
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to the graduand, the diadem which was placed on his head
and the ring which was passed on to his finger, did not
endow him with knowledge of the Law but rewarded him for
it, did not give him the qualities of a doctor but
merely confirmed that he possessed them. But if we know,
thanks to Homodeis, how one became a doctor, we do not
know who could do so and what the requirements for
eligibility to doctorhood were. We do not know in other
words what a doctor really was. The texts we have studied
throw little or no light on the matter, for almost all of
them take doctorhood for granted. Biondo is the only
author not to do so, and he claims that in his day any
lawyer called himself a doctor, though there were many
who abused the title. Bolognini's distinction, following
Tartagni, between doctores and doctorellos who he had
rather were called dolores (see above p.50) would tend
to confirm this assertion; and so would Beccadelli's
saying that a real doctor is one who "professa in scrana"
(see above p. 23), which suggests that not all doctors were
genuine. Mora too, several decades later, maintains that
many doctors were impostors, since doctorates were being
"concessi a molti bufali" (see above p.253). It would
seem therefore that there was as much abuse and as little
dignitas on the one side as there was on the other in the
querelle, though the knights appear the greater culprits,
no doubt because it was not they who wielded the pen.
Presumably a doctor must have had some form of legal
training, but how rigorous this is likely, to have been is
another moot point. Biondo draws our attention to the
many doctors "qui, cum paucas aut nullas sciant litteras ,
ipsum inquinant doctoratum" (see above p.72.), and from
this it is easy to conjecture that it was possible for
any "quack" to pose as a doctor. But if it was so easy
in those days to become a doctor, there must have been a
time when the title was a more restricted privilege and
had greater substance, since Roman lawyers held it in
such high regard. It is impossible to say however under
what circumstances and when doctorhood may have become
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accessible to all. Assuming a change of that nature did
indeed take place, one should like to know of course
what a doctor had originally been and what later on there
was to distinguish a real doctor from the crowd of
doctorelli. Here again the clues are few and far between.
Homodeis says that the aim of doctors was to preserve
states ("finis doctorum est quod provinciae conserventur"
- see above p.36)5 which is uninformative. Tartagni
makes the distinction between "doctores existentes ad
latus principis" and "doctores qui non sunt ad latus
principis" (see above p.50), which may indicate that some
were involved in the functions of govern/ment whereas
others were not, but is still not very informative.
According to Fitting, a doctor was initially a teacher of
law, but in due course a doctorate ceased to be a job
description and instead became an honorific distinction
(see above p.'2S). Fitting however does not substantiate
his claims, nor does he give any indication as to when
the transformation might have taken place. Biondo for his
part believed that the title of doctor was introduced as
a substitute for judex towards the end of the fourteenth
century (see above p.70). The title, as we know, had been
in use long before that, but Biondo is not alone in
associating the roles of doctor and judge. For Beccadelli
a real doctor was one who " professa in scrana", which
as we have seen (above p. 2 3), may have been a judge,
although it could equally have been a professor. And as
evidence against the i denf i f i c at i on of doctor and -judge,
we have the Florentine sumptuary law quoted above (p.272)}
whose provisions make a clear distinction between the one
and the other. The case is therefore still wide open;
and it leaves many other questions unanswered too. Did
for instance the ceremony of conferment as described by
Homodeis continue to be performed even after the doctorate
had ceased to be a restricted privilege? What was the
nature and function of Colleges of Doctors, such as the
Alessandria College which petitioned Francesco Sforza in
lb63 (see above p.27£), and when did they come into
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existence? Above all, who had the right to confer
doctorates? The colleges, or universities, or "both? And
any particular individuals, such as the local ruler?
Finally, were there any differences from town to town, or
state to state?
If we ever succeed in answering all these
questions and in discovering the professional identity of
doctors,we may still have to investigate their social
identity and origins, before we are in a position to gauge
the true significance of-the querelle and the conflicts
which lay behind it. This may turn out to be an even more
delicate task, for we may come across cases like Taddeo
de' Pepoli , the organiser of the public disputation in
Bologna on the subject of precedence. The Pepoli were
a leading Bolognese family and had been so for long
enough to be considered' "noble"' "but "they had made their
fortune in trade and banking. Taddeo himself had studied
law and become a doctor, and this had been the excuse for
great public festivites in Bologna. He knew also how to
wield the sword and to use it effectively in defence of
his and his family's interests, and he had also been
21
knighted. Was he therefore a doctor or a knight, a
bourgeois or a nobleman? We might also find somebody
like Lapo da Castiglionchio the younger. He was not a
doctor of law, it is true, although his grandfather had
been one, but he was a student of letters, who made of
letters his profession. At the same time he came from a
family which was of old feudal stock (albeit dispossessed).
Is he therefore to be seen as the representative of a
rising or a declining class , as the mouthpiece of new or
old political interests? Hopefully not every case will be
as complicated, but each case will need to be examined
carefully. That much at least we can say regarding the
significance of the querelle of Knights and Doctors, that
it was a strictly urban phenomenon; and if our hypothesis
proves to be correct that most of the knights involved
were not real knights but disguised merchants, and that
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the contestants on both sides therefore were drawn mainly
from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, then the querelle
would represent not a real conflict of classes, but more
a clash of professional interests.
If the evidence from the querelle of Knights
and Doctors is confusing, it becomes even more so when
knights and doctors give way to arms and letters, and
especially in the latter part of the sixteenth century.
By then, as has already been pointed out (above p.229 ),
the lexical register used to describe the contending
parties has become quite extensive and indiscriminate.
Cavaliere and dottore may still be amongst the most
frequently recurring terms, but they have become
synonymous with the even more common and unfathomable
soldato and letterato. There are signs moreover that the
doctors referred to are no longer just doctors of law and
indications that the word cavaliere is often applied
metaphorically. For Mora, in whose hands the querelle
acquires most vivacity during this period, any soldato ,
regardless of his rank and social origins and of whether
he fights on foot or on horseback, is a cavaliere: and he
is so not by virtue of having been dubbed or of wearing
golden spurs or of satisfying any other condition (such
as the six conditions of Accursius), but simply because
he bears arms and fights. Mora also has a more chivalric
than legalistic conception of knighthood. What makes a
cavaliere different, apart from his profession, is his
sense of honour, his obedience to none but his lord and
his allegiance to the Church, like the Orlando to whose
school Mora claims to belong (see above p.262). Unlike
Orlando however and contrary to the more romantic notions
of chivalry which we find in other works of that period,
Mora and his cavaliere will have little to do with ladies
and are hard put at times to conceal their misogynism.
For a start, "leterati ... non dicono che parole, che
sono femine" (p.31) - Mora no doubt preferred not to
remember the gender of armi - and he strongly objects to
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the involvement of ladies, as we witness!" it in other
texts of the genre like Romei's Discorsi, in discussions
on matters of cavaleria : "alcune ... vogliono fare le
dotte e le leterate con introdursi sovente nei convivij
fra nohili , con ogni alterezza disputando del mestiere di
Cavaleria e parlandone con tanto ardire, come se in
imprese bellicose spesse volte si fossero trovate" (p.126).
But for all his rejection of social refinements, and in
particular of learned discourse, one wonders how genuine
Mora's anti-literary stance is and how much of his
Cavaliere1s make-up is owed to personal experience on
and off the battlefield, as Mora claims it is, and how
much is in fact the product of literary convention,
especially insofar as the ideological aspect of knight¬
hood is concerned. As the author of the Tre quesiti for
instance, and in spite here again of an avowedly experi¬
ential approach and anti-bookish pose, Mora shows himself
to be quite, familiar with, other, works written on the subject.
This is a problem however which does not concern Mora
alone but all the works of the later Cinquecento, of what
we might call the "post-Brucioli" phase of the querelle.
How much of what was written at the time was born of
literary precedent and how much is the reflection of a
social reality? One's main impression, reading the texts,
is that the querelle was primarily a literary phenomenon,
with each new work imitating and composing variations on
a well-known theme. Nevertheless almost every work
contains allusions to contemporary events and circumstances_,
and although this in itself could be no more than a
literary convention, we do at least have one important
piece of evidence (the submission by the Magistrato
Supremo to Cosimo I) to prove that disputes about prece¬
dence were still taking place in the second half of the
sixteenth century. This means that all the questions
which we were asking about the significance of the
querelle during its initial stage, need to be asked again.
How frequently and where did disputes about precedence
arise? How were they resolved and what were the identity
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a;d social origins of the contestants? In this case too
one could start "by focusing one's attention on a
particular city, and there is an intriguing lead to folio-w¬
in Romei-'s Discorsi. As will "be remembered, the
discussion about arms and letters in the Discorsi was
triggered off by the seating arrangement of the courtiers
at the dinner table, "dall'una banda i Togati e le Dame,
e all1incontro i Cavaglieri e huomini di cappa" (see above
p.238). It would be interesting to know whether it was
customary for the courtiers at Ferrara to be seated in
this way, or whether this was simply poetic licence on
Romei's behalf. If it was the custom, what social reality
did it reflect? Did it conceal some form of class rivalry,
or was it just a courtly nicety? Romei's actual dialogue
exudes an air of camaraderie, as do most of the texts of
that period, which therefore leave an impression of perfect
harmony. Reading between the lines however one gets the
feeling that the sailing was not always as smooth as the
authors would have liked it to be, and that beneath the
surface of literary appearances tension was always simmering,
a tension which came to a head in Mora's Cavaliere. One of
Mora's main grudges against letterati was the spurious
claims they made and the undeserved attention they demanded
and received from men of authority and dispensers of patronage,
i.e. from princes. If there was antagonism behind the facade
of the querelle, this is probably what it was: parasitic
courtiers presenting their credentials for recognition
and protection from their prince. In this connection it
is interesting to note that arms and letters were also a
popular theme amongst emblematists during the latter part
of the sixteenth century and that in recent years an
interpretation has been given of its popularity which
also seeks to present it as an expression of the competitive¬
ness of the courtly environment:
as the principal authors were dependent for their liveli¬
hood upon wealthy patrons and the court, they were obliged.,
or felt themselves obliged, to demonstrate their social
and political utility. Furthermore, they were eager for
glory and kudos. Theirs was an actual, practical desire
as well as a doctrinary Pindaric or Horatian persuasion.
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Aside from the sycophants at court, their most active
competitors for glory and recognition were the busy
fighters and condottieri of the time. Realization of
this fact set them to reflecting and theorizing about
the relative values of the two vocations. 22
Emblems, because of their epigrammatic nature, offer
even less clues about their social background than do
our various texts, and this interpretation of them is
conjectural, or at least unsubstantiated by its author,
but it is nevertheless interesting in view of the emphasis
it lays on the motivating role of the court. It would
seem that it was the court which also gave the querelle
of Arms and Letters its specific character. It dictated
both the choice of setting - most texts are either set in
or around some court - and the subject matter - arms and
letters, on Castiglione's evidence, being of particular
concern to courtiers -, but it is the mode of presentation
which it influenced above all, with its mixture of
civility, conformity and flattery. It presents what is
most likely an idealized portrait of a society in which
everyone tries to please, is careful not to cause offence,
and therefore only expresses acceptable and accepted ideas
(i.e. ideas sanctioned by literary precedent). What is
more, the very idealization of the portrait was probably
a means of indoctrinating the readers into believing that
that was the type of world in which they lived, and it
was most certainly a way of assuring one's prince
(encomium, it must be remembered, became an integral part
of the genre) that all was well in his best of worlds.
It is in this respect that the works of the mature stages
of the querelle are conspicuously different from those of
the early phase. During the early phase it was what was
said which mattered; later on it was how it was said
which came to matter.
Whether courtly or urban, of knights and
doctors, or of arms and letters, the querelle was first
and last a literary phenomemom from the north of Italy.
In between however there was that brief interlude from
the Neapolitan south, with Galateo and Acquaviva, Nifo
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and Prassicio. This was by far the genre's liveliest
phase, and it is therefore the most tempting one to submit
to further inquiry. One's initial impression, despite
the small nember of texts, is of a debate which involved
the whole kingdom. According to Acquaviva (see above
p.1 58) no subject was discussed more eagerly and defended
more passionately by the aristocracy than their military
vocation. Just how eager and passionate they were, there¬
by inciting those who took the other side to retort with
equal fervour, can be seen from Galateo's writings. This
induced Andrea Carafq,Count of Santa Severina and one¬
time Lieutenant-General of the Realm, to commission Nifo
to write a report on the subject which would bring peace
to the contending parties. But Nifo was unsuccessful and
the polemic went on. The confrontation was no trifling
matter, for it brought to grips two classes of society,
each with its own way of life and of evaluating life:
on the one hand the magnates, the proceres whom Galateo
accuses of embezzled nobility, who were the feudal and
military aristocracy of the kingdom, to which families
like the Acquaviva belonged, and who had learnt to live
by and for the sword, and on the other hand individuals
of more humble extraction, like Galateo and Nifo, who
believed in the nobility of learning and in an aristocracy
of merit and who tried to live from the fruits of their
pen. Whether and to what extent they constituted an
actual noblesse de robe, socially and legally
distinguished from the nobles s e d'epee, and whether the
querelle is therefore the articulation of a conflict of
two nobles s es competing for power, remains to be
investigated, but that is certainly how the contestants
themselves present the issue. Galateo boasts of his "avus
... et proavus et ceteri progenitores" who were
"sanctissimi sacerdotes graeci ... ., philosophiae et
sacrarum scripturarum scientissimi" (see above p.1££).
In reply Belisario Acquaviva rallies to the defence of
his own caste: "ne tamen a nostra nostrorumque professione
aberrare videamur ... arma litteris preponenda esse
500
c en s emus" (see above p . 1 51) • The urgency and reality of
the debate can not only be gauged from the passion with
which it is argued (only Nifo shows more restraint, but
he was the only author not to write spontaneously on the
subject, and even he can become quite involved at times);
it is also visible in the authors' attitude to their
literary sources. Their starting point is always literary
authority, but it is never long before they confront it
with the teachings of experience: and it is usually
experience which suffers least from the comparison.
Galateo begins by faithfully adhering to the words of
Aristotle, but concludes in a violent outburst of
iconoclasm, which is a result of what he has learnt from
life. Acquaviva too is ac/utely aware of the gap which
exists between life and literature. He too begins with a
S 1 <3* V 1 S ]l rendering of what he has learnt from books,
but he too concludes by claiming that there is no better
guide to life than life itself. And it is real life,
their lives, which these people are talking about and is
always uppermost in their minds. Galateo's concern "non
de terminis sed de tota possessione" (see above p.132)
is not just a philosophical stance; it is motivated by
his desire to come to grips with the problem. Existential
questions could not be resolved grammatically or
etymologically. Even Prassicio, in his eminently academic
approach, is concerned unlike few others that the
discussion should not turn into a sterile play on words
but that it should reflect the truth. His approach to us
may seem strangely "unrealistic", proceeding as it does
from God through the intelligences down to man. But for
Prassicio that was the only way of understanding life and
therefore of knowing how to lead one's life. It would
definitely seem therefore as though in southern Italy the
querelle was more the product of a particular social
context than it was of literary tradition, that the
support of literature was merely enlisted to give voice
to a specific social problem, whereas in the north,
despite the reality which undoubtedly lay behind the
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texts, one often has the impression that the genre,
especially with the progressing of time, was rather the
product of itself,. _ But since the social context of the
querelle, both north and south, remains largely unexplored
territory, this impression is bound to be no more than an
impression until such time as more detailed research has
been carried out.
If the social context of the querelle is
largely unexplored territory, its literary context (i.e.
the literary trends to which it was attached) is on the
whole better known, though not necessarily better charted.
One topic with which the querelle has many points of ■
contact and which enjoyed great popularity during the
Renaissance is the educational debate on the desirability
of combining arms and letters. It is important to realize
however that the querelle and this debate, even though
they may have a great deal in common, are two quite
different things. In this study we have attempted to
acquaint the reader with the particular mannerisms and
vocabulary of the querelle, so that he would be in a
position to recognize it and distinguish it from other
pronouncements oh the subject of arms and letters made
during the Renaissance, such precisely as the debate on
the uniting of arms and letters. It is true that our
knowledge of this debate is patchy and vague. We know
about classical ideals of education and, up to a certain
point, about their reception in the Renaissance, we know
of Vittorino da Feltre and other Renaissance education¬
alists, and we are of course familiar with Castiglione's
ideal courtier who is to possess arms and letters
concatenate . But we have little information on the
actual development the debate underwent during the
Renaissance, and the generalizations which were being
made about it some fifty years ago, are still being
23 ...
uttered today. Nevertheless our information is
sufficient for us to appreciate how different it is from
the querelle. Whereas the querelle contrasts two "classes"
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of men, two "professional" groups (men-of-arms and men-
of-letters), the educational delate seeks to bring about
a harmonization of man's major potentialities, his mind
(typified by letters) and his body (typified by arms).
The querelle and the debate therefore tend in opposite
directions, and nowhere is this more obvious than in the
Cortegiano (see above p.225), where it is precisely
because it opposes arms to letters instead of uniting
them that the querelle is dismissed so abruptly by the
speakers. Yet many of the texts of the querelle, as we
have seen, also advocate the alliance of arms and letters.
It is Galateo who does so most forcefully, but 1
Castiglionchio had also done it, even if less convincingly,
and so did Nifo, albeit surreptitiously, and almost every
author of the later Cinquecento portrayed arms and letters
as bosom companions and many actually advocated the
expediency of their union. But they always did so. as a
kind of afterthought, for it is the antithesis of arms
and letters which in every case was the starting-point
of the querelle. The querelle may have been used as a
medium for the educational debate or as a way of contri¬
buting to it, but it always retained its individuality
and always remained recognizably within the tradition of
the genre to which it belonged. Not every utterance
therefore about arms and letters in the Renaissance - and
there are myriads - is of the same nature, and one must
learn to discriminate. One of the more memorable episodes
in the literature of the time concerning arms and letters
is Agricane's outburst in the Orlando innamorato:
e cosi spesi la mia fanciulezza
in caccie, in giochi di arme e in cavalcare;
ne mi par che convenga a gentilezza
star tutto il giorno ne' libri a pensare;
ma la forza del corpo e la destrezza
conviense al cavaliere esercitare.
Dottrina al prete ed al dottor sta bene:
io tanto saccio quanto mi conviene ( I, xvii i , 1+3 ) •
It has been suggested that this episode has similarities
with the controversy between Bembo and Canossa over the
superiority of arms and letters in the Cortegiano, and
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by implication therefore that it belongs to the tradition
2 b
of the querelle. It does, it is true, talk of
cavaliere and dottor , it does oppose arms ("arme") to
letters ("libri", "dottrina"), and it does, by identifying
gentilezza with cavaliere - a point which is
re-emphasized in Orlando's reply ("io tiro teco a un
segno, / che 1'arme son de l'omo il primo onore") -,
appear to be arguing the kind of question with which the
querelle deals. But the case which Agricane is really
making is that it is not necessary for a gentleman to be
learned, that arms and letters in other words need not
be united, and it would be more correct therefore to see
this episode as a contribution to the educational debate
than to the querelle as such. It would be absurd of
course to want to draw too rigid a line between the two,
since they obviously had much in common (as this very
episode demonstrates) and since they are also quite likely
to have influenced each other, though how much, we will
not know until we are better informed on the actual
debate. The discussion as to whether letters befitted a
gentleman or whether he only needed to know how to fight,
must have given considerable momentum to the querelle,
but there may also have been an influence at work in the
opposite direction. It is usually held that the
educational debate about arms and letters gained its
original impetus from newly rediscovered classical ideals
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and models of education, and this is no doubt true.
But we are bound to wonder how much the way was paved for
the acceptance of the idea that arms and letters had
need of one another by generation upon generation of
Roman lawyers repeating: "imperatoriam maiestatem non
solum armis decoratam, sed etiam legibus oportet esse
armatam" and "summa rei publicae tuitio de stirpe duarum
rerum, armorum atque legum veniens vimque suam exinde
muniens felix Romanorum genus omnibus anteponi nationibus
omnibusque dominari tarn praeteritis effecit temporibus
quam deo propitio in aeternum efficiet" (see above p.27)?
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That lawyers may have played an important part in
fostering new modes of thought in the Renaissance is a
fact which is widely recognized, but the extent to which
the ideological contents of the corpus of Roman
law may actually have inspired new beliefs and intellec¬
tual trends is not a point which has received much, if
any attention, and understandably so, given the likely
dimensions of such an undertaking. ^ But it is an area
which, if investigated, promises to be rewarding.
In the Cortegiano , no sooner is the
suggestion made that a courtier should master both arms
and letters than it raises questions of national
differences, not to say antagonisms. "Oltre alia, bonta
- says Ludovico da Canossa - il vero e principal
ornamento dell'animo in ciascuno penso io che siano le
lettere, benche i Franzesi solamente conoscano la
nobilita delle arme e tutto il resto nulla eatimino; di
modo che non solamente non apprezzano le lettere, ma' le
aborriscono, e tutti i litterati tengon per vilissimi
omini; e pare lor dir gran villania a chi si sia,
quando lo chiamano clero" (I, xlii). Unlike the French
who have a visceral mistrust of letters, the Italians, it
is said, feel an instinctive affinity towards them, and
this is greatly to their credit, even though, as Canossa
reluctantly has to admit, their prominence in the field
of learning has been of little use to them on the battle¬
field. Canossa's opinion, with its mixture of scorn, envy
and a sense of inferiority, is typical of what all the
texts written in the wake of the French invasions have
to say any time there is a mention of the necessity to
combine arms and letters. We have seen for example with
what passion Galateo vituperates the "Goths and Franks"
(and those in Italy who might feel tempted to admire
and imitate them) for their contempt of learning (see
above p. 1 2 8 ), and how the same contempt causes
indignation even to Nifo in his seeming aloofness. In
works of the later Cinquecento too the letter-loving
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Italians are presented as the heroes of the tale and the
letter-hating foreigners (usually the French) as its
villains. The only exceptions are Mora's Cavaliere,
where the roles are reversed (would that the Italians
despised learning, is what Mora feels), and Guazzo's
Dialoghi piacevoli, in which lavish praises are showered
on the French, and the lamented Francis I in particular,
for their patronage of letters (the Dialoghi , it must
be rembered, are dedicated to a peer of the French
Realm, Lodovico Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers) and in which the
Italians are not always presented in the most favourable
of lights: "hoggidi nelle corti de ' prencipi non si
veggono ne poeti, ne oratori, ne filosofi, ne altri
letterati, o se pur ve n'ha alcuno, gli conviene (per sua
sciagura) recarsi a ventura il poter mangiar a tinello e
riempir l'ultimo seggio della tavola" (p.178). An
observation of this nature must make us pause and wonder
how much truth there is behind the expressions of
national pride and prejudice which crop up so regularly
from work to work. Were the French and other foreigners
really such Philistines? And how much better were the
Italians? It is true that within the context of the
querelle the first criticisms to be directed at specific
nations instead of "barbarians" in general appear during
the period of foreign invasions, and this must mean that
there was more to them than mere literary convention,
especially if one considers how vehement some of them
were. But if it was natural for someone like Galateo to
feel humiliated at having to look on helplessly while his
country was being raped and plundered by foreigners, he
may not, initially at least, have been in a position to
judge the degree of their education, and the invasions
may no more than have uncovered latent cultural
prejudices within him, which he was now able to attach to
a particular object, barbarian being substituted by
French. In Lapo da Castiglionchio we also find many
attacks upon the uncouthness and ignorance of barbarians,
but since Lapo had no experience to speak of of foreign
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peoples and since he was only, too painfully aware of the
Philistinism of his fellow nationals, his prejudice can
only have teen culturally motivated. It is of course
the type of prejudice fostered by Petrarch against the
"furor de lassu, gente ritrosa" and to which anyone
imbued with ideals of Italian re-birth, such as Lapo was,
was bound to respond and which he was bound to cultivate.
Galateo was also possessed with such ideals, and
considering how his admiration for ancient Greece made it
hard enough for him to tolerate Romans, it is no wonder
that he should have latched on to the opportunity
afforded him by the foreign invasions of fulminating
against barbarians of flesh and blood. His xenophobia
would seem therefore to have been inspired more by his
education than by his own experience of life. He him¬
self realized at times (even before the self-inflicted
auto-da-fe of his old age, when he condemned the culture
with which he had been imbued as totally mendacious and
illusory), that there were in fact as many barbarians
inside Italy as there were without. If even Galateo1s
I
judgement of his compatriots and enemies therefore was a
cliche , how much more so is that of later authors likely
to have been, when the whole genre had in any case become
a series of common-places. The French view of Italy and
the Italians during the Renaissance, and its evolution
as a result of various stimuli, both literary (e.g. the
translation and diffusion o'f the Cortegiano ) and non-
literary (e.g. the presence of numerous Italians in and
around the royal court), has been the object of careful
27
study by modern scholars. Similar attention ought
now be devoted to a study of the Italian view of France
and the French; and it would be intriguing to know to
what extent this view was fashioned not only by a
cultural parti pris and by the presence of Frenchmen on
Italian soil, but also in reaction to the opinions which
were circulating in France, where it was the French who
were obviously the heroes and the Italians the villains.
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Other literary topics which were common at
the time in Italy, and which are also part of the fabric
of the querelle, are the debates on nobility and on the
2 8
active and contemplative lives. They are however
but components of the genre, and must not be seen as
identical with it. It is only Galateo and Prassicio who
view the conflict between arms and letters as one between
action and contemplation, though even Galateo does not
do so consistently. When he attempts to bring about a
reconciliation between arms and letters, which is his
main purpose, he does not consider them so much as an
expression of two types of life, but as the two
elements which make up the full potential of man's
personality, his "moral" and his "intellectual"
capabilities. There is a certain extent to which a
contrast between action and contemplation is also the
main objective of Lapo da Castiglionchio's Comparatio,
but the antithesis between the two, as we have seen, is
more apparent than real. Contemplation to Lapo is not
upward-looking and is not an end unto itself, but it is
a kind of power store from which energies are released to
inspire and stimulate the life of action; and letters
thus tend to signify both action and contemplation, i.e.
life, whereas arms become the agents of evil and
destruction. Nifo for his part discounts contemplation
altogether, considering all life to be action, and in the
Comentariolus the arms-letters polarity represents the
opposition between action and inaction. In the later
Cinquecento action and contemplation are sometimes
identified with arms and letters, but their comparison is
just one of many arguments (often coupled with the mind-
body argument) and is of no more significance than any
other argument. During the early stages of the querelle,
when the subject had been not arms and letters but knights
and doctors, there had been no mention at all of action
and contemplation, for the problem was entirely of this
world. The question of nobility on the other hand is an
inextricable feature of this early stage of the querelle,
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where it is precisely in virtue of one's nobility that
one is entitled to precedence: a doctorate is a dignitas,
and a doctor is therefore noble and entitled to
precedence. Hobi1is however simply means better, and
knighthood and doctorhood are considered strictly as
individual, not as collective entitlements. The
discussion therefore is not of birth against merit. It
is about greater or lesser personal merit. It could also,
if one accepts that the knights who are the doctors' butt
in the querelle are mostly dubbed nouveaux riches, be said
to be a contribution to the Aristotelian debate on
whether or not riches are a legitimate factor of nobility.
However, riches are never directly referred to, and
certainly no distinction is ever made between newly
acquired riches and riches of older stock. There is
little therefore by which to connect the querelle with
the type of discussion about nobility to which Dante
contributed in the Convivio and with which Dante's friend
Cino da Pistoia may well have attempted to link it, when
he remarked, exceptionally, that "qui meruit sua virtute
nobilitatem habere, magis dicitur nobilis, quam ille, qui
descendit ex nobili genere" (see above p.29). The
only one of all our authors to argue in terms of in¬
herited versus personal nobility is Galateo, who
identifies arms with the former and letters with the
latter and for whom the querelle becomes a means of up¬
holding the rights of legitimate claimants to titles of
nobility (men of learning and virtue) against the
usurpations of fraudulent pretenders (men of arms and
ignorance). The only author explicit/ly to equate
nobility with riches and lineage is Mora, for whom they
are the very ingredients of nobility, and for whom not
even arms, let alone letters, can confer nobility.
Otherwise nobility is always used as a rough equivalent
of excellence and the querelle of Arms and Letters is
never therefore strictly speaking about nobility,
certainly not during its later phase, when it is
generally accepted that both arms and letters are "noble"
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(i.e. excellent) and the only problem is to find out
which is "more noble".
It has been suggested that the querelle of
Arms and Letters might also be connected with a debate
about a different kind of nobility. In I9U7 Eugenio
Garin edited Ilicino's querelle (in a savagely abridged
version) together with Galateo's De dignitate disciplinarum
(in a doctored version), both of which he published, with
several texts on the Law versus Medicine querelle, under
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the title Disputa delle artl. In his introduction,
and to justify the title, Garin recalled an article by
Oskar Kristeller, Humanism and Scholasticism in the
Italian Renaissance, in which it is said that the
inspiration behind the "battle of the arts" was the
rivalry between various faculties and sciences at
universities, which usually found its expression in the
inaugural lecture delivered each year by every professor
in praise of his own subject. In comparing their field
of knowledge with that of their colleagues and rivals,
and above all in seeking to prove its superiority, these
professors, according to Kristeller and Garin, used
criteria which were derived, via Averroes , from Aristotle,
and according to which the nobility of a science was
deducible either from its methodology or from the
exaltedness of its subject: "il tema e 1'impostazione
della questione circa la nobilta delle scienze, almeno
come si profilo nel 'U00 ,. seguiva puntualmente il; primo
commento d'Averroe al De anima, ove, appunto, si
profilava una gerarchia delle discipline o secondo il
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metodo ... o secondo la dignita dell'oggetto . " To show
how common this method of arguing was, Kristeller
pointed to a remark by Pomponazzi in his Questions on the
first book of Aristotle's De anima ("Uobilitas scientiae
a quo sumatur. Quaestio est a quo sumatur magis
nobilitas scientiae, an a nobilitate subiecti an a
certitudine demonstrationis vel aequaliter ab ambobus "),
and to Galileo's statement that the nobility of a science
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depends on the certainty of its method rather than the
31
dignity of its subject matter. Kristeller also drew
attention to the fact that comparisons of one "art" to
another were equally the rule outside academic circles:
Leonardo in his Paragone for instance advances claims for
32the superiority of painting over other arts. To this
one could add the arguments put forward by loan Cristoforo
Romano in the Cortegiano for the superiority of sculpture
over painting, to which Ludovico da Canossa replies: "parmi
la pittura plfi nobile" (l,lii), because it imitates
Nature more reliably, i.e. because its method is more
certain. There is no doubt that this form of reasoning
permeates the entire querelle of Arms and Letters, and
for that matter the querelle of Knights and Doctors too.
The superiority of arms and knights or of letters and
doctors is often deduced from their object or from how
they seek to achieve it. There are also a great many
similarities between the actual arguments of the Arms
and Letters querelle and those of the querelle of Law
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and Medicine. It would be wrong however to want to
assign the querelle of Arms and Letters too rigidly to
the "battle of arts" tradition, for although many of
its arguments are of academic inspiration and although
it often presents warfare as a learned art, it cannot in
any way be said to be an expression of the competition
between rival university faculties. Even letters are
used too vaguely or generally to correspond to any
academic discipline in particular. When looked at from
the point of view of this tradition in fact, the querelle
seems quite incongruous, contrasting as it does two
subjects which are not only non-academic in the strict
sense of the word, but which are so different in nature
the one from the other. The idea of opposing arms to
letters can only therefore have come from somewhere else.
At the same time it is important to take account of the
many analogies between the querelle and the disputa delle
arti, for they demonstrate that the querelle was no
isolated phenomenon, but that it was very much in line
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with current intellectual trends.
The most notable affinity between the
querelle and the "battle of the arts" is that they were
both ultimately of Aristotelian derivation. We have seen
again and again how pervasive the influence of Aristotle
was on the querelle, especially during its Arms and
Letters phase. Almost every author of this phase
acknowledges a debt and declares his allegiance to the
Stagirite. Not one of them however, with the exception
of Galateo , names Aristotle as the express ideator of
the genre. Galateo for his part claims that it was a
discussion on Aristotle's Ethics and the question "de
dignitate virtutum" which lead to his writing "de
dignitate disciplinarum" (see above p. 135). Insofar
as the querelle of Arms and Letters can be reduced to a
comparison of moral and intellectual virtues (and that is
indeed the matrix of most of the texts) , then the Ethic s,
with its investigation of the value of these virtues and
of the active and contemplative lives, can undoubtedly
be considered as the single most influential classical
work on the genre. It is by no means however the only
work of Aristotle's which our authors quote. References
to his other works are legion, and it would be a thesis
in itself to record and chart Aristotle's overall
influence. It would also require the knowledge of an
expert to sort out what is genuinely Aristotelian from
what is not, what was gained at first hand and what at
second, third or more. Even an expert might not be
sufficient to the task, since Renaissance Aristotelianism
is mostly still an enigma (see above chap. IC, n.57).
What matters however at this stage is not to discern
genuine from less genuine. It is simply to state and
take note of Aristotle's overwhelming presence in texts,
many of which are not esoteric philosophical treatises
but works of popular appeal. Aristotle and
Aristotelianism have tended in the past to be regarded as
untypical of the Renaissance and more characteristic of
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the Middle Ages. This view is now being corrected and
the ubiquitousness of Aristotle in the querelle brings
us ever closer to that "stage where Renaissance
3 ^Aristotelianism must be seen in a new light."
No other ancient authority enjoyed quite the
same prestige as did Aristotle amongst the authors of the
querelle. Cicero was his closest rival, but his influence
seems to have been more cosmetic than substantial.
Whereas Aristotle provided food for thought, Cicero
supplied nice quotations, the most popular of which was
"cedant arma togae, concedat laurea linguae". Almost
as popular was the equally pithy "parvi enim sunt foris
arma, nisi est consilium domi", and the much longer:
"quis enim est tarn cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque
rerum natura ut, si ei tractanti contemplantique res
cognitione dignissimas, subito sit allatum periculum
discrimenque patriae cui subvenire opitularique possit,
non ilia omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi
dinumerare se stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem
arbitretur?" All three of these quotations come from the
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first book of the De Officus. It was known that they
did, and very often it was said so explicit/ly, but little
attention was paid to the actual purport of Cicero's work,
which investigates the relationship between the
individual and society, between private and public needs,
to conclude that man, who is a social animal, must and
will naturally sacrifice his selfish aspirations to the
demands of the community. This may be an argument one
encounters in the querelle, but it never becomes a frame
of reference for the genre as a whole in' the same way as
Aristotle's hierarchy of virtues does. Cicero, one feels
from reading the querelle, was to that period what Marx
is to ours: the authority quoted by all and misquoted by
even more, but read by only a few and understood by
fewer still. He was taken so much for granted that no
one bothered to check him up. Had they done so, they
might have struck upon the one work of his which was
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truly pertinent to their subject: his oration Pro Murena
in which, to defend his client, Cicero contends that it
is to her military power and virtus that Rome owes her
greatness, and that everyone must therefore give way to
those who take up arms to defend her. This point at least
was not lost on Flavio Biondo and Belisario Acquaviva,
the only two authors to recall the Pro Murena, but even
they did not cite what is arguably its most quotable
quote and seems even more relevant to the querelle than
the "cedant arma togae": "cedat ... forum castris , otium
militiae, stilus gladio, umbra soli: sit denique in
civitate ea prima res, propter quam ipsa est civitas
omnium princeps" (xiv). It is all the more surprising
that the Pro Murena was not better known, if one
considers that Quintilian's much read and imitated
Institutio oratoria puts it forward as a useful model for
a rhetorical exercise on the theme "iuris periti an
3 ^
militaris viri laus maior". This only goes to prove
that Cicero served more to spice the debate than to
fashion it. He may have been as omnipresent as Aristotle
but his name was never pronounced with as much reverence
as was the name of the "veramente maestro di coloro che
sanno" (see above p.258). Besides Aristotle and Cicero,
countless other writers from classical antiquity found
their way into the texts of the querelle, though none
quite so frequently. None of them moreover are the
authors of works directly related to the genre, and there
is no point therefore in giving their names, especially
as it was in any case the rule rather then the exception
during the Renaissance to list as many authorities as
possible.
If one is to believe the word of 2.R. Curtius,
the origins of the genre could actually be traced beyond
classical antiquity and beyond even the bounds of history.
In his European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages
Curtius claims that the arms-letters binomial is the
expression of a polarity inherent in the notion of
314
sovereignty common to "the Indo-Iranians , the Celts,
the Germanic and Italic peoples, ... the polarity of
the magical, fruitful king and the wise, lawmaking
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king". It is a polarity in terms of which, still
according to Curtius, Livy for instance explains the
history of Rome, and which is also reflected in the
poetry of Virgil. After Virgil it became codified as
sapientia and 'fortitudo , and declined "to the domain
of topics" (p.17^). Curtius then follows the topos
through the Middle Ages, when it was incorporated into
"laments for the dead and eulogies of rulers as well as
short narrative poems and the epic" (p.175) 5 until the
Renaissance, which it "entered in didactic writing on
courtly ideals" (p.178). As a first example of such
writing Curtius gives Castiglione's Cortegiano. This
would mean a rather delayed entry into the Renaissance,
and altogether Curtius's contention is so sweeping as to
be misleading and unhelpful. It could nevertheless
account for the fact that arms and letters offered them¬
selves so spontaneously at the time, and not to authors
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of the querelle alone, as joint terms of comparison,
and it is true that in the querelle arms are often
identified with fo rt e z z a (albeit in connection with the
other three moral virtues) and that letters are not
infrequently equated with wisdom. The querelle was not
however, certainly not at its inception, the lifeless
topos to which Curtius1s theory would reduce it, but it
could, as we have seen, serve as the liveliest possible
comment on real life. To be sure, it was a culturally
determined mode of evaluating life, and as such may well
have stretched as far back as Curtius would have it. The
proposition is interesting, but unprovable.
If the sapientia-fortitudo topos was indeed
as well engrafted upon the consciousness of Indo-
European races as Curtius has suggested, it may also lie
at the root of another 1 it e r ary deb. at e whi ch enjoyed a
fair degree of popularity during the Middle Ages and
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which has been linked causally with the querelle of
Arms and Letters: the debate of Clerks and Knights. In
the chapter entitled "Las armas y las letras" of his
Pensiamento de Cervantes, A. Castro, referring to the
famous version of the querelle of Arms and Letters in
Don Quixot e, wrote: "a veces nos parece percibir en aquel
debate, a traves del simetrico paralelismo de sus razones,
un eco lejano de las polemicas entre el clerigo y el
O Q
caballero" (pp.218-19). A cursory glance at any of
the texts of the debate of Clerks and Knights however
will show how distant the echo indeed is. Its
arguments are of a totally different order. It compares
knights with clerks as lovers, dwelling upon their
character, their physical prowess and their manners. It
is impossible therefore that it should have exercised an
influence on the contents of either the querelle of
Knights and Doctors or the querelle of Arms and Letters,
even though it was well established at the time the
querelle of Knights and Doctors was beginning to get off
the ground. It was also a more specifically French
phenomenon (and to a certain extent Spanish as well), and
it might be more correct for that reason to see it as
France's counterpart to the querelle, expressing a
similar type of conflict but against a different sort
of background. There were knights in both countries
(some more, some less genuine), but whereas in Italy,
where univer/sities were of a more secular character,
they were opposed by doctors and letterati , in France,
where the centres of learning were under the control of
the clergy, they were opposed by "clerics". Clerico ,
. Ul . .
clero , cherci are definitely not words which were m
common usage in Italy. They are never once mentioned in
the context of the querelle, and when Ludovico da
Canossa exceptionally uses clero in the Cortegiano , he
stresses that it is a Gallicism: "i Franzesi solamente
conoscano la nobilita delle arme e tutto il resto nulla
estimino; ... e pare lor dir gran villania a chi si sia,
quando lo chiamano clero" (l,xlii). Knights and Clerks
and Knights and Doctors were therefore independent genres.
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.The only hint we have of them ever rubbing shoulders is
in the plot of Flamminio Scala's II pellegrino fido
amante (see above p. 2 22 ), in which Flaminia would
like to marry a letterato whilst her father would
like to give her to a milite . The terminology is that
of the Knight-Doctor/Arms-Letters querelle, but the idea
is similar to the one behind the debate of Knights and
Clerks: who would be a better husband (lover), a man of
learning or a man of arms? Unfortunately Scala only
provides us with the sketchiest of outlines for this
comedy, and it is a matter of conjecture as to how the
actors actually filled it out. The suggestion has been
made (see above p.223) that, given the close links
between Scala and Isabella Andreini , they could have
used arguments from the querelle of Arms and Letters
(which also comprised arguments from the querelle of
Knights and Doctors). Whether they might also have used
arguments from the Knight and Clerk debate and how much
that debate was still, if it ever had been, alive in
Italy, and whether it did influence the querelle in a way
which it is not possible to ascertain at this stage, are
yet further questions which must remain unanswered for
the time being.
If we know that the debate of Clerks and
Knights flourished during the second half of the twelfth
century and the first half of the thirteenth, and if we
can conjecture therefore the kind of society in which it
did flourish, we must recognize that the texts themselves
give us no information whatsoever about their background.
They are mostly anonymous, and all they portray are the
personal attributes of individual knights and clerks and
the feelings they arouse in the hearts and minds of ladies.
In spite of this, the debate has been interpreted as
having an eminently sociological and political
significance at an important moment in the history of
western Europe. The great medieviste Le Goff for instance
said of it in 1962:
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an fond du fameux debat entre le Clerc et le CI .valier
qui a inspire tant de poemes, il y a la rivalite de deux
groupes sociaux en face de la femme. Les Goliards ne
croient pas pouvoir mieux dire leur superiority en face
des feodaux qu'en vantant la faveur dont ils jouissent
aupres des femines . Elles nous preferent, le clerc fait
mieux 1'amour que le chevalier. Dans cette affirmation,
le sociologue doit voir l'expression privilegiee d'une
lutte de groupes sociaux. b2
Some years earlier Vittorio Russo had written:
si andava formando una vera e propria classe intellettuale
con la coscienza di una cultura nuova, di sensi piu
liberali e laici, che si immetteva nella societa
medievale, apportando in essa l'ideale nuovo di una
supremazia fondata sulla forza della cultura e della
ragione, piu che sulla forza delle armi e della fede.
(...) I debats individuano il momento di affermazione
della nuova 'chiericheria' contrapponendo all'ideale di
prodezza della tradizione cavalleresca e feudale, l'ideale
di supremazia culturale. ^3
The confrontation between arms and letters during the
Renaissance (what we have called the querelle) took
place against a much more visible background than the
deb at s had done, especially in the case of its two most
famous instances, in the Cortegiano and in Don Quixote,
and it is hardly surprising therefore that it too should
have been the object of such momentous interpretations.
Commenting on the querelle chapters of the Cortegiano,
Giuseppe Toffanin wrote in 1961:
l'umanesimo italiano prepose, com'e noto , le lettere alle
armi: fu la sua gloria e la sua debolezza in un mondo che
la pensava molto diversamente. Ma qual'era il sentimento
che muoveva gli italiani a questa rivendicazione ed
esaltazione delle lettere? Vanita? Estetismo? IIo: era
quella fede religiosa nella virtu rinnovatrice e
coneiliatrice della sapienza adoperata dai laici con animo
sacerdotale, come se il regno di essa stesse ora per
cominciare: quella fede che appare ormai concreta nel
Petrarca. Hon la forza, pensavano gli umanisti, muove il
mondo; non con le armi conquisto Cesare il mondo, ma con
il suo spirito, scriveva il Petrarca in versi e in prosa.
E non intendeva fare della retorica. (...) Gli umanisti
credono che nel retaggio della letteratura classica si
celi una minore ma anch'essa necessaria Rivelazione. I
popoli che, come i Francesi, preponevano le armi alia
.gloria, erano popoli ai quali il messaggio umanistico
non era giunto. L'idea di una pace universale che
1'universalizzarsi dell'umanesimo avrebbe portato qui
s'adombra. UU
If there is any truth in what Toffanin says, it would tend
to conflict with the opinion of Russo and Le Goff and
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thereby to stir up once again the whole polemic of the
Renaissance versus the Middle Ages. Not everyone though
has taken the same view as Toffanin. Cian, as we know,
dismissed those very chapters of the Cortegiano for
trotting out "una delle tante questioni oziose ...che, a
partire dall'antichita ... e durante il Rinascimento,
furono trattate e agitate con un interesse e un ardore
polemico, che noi oggi difficilmente riusciamo a
1+ 5
spiegarci. Cian was outbidden by G. Todaro , in
II tipo ideale del cortegiano nel Cinquecento, written in
1906. Todaro numbers the querelle amongst "questioni
inutili e sciocche" and strongly berates Castiglione for
bothering with such trifles: "cosi il Castiglione si
lambicca il cervello, anch'egli, a trattare quella
questione cosi oziosa e di nessuno interesse, sulla
U 6
preferenza da darsi alle armi o alle lettere." It was
in reply to this contention that Amerigo Castro wrote in
1925 "no debe considerarse la polemica como ociosa en si
misma (pese a la frivolidad o inconsistencia de los
argumentos que a veces se utilizaron), ni como un pleito
„ L 7
que hayamos de fallar hoy en uno u otro sentido.
And Castro, whilst not going to the same lengths as
Toffanin was to do, expressed the view that the question
was to be seen as a "molde para las preocupaciones
sociologicas del Renacimiento" (p.218). These critics
had not identified the querelle as such, but they had
intuited the fact of its existence, especially Cian and
1+8 . . .
Castro. However, by focusing their attention on its
least typical manifestations, they tended to misunder¬
stand it. As we ours elves have noted (see above p . 2 0 7 ff )
the querelle in the Cortegiano appears somewhat out of
place and is discussed rather lightheartedly by the
speakers, which explains why it could be seen as "otiose".
In Don Quixote on the other hand, even though it is
presented with detached irony, it acquires more
significance through the mere fact of its inclusion in a
work which is a satire of the customs and beliefs of a
time. That is why Castro reacted against Cian's
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interpretation. As for Toffanin, he was probably the
victim of a particular vision of reality developed during
the Renaissance and kept alive even today amongst
scholars in Italy, which pictures the Renaissance as an
age of culture and light, and the Middle Ages as a
period of barbarity and violence. To anyone imbued with
such notions the Arms-Letters dichotomy presents itself
as a convenient metaphor to express the antithesis
between the two periods. But in accepting too readily
that the two terms have a value-loaded significance, one
runs the risk of using them, rather than as the-object
on which to direct one's looking-glass, as the looking-
glass itself. This, it would seem, has been the mistake
of several critics to date, and in particular of the
author of a fairly recent thesis on the very subject of
. . k 9Arms and Letters during the Renaissance (in France).
In this study we have tried to avoid that
pitfall and to find out the ways in which the terms were
actually used during the Renaissance. One way was to
bring arms and letters together (this is the educational
debate) and another was to pit them against one another:
this is what we have called the querelle, and it is this
on which we have concentrated our attention. It all
began with knights and doctors competing for precedence
way back in the twelfth century (if not before), and it
was turned into a popular literary theme towards the end
of the fifteenth century by Petrarch's commentator •
Ilicino, who substituted a legal terminology with a
philosophical terminology. The genre reached the apex
of its popularity in the second half of the sixteenth
century. At times it displayed such liveliness that
it was obviously acting as a vehicle for social and
political considerations; at others it became so
repetitive and conventional as to appear no more than a
lifeless topos. All the while however, knights and doc¬
tors, letterati and soldati were continuing in the back¬
ground, or so it would seem at least, to argue about
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precedence. There are still many questions about the genre
which remain unanswered - in particular concerning the de¬
gree to which it did reflect a social reality, and if it
did, concerning the precise identity of the contestants -
but at least, the very fact that we are able to articula¬
te these questions, means that we have made some progress
towards dispelling ignorance.
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